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Thesis Summary 
This thesis analyses the Conservative Party's electoral demise in Scotland from 1979 to 
1997. This subject has already been extensively explored elsewhere. However, whilst 
acknowledging the validity and importance of what might be described as the canon of 
traditional reasons given for the Party's problems north of the border, this thesis identifies and 
explains the importance of a previously undervalued dynamic in the Scottish party political 
process. 
The central argument of this thesis is that the role of local party politics in Scotland has a 
significant impact on General Elections. The hypothesis under consideration is whether the 
Conservative Party found it particularly difficult to recover in General Elections subsequent to 
notable losses in levels of Local Government representation north of the border. Thus, the more 
qualitative aspects ofthis thesis establish why this might have been the case. This extra aspect of 
the party political system in Scotland is developed through a series of studies that analyse 
primary and secondary sources and the results of an elite and Local Councillor interview 
programme. These studies assess what Conservative Governments in London were hoping to 
achieve with their policies, how Local Government in Scotland reacted and what effect these 
dynamics had on the electorate north of the border. 
After a case study on Stirling that examines how the matters in hand impacted upon a 
specific community, the Conclusion is then informed by a study of General and Local 
Government Election results from across the whole of the UK from 1979-1991. This thesis is not 
a comparative study of Local Government in Scotland and England. However, as the results in 
Chapter 1 demonstrate, the Conservatives did seem to find it much more difficult to recover from 
Local Government representation losses in subsequent General Elections north of the border. 
This suggests that the variable under consideration is a significant addition to the canon of 
reasons for their electoral demise in Scotland. 
viii 
Introduction 
Introduction 
This project has its origins in an analysis of the contemporary relevance of core-periphery 
relations. One of the most obvious examples concerned with the governance of the United 
Kingdom has been the tension between the Conservative Party, when in power in Westminster, 
and the electorate Scotland. As Chart 1.1 shows, these tensions were manifested in poor General 
Election results for the Party north of the border during the era in question. 
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1.1 - Sources: Butler & Kavanagh: "The British General Election of.. ,,1. 
In recent years, the demise of the Conservative Party in Scotland has been thoroughly 
investigated2• The way in which the Scottish electorate has unfavourably received policies such 
I Butler & Kavanagh: "The British General Election of... ", Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1979, p356; 
1983, p301; 1987, p284; 1992, p286 & 1997, p256. 
1 
as the Poll Tax has also been extensively explored3. To find an original angle, therefore, the 
familiar set of reasons for the Conservatives' demise north of the border has had to be 
assimilated to see whether there were any misunderstood or undervalued aspects of the Anglo-
Scottish relationship. An original testable hypothesis began to emerge, most notably from the 
findings of my elite interview programme. This can be stated briefly in the following manner. 
The electoral benefits of Westminster seat incumbency have been studied and proved4. 
Thus, we can appreciate the importance of personality and accessibility amongst electorates with 
regard to their MP. As we shall see, what the Conservative elite in London failed to appreciate 
was that, in Scotland, voters also seemed inclined to base their General Election choices on the 
presence of effective and approachable Local Councillors who represented the national parties. 
Chart 1.2 plots Conservative Local ('LA') and national ('MP') Government 
representation at the time of the General Elections in the Thatcher-Major era. As there are only 
six Elections in the time frame, the sample size is too small for correlation calculations to be 
statistically significant. Nevertheless, it is possible to ascertain from this chart that there might 
2 Examples include: Cooper, James: "The Scottish Problem: English Conservatives and the 
Union with Scotland in the Thatcher and Major Eras 1975-1992", PhD Thesis, University of 
Sheffield, July 1998~ Lynch, Philip: "The Politics of Nationhood. Sovereignty, Britishness and 
Conservative Politics", Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1999 and Seawright, David: "An Important 
Matter of Principle. The Decline of the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party", Aldershot, 
Ashgate, 1999. 
3 Examples include: Evans, Eric J.: "Thatcher & Thatcherism", London, Routledge, 1997, p25~ 
Mitchell, James: "Conservatives and the Union - A Study of Conservative Party Attitudes to 
Scotland", Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1990, p99~ Riddell, Peter: "The Thatcher Era 
And Its Legacy", Oxford, Blackwell, 1991, p163 & Wilson, Edgar: "A Very British Miracle. 
The Failure of Thatcherism", London, Pluto Press, 1992, p181. 
2 
be an important connection between Local Government and national representation in Scotland. 
The data in this chart does not prove such a connection, but strongly suggests that it is worth 
investigating further. 
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It seems that, being unaware of this possible link, the Conservative elite did not do 
enough to arrest the tide of Party Local Government election losses in Scotland that were being 
caused by central Government policies. Therefore, this thesis will be investigating the 
connection and inter-relationship between success in Local Government and General Elections in 
Scotland from ] 979-1997, with the intention of adding these dynamics to the existing list of 
4 For example, Norris, Pippa: "Electoral Change Since 1945", Oxford, Blackwell, 1997, pp185-
186. 
3 
significant causes of the Conservatives' electoral decline north of the border. Before putting 
forward the full thesis agenda, however, the first task of this chapter is to outline some concepts 
essential to the work. 
Conceptual Underpinning 
A piece of work such as this can benefit from previous attempts at explaining similar 
phenomena. Any such concepts of the state and party political process will be of an essentially 
contested nature6. Nonetheless, having a conceptual exemplar will facilitate analytical 
consistency throughout the work as any new evidence can be referred back to a constant model. 
Therefore, and in spite of the lack of reference to geographical differences in his work, this thesis 
has benefited from the ideas of Andrew Gamble in "The Conservative Nation" (1974). For the 
sake of originality and because the objective issues in question are quite different, I do not wish 
to follow or test Gamble's hypothesis too closely. However, for the purposes of my thesis, it is 
very important to have a clear understanding of two key terms from: "The Conservative Nation." 
These are the 'Politics of Power' and the 'Politics of Support.' I want to explore them briefly 
here to lend credibility to my proposition that Conservative central Governments in the era in 
question might have fared better in elections in Scotland if they had been more aware of public 
and Local Government reception of their policies and the electoral effects thereof. 
5 1979, p356; 1983, p301; 1987, p284; 1992, p286 & 1997, p256. 
6 Further consideration of this term is given in the methodology chapter (9) at the end of this 
thesis. It should be noted at this point that all concepts should be tested both empirically and 
qualitatively against the 'facts' - however specified. Through the course of this thesis, it thus 
appears that Gamble's concepts emerge as very 'useful' on Gallie's criteria. 
4 
'The Politics of Power' 
The 'Politics of Power' is concerned with the way in which the central Government 
presides over the state, the Government being the authority that is the apex or overlap between 
the permanent institutions and culture that make up the state and the continually shifting party 
political contest. It is important to note that the state, according to Gamble, consists of more than 
just the machinery of the state system such as the civil service, judiciary, police, military and -
importantly for this thesis - Local Governmene. The social, economic and political 
arrangements of society are also included. As important parts of the state, these arrangements 
should constrain governments. 
As we shall see in this thesis, the social and economic and political climate in Scotland 
was somewhat different to England during the 1980s and 1990s. Therefore, according to 
Gamble's model, the Conservatives should have acknowledged these different constraints on 
their power north of the border. Success in the 'Politics of Support' - to be examined below - is 
dependent on such flexibility and adherence to the constraints of the nature of the state. That the 
Conservatives chose a strictly unitary code suggests that such pragmatism was not always 
employed and will have to be considered in this thesis as a primary potential cause of their 
downfall in Scotland. 
In order to highlight the difference between Gamble's 'Politics of Power' and what was 
perceived to be the 1979-1997 Conservatives' preferred form of 'statecraft', the term 'Politics of 
7 Gamble, Andrew: "The Conservative Nation", London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974, p3. 
5 
Metropolitan Power' will be used from hereon8. This will denote that the Government was 
trying to run the state by only conforming to the constraints and demands put upon it by the 
prevailing circumstances of the affluent South East of England. Furthermore, this term 
highlights the differences and distance between the administration in London and the voters and 
local authorities on the geographical periphery. 
'The Politics of Support' 
The 'Politics of SUpport,9 is the arena in which political parties compete for votes. A 
General Election victory gives authority to the Government to carry out its agenda in the sphere 
of the 'POMP.' To secure such wins, a firm understanding and successful execution of the 
'POS' is essential. To have any sort of chance of controlling the state, a political party must use 
the democratic system to acquire and hold such power. This central tenet of all the major 
political parties is also at the root of the 'POS.' The nation, as opposed to the state, is the main 
arena for this section of Gamble's hypothesis. The Conservative elite in London is most 
concerned with the 'POMP'; that is to say, the 'high politics' of trying to run the state. Gamble 
writes: "The Conservatives have always prided themselves a party of government"lO. However, 
the Leadership must also realise the need to reconcile this with the electorate of all persuasions 
and affiliations to be sure of winning the right to control the state. Once a political party has 
accepted the potential constraints that are placed on it as an incumbent or prospective 
Government by the realities of the 'POMP', it has to calculate how best to win support from the 
8 Hereafter abbreviated to the acronym 'POMP.' 
9 Hereafter abbreviated to the acronym 'POS.' 
10 Gamble, 1974, pS. 
6 
electorate at large through its own MPs, representatives in Local Government and grass roots 
members. That is to say, how to have success in the 'POS.' 
The support of the general electorate in the form of votes is obviously essential for the 
acquisition and maintenance of office. The idea as far as the Conservatives are concerned is to 
convince the voters that the Party is best equipped to run the British state. Such an acceptance 
by the electorate would herald the advent of the 'Conservative Nation' II. Gamble equates the 
'POS' with a market place, with the metropolitan Government playing the active role of 
producers through the 'POMP'; with the voters as the consumers, who are usually passive, 
except at election time. There are certain rules that the Government must follow insofar as they 
have to supply policies that will satisfy enough of the voters to ensure re-election. I wish to 
impress that Governments, in the language of Gamble's model, must also react, instead of just 
dictating, to the needs and desires of their own Party members, Local Government 
representatives and voters in order to preserve the possibility of a General Election victory. This 
relationship between the core and periphery of the Party must be maintained not only through 
amicable and acceptable intra-party directives. In addition, and perhaps more importantly, the 
Government must supply 'POMP' that the membership and representatives in Local Authorities 
agree with and find easy to work with and defend in their own areas. 
This thesis investigates the connection between Local Government and General Election 
success. However, as the complex notion of the 'POS' suggests, this relationship should be 
viewed as more than just a simple 'coat-tail effect.' As we shall see, Local Councillors, 
7 
I 
especially in Scotland, could not expect merely to stay in office because they represented the 
same party as the local MP or Government in Westminster. Quite often, the very opposite was 
the case for Conservative Councillors north of the border. Importantly for this work, it will 
become apparent that the Conservative metropolitan elite had to supply their Local Councillors 
with easily defensible policies during the era in question. If they did not, Local Councillors were 
likely to be voted out due to their association with an unpopular metropolitan administration. 
Thereby, as this work seeks to prove, the chances of victory for a Conservative General Election 
candidate in Scotland would be severely jeopardised as these important figures in their 
communities would no longer be in a position to organise and direct General Election support for 
the Party in their area. The development and importance of this role for Scottish Local 
Councillors is investigated further in Chapter 3, especially. 
In essence, my original hypothesis couched in the terms of "The Conservative Nation" 
was that, from 1979-1997, the Conservatives interpreted the 'Politics of Power' as relating more 
or less exclusively to the governance of England. Ultimately, not only did this angle leave very 
little scope for original work as the subject has been covered so completely; it also proved to be 
very difficult to prove. Unsurprisingly, none of my Conservative elite interviewees were 
prepared to countenance such an accusation. Without first hand evidence, any postulations that I 
could have formulated would have been over-reliant on estimation and assertion. However, my 
initial investigations into the traditional aspects of the Anglo-Scottish scenario yielded a slightly 
more sophisticated hypothesis. I still wish to demonstrate that, because the 'POMP' was pursued 
without regard to the constraints imposed by the particular social and economic circumstances in 
11 Ibid, p15. 
8 
Scotland, the 'POS' reacted back on the Government's ability to run the state, as they were out 
of office. However, their failure to manage the 'POS' competently went beyond merely 
alienating Scottish voters with unpopular policies. 
What has not been examined to date is what might be termed to be one of the more subtle 
'side effects' of the Conservatives' 'POMP.' Therefore, this thesis will assess whether the 
dynamics of Local Government in Scotland had a significantly discernible effect on the 
Conservatives' General Election demise north of the border. Specifically, we shall be 
contemplating the proposition that the loss of Conservative Local Government representatives 
(mainly due to unpopular metropolitan Government policies) significantly damaged the Party's 
'POS' and consequent General Election chances in Scotland, and why this might have been the 
case? 
The basic relationship between the 'POMP' and 'POS' can be expressed in quite 
straightforward terms. In essence, unpopular policies such as the withdrawal of industrial 
subsidies or the Poll Tax cost incumbent Governments votes. In 1980s and 1990s Scotland, such 
policies may have been insensitive to the specific needs of certain parts of the electorate, such as 
those in precarious employment situations. Support may also have been lost by policies that hurt 
the voters financially. Similarly, the disparity in affluence between Scotland and the South East 
of England and Scottish antipathy towards Mrs Thatcher personally did not help the Party's 
cause north of the border. However, the question remains of whether these problems, which 
perhaps could have been surmounted by an economic recovery or Mr Major's ascendancy, were 
9 
sufficient to completely destroy the Party's General Election chances in Scotland or, indeed, 
whether there are any previously unexplored reasons? 
It should be noted that Mrs Thatcher felt that more than an economic upturn would be 
required to save the Conservatives north of the border12. As will be assessed later in the thesis, 
she felt that a dramatic change in Scottish thinking~ away from 'dependency' and more towards 
enterprise, which would embrace Thatcherism as in England, was required13. We shall also 
discover that services and subsidies provided by Local Government in Scotland were key to 
preserving the voters' dependency. Therefore, if that culture were to be overturned, new 
relationships between Scottish voters and their Local Authorities and these Local Authorities and 
the Government in London would have to be engendered. If, as this thesis seeks to demonstrate, 
Scottish Local Government has a particularly pervasive effect in society, such a sea change 
would be a point of great contention in the 'POS.' The issue of Local Authority housing 
provision demonstrates this dynamic well and is frequently used as an example of the 
metropolitan-peripheral relationship under investigation. Relations between the metropolitan 
Governments and Local Authorities during the era in question are key to this thesis. Therefore, 
in order to understand the interaction between the two levels of government better, a summary of 
core-periphery relations theories must be undertaken now. 
12 Thatcher, Margaret: "The Downing Street Years", London, Harper Collins, 1993, p619. 
13 Interview with Lord Lang, 27.3.01. 
10 
Core-Periphery Relations Theories 
Rokkan and Unwin assert that the presence of 'difference', 'distance' and 'dependence' 
is necessary for a territory to be defined as truly peripheral14. All three requirements are satisfied 
by the Anglo-Scottish relationship. The differences in political culture are explored more fully 
in Chapter 3~ and we shall also see the close correlation between central Government subsidy 
and high levels of employment north of the border (Chapter 4)~ that is to say, some degree of 
dependence on the metropolis. A key task now is to assess the relevant characteristics of the 
'statecraft' employed by the Thatcher and Major administrations and how they impacted on 
Local Government in Scotland. 
At the basis of the unitary state ideology that pervaded the Thatcher era is the notion that 
a strong, unified state is characterised by a stable, powerful centrel5. This is not a new concept. 
The Jacobin tradition prescribes that the national will should always prevail over particular local 
interests and the "Federalist Papers" assert that a strong core government is necessary to protect 
individuals against pernicious local administrationsl6. Rokkan and Unwin note that the aim of a 
strong central state should be preserve the integrity of the whole territory whilst retaining 
legitimacy on the periphery. The eternal conundrum for metropolitan party leaders is how much 
accommodation of peripheral needs and desires can they allow in order to court popularity 
without compromising the established state systeml7? Such regional accommodation is usually 
14 Rokkan, Stein & Unwin, Derek: "Economy, Territory, Identity. Politics of West European 
Peripheries", London, Sage, 1983, p3. 
IS Rousseau, Mark O. & Zariski, Raphael: "Regionalism & Regional Devolution in Comparative 
Perspective", New York, Praeger, 1987, pS. 
16 Ibid, plO. 
17 Rokkan & Unwin, 1983, pp166-168. 
11 
managed through economic protection or subsidy. The way in which this method of courting 
support was not compatible with Conservative unitary strategies in the 1980s and 1990s and the 
consequent unpopularity of the resultant policies will be examined in Chapter 4. The 
Conservatives were relying on an economic recovery in Scotland to match the rest of the United 
Kingdom in order to revive their fortunes there 1 8. As we shall see, such a revival was not 
forthcoming and the Party's 'POS' north of the border was severely damaged as a consequence. 
Another key to the successful integrationl'subjugation' of peripheral territories is the 
incorporation of the contemporary local elite19. As Bulpitt notes, the Conservative Party was 
aware of this tactic from an early stage and used it to considerable effecro. However, the 
Thatcher era saw a change in direction with regard to peripheral elite collaboration. She herself 
notes in her memoirs how senior Scottish Conservatives did not always seem to be 'one OfUS'21. 
Consequently, the Scottish Conservative elite was discounted along with other groups who had 
traditionally been allowed input into Government decision makinfi2. Such groups included 
Trade Unions and deputations from industrial leaders and professional groups. Not only would 
this new attitude lead to policies that had not benefited from plural advice, and were thus more 
likely to be unpopular with significant sections of the electorate; but the newly excluded groups 
could advise many members to cast their votes and send their funds elsewhere. 
18 Thatcher, 1993, p619. 
19 Bulpitt in: Madgwick, P. & Rose, R. (eds.): "The Territorial Dimension in United Kingdom 
Politics", Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1982, p146; Rousseau & Zariski, 1987, p79 and Rokkan & 
Unwin, 1983, pIS. 
20 Bulpitt in: Madgwick & Rose (eds.), 1982, pl46. 
21 Thatcher, 1993, pp36 & 620-623 + Interview with William Paterson, 13.9.01. 
12 
Rousseau and Zariski give the following overview of core-periphery studies, through 
which the dynamics of the London-Scotland relationship can be better understood23. Firstly, the 
classical elitist model, as represented by the works of Pareto, Mosca and Michels suggests that 
centralisation is inevitable. Notwithstanding the seemingly dialectic relationship between 
centralisation and devolution24, the elitists feel that substantial power will always gravitate 
towards the centre, where superior resources and personnel reside. C. Wright Mills notes that 
power accrues from actual offices and institutions, as well as the incumbent actors25. This 
structural aspect of core-periphery relations is especially noteworthy when considering a unitary 
state, as it is often in the gift of the metropolitan Government to decide how much power is 
vested in the institutions of the periphery at any particular moment. 
Here lies one of the main debates within orthodox assessment of Local Government. 
Pickvance and Preteceille note the dichotomy between a structure-centred approach, which 
focuses more on the size and functions of units of Local Government~ as opposed to the view 
that Local Government is a reflection of national politics, thus rendering actors and values at the 
local level more importanr6. With regard to Scotland in the 1980s and 1 990s, the latter 
proposition can be more compelling, with some qualification. If 'national politics' is seen to be 
22 Interview with William Paterson, 13.9.01. 
23 Rousseau and Zariski, 1987, pp44-84. 
24 This relationship may be explained by central Governments feeling the need to reduce their 
responsibilities and/or ensure the loyalty of the periphery by appearing sympathetic -Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Pickvance, Chris & Preteceille, Edmond (eds.): "State Restructuring & Local Power. A 
Comparative Pel'Sj)eCtive", London, Pinter, 1991, p6. This view is mirrored in the Glasgow 
Herald of 5.5.88, p12. Here, on the occasion of Local Government elections, the editorial is 
encouraging a high turnout in order to provide an accurate assessment of whether the Poll Tax 
and Thatcherism in general are viable north of the border. 
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UK-wide, then Local Government north of the border did not reflect the situation at all 
accurately, as the opposition parties were over-represented. Indeed, the Conservatives suffered 
greatly from not having significant representation on many Councils in Scotland as the 
implementation and 'selling' of 'POMP' at a local level was becoming increasingly difficult, as 
was campaigning for elections at any levef7. However, if just the politics of the nation of 
Scotland is taken into account, it does seem that Local Government was reflecting the national 
situation accurately. On the other hand, we shall see that some of the functions of Scottish Local 
Government, such as the provision of housing, are so important in the fabric of the political 
culture north of the border as to render the structure-centred approach useful in some respects. 
Classical pluralist views of core-periphery relations assert that power may be shared 
between the levels of government, but admits that power is still concentrated in a limited number 
of locations. Thus, if the party in power in the centre finds its lieutenants in office on the 
periphery, dictation of political direction should not be problematical. However, as this thesis 
seeks to emphasise, the Conservatives rarely enjoyed control of, or even substantial 
representation in, Local Authorities in Scotland. Therefore, even though Local Authorities north 
of the border were statutorily bound to implement the laws of the land, antagonism with the 
centre was likely28. Pluralists such as Tocqueville warn of the dangers of over-centralisation. 
27 Interviews with Viscount Younger, 14.2.01 & Keith Harding, 12.9.01. 
28 Interview with Keith Harding, 12.9.01. The non-collection of Poll Tax was perhaps the best 
example of Scottish local authorities seeking to disrupt the 'POMP' - Interview with Lord 
MacKay of Ardbrecknish, 25.1.01 (see further in Chapters 4,5 and 6). 
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However, they also have to admit that the alternatives of voluntarism and localism are no more 
The 'centre-periphery interaction' approach has identified a number of potential aspects 
of government and society to be studied. This school feels that the notions of identity and sense 
of (political) community impart more importance to peripheries than some others acknowledge. 
The legitimacy of an administration to govern and the reciprocal obligation to obey are 
important, as is the degree of penetration a central Government has; that is to say, how far has its 
effective control extended over a territory? Finally, within a core-periphery relationship, it is 
important to assess how well balanced the distribution of wealth and resources are between the 
various regions, as this dynamic often denotes whether a distant region will be content within a 
union. 
Basic constitutional principles would suggest that larger more diverse states lend 
themselves to a federal system30. Consequently, there is an intermediary level of government 
between the citizens on the geographical periphery and the distant centre31 • Given the thoughts 
of the Enlightenment and their embodiment in the constitutions of France and the United States, 
the question of whether Britain should be governed by a federal system came to light under the 
strains imposed by Irish and Scottish nationalism in the Nineteenth Century. The writings of 
Albert Venn Dicey provide excellent background to the debate. He was convinced that any form 
29 Rousseau & Zariski, 1987, p67. 
30 Alan Grant in: Axford, B., Browning, O. K., Huggins, R., Rosamond, B. & Turner, J: 
"Politics. An Introduction", London, Routledge, 1997, p346. 
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of home rule or federalism would send the United Kingdom onto a 'slippery slope' towards 
breaking up due to competing local interests32. Furthermore, he was prepared to highlight the 
merits of the unitary system of government that had worked so well since 1707. The Act of 
Union created Great Britain. The unity engendered by this act had been strong enough to 
withstand pressure from Louis XIV. Similarly, if the Act had not been popular and effective, 
surely it would have been challenged by the sweeping wave of reform in the 1830s? Dicey's 
support for the authority of the legal sovereign Parliament in Westminster would have been most 
compelling for a metropolitan English audience. Victorian Englishmen were very keen believers 
in an almost divine destiny for their nation and Empire. More scientific theories from Darwin 
and legal positivists made many believe that England could only survive in the expanding global 
'jungle' if it was governed by a strong state. This strength would be due in no small part to 
powerful direct government provided by a single source of legislative sovereignty~ that is to say, 
Westminste~3. Similarities with the circumstances and prevailing attitudes of the late Twentieth 
Century are obvious. Thus, it is easy to appreciate how such sentiments as Dicey's would have 
been popular in the modem era. 
As the Act of Union had been entered into as a legally binding agreement, England had a 
moral obligation to uphold it. England also had a legal obligation to respect the Scottish 'holy 
trinity' institutions (Church, education and the legal system) preserved in the terms of the Act of 
31 This buffer is held as very important in Scottish society - Interview with William Paterson, 
13.9.01. 
32 An argument repeated at length by modem Conservatives, as we shall see in the assessment of 
the 1992 General Election campaign in Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
33 Dicey, Albert Venn: "Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 8th Ed. ", 
London, Macmillan & Co., 1920, p141. 
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Union34. Importantly, it was assumed that Scottish Local Government was to be preserved also. 
These institutions should have been sufficient to uphold an acceptable level of distinctiveness for 
those in Scotland with nationalist leanings. Therefore, the maintenance of the Union in unitary 
form was expedient and just as long as it did not contravene the democratic principles and sense 
of justice required to keep a state together. It seems that the modem Conservatives took the first 
part of this instruction literally but rather chose to ignore the latter requirements; insofar as they 
felt justified in upholding unitary principles, whilst seemingly having little regard for the lack of 
democratic credibility that they had north of the border. As we shall see in Chapter 3, a lack of 
credibility and mandate for the metropolitan Government in Scotland rendered Local 
Government more legitimate and influential in the eyes of many voters there. 
A constitutionally guaranteed division of powers usually further dictates that local levels 
of government are responsible for what might be tenned as more everyday aspects of citizens' 
lives, such as welfare provision. The fact that this thesis deals with the Anglo-Scottish situation 
before the institution of the devolved Parliament in Edinburgh should be remembered at this 
point. In the 1980s and 1990s, the most important issues of the day, according to contemporary 
opinion polls, were very often only in spheres that a central Government could deal with. Such 
issues included unemployment and the cost of living. However, if we look only slightly further 
down the list into the realms of 'low politics', we see that there was considerable concern about 
issues such as housing, education and health care provision. Therefore, we see further how 
34 Harvie, Christopher: "Scotland & Nationalism - Scottish Society & Politics 1707-1994 - 2nd 
Ed.", London, Routledge, 1994, P 141. 
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Scottish voters may have had sufficient cause for high levels of contact with Local Government. 
This relationship and its consequences for the 'POS' are explored more fully in Chapter 3. 
An important question facing the Conservatives in the 1980s and 1990s was whether the 
central Government should endeavour to ensure normative equality amongst all its regions 
through protectionism, subsidies and distributive welfare, as featured in earlier forms of 
Conservative 'statecraft'/territorial management? Alternatively, it could engage in more 
technocratic reformism, which ensures help and encouragement to productive areas, whilst 
leaving others to wither? As we shall see in Chapter 4 with regard to dropping levels of 
subsidies for industry in Scotland during the 1980s, the Conservative leadership decided on the 
latter, for apparently sound economic reasons35• In the terms of Sidney Tarrow, this was not so 
much a case of a 'diffusion-isolation' model, where the centre sought to dominate an 
isolatedlbackward area. It was more of an example of a 'dependency-marginality' model, where 
central statutory control was already assured and, indeed, strengthened by a return to unitary 
government. Furthermore, a form of 'internal colonialism' was perpetuated36. 
The idea of a 'dual polity,37 is most important in understanding the development of the 
relationship between central and Local Government in the 1980s and 1990s. In previous years, it 
seemed to suit both sides to remain relatively autonomous. Especially in Scotland, this 
understanding helped to preserve national pride. However, Local Authority spending levels were 
35 Interview with Lord Sanderson, 30.11.00. 
36 Rousseau & Zariski, 1987, p79. See also: Hechter, Michael: "Internal Colonialism - The 
Celtic Fringe in British National Development 1536-1966", London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1975. 
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beginning to rise significantly in the 1970s. Due to the economic atmosphere of the time, 
Westminster became more alert to the potential waste of taxpayers' money. Consequently, the 
issue of funding for Local Government became highly contentious and polarised the two major 
parties; who had been happy to enjoy the consensus until then38. Furthermore, it was asserted 
that the issues of funding, efficiency and accountability could only be proficiently managed by 
actions of the metropolitan Govemmenf9. Therefore, notions of a 'dual polity' were subverted 
to a more dominant central administration. It was an irony that a neoliberal administration that 
was espousing the reduction of government interference in the lives of its citizens had to disturb 
the post-war equilibrium between central and Local Government heavily in the favour of 
Westminster to achieve this aim. This thesis will look to the dynamics of local party politics in 
Scotland to provide an extra dimension to the canon of reasons given for the Conservatives' 
electoral demise there. The next stage is to develop an original testable hypothesis that would, if 
proved, clearly demonstrate the validity and significance of this new variable. 
Hypothesis & Agenda 
This thesis is concerned with how local party politics in Scotland may have helped to 
precipitate the demise of the Conservative Party north of the border. Now that theoretical 
underpinnings are in place, the precise hypothesis for investigation must be presented. The 
hypothesis under consideration is whether: 
37 Bulpitt in: Madgwick & Rose, 1982, p 161. 
38 Pickvance in: Pickvance & Preteceille (eds.), 1991, pS8. This dynamic is investigated further 
in the literature review at the end of Chapter 4. 
39 Ibid. 
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Conservative losses in Local Government Elections in Scotland (losses primarily caused by the 
contemporary 'POMP,) were severely dalllllging to the Party's subsequent General Election 
chances north of the border? 
If the qualitative and quantitative evidence herein can adequately support this hypothesis, 
it could be added to the list of significant causes of the Conservatives' electoral problems in 
Scotland. A detailed agenda follows in order to show the development of the hypothesis and 
evidence, both qualitative and quantitative, in its favour. 
Chapter Summary-
2. Ideology & Organisation in the Conservative Party 
Traditional views on Conservative Party ideology and organisation suggest that a strictly 
Unionist and, from the Thatcher years onwards, unitary, code was followed and that the Party 
leadership was highly centralised and consequently less caring about the needs and desires of 
voters on the geographical periphery. It is the aim of this chapter firstly to investigate this 
perception. If there is any truth in it, the potential for electoral problems in Scotland is evident. 
This chapter includes assessment of the key principles of Conservatism and their effects 
on the 'POMP', including territorial management from 1979-1997. It goes on to assess 
Thatcherism as an ideology and the impact of the New Right in Scotland. The 1992 General 
Election campaign is then examined as a good example of 'key principles' being at the heart of 
the 'POMP.' Thereafter, the structure of the Party, the Party Leader and Central Office, the 
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Party Conference and the roles of the Secretary of State for Scotland and Scots in Westminster 
are all covered. All these sections seek to assess how and where 'POMP' decisions are made in 
the Conservative Party and whether from 1979-1997 the contemporary ideas, structures and 
agents were inherently incompatible with successful management of the 'POS' in Scotland? 
3. Scottish Local Governance & Its Effect on the 'POS' 
It is the purpose of Chapter 3 to highlight the pervasive nature of Local Government in 
society north of the border in order to introduce why it may be a new and significant addition to 
the list of reasons for the Conservatives' electoral demise in Scotland Therefore, the chapter 
begins with an examination of the role of local party politics north of the border. This is 
followed by an assessment of the role of the state in Scottish society. These sections show how 
quite frequent contact is undertaken between Scottish voters and their Local Government 
representatives. This close relationship can be briefly attributed to more reliance on the state for 
employment benefits and housing, and an increased sense of legitimacy for government based in 
Scotland, as opposed to distant English 'absentee landlords,40. These reasons are explored much 
more fully in the chapter. The effects of the Scottish education system, media and religion on 
the political culture north of the border are also examined in order to assess further why the 
Conservatives might not have been faring so well. 
Throughout this work, it is also important to remember that there was significant, if rarely 
Council-controlling, Conservative representation in Local Government in Scotland throughout 
the era in question. The next section highlights instances of how this branch of the Party helped 
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the national Party's General Election causes or, indeed, sought to criticise the central leadership. 
As we see in Chapters 2 and 3, it is essential to maintain an effective cadre of active local party 
workers in order to have success in the 'POS'. It was often the case in Scotland that such 
organisation often crumbled away in the face of indefensible metropolitan policies and, 
especially, after Local Government election losses. This last point is crucial to the hypothesis 
and centres around the idea that important organisation and direction for Conservative supporters 
comes from Party Councillors north of the border41 , but only when they are able to stay in office. 
Once the importance of local party politics in Scotland has been established, subsequent chapters 
go on to present and assess situations and policies that made it harder for the Conservatives to 
maintain adequate and effective Local Government representation and support north of the 
border. 
4. Conservative 'POMP' & the Party's Demise in Scotland 1979-1997 
There were several policies and attitudes ascribed to the successive Conservative 
administrations during the era in question that, whilst being somewhat popular with more 
afiluent voters in England, served to lose the Party many votes in Scotland. Examples of such 
(in)farnous programmes include the Conservatives' intransigence over devolution, the 
withdrawal of industrial subsidies and the Poll Tax42. To ascribe substantial, but not total, 
causality to these reasons for the Conservative demise in Scotland requires only basic perception 
of voters' motivations. Nonetheless, such analyses are very persuasive as an explanation of the 
matter in hand. 
40 What Mrs Thatcher despised as the 'dependency culture' - Interview with Lord Lang, 27.3.01. 
41 Interview with Lord Fraser, 5.3.01. 
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The connection made by voters between their personal financial affluence and the 
competence of the incumbent Government to be rewarded at the polls is well documented43• 
Therefore, it is safe to extrapolate from this particular model, which has its critics44, that voters 
may also punish Governments if they feel that they themselves are not doing well financially. 
The Conservative elite is aware of this dynamic45 . When interviewed, Mr Perry asserted that 
there are two main issues that affect voters' intentions. Firstly, and most importantly, personal 
fortune, as indicated by factors such as income, unemployment, the cost of living, inflation and 
interest rates. Secondly, it may be 'time for a change', as was witnessed in 1974 and 1997, when 
the economy was starting to recover46. Incumbent administrations may tackle the first set of 
issues through the 'POMP.' There seems to be little that they can do about the second dynamic. 
Thus, a very simple function to partially explain the Conservative demise in Scotland 
may be constructed. Many Scots lost their jobs when the Government withdrew uneconomic 
subsidies for heavy industry north of the border~ they blamed the Government in London for 
42 Interview with Lord Sanderson, 30.11.00. 
43 Examples include: Fiorina, M. P.: Economic Retrospective Voting in American National 
Elections: A Micro-Analysis, in: American Journal of Political Science, 22, 1978, pp426-443~ 
Butler & Kavanagh, 1984, p14; Hugh Ward in: Marsh, David & Stoker, Gerry: "Theory and 
Method in Political Science", Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1995, p92 + Sanders, David: Government 
Popularity and the Next General Election, in: Political Quarterly, Vol. 62, no. 2, 1991, pp235-
261. 
44 For example: Schofield, N. J.: "Social Choice and Democracy", New York, Springer-Verlag, 
1985, p291, where it is argued that the electorate takes a more general overview of the 
incumbent's economic competency for the whole nation 
45 Interview with Martin Perry, 24.8.01. 
46 This view was also expressed in the Stirling Councillor Survey (Lab), Winter 200 1-2002. This 
survey comprised of face-to-face and telephone interviews and one written statement from the 
nine Stirling Councillors (5 Conservative & 4 Labour) who were in office through the 1980s and 
1990s. The interviewees are listed in the Bibliography. The party affiliation of each particular 
respondent is noted in the relevant footnote. 
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these problems and, consequently, did not vote Conservative. Unemployment was the most 
potent cause of Conservative unpopularity in Scotland in the 1980s47. This problem was 
exacerbated when comparisons by voters were made with the affluent South East of England. 
Furthermore, many Scottish voters lost out financially when they had to pay Poll Tax 
instead of domestic rates. Domestic rates were usually subsidised to such an extent that many 
Scottish voters had to pay nothing at a1l48. There are fairly justifiable long-term economic 
reasons for both of these particular policies, which are explored more fully in Chapter 4. 
Opposition parties, including in Scottish Local Government, were keen to perpetuate the view 
that the Conservatives were actually anti-Scottish49. The succession of unpopular policies 
seemed to support this opinion and the electorate showed their disapproval at the polls. 
Chapter 4 gives an overview of the growing antipathy felt for the Conservatives in 
Scotland during the 1980s and 19905. More importantly, however, it also goes on to further the 
argument that infamous policies such as the Poll Tax were not only directly unpopular with the 
general electorate, but were also damaging the Party in Local Government in Scotland. This 
damage to the Party's 'POS' was due to the policies causing considerable losses in Local 
Government Elections and their demoralising effect on Party workers and representatives north 
of the border. Furthermore, Labour representatives in Local Government in Scotland were, as 
we shall see, very often somewhat antagonised by the contemporary 'POMP' into increasing 
47 Interview with Ross Harper, 6.8.01. 
48 Ibid 
49 Interview with Lord Stmthclyde, 8.11.00. 
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their efforts to discredit the metropolitan Government amongst the electorate in their area50. This 
thesis seeks to highlight the magnitude of these problems. There is no intention to try to 
undermine the importance ascribed to policies such as the Poll Tax or industrial closures as 
causes of the Conservative downfall in Scotland. However, this thesis introduces new results of 
these policies in order to further the analysis of their effec~s. 
Firstly, local Party activists were seen to stop working for the cause when they felt it to 
be lost in the 1980s due to a stream of unpopular measures emanating from London51 . By the 
end of the 1980s, Conservative canvassers in Scotland were being met with 'pure hatred' on 
doorsteps due to their association with a distant unpopular regime in London52• The loss of these 
active members is disastrous for the 'POS', as they serve to undertake somewhat mundane, but, 
nonetheless, essential campaign duties at election time. Furthermore, an absence of an 
established and compliant Conservative network, including Local Government representatives in 
a contested geographical region, makes it even more difficult for the central administration to 
'sell' bitter-tasting measures to the electorate and fend off damaging criticism from better 
organised pockets of local opposition53. 
Chapter 4 ends with a review of other existing opinions on the Conservatives' electoral 
decline in Scotland. There are two main schools of thought as to the nature and chronology of 
this demise. The longer-term view argues that the Conservatives' regression in Scottish General 
so Stirling Councillor Survey (Con & Lab), Winter 2001-2002. 
51 Interviews with David Seawright, 13.4.00, Viscount Younger, 14.2.01, Lord Lang, 27.3.01 & 
Ross Harper, 6.8.01. 
52 Interview with Keith Harding, 12.9.01 & Stirling Councillor Survey (Con), Winter 2001-2002. 
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Elections has been somewhat constant and relentless since their zenith of 1955. The causes, 
according to proponents of this argument, are not so much in the policies of any particular 
Government in London, but more to do with the modernisation and secularisation of Scottish 
society. The consequent demise of Unionism, coupled with economic divergence with England, 
has thus left Scottish Conservatism bereft of any relevance. Those in favour of this long-term 
argument present the linear regression of Conservative results in Scotland (see Chart 4.5) as 
quantitative evidence. As Michael Dyer notes, there is no evidence that the General Election 
results of the 1980s and 1990s were any better or worse than expected for the Party north of the 
borde~4. 
These opinions are contrary to the other main argument that it was indeed the 'POMP' of 
the Thatcher-Major era that was the prime cause of the Conservatives' demise in Scotland. This 
part of the canon argues that the way in which issues such as Devolution and unemployment 
were handled by London, especially in the 1980s, gave rise to a feeling that that Conservatives 
were 'anti-Scottish.' Opposition parties used actual policies such as the Poll Tax as evidence to 
perpetuate this feeling. This short-term argument places more importance on the immediate 
effects of Thatcherism on the Scottish electorate, rather than contemplating longer-term 
structural reasons. 
In this thesis, it is necessary to give credence to both arguments. As Chapter 4 
investigates, the contemporary 'POMP' did have a definite impact on the Scottish electorate and 
53 Interview with Viscount Younger, 14.2.01. 
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Local Government in the 1980s and 1990s. The main issues and policies in the short-term 
school of thought generated the topics and interview questions for Chapter 4. Nonetheless, it is 
also important to take into account the changes in Scottish society since the 1950s. Without the 
apparent demise in Unionism brought about by modernisation and secularisation, it is unlikely 
that Opposition parties would have had the credibility to be able to marshal the 'POS' so 
successfully through Local Government in the 1980s and 1990s. Chapter 5 goes on to 
investigate an aspect of the contemporary • POMP , that had an especial impact on Local 
Government in Scotland. 
5. Centre-Peripheral Governmental Relations 1979-1997: 
'Rolling Back the State' 
As earlier chapters seek to establish, Local Government north of the border seems to have 
an important General Election role, especially through the promotion or undermining of 
metropolitan policies and the use of its power and influence to rally support for all of the major 
parties. Of significant importance, therefore, is a set of policies instituted by the Thatcher 
administration in an attempt to rein in dissident Local Councils. These policies constituted the 
'Rolling Back the State' programme. 
As we shall see, the Government emphasised to the voters that power and funding was 
being taken away from Local Authorities in order to increase accountability and economic 
efficiency55. These goals were consistent with the New Right attitudes that pervaded the 
54 Dyer, Michael: The Evolution of the Centre-Right and the State of Scottish Conservatism, in 
Political Studies, 2001, Vol. 49, pp30-S0, p32. 
55 Interview with Lord Mackay ofClashfern, 22.1.01 + Thatcher, 1993, p32. 
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administration and its advisers. In England, voters were affluent enough to benefit from the 
resultant cuts in income tax, and were therefore more likely to reward the Government with their 
votes56. North of the border, however, reliance on the state was higher and affluence was lower. 
Therefore, most Scottish voters noticed the reductions in the services and subsidies that they had 
become used to, rather than the financial benefits of tax cuts57 . 
Chapter 5 will, with the housing issue as a primary example, assess how successive 
Conservative Governments liaised with, and, very importantly, controlled and dictated to, Local 
Authorities in Scotland. Whilst they may have been popular amongst the English electorate, I 
wish to demonstrate how these metropolitan dictates engendered friction in Labour Local 
Government north of the borde~8. This perceptible antagonism has particular relevance to the 
hypothesis under consideration. If Conservative Local Government representatives were being 
voted out of office, there would have been little opposition to Labour Councillors attaining local 
ideological hegemony and consequently steering their communities away from the Conservatives 
in General Elections. 
Scottish Labour activists were not able to cause the downfall of the metropolitan 
administration, but were able to channel their efforts successfully into marshalling the voters in 
their area to substantially disrupt the Conservatives' 'POS.' Concurrently, unpopular measures 
in the 'POMP' were causing many Conservative Local Government representatives in Scotland 
to lose their seats. Therefore, there was little chance that the Conservative elite could effectively 
56 Interview with Lord Mackay of Clashfern, 22.1.01. 
S7 Interview with Lord MacKay of Ardbreclcnish, 25.1.01. 
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defend the 'Rolling Back the State', or any other 'POMP', measures in Scotland. Before the 
hypothesis is tested empirically, a useful exercise will be to assess how the various policies and 
Local Government counter-measures affected a particular area of Scotland. Therefore, a case 
study of the Stirling area forms Chapter 6. 
6. Stirling Case Study 
This study examines how the 'POMP' and Local Government impacted on a particular 
area of Scotland in order to further suggest that the loss of Local Government representation 
would have created General Election difficulties for the Conservatives. From this study, it will 
be possible to ascertain how the various topics that have been discussed up to this point 
interacted to undermine the Conservatives' 'POS' north of the border. 
The subject area of the case study was more affluent than more urban parts of Scotland. 
Therefore, it may have been inclined to lean more in favour of the Conservatives and their fiscal 
policies. Thus, in Stirling, both the Westminster seat and the Local Council were very closely 
contested throughout the era in question. Vitally with regard to the hypothesis under 
examination, the Conservatives did not lose the Parliamentary seat until they had lost significant 
numbers of Local Government representatives in the area, even though other more traditionally-
accepted circumstances for the likely loss of a Conservative candidate were present in earlier 
years. Furthermore, the District Council, which was Labour-controlled for all but three of the 
years in question, often had cause to dispute directives emanating from the • POMP. , Therefore. 
58 Stirling Councillor Survey (Lab), Winter 2001-2002. 
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we are able to assess how such antagonism from the centre disrupted the Conservatives' 'POS' 
on the periphery through the efforts of disaffected Local Government in Scotland. 
The first part of the chapter profiles the population of the area in order to understand why 
and how the major parties may have appealed to the electorate. Within the party political history 
of Stirling that follows, the issues of subsidy cuts, central control of Local Government and the 
Poll Tax are of key interest. They best demonstrate how Local Government representatives from 
both sides sought to promote the image of their own national parties amongst the voters by using 
local issues as a microcosm of the whole UK. Chapter 6 concludes about the defeat of the 
Conservative Parliamentary candidate in 1997, and whether this loss was significantly 
precipitated by the loss of 30% of Conservative representation in Local Government in the area 
in 1995. The Conservatives could have lost the Parliamentary seat in 1987 or 1992, as they did 
in many other parts of Scotland Economic difficulties and opposition to metropolitan policies 
such as the Poll Tax were just as evident in Stirling as elsewhere in Scotland in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s. However, unlike in other areas, Party Local Government representation 
remained high during these years in Stirling. This chapter seeks to assess whether the presence 
of effective Conservative Local Government representation up to 1995 was a significant cause of 
the Party MP in the area being immune to the General Election problems being suffered by his 
colleagues elsewhere in Scotland. 
7. General & Local Government Election Results 1979-1997 
All of the chapters to date have introduced and expanded the idea that the Conservatives 
might have suffered in General Elections in Scotland not only because of ideological failure and 
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unpopular central ideas and policies, but also due to an undercurrent of organisational failure at 
the local level in Scotland caused by the Party's 'POMP.' We have also seen why local affairs 
are very important in the 'POS' in Scotland due to the mandate issue and characteristics of the 
political culture. The dynamic of national fortunes reflecting local events is not unique to the 
Conservative Party. Much support for the Twentieth Century Liberals was generated from 
peripheral, rather than metropolitan roots59. Similarly, the SNP suffered poor results in the 1979 
General Election subsequent to a series of Local Government 'blunders' in the preceding years60. 
However, I believe that this thesis is original in contemplating how the 'POMP' being exercised 
by a party in Government in Westminster could undennine its levels of Local Government 
representation and peripheral organisation; with this dynamic being a substantial cause of 
subsequent failures for the party in General Elections. 
This thesis is not a comparative work. The dynamics of Local Government in England 
are not studied in depth. However, in Chapter 7, a comparison between the relevant Local 
Government and General Election results north and south of the border is made. In order to lend 
precision to the hypothesis, this has been undertaken in order to qualifY whether Local 
Government representation losses were particularly damaging for the Conservatives in Scotland 
alone. To test the hypothesis as fully as possible, General Election results in Westminster 
constituencies affected by substantial Conservative Local Government losses in all regions of the 
United Kingdom are analysed. It is then possible to cross-tabulate and observe whether the 
hypothesis is substantially supported by the results. Such a comparative analysis qualifies the 
59 Curtice & Steed in: Butler & Kavanagh, 1984, p347. 
60 Butler & Kavanagh, 1980, p 11. 
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terms of the hypothesis. We are questioning whether Local Government election losses in 
Scotland were 'severely damaging' to the Conservatives' General Election chances there? To be 
able to quantify the findings in terms of whether such losses were more or less damaging in 
Scotland than in similarly affected constituencies in England introduces a sense of precision into 
relative phrases such as 'severely damaging.' 
The results in Chapter 7 give the hypothesis substantial support and may also be used as a 
defence against accusations of false particularisation. A potential criticism is that the declines of 
local and national Conservative representation are associated symptoms of a more general 
decline of the Party in Scotland. However, the results in Chapter 7 clearly show that, indeed, the 
Conservatives would usually find it much more difficult to recover from mid-term protest votes 
north of the border. Furthermore, an assessment of all concurrent Scottish General Election 
results shows that such losses were not incurred where Conservative local representation 
remained more stable. Thus, whilst long and short-term reasons presented in other works are 
still valid, the hypothesis in this study should be added to the list of reasons for the Scottish 
Conservatives' electoral decline. 
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Introduction 
2. Ideology and Organisation in the 
Conservative Party 
The aim of this chapter is to assess how the 'POMP' was formulated in London and how 
this process led to a further breakdown in the 'POS' north of the border. As Conservative 
General Election results in Scotland from the zenith of 1955 show, the Party's support has been 
in steady decline there (see Charts 1.1 and 4.5). Traditionally accepted reasons for this decline 
are examined more fully in Chapter 4 of this thesis. For the purposes of the current chapter, 
however, it is essential to bear in mind that the Party's support base in Scotland was less deep-
rooted than in England 1. Therefore, the Conservatives could not afford to alienate too many of 
their meagre support-base north of the border, as such losses could not be sustained easily. 
It would be impossible to develop a cohesive set of policies - the 'POMP' - without 
some concept of a framework of guiding ideas. Therefore, I wish to make a brief study of what 
ideas underpin Conservative Party strategies. Thereby, it will be possible to assess whether such 
an ideology is compatible with making policies that could have been popular in Scotland from 
1979-1997, given the social and economic climate of the time. The second subject for 
investigation is the organisation and structure of the Party. We need to know who, whether 
individuals or (in)formally recognised offices and groups, had significant input into the policy-
1 Interview with William Paterson, 13.9.01 and Seawright, 1999. 
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making process? It will also be interesting to note here how heavily Scottish Conservatives were 
involved in this process. Once we know how policies were being made, and by whom, it will be 
easier to contemplate why the fortunes of the Party fluctuated so widely between England and 
Scotland. 
Therefore, this first section on ideology begins with an assessment of the key principles 
of Conservatism and how they affect policy making in the British Conservative and Unionist 
Party. Whether or not Thatcherism was an ideology is addressed thereafter, as are the effect of 
the politics of the New Right on Scotland and the 1992 General Election campaign; the final 
issue being a good example of a 'key principle' being at the heart of the 'POMP' and its effect 
on the 'POS.' A key point to remember through the course of the chapter is whether the era in 
question emerges as a continuation of past practices, or a paradigmatic shift in Conservative 
thinking and organisation. If the latter is the case, it is possible that these changes may have 
been a significant cause of the Party's demise in Scotland. If not, issues more readily associated 
with the 'POMP' may have been to blame; but at least one major variable will have been 
eliminated. 
Key Principles of Conservatism 
Philip Norton is very keen to point out that, rather than having a strict ideology about 
how society should be, Conservatives are more inclined towards descriptive 'dispositions' 
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concerning how the world actually is2• This point was emphasised especially in the 1990s when 
the Party was trying to re-build under Mr Major and exorcise the dogmatic image of his 
predecessor3. We should also bear in mind that the British Conservative Party is renowned for 
subjugating ideological differences in favour of the Party unity required for their ultimate goal of 
winning office4. Gamble is not convinced that Conservative politicians are terribly concerned 
with questions of human nature and the organic development of societys. Instead, he contends 
that the Party has been more concerned with carrying on with Government and winning re-
election. This has been the case since the advent of mass suffrage and helps Gamble to develop 
his theories of the 'Politics of Power' and 'POS.' He asserts that the advent of mass democracy 
has weakened Parliament's power over policy making as politicians in the modern era have to be 
more mindful of winning office. The similarities with Bulpitt's notion of 'statecraft' and its 
concentration on holding and winning power6 are clear. One implication of a political party's 
over-concentration on issues at the political centre might have been a disregard for matters and 
members on the geographical and power periphery. As this thesis seeks to demonstrate, such 
aloofness by a central elite can have disastrous results in the 'POS.' 
2 Norton, Philip (ed.): "The Conservative Party", London, Prentice Hall, 1996, p68. This and 
many of the subsequent points in Norton seem to rely heavily on Oakeshott. 
3 Lang, Ian: "Doing the Right Thing", London, Conservative Political Centre, 1994, pp6-7. 
Whether or not the Thatcher years were indeed a dogmatic shift away from the more pragmatic 
approach to the 'POMP' usually employed by the Conservatives is assessed more fully later in 
this chapter. 
4 Interviews with Andrew Gamble, 16.3.00, Lord MacKay of Ardbrecknish, 25.1.01 & Lord 
Fraser, 5.3.01. 
s Gamble, 1974, ppl-2. 
6 Bulpitt, Jim: Historical Politics: Macro, In-Time, Governing Regime AnalYSiS, in: 
Lovendowski, Joni & Stayner, Jeffrey (eds.): Contemporary Political Studies, 1995, (2), p518. 
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Inconsistencies and tensions inherent to conservative ideology, such as those between 
continuity and change, market forces and interventionism and the individual versus society, can 
be balanced by the potential for flexibility in a Conservative Party Governmene. With regard to 
the Scottish question, such flexibility would have been necessary to rationalise the seemingly 
incompatible practices of subsidy, intervention and regional preferences with the unitary free 
market approach of the Thatcher era. Therefore, a major question for consideration is how does 
change come about in a Party naturally disposed towards conservatism? 
Even in a conservative political party, there must be some facility for new ideas and 
policies. If society is a product of history, any changes must come slowly and 'naturally.' Such 
an 'organic' description of society ("Right is a function of time, rather than present rationality"s) 
can settle any disquiet concerning the possibility of radical change. Oakeshott acknowledges 
that Conservatives do not idolise the past or hope that change will never come. On the contrary, 
pragmatic Conservatives should be grateful for lessons that can be learned from history and 
events made possible by times gone by. However, it should be remembered that the spectre of 
radical change causes disquiet amongst Conservatives who fear potential losses more than they 
eagerly anticipate potential gains9. The notion of the organic nature of society can also help to 
give citizens more of a sense of belonging to such a community free from artificially imposed 
7 Norton (ed.), 1996, ppSO-S2. Such flexibility is not a characteristic often associated with the 
Thatcher administrations of the 1980s - Interview with Lord Mackay of Clashfe~ 22.1.01. 
8 Norton (ed.), 1996, p71. As we shall see, many policies, in the Thatcher era especially, were 
justified as being 'right' (usually on economic grounds - therefore giving more credence to the 
'present rationality' argument), even though they were unpopular with large sections of the 
electorate. 
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regulations. Oakeshott contends that the main issue that has to be preserved in society is 
identityJO. The ramifications of this assertion for territorial management are obvious. 
Luminaries of the conservative tradition such as Burke have asserted that changing to 
keep up with contemporary circumstances was necessary if the essential fabric of society was to 
be preservedll . For Burke, the most important issues were the conservation of community, the 
'organic' development of society, tradition, authority and a hierarchical system 12. As we shall 
see in Chapter 3, the notion of community is very important in Scotland. Therefore, the 
Conservative elite would have been well advised to ensure that this particular principle was 
adhered to well north of the border in order to avoid the 'POS' problems brought about by 
crumbling organisation and Local Government representation. 
Many liberal theories consider what could be possible in a state, given their acceptance 
of the potential perfectibility of man, whereas Norton asserts that long periods in office have 
taught the Conservatives to be more pragmatic and care only for what is currently possible13. 
Lord Lang noted that this attitude within the Party elite was never going to be popular in 
Scotland. Whereas the Thatcher administration was keen to emphasise to voters what they could 
reasonably expect from a Government in return for their tax payments, the Scots still somehow 
90akeshott, Michael: "Rationalism in politics & other essays", Indianapolis, Liberty Press, 1991, 
0408. 
fo Ibid, p410. 
11 Norton (ed.), 1996, p72. This conforms to Gamble's concept of the 'Politics of Power', in 
which Governments are constrained in part by the social and economic changes apparent in 
society - Gamble, 1974, p3. 
12 Lynch, 1999, p4. 
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felt that they were due more. The Prime Minister despised this 'dependency culture.' She was 
not prepared to dilute her message and, thus, a seemingly intractable divide between her and the 
Scottish electorate began to appear 1 4. This thesis assesses whether the Conservative elite's 
failure to act upon the unique structural characteristics of Scottish local communities and 
political culture was a significant factor in the Party's demise north of the border. 
'Key Principles' of Conservatism in the 'POMP' 
The issue that precipitated confrontation was the withdrawal of Government subsidies for 
ailing heavy industry in Scotland. These measures, which are examined more closely in Chapter 
4, were presented as pragmatic economic responses to the contemporary industrial climate. For 
the purposes of this chapter, it is interesting to note that the Government was also prepared to 
justify the measures on 'philosophical', that is to say, neoliberal, grounds. It seems that this 
diversion from less dogmatic ways may have been ill conceived with regard to the governance of 
Scotland. In Chapter 3, we shall see in a study of the role of Local Authority housing provision 
that the New Right philosophy of 'Rolling Back the State' and increasing individuals' sense of 
self-preservation was popular in England. South of the border, the economy was buoyant 
enough to sustain voters through the initial symptoms of state intervention withdrawal. This was 
not the case in ScotlandlS. Therefore, to justify the changes because they were 'righf l6 would 
have required a much greater level of ideological hegemony for contemporary Conservative 
Party New Right thinking in Scotland than was actually the case if the electorate there was going 
13 Norton (ed.), 1996, p72. 
14 Interview with Lord Lang, 27.3.01. 
IS Interview with David McLetchie, 19.1.01. 
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to accept the policies. Furthermore, these attitudes and policies that were becoming so 
unpopular with the Scots were also difficult to defend in Local Authority forums north of the 
border. Therefore, Conservative Local Government representatives in Scotland were losing 
office or local ideological hegemony and credibility to Opposition parties through little fault of 
their ownl7. Consequently, the Party was losing essential cohesion and enthusiasm in the face of 
well-organised local opposition in Scotland. As we shall see in Chapters 4 and 5, such 
opposition was mainly managed by the established political parties in Local Government and 
Pragmatism comes very much to the fore in the history of Conservative policy making. 
However, it would not seem possible for a party to be run completely without principles. 
Gamble feels that the Party leaders are always heavily pragmatic due to their natural instinct for 
powerl9. This instinct has served the leaders and the Party well, as witnessed by their many 
years in office in the Twentieth Century. However, there are some issues upon which a stance is 
taken as a fundamental issue of principle. There are three obvious examples of how sticking to 
such principles did not produce a positive result at the polls. We have already introduced the 
problems caused especially in Scotland in the 1980s by neoliberal economics. Secondly, 
Gamble noted that the Conservatives would have been better advised not to identify the 
European question as the defining issue of British politics in the mid-1990s. He asserted that the 
British public was not really that interested. Ironically, given Scotland's traditional pre-
16 Interview with Lord Mackay ofClashfern, 22.1.01. 
17 Stirling Councillor Survey (Con), Winter 2001-2002. 
18 Interview with William Paterson, 13.9.01. 
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disposition towards looking outwards from the British Isles2o, this was one issue of principle that 
the Major administration may have been able to make some political capital from north of the 
border. The final problematical Conservative principle in Scotland was their intransigence over 
Devolution. That issue is dealt with more fully below and in Chapter 4. 
Law, order and authority are vital principles to Conservative notions of how the state 
should be run; and are, thus, key elements of the 'POMP: However, Conservatives have always 
been suspicious of governmental power imposing on the individual rights of citizens. State 
involvement is essential to defend the realm and domestic peace, but central administrations 
should always be answerable to Parliament. Oakeshott asserts that changes in the rules that 
govern society should reflect contemporary events, rather than being artificially imposed21 . It 
could be argued that the alleged use of Scotland as a 'guinea pig' for the Poll Tax and other 
Local Government financial control experiments were examples of such erroneous imposition22. 
However, it should also be noted here that the Poll Tax originated from requests by Scottish 
Conservatives to reform the Domestic Rating system; this suggests that the policy was indeed 
reflecting the wishes of at least part of British/Scottish societl3• 
19 Interview, 16.3.00 + Interviews with Lords Sanderson, 30.11.00 & Lang, 27.3.01. 
20 As demonstrated by their alliances with the French and heavy involvement in Empire, military, 
engineering and religious missions - interview with Lord Lang, 27.3.01. 
210akeshott, 1991, p428. 
22 These matters are studied in greater detail in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, which deal more specifically 
with the Conservatives' 'POMP' and its effects on Local Government. 
23 Interview with Ross Harper, 6.8.01. 
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The Conservatives' actual problems with nationalism are discussed in greater depth in 
subsequent chapters of this thesis, with especial reference being given to the question of who has 
a legitimate mandate to govern Scotland? Here, it is important to note that their guiding 
principle on the issue (that of reconciling liberty with order) would have put them at odds with 
many sections of Scottish society, including Conservative members there. Thus, the chances of 
Conservatives north of the border being able to stay in Local Government office or in the esteem 
of their neighbours and peers were rendered quite slim. 
Of most interest to this chapter is the way in which Conservative 'POMP', that was 
derived from the dominant principles in the Party during the era in question, may have served to 
undermine Party organisation and Local Government representation in Scotland. The way in 
which 'key principles' affected the Governments' attitudes towards territorial management in the 
UK is considered now to assess whether it may have been a cause of failing 'POS.' 
'Key Principles' and Territorial Management 
The main question to be dealt with in this section is how Conservative ideology 
influenced territorial management practice? Hereby, we may gain insight into why their 'POS' 
began to fail in Scotland. Given the Conservative tradition's emphasis on sceptical 
reductionism, one would expect that local conditions would very much influence 'POMP' 
measures, with regional sensitivity very much in evidence. Once the Irish Home Rule question 
had pushed territorial matters into the realms of 'high politics' in the aftermath of the First 
World War, members of the Conservative elite had to give more consideration to matters they 
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had previously felt happy to leave to local agents. The old dual polity system had protected 
central autonomy to pursue what the elite felt to be genuinely 'higher' matters24. As 
conservative Unionists, the Party was looking to preserve the constitutional settlement, the 
Empire, the sovereignty of Parliament and the contemporary distribution of power and property 
in society. Peripheral pressure for Devolution had been dealt with by allowing concessions such 
as the creation of the Scottish Office in 1886. This was still within the bounds set out in 
Unionist texts such as A. V. Dicey's "England's Case Against Home Rule", which contended 
that the Union was the only framework within which justice, freedom and state authority could 
be maintained25. 
More modem examples of the centre's desire for autonomy are the ways that they wished 
to see race politics issues and housing provision settled at a sub-nationallevet26. Furthermore, 
and vitally for this thesis, the way in which the central Party did not seriously engage in local 
politics to any serious degree27 demonstrates a desire to remain somewhat autonomous. This 
thesis contemplates the proposition that this Party elite tendency to remain aloof from local 
politics was just as much of a cause of general electoral problems for the Conservatives in 
Scotland as some of the less well received 'POMP.' This was due to the apparent fact that 
Opposition parties were more effective on a local level and the Conservatives had lost their main 
24 Bulpitt in: Madgwick and Rose (eds.), 1982, p163. 
2S Cited in Lynch, 1999, p17. 
26 Bulpitt in: Layton-Hemy & Rich (eds.), 1986, p41 & Thatcher, 1995, p396. 
27 Interview with Lord Lang, 27.3.01 & Stirling Councillor Survey (Con), Winter 2001-2002 -
notwithstanding occasional strong intervention by the Thatcher and Major administrations when 
they felt that Opposition controlled Local Government needed to have power or funding 
removed - see Chapter 5 especially. 
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sources of organisation and direction in the form of Local Government representatives who had 
lost office. 
One 'basic disposition'I'key principle' that has been important to many Conservative 
Governments, including those of Mr Major, is the concept that Britain should be 'One Nation.' 
The idea of domestic 'one nation' Toryism has two meanings. The first is a desire for social 
hannony amongst the various interest groups and classes. This idea in the 1980s and 1990s 
came to mean equality of opportunity and freedom within the law and from over-regulation by 
governments at local and national levees. Secondly, and very importantly for this thesis, the 
idea of 'one nationism' is especially concerned with a commitment to the preservation of the 
Union; although it should be remembered that this does not necessarily mean that peripheral 
identities have to be subjugated in favour of a homogenised British version. An electorally 
profitable application of the 'one nation' principle has been for Conservatives to appeal to the 
imperialism/patriotism of most Britons, including Scots, at election time. Mr Major was to use 
this tactic to some effect in the General Election of 1992 especially. His predecessor also 
benefited greatly from an upsurge in patriotism following the Falklands War just before the 1983 
General Election. 
David Seawright provides a concise summation of Unionist principles and policies29• He 
identifies Unionism as a substantial ideology in itself, thus making it serve as credible theoretical 
28 Waldegrave, William: "Tory Democracy and One Nation: Their Relevance Today", London, 
Conservative Political Centre, 1996, p12. 
29 Seawright, 1999, p1S8. 
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underpinning for the modem Conservative Party; a party not renowned for dogmatism. 
Seawright asserts that the Party's roots lie in moderate socio-economic policies, interventionism 
and a desire to preserve the Union. Aughey also confirms a link between English Conservatism 
and Unionism3o. The Party has always suffered in Scotland from an overtly English image. For 
this thesis, it is important to note that this image was exacerbated in the Thatcher era31 . 
However, many other policies in the 1980s also seemed to react more to contemporary 
circumstances in the manner of traditional Conservative pragmatists, rather than being based on 
dogmatic principles. Therefore, the next question to be assessed is whether Thatcherism was a 
radical new form of Conservatism; and what effect did it have on the governance of Scotland? 
Thatcherism as an Ideology (?) 
Traditional Conservatism can be characterised by a distrust of new ideas not tested by 
experience and a wish to conserve (the essentialist view of the existent); only gradual 'organic' 
change is acceptable32• However, it does not account for more radical policy shifts as displayed 
by the Heath and Thatcher administrations. Indeed, Mr Major was keen to distance the Party 
from any perceived radicalism and, i~ project an image of 'refreshingly constant' beliefs; 
even though policies would have to be adapted to suit contemporary times33. Thus, there may be 
an argument that the 1980s were indeed a significant departure from traditional Conservative 
ways, thereby possibly being the cause for the Party's demise in Scotland. Therefore, this is an 
30 In Norton (ed.), 1996, p233. 
31 Interview with Lord Lang, 27.3.01 &. Thatcher, 1993, p624. 
32 Norton (ed.), 1996, p68. 
33 Major, John: "Conservatism in Action: Strengthening the Rule of Law", London, Conservative 
Political Centre, 1996, p4. 
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appropriate point to assess the impact of the politics of the New Right that seemed to underpin 
the 'POMP' employed in that decade. 
Advocates of the New Right "(S)tress the efficacy of the free market for economic and 
political freedom,,34. Mrs Thatcher was very much an adherent of this neoliberal creed. She 
believed that the British economy had stagnated and the citizens had become too used to a 
'nanny state' in the post-war era and especially in the 1970s under Labo~5. The Prime Minister 
hoped that the New Right approach would re-vitalise the United Kingdom and was thus 
committed to the principles put forward by economists and theorists such as Hayek, Adam Smith 
and her contemporary, Sir Keith Joseph36. These ideas conformed to the post-industrial 
consensus among Western European and North American Governments of the centre-right at this 
The tax cuts inherent to a programme of deregulation and sub-contracting of state and 
municipal functions was popular with aftluent voters in the South East of England in the early 
1980538. As we shall see in subsequent chapters, however, this programme of 'Rolling Back the 
State' did not seem to be so popular in Scotland. This came as a surprise to the Prime Minister, 
who thought that the Scots should be especially receptive to such ideas, given the apparent 
34 Ian Fraser in: Mclean, lain (ed.): "Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics", Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1996, p341. 
3S Interview with Lord Lang, 27.3.01. 
36 Interview with Lord Sanderson, 30.11.00. 
37 Studlar in: Waltman, J. & Studlar, D. T. (eds.): "Political Economy - Public Policies in the 
United States and Britain", London, University Press of Mississippi, 1987, p7. 
38 Interview with Lords Sanderson, 30.11.00 & MacKay of Clashfem, 22.1.01. 
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traditions of self-help and thriftiness that she perceived to be in place north of the bordef9. 
When assessing why Thatcherism failed in Scotland throughout this thesis, it will be important 
to remember two major factors. Firstly, the economy in Scotland did not expand like its English 
counterpart in the 1980s. Consequently, fewer of the voters there were in a position to benefit 
from tax cuts. Secondly, greater dependence on the state for jobs, welfare and housing north of 
the border dictated that any reduction in services or benefits was unlikely to be popular there. 
This aspect of Scottish culture is explored more in Chapter 3 and strongly suggests that Local 
Government in Scotland was likely to have an important role in the 'POS.' David Seawright 
identifies the alienation caused in Scotland by the 'New Right' ideology being employed in the 
1980s as one of the most important factors in the demise of the Conservatives in Scotland4O• 
The Prime Minister described the thinking behind her policies thus: 
"In Education, Housing and Health the common themes of my policies were the 
extension of choice, the dispersal of power and the encouragement of 
responsibility. This was the application of a philosophy not just an administrative 
programme'.4!. 
It is especially interesting to note that the policy issues raised in this quote were being 
administered, to varying degrees, by instruments of Local Government. Therefore, potential 
conflict with Opposition parties and lack of manageable policies to be defended by 
Conservatives in Scotland are imminent. It is very important to provide Conservatives in Local 
39 Thatcher, 1993, p622. 
40 Seawright, 1999, pl99. 
41 Thatcher, 1993,p618. 
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Government with policies that they feel happy to defend42• In many instances, local 
Conservative politicians have even been prepared to ally with their opponents on a local level, 
rather than pursue a central policy that they feel will be disadvantageous to residents in their 
region43• Issues specific to these parts of the 'POMP' are investigated in subsequent chapters of 
this thesis. 
Mrs Thatcher defended her 'philosophy' with almost religious zeal. This was 
demonstrated in a reply to Church leaders who had condemned the Government for being too 
materialistic44. When the Bishop of Durham had called Thatcherism 'almost wicked', the Prime 
Minister replied that even the Christian faith condoned personal responsibility in addition to 
spiritual redemption. She believed that it was the duty of individuals to create wealth and 
dispose of it responsibly for the good of the nation45. The state should do its best to relieve 
hardship and provide education and social services. However, Mrs Thatcher was convinced that 
the prescribed role of government should not extend to undermining individual responsibility 
through excessive intervention46. That the very term 'Thatcherism' was coined to describe the 
'POMP' employed by the Conservatives in the 1980s suggests that it was indeed a departure 
42 Interview with Viscount Younger, 14.2.01. 
43 Interview with Martin Perry, 24.8.01. An example is the way in which Neville Bosworth 
would occasionally side with his Labour opponents in order to preserve his promise of putting 
'Birmingham First.' 
44 Mrs Thatcher's alienation of the agents of the 'holy trinity' (clergy, lawyers and teachers) of 
Scottish society - in addition to doctors there - led to a breakdown of these socially powerful 
professional groups, with malevolent effects on the Party's 'POS' north of the border - Interview 
with William Paterson, 13.9.01. 
4S This attitude was never going to be popular in Scotland where, as the Conservatives in London 
acknowledged, a 'dependency culture' existed- Interview with Lord Lang, 27.3.01. 
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from previous forms of 'statecraft.' If an ideology is defined as a consistent set of ideas by 
which a group understands the world and pursues to achieve their aims, then Thatcherism seems 
to satisfy these conditions. What we must question, therefore, is how far did it actually deviate 
from traditional Conservatism, and did these changes precipitate the Party's demise in Scotland? 
Stephen Lee lists six basic priorities of Thatcherism: to reduce the role of the state and 
promote individualism; to develop the market economy to arrest any economic decline; to 
promote popular capitalism through privatisation programmes; to destroy inflation by controlling 
the supply of money; end industrial conflict by eliminating the power of the Trade Unions and 
enhance Britain's international standing47. The battle against inflation was the most important of 
these objectives to the 'New Right' in 197948. Displaying tremendous confidence in the ability 
of market forces to cure the woes of the country by promoting competitive efficiency and 
accountability, Mrs Thatcher put forward this 'philosophy' from her earliest days as Leader of 
the Opposition. However, these principles appeared in their purest form during the 1987 
General Election campaign. With a large majority behind her, the Prime Minister sought to 
'Roll Back the State' as much as possible; a policy with its origins in the neoliberal creed. This 
programme was very much to include Local Government - with important consequences for my 
hypothesis. Important measures included the introduction of the Poll Tax. and furthering the 
46 Thatcher, Margaret (compiled by: Cooke, Alistair B.): "The Revival of Britain. Speeches on 
Home & European Affairs 1975-1988", London, Arum Press, 1989, p249. 
47 Lee, Stephen J.: "Aspects of British Political HistOlY 1914-1995", Routledge, London, 1996, 
&231. 
Evans, 1997, pit. 
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privatisation programme49. Clive Grey notes that Mrs Thatcher's modifications in Local 
Government changed the post war consensus that had been accepted in Scotland and the rest of 
the Union50. Opposition parties in Scottish Local Government did not welcome such a change5l . 
As we shall see in subsequent chapters, this dynamic was to have a serious effect on the 
Conservatives 'POS' north of the border. 
There is little doubt that the Prime Minister could not be swayed easily from her devotion 
to this brand of policies. Indeed, given her personality, and the inherent dangers to their career 
prospects of doing so, few Cabinet members were prepared to try. An interviewee who wishes 
to remain anonymous on this point related the best demonstration of this scenario to me. He 
recalled how new members of the Cabinet were often quietly advised by their more seasoned 
colleagues never to interrupt the Prime Minister when she was "on a roll." This says more about 
Mrs Thatcher's personality than about whether Thatcherism was an ideology. We will examine 
the effect of this personality on the 'POMP' and 'POS' in Scotland in Chapter 4. For the time 
being, it is nonetheless essential to note that this Prime Minister, perhaps more than any of her 
Conservative predecessors, was determined to rigorously adhere to her principles. This was not 
a problem when the English economy was buoyant. However, when more flexibility was 
required, such as with the Scottish situation, the Prime Minister was seen to fai152. 
49 Guardian, 22.5.87. 
50 Grey, Clive: "Government Beyond the Centre - Sub-National Politics in Britain", Basingstoke, 
Macmillan, 1994, p55. 
51 Interview with Viscount Younger, 14.2.01. The 'Rolling Back the State' programme's effects 
on Local Government and the 'POS' in Scotland are examined closely in Chapter 5. 
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However, before Mrs Thatcher is judged as being solely committed to the dogmatic 
adherence to a narrow ideology, another dimension must be considered. Rather than being a 
pro-active theory of government, some writers such as David Marsh and Andrew Gamble 
conclude that Tbatcherism was devised as a pragmatic response to the circumstances that the 
Conservatives faced at the end of the 1970s53 . Instead of New Right ideology being the only 
guide to the Government's actions, it could be considered to have been merely a tool to deal with 
economic stagnation. To follow the ways of authoritarian populism can even be seen to be a 
pragmatic move, as voters in Britain and around the western world seemed to be moving in this 
direction54• Marsh also suggests that using Britain's industrial malaise as being the only reason 
for the advent of Thatcherism is too simplistic. He prefers to cite the social and economic 
problems of the 1970s as just the context in which the Conservatives had to take electoral and 
policy decisions. Therefore, the Thatcher Governments should not be judged as having been a 
complete reversal of all traditional Conservative ways. 
A difference with earlier times was detected due to the novelty of the policies and 
accompanying attitudes. Accusations that Thatcherism was a dangerously radical creed came 
most often from voters and Party members who did not benefit from the actual policies55• James 
Mitchell holds the opinion that the Conservative Party was doing very well in England by 
52 A series ofunattributable interview comments - Winter 2000-2001. 
53 Marsh, David: Explaining 'Thatcherite' Policies: Beyond Uni-dimensional Explanation, in: 
Political Studies, 1995 XLill, pp595-613, pp595-597 + Gamble in: Mohan, John (ed.): "The 
Political Geography of Contemporary Britain", Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1989, ppl-3. 
54 Interview with Keith Harding, 12.9.01. 
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picking up new working class voters with its tax cuts. However, he feels that the Party became 
too reliant on this section of society. Mitchell believes that the Conservatives felt that Scotland 
was no longer worth fighting for as a healthy Parliamentary majority could be obtained just by 
securing England56. If such an attitude filtered through to fonnerly loyal supporters north of the 
border, they would have become very disenchanted57. 
A senior Conservative asserted to me at interview that the ideals of Thatcherism rang true 
in Scotland and that she had many admirers there58. However, this admiration could not be 
translated into effective local campaigning and support. The interviewee admitted that a major 
cause of this failure in the 'pas' was the perception amongst Scottish Conservatives that the 
party in London ultimately did not care about the fate of its northern branches. This is an 
example of Scottish Conservatives being put into an untenable situation by London. Even if the 
Scots' perception was unjustified, the very presence of these feelings would have had a 
malevolent effect on the 'pas.' Therefore, the issue should have been addressed by the 
Conservative elite in London through their intra-Party and 'POMP' dealings with their Local 
Government representatives and Associations in Scotland. 
Most importantly, however, it should be noted that the Thatcher years were unpopular in 
Scotland because of the policies that were imposed and the contemporary economic conditions 
55 The Poll Tax was an example of a zero-sum situation where those who lost out financially 
were far more vocal with their protests than any praise that came from voters who benefited -
Interview with Ross Harper, 6.8.01. 
56 This opinion was refuted by all of my elite interviewees from within the Conservative Party. 
57 Interview with James Mitchell, 8.6.00. 
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north of the border. Importantly, any particular changes in ideology, for example from Unionist 
to unitary, were not noticed particularly by the electorate or Party members, who were more 
concerned with their immediate employment prospects and financial situations59. When she 
became Conservative Leader, Mrs Thatcher was received with relief and confidence by a party, 
including its Scottish members, who wanted to distance themselves from the Heath era60. She 
undertook to tackle the Trade Unions and this pro-active style was welcomed in the same way as 
Ian McLeod's promises of tax cuts in the 1960s. Nevertheless, especially up to the 1987 General 
Election, there is little justification for identifying radical ideological shifts in the Conservative 
Party. The 'POMP' may have been pursued with new vigour and direction, but this is 
insufficient evidence for arguing that the ideology of the Thatcher years caused a breakdown in 
the 'POS' in Scotland. 
Once Mrs Thatcher was out of office, one of the biggest challenges facing her successor 
was to decide which policies and attitudes should be perpetuated, and which ones jettisoned? 
We see how Mr Major dealt with successful and troublesome policies such as the sale of Council 
Houses and the Poll Tax elsewhere in this thesis. In this chapter, we are most concerned with 
what levels of dogma the new Prime Minister approached his position? As the example of the 
1992 General Election campaign shows, there were some issues, with direct impact on the voters 
of Scotland, that Mr Major was prepared to take a stand on. 
58 Anonymous Interview, 21.6.00. 
S9 Ibid and Interview with Lord Strathclyde, 8.11.00. Statistical support for this assertion is 
presented in Appendix A to this chapter. 
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The 1992 General Election Campaign 
Norman Blackwell, the head of Mr Major's policy unit, had five key themes that the 
Party's 'statecraft' should be based on. They were: a sound economy, opportunity and choice, 
law and order, first class public services and national pride61 . Blackwell had realised that the 
Party elite seemed out of touch with the needs and desires of its supporters around the country, 
including Scotland, and consequently initiated 'Operation Disraeli.' This was a consultation 
exercise to try to construct an accurate picture of what the Government should be trying to 
deliver in terms of 'POMP' in order to maximise support at the next General Election. The 
themes listed above were based on his findings. However, it remained to be seen how the 
Government could operationalise the concepts whilst remaining within the guiding principles of 
Conservatism and, more importantly, within the parameters of cost and ease of implementation. 
One of the issues of principle that was to have the most significant effect on Scotland 
was the Unionist stand against Devolution taken by the Major campaign during the 1992 General 
Election. In his autobiography, the former Prime Minister outlines his reasons for a heavily pro-
Unionist stance62. He describes how he felt that Devolution would lead to a 'slippery slope' 
ending in the break up of the United Kingdom63. Thus, Britain would have lost credibility and 
standing on the international stage. Furthermore, Scotland would lose the political influence it 
60 Interview with Martin Perry, 24.8.01. 
61 Seldon, Anthony: "Major - A Political Life", London, Phoenix, 1998, p543. 
62 Major, John: "The Autobiogmpby''', London, Harper Collins, 1999, pp415-418. 
63 Mr Major was not the first Conservative to express this fear. Lord Sanderson confinned that 
William Whitelaw saw this dangers of Devolution many years before, thus confirming how a 
long-standing assessment of a literal situation can be adopted as a key principle of conservatism 
- Interview 30.11.00. 
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enjoys through the Scottish Office in London and much of the inward investment that had 
generated the start of an economic recovery. 
The Prime Minister was aware that the official Party line on Devolution was not 
necessarily going to be popular in the contemporary Scottish climate64. However, the decision 
was taken to pursue this tactic because it was 'right', even if the electoral consequences would 
be to see the last thousand Unionists in Scotland 'go down in flames' together65. As we shall see 
in Chapter 4, the Conservatives frequently justified policies that were uniquely unpopular in 
Scotland as being 'right.' The example of the replacement of the Poll Tax, one such 'right' 
policy, when it became unpopular in England suggests that the Party's sense of right was not 
entirely independent from serious problems at the polls that their policies were causing. Herein 
lies a most important question. Can a key guiding principle really overpower the desire for 
electoral success in the Conservative Party? 
The genuineness of Mr Major's hostility towards Devolution is questionable because of 
the fact that, at the same time he was advocating continued administrative centralisation within 
the UK, he was stridently opposing the same feature of governance being proposed for the 
European Union66. This issue is not quite as clear as Gilmour would have us believe, however. 
Lord Lang. a key architect of the Conservatives' position on Scotland at the time, explained the 
64 Hogg, Sarah & Hill, Jonathan: "Too Close to Call. Power & Politics - John Major in No. 10", 
London, Little, Brown & Co., 1995, p248. 
6S Ibid, p246. 
66 Gilmour, Ian: "Whatever Hapj)ened to the Tories - the Conservatives Since 1945", London, 
Fourth Estate Ltd., 1997, p370. 
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difficult balance that was being sought then67. The Conservatives have always seen themselves 
as a 'naturally Devolutionary party', in the sense that they wish to devolve as much power as 
possible not to regional governance, but directly to individual voters. This idea corresponds with 
Bulpitt's ideas on central autonomy and a contemporary desire to by-pass pockets of socialism in 
Local Govemment68. As later chapters will show, this disregard for local affairs and 
organisation was to cost the Conservatives very dearly in General Elections in Scotland. The 
hardest task, according to Lord Lang, was to find a 'stable ledge' between full integrationary 
Unionism and the Conservatives' brand of Devolution to the individual in Scotland, as with 
relations with the EU. Lord Lang was sceptical about whether such a point can be found in 
practice, thus demonstrating the complications incurred when a key principle and the 
contemporary situation are not in harmony69. 
One of the key questions in my elite interview schedule, therefore, centred on whether 
the 1992 anti-Devolution campaign was genuinely being run on key principles, or whether it was 
a pragmatic strategy, merely justified by, and promoted as, being somehow 'above' the more 
mundane day-to-day (mainly economic/fiscal) issues7o? Without fail, every respondent 
confirmed that the Prime Minister truly believed in the Union and campaigned passionately for 
its preservation. Ross Harper confirmed the view that the Conservatives could have avoided 
fighting the Nationalists head on over the issue of Devolution71. Such a confrontation would 
67 Interview, 27.3.01. 
68 Bulpitt in: Madgwick & Rose (eds.), 1982, p163. 
69 Interview 27.3.01. 
70 Hogg & Hill, 1995, p249. 
71 Interview, 6.8.01. 
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always be more costly than taking on Labour and diverted attention from combating the main 
Opposition. Furthermore, it was felt at the time that the advent of a Scottish Parliament would 
help the Conservatives at Westminster72. Nevertheless, a principled stand was taken. The 
Conservatives were an Unionist party and would promote this message, no matter how 
unpopular, in Scotland. However, this is not to say that the programme was adopted with no 
consideration for its possible electoral effects. Lord Strathclyde confirmed that a decision to 
pursue this tack was taken by a meeting of Scottish Conservative Parliamentarians at the end of 
1991 after a worrying by-election loss in Aberdeen73. Therefore, being a committee decision, it 
seems that this policy was constructed on more than just the Prime Minister's feelings. 
Another factor that should be considered is that the Party made the calculation that there 
was little prospect of electoral success in being seen as only the fourth most enthusiastic party 
for Devolution in Scotland 74. Instead, the decision was taken to try to sweep up all of the anti-
secession voters of all party persuasions, including the SNP, who may well have been in favour 
of Devolution, but feared the economic dangers of the 'slippery slope' towards independence75• 
As the campaign progressed, an unforeseen benefit of a heavily pro-Unionist stance 
became evident. Not only did Scottish voters see the message as important, but the English also 
began to rally to Mr Major's defence of the Union76• Given the heated debates over Europe at 
72 This does not seem to have been the case in 2001. 
73 Interview, 8.11.00. 
74 Anonymous Interview, 21.6.00. 
75 Interview with Lord Lang, 27.3.01. 
76 Ibid 
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the time, any seemingly genuine defence of the integrity of the UK was going to be popular 
south of the border. Therefore, another electoral reason for standing by this key principle is 
revealed. Commenting on this point, James Mitchell was prepared to say that he felt that the 
1992 Unionist campaign was designed mainly for English consumption77• The implications of 
Lord Lang's comments did not seem to be that strong. This incident, though, does demonstrate 
the value of the occasional use of dogma to justify contentious policies. 
However, as Andrew Gamble noted, the Conservatives in London were "recklessly" no 
longer thinking of their Scottish members in 'POS' terms by this poine8. This means that this 
seemingly regionally specific policy had been made with little consultation with those whom it 
would affect most directly. That it did not coincide with their opinions on the issue of 
Devolution made it even more unlikely that it would be successfully implemented north of the 
border. As Gamble said, the Conservative supporters in Scotland were feeling marginalised. 
This thesis tests whether such a relationship with the centre broke down Local Government 
representation, organisation and enthusiasm sufficiently to endanger General Election prospects. 
To conclude this brief examination of the effect of a principle on the 'POMP', it should 
be noted that there can be very little doubt that Mr Major genuinely believed his rhetoric about 
the preservation of the Union. However, given the above examples of how the message was 
77 Interview 8.6.00. 
78 Interview 16.3.00. Lord MacKay of Ardbrecknish felt that up to 25% of Conservatives in 
Scotland were in favour of some sort of Devolution at this time to stem the nationalist cause -
Interview 25.1.01. 
57 
examined for electoral viability along the way, I feel that it would have been modified or 
underplayed had the conclusions been different. 
We have seen how some key issues in Conservatism can have an effect on the way in 
which the Party is run. The underlying theme has been that there are few core beliefs that can 
sway the Party from a pragmatic vote-winning approach. However, once a way forward has been 
decided on, it is not easy to sway the chosen course. If poor policy design and implementation 
was at the root of the Conservatives' demise in Scotland, the ability to request and implement 
changes might have saved them. Therefore, we must now examine the structure, organisation 
and modus operandi of the Party to see how key principles or pragmatism were converted into 
policies and who actually had the power to make and change these decisions. 
Organisation Within the Conservative & Unionist Party 
The purpose of this section is to examine which agents and structures influence policy 
making in the Party; thereby facilitating a more informed assessment of how the Conservatives' 
'POMP' may have led to problems in the 'POS' in Scotland. In the brief examination of 
Conservative philosophy above, we have seen that the Party is quite renowned for seeking 
pmgmatic solutions to contempomry problems, mther than relying on dogma. As dogma has a 
relatively small role to play in the Conservative 'POMP', actors, agencies and structures are of 
paramount importance. This is because it is their deeds that have constructed the late Twentieth 
Century 'POMP' that had such a disastrous effect on the Party's 'POS' and ultimately, therefore, 
their right to govern in Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom. 
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The agenda of this section includes an examination of the structure and history of the 
Party, the office of the Party Leader, deference shown to the Leader, the Central Office, the Party 
Secretariat and the Party Conference. With particular reference to the 'POMP', the influence of 
Scottish MPs and Members of the House of Lords, the Scottish Office and Secretary of State and 
infonnal situations where important decisions may be taken are explored. As we shall see, all 
these actors and institutions hold varying degrees of influence in the Party, and are able to affect 
the 'POMP' accordingly. If peripheral input into 'POMP' was pennitted and encouraged, 
regionally insensitive policies should not have emerged. If they did, the central elite could claim 
to have been misinfonned by their geographically peripheral representatives. A key task, 
therefore, is to assess who held real decision making power in the Party from 1979-19971 
Structure & Historical Development of the Party - Where are Decisions Made? 
This study will first consider the constitutional structure of the Conservative Party. I 
wish to discover whether the Party is officially open to the input of all its members around the 
United Kingdom? If the Conservative 'constitution,79 suggests that such democracy is officially 
frowned upon, then the potential for peripheral dissidence rises abruptly. That all power rests 
with a limited number of, mainly English, officials in Smith Square or the corridors of 
Westminster would mean that any decision-making powers enumerated to the Conservative 
Associations in Scotland seem somewhat worthless. Another, sometimes overlooked, aspect of 
English domination that is not good for the Party in Scotland is the apparent Anglicanisation of 
79 The Conservatives survive more on infonnal contacts, tradition and precedents than 
formalised constitutional rules - Interview with Lord Sanderson, 30.11.00. However, there are 
permanent hierarchical structures to be studied. 
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its leaders there. The imposition of English officials, or (even more gallingly80) the return of 
Scots from the south with their nationality diluted in favour of the ways of London, has fuelled 
the view that Scotland has no role or influence in the Party or government of the United 
Kingdom81 . Lord Strathclyde confirmed that his Commission into the reorganisation of the Party 
in Scotland was very keen to address this apparent imbalance82. 
This chapter is seeking to find out where binding decisions are made in the Conservative 
Party and whether Scottish Conservatives have sufficient access to these forums? The first task, 
therefore, is to establish a chain of command within the Party. There is no constitutional 
document that can immediately identify who has ultimate hold on power. Thus, it is often left to 
the researcher to infer how the various bodies within the Party relate to each other83~ inferences 
that I have made, based on elite interview material, in Chart 2.1. On UK wide and Scottish 
levels, the Party is divided into three 'strands', the Parliamentary, 'professional' and voluntary84. 
The most important aspect of the links in Chart 2.1 is that, whilst information may be 
passed upwards, the Party Leader holds immense power to dictate and make appointments down 
the chain of command. Remembering that anything that might undermine the cohesion of local 
80 Interview with Lord Fraser, 5.3.01. 
81 Interviews with Lords MacKay of Ardbrecknish and Fraser, 25.1.01 & 5.3.01. 
82 Interview, 8.11.00. Most such intra-party exercises are accused of being exercises that achieve 
little but perpetuation of the current elite. David Seawright is convinced that this is what the 
Strathclyde Commission is aiming to do - Interview, 13.4.00. 
83 Gamer, Robert & Kelly, Richard: "British Political Parties Today", Manchester, Manchester 
University Press, 1993, p98. 
84 www.scottish.tory.org.uk, as depicted in Chart 2.1 (my interpretation of the various texts in 
this website). 
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Party organisation in Scotland could be very dangerous for the 'POS', the need for regional 
sensitivity in these instruments of the Leader's power is clear. Furthermore, whilst the most 
obvious sideways links have been depicted in the schematic, it is important to note that a well 
developed network of effective informal links exists that can transcend status and function, as 
will be discussed later in this chapter. 
The politicallParliamentary wing is under the control of the Party Chairman. Most of the 
Party's members are in local Associations; they form the voluntary section. The constituency 
Associations are affiliated to the National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations. 
The professional strand of the Party is concentrated in the Central Offices in London and 
Edinburgh85. The National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations was set up in 1867 
to make contact between the Parliamentary Party and the newly enfranchised urban voters. Even 
in official pronouncements, this body has been known as the 'handmaid' of the Parliamentary 
86 Party . 
85 The reforms initiated by Russell Fairgrieve in the 1970s integrated many of the functions of 
the Scottish Central Office into Smith Square. However, a balance was maintained as Scottish 
constituencies were thereafter permitted to send representatives to the national Conference in the 
same proportions as their English counterparts - Butler & Kavanagh, 1980, p117. 
86 McKenzie, R. T.: "British Political Parties. The Distribution of Power Within the 
Conservative and Labour Parties", London, Heninemenn, 1963, p146. 
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2.1 - Organisation of the Conservative Party 
Sources: Gamer, Robert & Kelly, Richard: "British Political Parties Today - 2nd Ed.", 
Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1998, pp92-94, www.scottish.tory.org 
+ Interviews with Lords Sanderson, 30.11.00 & Mackay of Clashfern, 22.1.01. 
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The Party Leader 
It should be noted at this point that the Constituency Association members did not have 
the right, as they do now, to vote in the Party Leadership election process during the era covered 
by this thesis. After only a brief assessment of the machinations of the various Party bodies and 
glancing at Chart 2.1, the all-encompassing power of the Party Leader becomes apparent. He or 
she appoints the Party Chairman and Executive Committee of the National Union. A Central 
Council governs the National Union. This Council has approximately one thousand members 
including the Party Leader, MPs, Peers, Parliamentary candidates and other senior officials. One 
of the primary roles of the Council is to elect the National Union Chairman and three Vice-
Chairmen. The decisions still, however, have to be ratified by the Party Leader. The Central 
Council must also officially ratify the decisions of the two hundred strong Executive Committee 
and discuss and vote on changes to the National Union organisation. One would imagine that 
organisations with names such as 'Executive Committee' or 'Central Council' would be quite 
powerful. However, they have only been instituted ultimately to advise the Party Leader. The 
Leader has control over the personnel on these committees and Councils. By virtue of only 
appointing supporters, it is therefore easy to ensure that only advice sympathetic to the wishes of 
the Leader appears87. The Leader also has complete power over the selection of any 
Conservative Cabinet. The Conservative Central Office is also frequently referred to as the 
Party Leader's 'personal machine,88. 
87 Interviews with Lord Sanderson, 30.11.00 &, Ross Harper, 6.8.01. 
88 Gamer &, Kelly, 1993, p125. 
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Proof of the Party Leader's vast power comes in the form of some of the functions he or 
she can undertake without technically having to listen to anyone else's advice. These include 
appointments and policy decisions affecting the whole Party. In 1962, the Scottish 
Conservatives sent Harold Macmillan their appraisal of many contemporary policy matters, 
including Britain's possible involvement with the European Community and possible legal 
reforms89. In his reply, the Prime Minister thanks them for their concern and input. However, 
he leaves them in no doubt where such important decisions are to be taken. He continues by 
reminding them that such central innovations as the Local Employment Act of 1960 are enough 
to look after their local needs90. Thus, the primacy of the centre is asserted, even at the risk of 
alienating peripheral workers, who may have felt that their strenuous efforts and views were 
being ignored. 
A good example of a Conservative Leader trying to use the power of appointment to 
perpetuate her own position came when Mrs Thatcher attempted to remove Scottish 
Conservative opposition to her policies by appointing Michael Forsyth as Chairman of the Party 
north of the border. This was an attempt to quash the complaints of leading Scottish 
Conservatives such as William Whitelaw, George Younger and Malcolm Rifkind by sending a 
89 This example may seem anachronistic (chronological restrictions are placed upon the 
Conservative Party Archive at the Bodleian Library). However, its inclusion is merited as the 
attitudes therein generated my interest in intra-Party relationships and inspired a line of 
questioning about more contemporary matters in my series of elite interviews. Furthermore, it is 
important to assess whether the 1980s and 1990s mark an era of change or continuity in 
Conservatives' organisation; as the presence of radical change would suggest some degree of 
causality with regard to the Party's 'POS' problems in Scotland. 
90 CCO 2/6/20. 
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Thatcherite into their midst91 . Ian Lang's appointment as Secretary of State by John Major was a 
similar move to try to install a sympathiser, rather than critic, from the Scottish Conservative 
elite92. If a leader is personally domineering and full of conviction, as Mrs Thatcher was, 
collegiate decision making can disappear. There is no formal method of calling a Leader to 
account93. 
Evans and Taylor re-iterate the importance of the Leader's powers, citing his or her 
influence over the Parliamentary and professional wings of the Party as being crucially important 
to maintaining a single direction for the party94. Such strength of direction by the Leader 
corresponds with the 'Political Argument Hegemony' part of Bulpitt's 'statecraft' theory9S. 
However, Bulpitt does also note the importance of responding to the wishes and desires of the 
Party at large when necessary to maintain cohesion96• Evans and Taylor also stress the 
importance of satisfying the aspirations of the Party members to keep them working and 
believing in the chance of electoral success. Raising the 'spectre of electoral defeat' is often a 
powerful weapon of the Party Leader to motivate his or her grass roots members97• 
91 Unattributable interview comments, Winter 2000-2001 + Bradbury, Jonathan: "British 
Regionalism & Devolution", London, Jessica Kingsley, 1997, p79. 
92 Bradbury, 1997, pSO. 
93 Whiteley, Paul; Syed, Patrick & Richardson, Jeremy: "True Blues. The Politics of 
Conservative Party Membership", Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994, p39. 
94 Evans, Brendan & Taylor, Andrew: "From Salisbury to Major. Continuity and Change in 
Conservative Politics", Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1996, pp279-80. 
95 Bulpitt, Jim: The Discipline of the New Democracy: Mrs Thatcher's Domestic Statecraft, in: 
Political Studies, 1986,34, ppI9-39, p21. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Interviews with David Seawright, 13.4.00 and Viscount Younger, 14.2.01. 
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Deference to the Party Leader 
This issue introduces a notion of deference towards the Party Leader~ even when his or 
her policies are contrary to the wishes of the peripheral members at large. Thus, this point 
constitutes a major reason why Party members have accepted dictates from London and 
members of the local elite. However, as Lords Fraser and Lang noted, the modernisation of 
society towards the end of the Twentieth Century led to a reduction in unquestioning deference. 
This cost the Conservatives dearly in Local Government and General Elections in Scotland as 
disaffected members either perpetuated rifts, left, or stopped working effectively for the party98. 
It is interesting to note here that the Party elite in London seemed to be aware of the 'POS' 
problems that were being caused by organisational failure in Scot1and~ yet no substantial changes 
were effected. 
Examination of the dynamics above suggests that the Party Leader is almost all-powerful. 
One would imagine that such domination by a single figure might not sit well with sophisticated 
members of a modem western democratic party. However, this does not seem to be the case. 
All Conservatives are primarily concerned with winning elections. Thus, there seems to be a 
trend for allowing the party's elite to carry on unhindered with the 'POMP.' Gamer and Kelly 
assert that, with regard to winning elections amongst the Party's grass roots: 
"(T)here has been a general belief that the best way to secure this goal - rather 
like an army winning a war - is to allow the leadership discretion and flexibility 
and to lend wholehearted support to whichever course of action is decided 
upon,,99. 
98 Interviews with Lord Fraser, 5.3.01, Lord Lang, 27.3.01 & Ross Harper, 6.8.01. 
99 Gamer & Kelly, 1998, pl02. 
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This view was shared by Martin Perry, who asserted that most Conservative constituency 
members join more for the social advantages than out of a desire to exert political influence. 
These members acknowledge the greater expertise of the Professional and Parliamentary wings 
of the Party. Importantly, any potential disquiet is easily stemmed by appealing their desire to 
seem important. Thus, an occasional visit to a constituency by a Cabinet member for a social 
event is usually enough to ensure continued loyaltyl()(). 
Apathy is a continual problem for all parties. One example of it within the Conservative 
Party is the discontinuation of the Conservative Political Centre's Reference Digest in the mid-
1960s. This guide was produced for members who may have wanted to search for more detailed 
information about contemporary debates and policies. If 'knowledge is power', then the ready 
availability such information would have constituted a definite move towards 
populism/pluralism within the Party. However, too few members took up the offer. It was 
quietly cancelled in May of 1965. A decade earlier, the Scottish Party elite had complained to 
General Director in London about the difficulty in educating/generating interest amongst the 
masses for political and economic issueslO1 • Especially in the 1980s, this dynamic became a 
particularly acute problem for the Conservatives in Scotland as they were being opposed on the 
Local Government level by well motivated, organised and 'canny' Labour and SNP cells lO2• 
100 Interview, 24.8.01. 
101 ceo 2/3/13. 
102 Interview with Viscount Younger, 14.2.01. 
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The serious implications of grass roots apathy for the chances of General Election 
success must be emphasised when considering the 'POS.' If local members fail to work for the 
central Party, then electoral failure beckons. A certain lack of interest must be attributed to 
normal apathy. However, it seems that insensitive treatment by the Party elite is necessary as 
well as apathy to dissuade grass roots members from working altogether. Very pertinently, such 
problems accrued at the local level in Scotland when the Conservative Leadership put the 
members in an impossible situation by asking them to stand up for, and run in Local Government 
Elections under the shadow of, regionally insensitive central policies. As Garner and Kelly point 
out, tradition and convention, rather than constitutional rules, dictate how the Party's central 
elite in London feel that they should be supported by the mass membership. Loyalty is assumed 
and dissent is neither expected nor tolerated103 . The presence of 'renegades' is inevitable in 
large organisations. The Conservative Party suffered in this respect in England over the issue of 
Europe in the 1990s. Ultimately, however, these dissenters must either defer or leave104. Such 
defections may have been sustainable in England. Working from a more shallow support base in 
Scotland suggests that any reductions in numbers and cohesion would have put the Party's 'POS' 
in considerable jeopardy there. 
Lord Mackay of Clashfem maintained that there were always avenues open to the 
membership if they wished to express dissatisfaction. However, such protests never seemed to 
arise 105. Lord Fraser noted that serious problems accrued for the leadership from not attending to 
103 Gamer & Kelly, 1998, pl00 & (in less strident terms) Anonymous Interview, 21.6.00. 
104 Interview with Ross Harper, 6.8.01. 
105 Interview, 22.1.01. 
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the unexpressed fears of the members, such as unemployment106. It seems somewhat harsh to 
expect the metropolitan Government to attend to inaudible protests. However, it is also 
reasonable to expect an administration to be aware of potential problems and sufficiently in 
touch with the needs and desires of its constituents to acknowledge when discontent was 
growing, even if it had no co-ordinated voice. Ross Harper defended the Party's leaders by 
saying that they could not be expected to know what local problems were developing in 
Scotland107. This opinion was modified by the assertion that it was, nevertheless, the job of the 
Secretary of State to keep London informed of events north of the border. The role of the 
Secretary of State is examined more closely later in this chapter. However, it is already 
becoming clear that some problems may have gone unnoticed. Thus, a fairly subtle (but 
nonetheless dangerous) problem such as the failure of local organisation and representation was 
unlikely to receive much attention from London. 
Garner and Kelly cite Robert McKenzie and Richard Rose as having described the 
Conservative leadership as being like a pre-constitutional monarch. Such a feudal system 
concentrates power. Such autocracy is reflected in the philosophy of the Party. Such ideology 
includes a belief in strong leadership, power, and responsibility in addition to unity, discipline, 
loyalty and respect lOS. Andrew Gamble notes, however, how this ethos may be a cause of the 
Party elite forgetting their own members. He writes: "It is hardly surprising, then, that the 
practical problems of organising government have busied Conservative leaders more than the 
106 Interview, 5.3.01. 
107 Interview, 6.8.01. 
lOS Gamer & Kelly, 1998, ppl00-l02. 
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practical problems of organising electoral support" 109. A familiar accusation levelled at the 
Conservatives in the 1980s was that they were over-concentrating on satisfying their affluent 
supporters in South East EnglandllD• This provides more evidence to suggest that London might 
not have been accommodating grass roots members and Local Government representatives in 
Scotland. This thesis assesses whether this mistake was to manifest itself in poor General 
Election results in Scotland, as there was insufficient organisation left north of the border to run 
efficient campaigns? 
Conservative Central Officers) 
Given that effective opposition to the Party Leader is unlikely to come from the periphery 
of the Party, I will now investigate whether the Conservative Central Office can have any 
dissuasive effect on a Party Leader who is set in his or her ways? Such a voice could have 
alerted the Party elite to the problems growing in Scotland. The professional wing of the Party 
was set up in 1870. There are (for the purposes of this study - more have been added since 
1997) eleven Area Offices and, importantly, a separate Central Office for Scotland I 11. Ball 
claims that these offices have no power over the theoretically autonomous constituency 
Associations112. These Associations guard their autonomy from what are perceived to be the 
Leader's 'machine' in London or Edinburgh1l3. It should be remembered that this question of 
109 In: Drucker, H. M. (ed.): "Multi-Party Britain", Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1919, p26. 
lID Butler & Kavanagh, 1988, p269. 
III The number of areas was increased to twenty-six after the 1991 General Election. 
1I2 My anonymous interviewee at Central Office (21.6.00) and Lord Sanderson - Interview 
30.11.00, substantiated this claim. 
113 Ball, Stuart: "The Conservative Party and British Politics 1902-1951", London, Longman, 
1995, pp20-22. 
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autonomy between centre and periphery works both ways. Bulpitt is keen to express how the 
centre would also want to remain aloof from the 'low politics' of the peripheryll4. The Central 
Offices were instituted to provide infonnation, organisation, campaign co-ordination, marketing 
and propaganda services for the Party. That comparable integration and funding has not always 
extended north of the border has caused disquiet amongst Scottish Conservatives for many 
Even in the era before the centralisation of power in the 1980s, Michael Pinto-
Duschinsky was one of only a small minority who were prepared to argue that the Central Office 
was anything other than a personal civil service for the Conservative Leader. He cites the fact 
that the Leader does not choose all the personnel in Central Office. The Central Office should 
not be compared with the temporary party machine of a US Presidential candidate. The 
personnel in Smith Square do not have such a personal stake in the success of the Leader. Thus, 
they may be more willing to dissent I 16. Pinto-Duschinsky argues that, especially after the 
Maxwell-Fyfe Committee findings in the late 1940s, the Central Office should be viewed as the 
servant of the Party as a whole. Central Office is there to guide, inspire, co-ordinate, assist and 
provide services for all the local Associations 117. 
114 Bulpitt in Madgwick & Rose (eds.) 1982, p161 - my thesis seeks to test and prove the 
General Election dangers of doing so. 
lIS CCO 2/7/13. 
116 Pinto-Duschinsky, Michael: Central Office and 'Power' in the Conservative Party, in: 
Political Studies, 20 (1), 1972, ppl-16, p2. 
117 Ibid, p9. 
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However, this view that Central Office is not predominantly in the thrall of the Party 
Leader is not typical, and hardly applicable during the Thatcher yearslls. An example of the 
minimal influence of Central Office noted even before Pinto-Duschinsky wrote was R. T. 
McKenzie's assertion that Area Offices, representing Central Office, and thus the Party Leader, 
were only in control of the work of their provincial areas 11 9. He asserts that only the Executive 
Committee was ever really able to exert some genuine advisory influence with the leadership120. 
The Conservative Political Centre does canvass the opinion of Party members about 
policies. This form of consultation would seem to be an essential part of maintaining the 'POS' 
in peripheral regions, as central policies might be received differently there and require 
amendment to make them easier to defend at the local level. R. A. Butler was very keen on the 
institution of this practice. In modem times, however, feedback from non-elite sources away 
from London is not seriously taken into consideration in the formulation of the 'POMP' 121. 
One important role of the Central Office is to emphasise the importance of the local 
members at election time. This is a vitally important component of the 'POS.' Even though 
General Elections are won on national issues, the Central Office boosts local members' self 
esteem and persuades them to work for the causel22• An attempt at this appears in Conservative 
Newsline, of February 1992 (p6). Like other Central Office publications, this newspaper is 
118 Anonymous Interview, 21.6.00. 
119 McKenzie, 1963, p237. 
120 Interview with Lord Sanderson, 30.11.00. 
121 Interview with Martin Perry, 24.8.01. 
122 Whitely et ai, 1994, p25. 
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usually filled with reports and instructions from the Party elite in London. This editorial, 
however, departs from the usual and tries to describe how important lower ranked members are 
to the election cause. Thus, Election Agents, Association Officers and other volunteers are 
singled out for praise and ego boosting. These individuals and groups form the backbone of the 
'POS.' 
It is therefore interesting to note that the Party leadership recognises the importance of 
keeping these workers happy and prepared to put in the effort for the cause. Morale was 
especially in need of such boosting after the unpopular policies of the 1980s when the prospect 
of heavy defeat did not inspire Party workers to tum out for their duties 123. It should always be 
remembered that such central praise for peripheral workers could often be superficial. For 
example, the tone of internal memoranda around the General Director's Office even in the mid-
1950s was somewhat disparaging towards complaining local agentsl24. This tone never appeared 
in communications with Scotland. Indeed, a vigorous campaign was launched by Central Office 
in 1965 to re-assure Scottish Conservatives that they were doing a good job and that neither the 
Prime Minister nor Central Office had any designs on exerting more dictatorial orders upon 
them 125. The whole episode emanated from a report in the Sunday Telegraph of 4.4.65. It 
claimed that Central Office in London had plans to control every aspect of the running of the 
party north of the border. Reforms were in the offing. However, Scottish agents were told in no 
123 Interviews with David Seawright 13.4.00, Viscount Younger, 14.2.01 & Lord Fraser, 5.3.0l. 
124 CCO 2/7/13. 
125 Ibid. 
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uncertain terms that they should wait for the genuine report of the Chelmer Committee, which 
was looking into the possibility of administrative changes126. 
With regard to the hypothesis under consideration, it is important to note that the Central 
Office has had a Local Government Department since 1946. This department nominally 
provides administration and organisation for the National Advisory Committee on Local 
Government (part of the National Union) and Conference. It also is used for explaining and 
publicising public policy issues and providing advice for local electioneering. One might expect 
that this department might be able to represent the needs and desires of the periphery in the 
metropolis. However, as they tend to fall under the remit of the Party Secretariat, they are just 
another part of the Leader's power base127• 
The Party Secretariat 
John Ramsden exposes another part of the Conservative central machine that can cause 
grievance in Scotland. The Secretariat of the Party is employed to research attitudes around the 
country. It is not part of the Central Office, but still comes under close control of the Leader as 
part of the professional support wing of the Party. It cannot be easy to research attitudes in 
Scotland from London. Edward Heath noted this problem and asserted that the research that he 
wanted done on Devolution should be done by a Scotsman to ensure good appreciation of local 
126 Ibid (N.B. the Chelmer Report was not published until 1973). 
127 Rhodes, R.: "Beyond Westminster and Whitehall - The Sub-National Governments of 
Britain", London, Routledge, 1988 pp209-21O. 
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affairs 128. This was not the typical attitude shown by Conservative leaders on this issue. 
Usually, the Secretariat would not have Scotsmen in it, as the Party Leader would be too afraid 
that the resulting research would be biased away from London and central direction129. James 
Kellas confirms the motivation behind this fear by writing: 
"In one sense, most Scots are nationalists. They are conscious of their nationality, 
prefer to think of themselves as Scots, and can attribute characteristics to Scots in 
general which are different to those of other nations (for example, England)"130. 
Thus, the power of appointment is very important. As a consequence of 'safe' appointments 
made by the Leadership, the Secretariat's findings are usually sympathetic to the wishes of the 
central elite. Therefore, the Conservatives suffered from poor information about the Scottish 
situation. In this respect, they lagged behind Labour, who had a well-established research 
k · I 131 networ In p ace . 
We are seeing how the central machine of the Conservative Party is very much geared to 
the wishes of the Leader. An important dynamic for the hypothesis under consideration is 
whether there were effective opportunities for Conservative Local Councillors and Party 
members in Scotland to alert the Party elite as to the damage being done to the 'POS' by 
contemporary 'POMP' in Scotland? So far, there seem to be few such opportunities. Therefore, 
we must now examine other potential sources of information and constructive criticism. 
128 Ramsden, John: "The Making of Conservative Party Policy - The Conservative Research 
Department Since 1929", London, Longman, 1980, p264. 
129 Ibid, ppI25-6. 
130 Kellas, James: "The Scottish Political System - 4th Ed.", Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1989, p124 + Interviews with James Mitchell, 8.6.00 & David McLetchie, 19.1.01. 
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The Party Conference 
Gamer and Kelly argue that the annual Party Conference and its sixty or so support 
meetings throughout the year can exert considerable influence on the Party LeadershipI32. 
Especially since the embourgeoisement of the Party membership in the late Twentieth Century, 
Gamer and Kelly go on to argue, the Leadership has been forced to take more notice. I tested the 
credibility of this thesis with my interviewees. As we shall see, their replies did not always agree 
with the references I had explored. Gamer and Kellys' ideas are certainly a revision of the more 
traditional view, as expressed by, for example, McKenzie 133. Such works suspect that 
Conservative Conference delegates do not attend to make radical policy decisions. Rather, the 
annual Conference is an exercise in showing support for the Leadership134. Rubber stamping 
proposals is the order of the dayJ35. McKenzie suggests that some dissidence can surface. 
However, the membership knows that their protests can usually have little effect. They are 
happy just if there is some acknowledgement of their views from the Chair136. This more 
traditional assessment of the situation seems to be more realistic. There are few independent 
studies that are prepared to assign policy-changing power to Conference. Whiteley et al try to 
conclude that the actual situation lies somewhere between the opinions of McKenzie and 
GamerlKelly137 . 
131 Interview with Keith Harding, 12.9.01. 
132 Garner & Kelly, 1998, p93. Viscount Younger defended this view- Interview, 14.2.01. 
133 McKenzie, 1963, p199. 
134 Lord Fraser noted the 'revivalist rally' atmosphere that permeated many of these meetings in 
the 1980s - Interview 5.3.01. 
135 Confirmed at interview with Lord MacKay of Ardbrecknish 25.1.01. 
136 McKenzie. 1963. p237. 
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It seems clear that Conference has no more than token levels of influence on the course 
of the 'POMP.' Nevertheless, there has been one way in which the Conference has been able to 
exert pressure on Conservative Governments. The event is perhaps the most important public 
relations event of any year for the Party. Consequently, the Leadership is extremely aware and 
wary of any form of public internal dissent that could be broadcast from the floor or platform to 
the general electorate. Examples of the Party elite being embarrassed in this way include 
Macmillan over housing provision in the 1950s and the way in which Douglas-Home had to 
devise a compromise deal to save the Foreign Secretary Peter Carrington over Rhodesia in the 
In modem times, the event is very carefully managed, with constituency Associations 
being told to alert the Conference organisers of possible dissenters, who are never called to 
speak. Potentially divisive measures can be carried without discussion. The Leadership are 
always ready for divisions over Europe. Therefore, the issue is kept off the agenda as much as 
possible. Now that the main Conference is so carefully managed, the greatest source of potential 
embarrassment are fringe meetings that attract media coverage~ meetings over which the 
Leadership can exercise less control. Therefore, even though the power is quite minimal, the 
Conference can be seen, in the pre Leadership election era, to be the arena where Party 
grassroots members could exercise the most influence over the elite. 
137 Ibid, p39. 
138 Interview with Martin Perry, 24.8.01. 
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An interesting pattern emerges from the Party Archive regarding Scottish Conservative 
Conferences; which diminishes their potential for exercising power over the Leadership in 
London. Throughout the series of files that I consulted139, there were standard letters of 
invitation for members of the Party hierarchy in London to attend. These were almost always 
met with a polite refusal citing a previous engagement. These refusals were phrased in deeply 
regretful tones. It seems that the elite in London, whilst not being worried about having to 
attend, were most mindful of not appearing to give their Scottish colleagues the 'cold 
shoulder' 140. This observation demonstrates the presence of some elite appreciation of the 
·POS.' The tone of the Scots' letters suggests that they almost knew that their invitation would 
be turned down. More importantly, the refusal of London Conservatives to attend shows how 
they were not worried that any binding dissident motions could be passed in their absencel41 . 
Lord MacKay of Ardbrecknish noted the importance of the Leader making the effort to be seen 
at important Scottish events such as Conference or the Cup Final 142 . Peter Thomeycroft and R. 
A. Butler always reminded Mrs Thatcher to maintain a high profile in Scotlandl43 . This she did 
and had been very popular there during her time as Leader of the Oppositionl44• However, there 
seems to be little evidence that much actual decision-making power was granted to the periphery 
through Conference. If these ties with Scotland were not always effective in swaying the Prime 
Minister from potentially unpopular policies, other possible avenues have to be sought. The next 
139 Party rules restricted my access to files beyond the mid-1970s. However, it is worth noting 
these findings as they heavily informed and influenced my interview questions. 
140 For example: ceo 2/2/18 & ceo 2/7/13. 
141 Examples of these exchanges can be found in virtually all the ceo Area Files that I consulted 
(see Bibliography). 
142 Interview, 25.1.01. 
143 Interview with Lord Sanderson, 30.11.00. 
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one to examine is the more formalised relationship between the (pre-Devolution) Executive and 
Scottish Office/Secretary of State. 
The Scottish Office & Secretary of State 
A more formal source of information that influences the Conservative Party in 
Government is the Scottish Office. The most pertinent question here is whether, during the 
Thtacher-Major era, the Secretary of State fought for Scottish interests in Cabinet, or was merely 
a conduit for Governmental decisions north of the border? I put this question to all of my 
interviewees. They all agreed that the Secretary of State was, and saw himself as, 'Scotland's 
man in London' 145. However, there was not unanimity with regard to how effectively this role 
was played out; the main obstacle being that the Party elite in London rarely believed the gravity 
of the situation in Scotland being relayed to them by the Secretary of State. That the 
Conservatives could not arrest their demise north of the border suggests that Scottish public 
satisfaction with the Secretaries of State as defenders of their interests was minimal. This is 
important for the hypothesis in hand as such disaffected Scottish voters might have looked to 
alternative sources of political power if they felt that the status quo could not satisfy their needs. 
This thesis investigates the proposition that Local Government north of the border provided such 
a viable alternative. 
144 Interview with Lord MacKay of Ardbrecknish, 25.1.0 I. 
145 The then George Younger's offer to resign over the difficulties being experienced at the 
Ravenscraig Steel plant demonstrates this attitude well - Interviews with Lord MacKay of 
Ardbrecknish, 25.1.01 & Viscount Younger, 14.2.01. 
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It seems that this dissatisfaction was not being noted in London. For example, Lord 
Strathclyde believed that the Scottish Office played such an important and effective role in 
looking after Scottish interests that there was never any real need for Devolutionl46. Similarly, 
Lord Sanderson noted the importance of the Secretary of State in Government by confirming that 
Mrs Thatcher was prone to asking in Cabinet how any proposed measures for all of the UK 
would impact north of the borderl47. It should be noted that this important question took on a 
more and more exasperated tone towards the end of the 1980S148. Nevertheless, this role for the 
Scottish Secretary does conform to the argument put forward against Devolution in the 1993 
White Paperl49. Here, the Major administration stresses how Scotland would be significantly 
worse off if it relinquished its influence on the British Government, exercised through its own 
Department, Secretary of State and special Parliamentary arrangements for discussing matters 
exclusive to Scotland. 
The personalities of the various officials at the Scottish Office also had an impact on 
their effectiveness at standing up to the Prime Minister. As we have seen, being forthright when 
bearing bad or potentially unpopular news from Scotland can be a challenge to those hoping to 
further their careers. Furthermore, strength of purpose was also needed in the face of suspicion 
from colleagues that the Scottish Office was aspiring to higher status and funding than it 
deserved. This occasional lack of receptiveness towards the Scottish Secretary perpetuated the 
146 Interview, 8.11.00. 
147 Interview, 30.11.00. 
148 Unattributable interview comment, Winter 2000-2001. 
149 Secretary of State for Scotland: Scotland in the Union - A Partnership for Good, em 222S, 
Edinburgh, HMSO, 1993, Chapter 4. 
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myth north of the border that the Conservative Leadership treated the interests of Scotland as 
secondary I 50. As Viscount Younger noted, being Scottish Secretary had political responsibilities 
beyond those associated with some other departments 'just' in charge of implementing measures 
specific policy areas151 . In return for support and funding, the Party expected, justifiably in 
Viscount Younger's opinion, help in all policy areas and votes to be delivered in Scotland. 
Mrs Thatcher complains at the poor advice she received about the potentially harmful 
effects of the Poll Tax in Scotlandl52 . It seems, therefore, that David Seawright is correct in his 
assessment of the power dynamic within her Cabinets 153. The Prime Minister could get away 
with being very selective in the advice that she acted on. This again demonstrates the high 
degree of power vested in the Office of Party Leader and the nature of Mrs Thatcher's 
personality; a feature to be examined in greater detail in Chapter 4. There seem to be few formal 
opportunities to affect the leadership style of a Conservative incumbent. However, there must 
have been some way to get information into Number 10, and have it acted upon. Many of my 
interviewees gave insights to the more informal machinations of the Party that seemed to have 
been effective in achieving this. 
150 Interview with Lord Lang, 27.3.01. 
151 Interview, 14.2.01. 
152 Thatcher, 1993, p622. 
153 Interview, 13.4.00. 
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Informal Settings 
Andrew Gamble expressed the VIew that many important decisions within the 
Conservative Party are taken away from formal settingsl54. Lord Sanderson confirmed this 
idea 155. The Party Conference, he asserted, is, as we have seen, a platform for ideas to be tested 
and policies to be defended, not a forum for changing policies. None of my interviewees were 
prepared to say that Conference is a serious policy-making arena. The hierarchical nature of the 
Party was evident in all of the replies, thus further focusing this study on the elite. 
More informal, and thus, unrecorded, meetings of members of the 'county set' and others 
with real influence are a more likely location for where the real decisions are madel56. Lord 
Sanderson identified Smith Square policy committees, the Party research department and 'think 
tanks', such as those headed by Keith Joseph and Alan Walters as being the expert sources of 
information most trusted and listened to by the Leadership157. One avenue open to Scots is, he 
believes, through the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Association, via the National Union. 
As a former Chairman of the National Union Executive Committee, Lord Sanderson confirmed a 
definite link to the Prime Minister from that source. Ross Harper, who identified Lord Gould as 
having been highly influential with Mrs Thatcher, confinned this. Sir Michael Hurst was also an 
effective voice for Scottish interests, as demonstrated by the protests at the imposition of VAT 
154 Interview, 16.3.00. 
155 Interview, 30.11.00. 
156 Interview with Andrew Gamble, 16.3.00. 
157 Interview, 30.11.00. 
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on domestic fuel under Mr Major158• Viscount Younger confirmed that the link to the Prime 
Minister through Smith Square was open and effective159. 
Lord Fraser felt that personal ties with Prime Ministers are very important. For example, 
Lord Gould and Betty Harvey-Anderson were trusted as 'one of us' in the Thatcher eral60. 
Commenting on the same phenomenon, two unattributable sources bemoaned the fact that 
several non-elected advisors were prone to giving inaccurate or incomplete advice in order to 
remain in favour with the Prime Minister. They did remain in favour as Mrs Thatcher felt that 
the Scottish Office, which was giving more accurate information, often bad news, was not to be 
trusted as it was just seeking to accrue more departmental funding. 
At first, the ultra-elitism that the mechanics of such a system implies suggests that the 
interests of Scottish Conservatives might be insufficiently represented at crucial meetings. 
However, it may come to pass that such a system might actually benefit Conservatives from 
north of the border more than an official constitutional system that could be stacked against 
minorities. The obvious necessity was for Scottish Conservatives to be represented at such 
ostensibly ad hoc meetings. If a Scottish Conservative was part of the 'in crowd', he or she 
would have been able to make a case for Scottish needs161 • One key point on which this 
depended was whether sufficient numbers of Scottish Conservatives were being elected to 
Westminster or senior posts in Local Government. 
158 Interview, 6.8.01. 
159 Interview, 14.2.01. 
160 Interviews with Lord Fraser, 5.3.01 & Ross Harper, 6.8.01. 
83 
The Influence of Scots at Westminster on the 'POMP' 
William Whitelaw was able to represent the Border area well in informal settings 162. In 
the same way, once Lord Home became prominent in the Party, an added sense of urgency 
seemed to permeate the Conservative Central Office's rate of response to Scottish questionsl63 . 
Thus, this process is not a new phenomenon. When Sir Alik Buchanan-Smith succeeded 
Colonel Patrick Blair as Chairman of the Scottish Conservatives in 1960, he was also able to 
assert more influence in London. This was demonstrated by his stand against Central Office 
opinion on licensing laws and ability to draw the Prime Minister's attention to the Scottish 
Young Unionists' calls for internal Party reforms 164. These are good early examples of Scottish 
Conservatives identifying the dangers of allowing local organisation to wither. 
Andrew Gamble agreed that Scots who could penetrate the 'county set' and Party elite in 
London in the Twentieth Century stood the most chance of putting forward ideas that might 
successfully curb the Powers of the Party Leader and keep Scottish differences on the agenda 165. 
However, just being a Scottish MP in London does not bring an individual sufficiently close to 
the centre of power. The 1922 Committee of the Conservative Party theoretically should be able 
to exert some pressure on the Leader. It is made up of backbench MPs when the Conservatives 
are in Office. All MPs except the Leader are on the Committee when the Party is in Opposition. 
161 Interview with Andrew Gamble, 16.3.01. 
162 Interview with Lord Sanderso~ 30.11.00. 
163 CCO 2/3/18. 
164 CCO 2/5/20. 
165 Interview, 16.3.00. 
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However, this Committee only exerts minimal constraint on the Leaderl66. Even if Scots on the 
Committee could sway its decisions, the effect on the Leader and Party policy would be 
negligible. Currently only one Scottish constituency is being represented by a Conservative at 
Westminster. Therefore, the chances of Scottish interests being promoted/protected through the 
1922 Committee membership are slim. 
Before the General Election whitewash of 1997, there was a weekly meeting of Scottish 
Conservative MPs. However, being the rump of the Party and having a questionable mandate 
north of the border rendered this group virtually powerless 167. It was almost inevitable that its 
members became disillusioned with fighting for the rights of fellow Scots and became 
assimilated into the English middle class 168. 
Lord Strathclyde asserted that Scottish MPs and Peers were very influential during the 
period 1979-1997, starting from a somewhat minor, but very vocal positionl69. When asked how 
he thought that these actors would choose between their Party/career and nation, he concluded 
that both these aspects would be taken into consideration. David McLetchie confirmed that most 
Scots, including senior Conservatives, are interested in the representation of their national 
interest within the British state - if not always to the point of calling for Devolution or 
166 Gamer & Kelly, 1998, pl08. 
167 Unattributable Interview comment - Winter 2000-200 1. 
168 Interview with Lord Fraser, 5.3.01 + Brand, Jack: "British Parliamentary Parties - PoliS!y & 
Power", Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992, p225. 
169 Interview, 8.11.00. 
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secession 170. Therefore, within the framework of the Conservative Party, it is reasonable to 
assume that senior Scots would have interests beyond, but not necessarily compromising, Party 
interests. As we have already seen, such a group of Scottish Parliamentarians was very 
important in the formulation of the 1992 anti-Devolution campaign. Many such meetings took 
place over the yearsl71. That senior members of the Governments were included in the cohort of 
Scots at Westminster suggests that they would have been able to exert substantial influence over 
policy decisions. David McLetchie also noted the high proportion of Scots in Cabinets over the 
years and felt that, even if they were representing English constituencies, they ensured that 
Scottish interests were not forgotten 172. However, in the same way as the effectiveness of the 
Secretary of State in this role is questionable, it seems that these individuals were not always 
successful. 
Lord Mackay of Clashfem noted another interesting angle on Scottish involvement at 
Westminster173 . Confirming the thoughts of David Seawrightl74, Lord Mackay noted how many 
Scottish business interests were represented through the cohort of Parliamentarians at 
Westminster. Therefore, the issue of withdrawal of Government help for ailing industries north 
of the border was particularly pressing and emotive. We will see in Chapter 4 how industrial 
closures in Scotland hurt Conservative support there not only amongst newly unemployed 
members of the Working Class, but also amongst the more aftluent employers who had been 
170 Interview, 19.1.01. 
171 Interview with Lord Strathclyde, 8.11.00. 
172 Interview, 19.1.01. 
173 Interview, 22.1.01. 
174 Interview, 13.4.00. 
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able to deliver significant amounts of votes and funding to the Party. This is a good example of 
how an element of 'POMP' could cause severe local organisational problems specific to 
Scotland~ a region where the Party could not afford to suffer any losses in representation or 
organisation. It should be noted that not all senior Conservatives were entirely happy with the 
potential power of the Scots in their ranks. Because of pressure from Scottish members of the 
elite, a modicum of'tartanisation' of otherwise successful policies was necessary. It was felt 
that such compromises were not always compatible with strong government, which critical 
situations require 175. 
The question of the effectiveness of pro-Scottish pressure from Parliamentarians remains. 
Lord Lang noted that there was potential for informing the leadership of what was happening 
north of the border176. Perhaps one of the more effective avenues was through speech writing for 
the Prime Ministers. However, he conceded that it was impossible to get a message inconsistent 
with Mrs Thatcher's principles passed. As we shall see in Chapter 4, the Prime Minister's 
apparent stubbornness, which may have been a useful attribute in times of crisis, is one of the 
reasons given frequently for the Party's inability to match its English popularity north of the 
border. 
Conclusion 
It seems that even the professional and Parliamentary wings of the Conservative Party 
can exert little meaningful pressure on the Leader. Therefore, it is not surprising to find that 
175 Interview with Lord Strathclyde, 8.11.00. 
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Scots, including Conservatives there, have at times become disaffected with such distant central 
direction and insensitive policy making. Such disaffection can lead to a failure in the ·POS.' 
This theme will be taken up again in subsequent chapters, as we see how Conservative 
centralisation affected Local Government in Scotland in the 1980s and 1990s. This thesis tests 
whether this dynamic was particularly dangerous for Party General Election chances north of the 
border. The objective of this chapter has been to show why and where ·POMP' decisions and 
directives for the Party membership are made in the modem Conservative Party. With regard to 
ideology, it has been interesting to note that, whilst some of her policies may have seemed 
radical, there is a sound argument in favour of identifying Mrs Thatcher as a traditional 
Conservative Prime Minister. This is insofar as she sought pragmatic solutions to contemporary 
problems; with ·key principles' playing an intermittent, if occasionally vital, role. We have also 
seen that the vesting of inordinate amounts of power in the Party Leader was not a new initiative 
in the 1980s. 
These examples of continuity are very important with regard to the Scottish question. If 
the era being studied could be identified as one marked by radical changes in Conservative 
ideology and/or organisation, causes for the failure of their support in Scotland might have come 
to light very readily. Such radical changes were not evident, however. The key, therefore, 
seems to lie not so much in how decisions were made, but, rather, in the actual policies that 
resulted, and how they were received in the various regions of Britain. There is little evidence to 
suggest that the ideology or structure of the Conservative Party are naturally biased against the 
176 Interview, 27.3.01. 
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geographical periphery. For example, if there were more Scottish MPs or if, indeed, the Leaders 
had been Scottish during the era in question, it seems likely that more attention could have been 
paid to issues north of the border 177. As it was, Local and General Election results dictated a 
relatively low profile for Scottish interests in the higher echelons of power, whilst the more 
affluent economy of the South East of England further emphasised the north-south divide. 
Therefore, in assessing why the Conservatives' 'POS' failed so dramatically in Scotland 
(with especial consideration to the dynamics of Local Government), it seems more appropriate to 
consider the nature of society there and measures taken in the 'POMP' as probable causes. This 
chapter has shown that Party ideology and structure have remained consistent with earlier more 
electorally successful eras. Therefore, they could not have been significantly to blame for recent 
Conservative electoral problems in Scotland. Nonetheless, in the following studies, it will be 
important to bear in mind the most important finding of this chapter. That is to say, that 
peripheral disquiet has had very little chance of changing the mind of the Conservative leader 
once he or she has decided upon a course of action in the 'POMP.' This was especially the case 
if a 'key principle' such as the unitary ideas of the New Right informed the policy. The next 
chapter considers the role of local politics in Scotland and why it might have been able to wield 
sufficient influence amongst the electorate to be significantly dangerous to the Conservatives' 
·POS.' 
177 In the post 1997 era, it can be argued that the high number of Scots in powerful positions in 
the Labour administration gives their interests disproportionate attention by the central 
Government. 
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Appendix A 
UK Voters' Opinions 1979-1997 
The (%) replies in the graphs below represent (UK-wide) positive answers to: 
Question 1 = "If there was a General Election tomorrow, who would you vote for?" 
( Conservatives) 
Question 2 = "Are you satisfied with the Government' s performance?" 
Question 3 = "Are you satisfied with Mrs Thatcher' s / Mr Major's performance as Prime 
Minister?" 
The points noted along the X-axes denote important events during the tenures of the 
Governments. The corresponding peaks and troughs on the Y-axes demonstrate how the 
electorate reacts more to immediate events than ideological shifts. If the latter were the case, 
one could expect a smoother plot (rising or diminishing). 
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It is interesting to note that there is less intertwining of the plots since 1990. This 
suggests that the voters were associating Mr Major less with contemporary problems than they 
did with his predecessor. 
2.2 to 2.7 - Sources: Gallup Political & Economic Index. # 's 226--140. 
June 1979 - April 1997 
And Cook, Chris & Stevenson, John: "The Longman Companion to Britain Since 1945. 2nd Ed.", 
Harlow, Pearson Education Ltd., 2000, pp23-35 . 
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3. Local Governance in Scotland and its Effect on the 
'Politics of Support' 
Introduction 
It is the purpose of this chapter to highlight an extra dimension to accounts of how 
territorial mismanagement by the Conservatives turned into electoral defeat in Scotland. In other 
chapters, we see some traditionally acknowledged sources of danger. The Party's ideology and, 
more importantly, hierarchical structure suggest that peripheral discontent could not be 
accommodated. In later chapters, we shall see that there were too many discrepancies between 
Scottish culture, needs and desires and the preferred 'POMP' of the Party elite in London. What 
still needs to be addressed, however, is why the Party was not able to rescue the situation in 
Scotland? We shall see that there was rarely any suggestion that the unitary system or economic 
or territorial management policies would be changed. The question in hand, therefore, is why 
was it not possible to win over the Scots to the Thatcherite creed, as had been the case in 
England? 
What is required to answer this question, as suggested by David McLetchie, Viscount 
Younger and Lord Fraser}, amongst others in my elite interview programme, is an assessment of 
the role of Local Government and the political sub-culture north of the border. As we shall see 
in this chapter, Local Government plays an important role in Scottish society. It will become 
apparent that this branch of government, when in opposition hands, was able to rally discontent 
1 Interviews, 19.1.01, 14.2.01 & 5.3.01. 
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with, or deflect due praise from, the central Government. Another proposition to be considered 
is whether Conservative Local Councillors were an important source of local organisation and 
direction for potential supporters north of the border? If this was the case, an assessment has to 
be made of the malevolent effect on Conservative General Election chances of losing many of 
these Councillors in mid-term Local Government elections. These losses were very often due to 
protest votes against 'POMP' measures2• As Norris shows, the electorates on both sides of the 
border are much more prepared to look beyond the major parties in mid-term Local Government 
Elections3. Therefore, the most important question was how difficult would it be to woo back 
these malcontents? Thus, it may be possible to add to the traditional list of reasons for the 
Conservative demise in Scotland. 
The contents of this chapter include analyses of the role of local politics and culture in 
Scotland. Specific aspects for consideration include the role and character of the state north of 
the border, the question of who has a legitimate mandate to govern Scottish territory, the 
education system, media and religion. Thereafter, the relationships between Scottish local 
culture and the 'POS' and between Scottish local politics and the 'POMP' are examined. Here, 
we begin to develop the provision of Council Housing as the optimum manifestation of the 
special relationship between Scots and their Local Government representatives. To complete the 
analysis of local factors north of the border, an assessment of the influence of Scottish 
Conservative members on the 'POMP' and their role in the 'POS', in addition to how 
centralisation may have soured intra-Party relations, concludes the chapter. 
2 Stirling Councillor Survey (Con), Winter 2001-2002. 
] Norris, 1997, p49. 
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The Role of Local Politics in Scotland 
The first proposition to be explored is whether local politics is indeed pervasive and 
influential in Scotland and, if so, why? There are several dimensions to this dynamic. Firstly, 
we should consider whether and why there might be higher levels of state involvement in the 
lives of Scots? Thereafter, the question of why Scots might be more inclined to look towards 
more local sources of power due to anti-English sentiments will be considered. Thus, we should 
investigate the familiar (nationalist) argument that London does not have a legitimate mandate to 
govern Scotland. This situation was particularly acute for the Conservatives in the 1980s and 
1990s when they struggled to win more than a handful of Parliamentary seats north of the border. 
Finally, we must check to see if there are any cultural/societal factors that make Scots more 
community minded than their southern neighbours? Even though the provision of several 
utilities (a very tangible contact between Local Authorities and voters) has been removed from 
the ambit of Local Government, several long-standing Council functions remain that continue to 
facilitate significant presence for Councillors in their communities. We are looking for raised 
levels of state involvement in citizens' lives and more concentration on community life north of 
the border in order to further the hypothesis that Scottish local politicians can be significant 
actors in the party political struggle for voters' support in Local Government and General 
Elections. 
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The Role & Character of the State in Scotland 
lain Hutchinson lists several indicators that suggest that there was more state involvement 
in Scotland than south of the border4. Thanks to their affiliation to the British state, many Scots 
benefited from the industrial nationalisation programmes undertaken by the Attlee administration 
after the Second World War. As proportionately more Scots were employed by the industries in 
question, such as steel, mining and shipbuilding, more voters there were directly dependent on 
the state for employment. Such jobs were not only directly involved with the heavy industries, 
but also in associated fields such as health care and education provision for the workforce and 
their families and, importantly, in Local Government itself. As the Weberian model would 
suggest, increased state involvement in the economy burgeoned a larger bureaucracy, which had 
to be staffed. More specifically to Scotland, the local civil service was also growing due to 
relatively poor urban living standards that required a highly developed welfare system to 
administrate poverty relief and housing and healthcare provision. With regard to the public 
education system, it is important to note that only a small proportion of children were being 
educated privately in Scotland, even among more affluent families. 
During the Thatcher years, there was an ideological opposition in central Government to 
too much state involvement in the lives of individuals. Nevertheless, somewhat pamdoxically, 
the central Government imposed itself frequently on sub-national levels of administration to 
prevent Local Authorities from acting too independently, thus trying to re-assert central controls. 
4 In: Devine, T. M. & Finlay, R. 1. (eds.): "Scotland in the 20th Centwy", Edinburgh, Edinburgh 
University Press, 1996, pp46-61. 
5 For example, there were 143 Acts of Parliament relating directly to the conduct of Local 
Government from 1979-1992 - Wilson, David & Game, Chris: "Local Government in the United 
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As the subjects of housing, the Poll Tax and industrial closures demonstrated (to be examined 
more fully below and in subsequent chapters), this was an attempt to have a dramatically 
restraining effect on Scottish Local Authorities, as they relied heavily on central subsidy. As the 
central Government provided so much funding, one would have expected them to be able to 
wield considerable power and influence over the directions taken by Local Authorities in 
Scotland. However, even with the Scottish Office supposedly in place to guarantee central 
control, the spirit and, often, practice of quasi-autonomy was retained in Local Government north 
of the border. 
Perhaps the most important cause of increased importance for local politicians in 
Scotland was their involvement in housing provision. That topic provides evidence for testing 
the hypothesis throughout this work. For the purposes of this section, it is essential to recognise 
that Scotland had more state-controlled housing than anywhere outside Eastern Europe in the 
second half of the last centUIy6. This meant that voters there were likely to have close ties with 
local politicians. These ties were most often manifested in terms of the 'POS' when Local 
Councils managed to 'buy' votes with low rents and other inducements7• Later in this chapter, 
the Conservative 'Right to Buy' project is given fuller consideration. It sought to wean voters 
away from such close ties with their Local Authorities. In Chapter 5, we shall examine the 
important issue of how the Conservatives in London tried further to halt the problem of 
Opposition Council influence on the electorate with subsidy reductions and regulations on how 
Kingdom", Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1994, p102. Chapter 5 of this thesis investigates central 
control of Local Government more closely. 
6 Regional Trends, Number 20, 1985, p61 & The Daily Telegraph, 10.5.79, pI8. 
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Local Authorities could spend their incomes. Thereby, the Conservative elite caused the sort of 
centre-peripheral friction that encouraged Scottish Labour Councils to disrupt the 'POMP' as 
much as they could within their statutory powers8. 
There are several other persuasive reasons that suggest that Scottish Local Government 
may have been able to stand up to London and thus enjoy enhanced credibility in communities 
north of the border9. Firstly, many Labour MPs from Scotland started their political careers on 
Local Councils. Consequently, when they reached London, their backgrounds suggested that 
they were more likely to continue to defend the independence of Local Government. Secondly, 
and somewhat ironically for the Conservatives, the professionalisation of Local Government that 
had been encouraged by the Party before the War meant that Local Councillors and other 
officials were becoming more confident and competent in their dealings with London. Thirdly, 
and very importantly, Local Government in Scotland seems to have a much greater mandate than 
in England (to be discussed further, below). 
We are beginning to see how Local Government, and the agents thereof, seem to have an 
important role in ScotlandlO. Whilst developing this idea through this chapter, a vital question to 
7 Interview with Lord Sanderson, 30.11.00 + Stirling Councillor Survey (Lab), Winter 2001-
2002. 
8 Stirling Councillor Survey (Con & Lab), Winter 2001-2002. 
9 lain Hutchinson in: Devine & Finlay (eds.), 1996, pp46-61. 
JO This thesis seeks to emphasise the especial 'POS' importance to the major parties of having 
strong Local Government presence in Scotland. RaIlings et al note potential General Election 
problems that could be caused by losing control of important local bodies that might be able to 
help in the mobilisation of support. Rallings, Colin; Thrasher, Michael & Johnston, Ron: The 
slow death of a governing party: the erosion of Conservative local electoral support in England 
1979-1997, in BJPIR, Vol. 4, no. 2, June 2002, pp271-298, p272. 
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be investigated, therefore, is how did this dynamic affect the Conservatives in General Elections? 
Presently, further assessment must be made of why Scots might be inclined to look towards more 
local sources of political power. 
Who Has a Legitimate Mandate to Govern Scotland? 
In Chapter 4, we shall see how the Conservatives m London believed the 
Devolution/nationalism question to be dead after the failed referenda in 1979. We will discover 
the error in this assumption and will be reminded by Lord MacKay of Ardbrecknish, amongst 
others, that every Scot holds nationalist sentiments to some degree - if not always to the point of 
supporting Devolution or secessionll . Within the sphere of local governance, these feelings are 
manifested in the question of who has a legitimate right to govern Scottish territoryl2? One 
familiar nationalist argument is that a distant Government in London hardly has the right to 
govern in Scotland, especially if it has won hardly any or no Westminster seats north of the 
border13. More traditional Conservative forms of territorial management ('statecraft') seemed 
inclined to agree tacitly with this proposition and sought to deflect criticism by the employment 
11 Interview, 25.1.01. 49% of respondents to Gallup in May 1996 preferred the description 
'Scottish first, British second', Gallup Political & Economic Index, #429, May 1996, p6. 
12 This problem arose almost instantly after the Act of Union in 1707, when it was perceived that 
London was exerting more managerial control over Scottish affairs than had been 
expected/agreed upon - Daiches, David: "The Paradox of Scottish Culture: The Eighteenth 
Century Experience", London, Oxford University Press, 1964, p3. 
13 This sentiment is expressed frequently in opinion polls~ for example MORl unpublished data 
May 1981, Gallup Political Inde~ #313, September 1986, p18 & #429, May 1996, p5. It is also 
mentioned often in the press; for example The Observer, 24.9.95, pl0 & The Guardil:!b 22.4.92, 
p2 (a report on a refusal by Strathclyde Regional Council to implement any more Conservative 
Local Government legislation, as the Council believed that the Major Administration had no 
legitimate mandate to impose such 'job threatening' measures). 
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of a local elite to manage affairs north ofthe border14. It may be argued that this tactic was used 
so that the central hierarchy could remain aloof/insulated from the 'low politics' of the 
geographical periphery. However, even if this was the case, the happy coincidences for the Party 
were that they could not be accused of governing from afar in a colonial style15 and the 'POMP' 
was rendered sensitive to the particular constraints of Scottish society. We should bear in mind 
that only on the geographical periphery did the Conservative elite in London ever seem to 
countenance the use of any form of agency or conduit for the implementation of their policies. 
Even though central control of this situation was very tight, it is important to note that 
Conservatives in London could not appeal directly to voters at extreme distance, as they were 
able to do in most areas of England. 
The (nationalist) mandate question gives significant substantiation to the proposition that 
Scottish voters might be more inclined to look to local sources of power. Through the 1980s and 
1990s, there were frequent calls for the institution of a Scottish Parliament16. This issue brings to 
light serious misconceptions manifested in the Conservatives' 'POMP.' They believed that the 
Devolution question was dead and that the Scottish Office was a sufficient guarantor of Scottish 
interests to preclude the need for a Scottish Parliament17• Furthermore, their over-concentration 
on the governance of aftluent southern England also led to the belief that the geographically 
peripheral English regions were entirely satisfied with unitary government from Westminster. 
14 Bulpitt in: Madgwick & Rose (eds.), 1982, p146. 
15 As argued by Hechter, 1975, p161. 
16 Unpublished MORl data from November 1981 saw 470.10 of Scots in favour of a devolved 
Assembly as the best solution. This figure was 44% in March 1988. Gallup recorded 61% of 
respondents in favour of some sort of Assembly (Gallup Political Inde~ #313, September 1986, 
p19) and 69% in May 1996 (Gallup Political Inde~ #429, May 1996, p6). 
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As in Scotland, this does not seem to have been the caselS. In the early 1990s, Labour identified 
a desire in sections of the electorate for Devolution to the English regions19~ and saw this policy 
as part of the 'unfinished business' of the de-railed referenda proposals of 1979. Especially with 
regard to their attitude towards Scotland, it should be noted that, at this time, the Conservatives 
never showed any such enthusiasm for devolving power away from the unitary Parliament in 
Westminster. lain Lang was quoted in The Guardian as saying: "You can't just carve off a little 
bit of sovereignty, and send it up to Edinburgh or Cardiff and let everything go on as before,,20. 
He acknowledged that Devolution to Scotland and Wales would lead to calls for English regional 
assemblies; and was adamant in his opposition to all. 
Even though the attitudes towards Devolution expressed in the Conservatives' 'POMP' 
seemed only to have domestic implications, it should be remembered that, especially during 
Britain's Presidency of the EU in 1992, the rest of Europe was granting much more importance 
to regional rights21 . Indeed, it was something of a paradox to witness the Major administration 
bargaining for Britain's national rights within the EU, whilst at the same time denying these 
rights to the various nations and regions of the UK. Thus, the Government's policies were 
making it somewhat of a mini pariah outside British borders, as well as within. Whilst this is not 
an appropriate forum to discuss Britain's relations with the EU in the 199Os, it is important to 
note that domestic support was lost because of the continuing bitterness and Conservative 
17 Interview with Lord Strathclyde, 8.11.00. 
18 Austin Mitchell in: Critchley, Julian (ed.): uBritain - A View from Westminster", Poole, 
Blandford Press, 1986, p63. 
19 Interview with Lord Strathclyde, 8.11.00 + The Guardi~ 2.11.90, p2, 25.2.91, p23, 9.3.92, 
g23, 10.1.95, p4 & 14.1.95, p7. 
The Guardi~ 15.10.94, p7. 
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intransigence on this issue22. Therefore, the rather hypocritical Conservative territorial 
management strategy was, yet again, causing them problems in the 'POS.' 
The Conservatives themselves even tried to use a version of the mandate argument after 
their 1997 Election defeat. Michael Howard claimed that the Labour Government in London 
still did not have the right to devolve powers to Scotland, as there were still many opponents to 
Devolution there23 . This poses the question that if Labour had no mandate in Scotland after 
seeing off every Conservative MP north of the border, how were the Conservatives able to claim 
legitimacy for their policies when they only commanded a handful of seats through the 1980s 
and 1990s? The key to the Conservative claims lie in ideas on unitary systems of government 
and their notion of the supreme authority of Parliament in London. Such theories can be found 
in the work of constitutional scholars such as A. V. Dicey, and the resultant policies are 
examined throughout this thesis. If these arguments did not entirely convince the Scottish 
electorate, it is possible to see how more local forms of government could have been seen as a 
more legitimate alternative. 
There was no suggestion that the Conservatives of the 1980s and 1990s ever 
countenanced levels of administrative Devolution that would have approached a quasi-federal 
system. Nonetheless, it is worth investigating what sort of relationship the Scottish electorate 
had with whatever forms of local governance that were available. It may be that Scottish Local 
Councils played a significant role in the lives and voting intentions of their constituents. 
21 Ibid, 4.7.92, p39. 
22 Interviews with Andrew Gamble, 16.3.00 & Ross Harper, 6.8.01. 
103 
Therefore, the Conservatives in London would have been well advised to take account of this 
situation and engage in Scottish local politics in order to promote and protect their 'POMP.' On 
a constitutional level, organisations such as the Constitutional Convention and other campaigns 
for a Scottish Parliament came into being mainly as a consequence of the mandate question. It is 
possible to conclude, however, and more pertinently for this thesis, that, on a day-to-day basis, 
Scottish voters would look to their local representatives for help and political direction much 
more readily than they would look to London. The closer one gets to the capital, it is reasonable 
to conclude, as is borne out by the election results in Chapter 7, that this effect decreases. Now 
we should look to see whether there were any structural aspects of Scottish society that would 
have hindered the Party's attempts to make any electoral headway there. 
Scottish Local Culture & the 'POS' 
This section assesses how certain characteristics of Scottish society could have 
contributed to an enhanced role for Local Councillors there. These characteristics form Scottish 
political culture - a definite subculture in the British polity - and constitute a key constraint on 
the 'POMP' 24. As we shall see, the particular social and economic circumstances of Scottish life 
have informed the nature of the political (sub )culture there. If we find that these circumstances 
have given rise to an enhanced role for Local Councillors in the 'POS', then the Conservative 
elite in London would have been well advised to take this cultural difference into account when 
formulating their 'POMP.' 
23 The Guardim 7.S.97, pS. 
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As Grant notes, a frequent problem with the term 'political culture' is that it is often used 
as a catch-all term to explain anything about a society that "(C)annot be accounted for in any 
other way,,25. In this instance, however, we shall see that the use of the term is appropriate as the 
attitudes and beliefs of the Scottish voters can be traced to specific events and practices such as 
the formation of tightly-knit communities in an industrial town or the preponderance of Local 
Authority housing. For the purposes of this thesis, it is important to note that this culture seems 
to be a relevant factor in explaining why Local Councillors have significant influence in Scottish 
society. 
"The Civic Culture", by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (1963) is often quoted as an 
important assessment of the notion of political culture26. This text emerged from the expansion 
of opinion polling in the 1950s. It presents the hypothesis that the central tenet of political 
culture is the attitude of the citizens towards authority. Within this framework, British society of 
the time is identified as conforming to a 'civility model', which is characterised by homogeneity, 
consensus and deference27. As Moran infers and Lords Fraser and Lang were most keen to point 
out, these traits were not to be seen in Scotland in the 1980s and 1990s28. These three sources 
agree that increases in affluence and populism in late Twentieth Century Britain severely 
diminished the sense of deference amongst citizens. More particularly with regard to Scotland, 
homogeneity and consensus with the rest of the British population was unlikely due to the 
24 'Political culture' being defined as: "The attitudes, beliefs and values which underpin the 
of!ration ofa particular political system", Wyn Grant in: Mclean (ed.), 1996, p379. 
2 Ibid, p380. 
26 For example, in: Moran, Michael: "Politics & Society in Britain - An Introduction. 2nd Ed.", 
Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1989, p34. 
27 Ibid, pp34-35. 
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different histories of the various nations. With regard to this thesis, this point is most relevant 
when considering whom many Scots believe to have authority to govern there. It is the purpose 
of this chapter to suggest that more local sources of government may have seemed more 
effective and legitimate to many Scots than the distant administrations in London. Thus, a 
distinct characteristic of the Scottish political culture could have been damaging the 
Conservatives' 'POS.' It now remains to investigate how this culture developed. 
We shall hear in Chapter 4 how Trade Unions played an important party political role in 
favour of Labour north of the border in the 1980s, some time after they had ceased to be so 
influential in England. This atmosphere suggests that there may have been a higher degree of 
communitarianism in certain parts of industrial urban (and, hence, more left-leaning) Scotland29• 
Going back further in Scottish cultural history, one finds the close ties of the clan system and 
rapid dense urbanisation as causes of greater awareness and empathy with one's neighbours30. 
Other indicators for raised levels of closer community spirit in Scotland include the incidence of 
towns being dominated by a single employer and, perhaps as a consequence of all these 
structural factors and their contemporary counterparts, a heightened sense of civil society and 
'fellow feeling,3l. Given these conditions, it is unsurprising to find that the Thatcherite 
28 Moran, 1989, pp39-49 + Interviews with Lords Fraser, 5.3.01 & Lang, 27.3.01. 
29 Stewart Ransom et al in: Stoker, Gerry (ed.): "The New Management of British Local 
Governance", Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1999, p103. 
30 M. Lynch in: Houston R. A. & Whyte I. D. (eds.): "Scottish Society 1500-1800", Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1989, p86 + R. A. Dodgshon in ibid, p169. 
31 Interviews with David Seawright, 13.4.00, James Mitchell 8.6.00, Anonymous at Central 
Office, 21.6.00, Lord Strathclyde, 8.11.00, David McLetchie, 19.1.01 and Lord Fraser, 5.3.01 + 
Chitnis, Anand C.: "The Scottish Enlightenment. A Social History", London, Croom Helm, 
1976, p95 + Waszek, Norbert: "The Scottish Enlightenment & Hegel's Account of 'Civil 
Society"', London, Kluwer, 1988, p212. 
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individualist creed, which had been more readily adopted in affiuent England, was not so popular 
north of the border. Lord Lang asserted that the Conservatives were eventually forced to 
concede that the stronger community-based culture that existed in urban Scotland in the 1980s 
and 1990s was not compatible with the promotion of individualism by the Governments of the 
time32. 
The Conservatives would have benefited from the preservation of more socially inclusive 
groups that were inclined towards them in Scotland33• Such groups, by their nature, bring like-
minded voters together in a social setting and help to foster a kindred spirit, which can herald a 
'conservative nation,34. In rural areas especially, trans-genemtion ties with local Territorial and 
Regular Army regiments (which stemmed from Imperial times) served as such an organisational 
force for the Conservatives due to the social networks that they engendered35. A dismantling of 
the Conservative communities that had built up around them followed the demise of these 
regiments36. Generally in rural Scotland, there is also an absence of socially inclusive activities, 
which are present in England, such as village crickef7. This further reduces the chance to build 
Conservative networks amongst the electomte. The greater geographical distances involved in 
ruml Scotland also lead to more of a lack of cohesion than south of the border. Scottish cities 
have been more libeml/pragmatic tmditionally. Therefore, it has not been possible for the Party 
to take advantage of the smaller distances involved there. 
32 Interview, 27.3.01. 
33 Interview with William Paterson, 13.9.01. 
34 Interview with Martin Perry, 24.8.01. 
35 Interviews with: Anonymous, 21.6.00, Lord Fmser, 5.3.01, Lord Lang, 27.3.01 & William 
Paterson, 13.9.01. 
36 Ibid (4 interviewees). 
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Raised concern and awareness of local issues was not always the case in urban Scotland, 
however. Harvie notes that after Scottish Parish Councils were abolished in 1929, forty years of 
indifference to local democracy followed38. In the 1950s (just as somewhat in the 1980s), the 
Conservatives had little direct interest in Scottish Local Government Elections. The majority of 
non-Labour Councillors stood as Independents, Progressives in Glasgow or Moderates in 
Edinburgh. Nevertheless, despite the resultant lack of Conservative Councillors, the Party still 
held 35 seats at Westminster at this time39. Thus, if adequately supported, this work's hypothesis 
should only be applied to the Thatcher-Major era. 
Even though Scottish Local Government might not have been so politicised in the post 
War years, the basis of the situation of the 1980s and 1990s was being laid in this period. The 
issue of Local Authority rent levels was becoming important. Indeed, this was key to Labour 
strategies in the 1980s and 1990s4O• The Conservatives were notable for their absence from sub-
national affairs. They were to pay for this deficiency when in national Government as they did 
not have local organisation in place to 'sell' policies or run General Election campaigns41 -
essential functions in the 'POS.' This section can conclude that local affairs do seem to playa 
very important role in Scotland. The precise effect of this on General Elections forms the 
evidence for the hypothesis throughout this work. It seems that any party would need a highly 
developed and well-organised membership and cadre of Local Government representatives north 
of the border to ensure that they could negotiate and take advantage of the unique circumstances 
37 Interview with William Paterson, 13.9.01. 
38 Harvie, 1994, p141. 
39 Interview with Ross Harper, 6.8.01. 
40 Interviews with Lords Strathclyde, 8.11.00, and Sanderson, 30.11.00. 
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there. The following sections analyse further aspects of Scottish local culture to see how they 
might have affected the Local-Central Government relationship and precipitated the decline of 
the Conservatives north of the border. 
The Scottish Education System 
This element of society is a factor that the Conservatives have seen as part of their demise 
in Scotland. It is important to note that this element of society is controlled on a local level. 
Therefore, not only might it put forward opposition to the central Government, but it could also 
serve to undermine Conservative organisation specifically in Scotland. Therefore, the potential 
for substantial damage to the Party's General Election support north of the border is evident. 
Scotland has always been proud of having its own educational system substantially free 
from control from London. Consequently, it was not surprising when this independent 
institution became a focus for opposition to Conservative ·POMP.' The educational 
establishment in Scotland became much more politicised after the main teachers' union, the 
Educational Institute of Scotland, joined the (S)TUC in the 1970s42. In the early 1980s, the 
funding and organisation of education needed attention in both England and Scotland. However, 
Keith Joseph had to delay until circumstances and finances were available to fix both cases. This 
is an example of unitary 'POMP' causing unpopularity in Scotland. As James Mitchell noted, 
41 Interviews with Viscount Younger, 14.2.01 and Lord Lang, 27.3.01. 
42 Interview with Viscount Younger, 14.2.01 - perhaps the most startling revelation was the 
instances related to the Secretary of State of promotion being refused to teachers who did not 
support Labour. 
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unitary government may be easier to manage in terms of less bureaucracy43. However, one of its 
weaknesses is the potential for peripheral protests. David McLetchie told of how even the 
Scottish Conservative Party tried to militate against the strictly unitary nature of affairs in the 
early 1980s as they sensed the problems that it would bring44. 
The teachers' strikes in Scotland during the 1980s were very damaging to the 
Conservatives. The EIS came up with many clever strategies, which co-opted parents into 
disliking the Conservatives almost by default. Strikes and school closures were called only in 
the constituencies of Government ministers, thus turning potential or existing Conservative 
supporters against the Party whilst causing no damage to Opposition MPs45. Furthermore, as 
part of their role as local activists, teachers were none-too-subtly indoctrinating their pupils 
against the Conservatives. Viscount Younger recalled how he would receive letters from 
schoolchildren as part of class projects that were clearly written or dictated by teachers and were 
blatant in their anti-Government stance46• Such deeds might not seem to be acts of radical or 
immediately effective opposition. However, the pupils were being socialised against the 
Conservatives and would be unlikely to vote for the Party in years to come. Another effect of 
this trend in Scottish education to be felt sometime afterwards was when graduates of the system 
entered Local Government and the media and organised protests against the central Government 
because of their natural left-leaning inclinations that had been formulated in their early years. 
43 Interview 8.6.00. 
44 Interview, 19.1.01. 
45 Interviews with Lord MacKay of Ardbrecknish and Viscount Younger, 25.1.01 & 14.2.01. 
46 Interview, 14.2.01. 
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The concept of unitary governance plus a lack of funding meant that refonns could not be 
introduced as quickly as the teachers may have liked~ thus precipitating protests from the EIS. A 
half-finished package could have been rushed through~ but this would not have been satisfactory. 
Furthennore, once the refonns, as fonnulated by senior Scottish education officials, had been 
implemented, the teachers, through no fault of their own, were not of sufficient calibre to deal 
with the extra demands. This extra pressure caused more resentment, which was focused on the 
Conservative Government47 • 
At the beginning of the Major era, an attempt was made to remove power from the 
educational establishment in order to prevent it from organising opposition to the Government in 
Scotland. Michael Forsyth admitted that there was a plan to put control of education into the 
hands of the Scottish Office as part of the 'opting-out' proposals. Thereby, it was hoped that 
fewer schools would be under the direct influence of left-leaning Scottish Local Authorities48. 
Neither plan came to fruition, despite a final effort to encourage opting out made by the 
Government in 1994. By then, so much power and central subsidies had been wrested from 
Local Authorities with regard to education in Scotland that it seemed that schools would have to 
opt out in order to remain financially viable49• However, the Government was not able to push 
through the final revisions, especially as elections to the new Unitary Councils were imminent. 
The Conservatives could not afford to suffer any more losses in Local Government north of the 
border because, as this thesis investigates, here was a source of effective local organisation to 
support the contemporary • POMP. ' Education was a powerful force for political socialisation at 
47 Ibid. 
48 Times Educational Scottish Supplement 17.5.91, p21 & 21.6.91, p5. 
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a local level in Scotland. Another vital influence on Scottish society was the media. Its effect on 
the political culture north of the border is examined now. 
The Scottish Media 
Throughout this thesis, the importance of communication between the major political 
parties and the electorate is stressed. Success in the 'POS' is dependent on being able to 'sell', 
defend or attack measures in the 'POMP', as appropriate. This section seeks to examine the 
effect of the media on Scottish political culture and how the Conservatives and Opposition 
parties used it to further their causes in the 'POS' north of the border. 
Whilst they do not rival the readership figures of some English regional publications such 
as the Manchester Evening News (160,000)50 or Liverpool Echo (145,000), many Scottish 
newspapers reach a significant proportion of their catchment area populations. For example, the 
Glasgow Herald has a circulation of approximately 92,000, The Daily Record 70,000, The 
Scotsman 80,000, the Edinburgh Evening News 72,000 and the Aberdeen Evening Express 
65,000. Thus, given their relatively high readerships, Scottish newspapers are vitally important 
tools for reaching the electorate and shaping the political culture north of the border. 
The received wisdom on the role of the media in Britain is that it conserves or reinforces, 
rather than actively changes, the political attitudes of voters51 • Therefore, according to this 
49 Ibid, 20.5.94, p23. 
50 All circulations from www.holdthefrontpage.co.uk. 
SI Harrop, Martin: "Voters", in: Seaton, Jean & Pimlott, Ben (eds.): "The Media in British 
Politics", Aldershot, Avebury Gower Ltd, 1987, p45. 
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model, the Scottish media in the 1980s and 1990s should have reflected the more leftist 
inclinations of the general population north of the border. Similarly, the Reinforcement Thesis 
suggests that the Conservatives should have enjoyed better press coverage in England, where the 
economy was more buoyant and the Party was enjoying resultant electoral favour. On initial 
inspection, it appears that these patterns were borne out. 
It was perceived amongst the Conservative Party elite that some branches of the Scottish 
media (The Daily Record and Glasgow Herald, especially) seemed to lean to the left and were 
keen to promote pro-Devolution and anti-Government agendas. Lord Lang noted how the Party 
in Scotland always had to work extra hard for electoral success due to the inherent anti-
Conservative characteristics of society and the media there52. An important question to consider 
is whether such publications were promoting their own agendas, reflecting the general mood 
amongst the Scottish electorate, or were being astutely used/manipulated by Labour and the 
Nationalists? In any case, the Opposition parties in the 1980s and 1990s were grateful for such a 
voice for their campaigns on issues such as Devolution or the Poll Tax53• Consequently, it was 
not difficult for the Left to instigate the view that Conservatives were actually anti-Scottish every 
time that a locally unpopular policy was implemented. This was particularly difficult for the 
Conservatives if the policy in question was unavoidable due to the necessities of economic 
52 Interview, 27.3.01. 
53 Thatcher, 1993, p619 + Interview with Lord Fraser, 5.3.01 - it must be remembered that this 
interview material is being utilised not especially for an accurate record of what was actually 
happening in Scotland Rather, it is being referred to so that we may know what the 
Conservative Governments of the time perceived to be the case, and how they adopted their 
'POMP' as a result. 
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efficiency. Such opposition was easier to organise and defend In Scotland, where the 
Conservatives were in too inferior a position to effectively counter4. 
Given the anti-Conservative bias that was perceived and the fact that there was no 
equivalent of a sympathetic tabloid such as the Daily Mail or broadsheet like The Daily 
Telegraph, it seems that the Conservative Cabinet did not have a ready conduit for their message 
in Scotland. An obvious problem of the absence of such support in the media is that voters in 
Scotland might never hear or read properly balanced reports or editorials. The Conservatives 
suffered badly from this55• In a society whose media seemed to be permeated with anti-
Conservatism56, it was never going to be easy to persuade voters of the merits of poliCies that 
hurt them financially in the early stages of implementation. It should be noted that the 
Government found the Scottish media quite 'fair' in its appraisals in the early 1980s57. 
As we have seen, socialisation processes in Scotland suggested that those entering the 
media profession towards the end of the Twentieth Century might have been Labour supporters. 
However, it seems that the journalists' natural inclinations to the Left were only major factors 
once Donald Dewar and Labour embarked upon their concerted efforts to discredit the 
Conservatives in Scotland58. This suggests that the proficiency with which the major parties 
used the media may have been at least as important a factor as the dynamics suggested by the 
54 Interview with Lord Lang, 27.3.01. This point furthers the case being tested in my hypothesis: 
that the Conservatives may have fared worse in General Elections in Scotland than in England 
subsequent to heavy Local Government losses. 
55 Interview with Lord Fraser, 5.3.01. 
56 Interview with Lord Lang, 27.3.01. 
57 Interview with Viscount Younger, 14.2.01. 
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Reinforcement Thesis. Lord Strathclyde was especially keen to note the role of the Scottish 
media in the downfall of the Conservatives north of the border in this era59. The co-operation of 
the media is essential in the 'POS', whether a party wishes to mount effective opposition or 
convince the electorate of the benefits of their policies60. 
Lord Mackay of Clashfem, among others, noted that the Scottish media was always 
closely monitored to gauge levels of support for the Party and its policies61 • Therefore, it would 
seem that the Government would not always have an accurate barometer of the popularity of 
their 'POMP.' As media analysis was used by the Government to assess the mood of the nation, 
the Conservative elite in London could not have been receiving an accurate reflection of feelings 
in Scotland. If anything, the unpopularity of their policies was being overstate<f2• Therefore, 
they would not have been able to adjust their 'POMP' accurately to what many Scottish voters 
actually wanted. 
Andrew Gamble acknowledged the role of the Scottish media in the Conservatives' 
downfaU63. However, as he noted, the traditional pillars of Conservative support north of the 
border were crumbling already. The political culture generated by these problems suggests that 
the Scottish media may well have been reinforcing existing sentiments in society north of the 
58 Interview with Lord Strathclyde, 8.11.00. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Interview with Martin Perry, 24.8.01. 
61 Interview, 22.1.01. 
62 Interview with Lord Lang, 27.3.01. 
63 Interview, 16.3.00. 
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border. However, as suggested above, an extra dynamic may have existed, which ensured even 
more 'pas' success for the Opposition parties through the media in Scotland. 
Gamble went on to assert that astute use of the media by Opposition parties in Scotland in 
particular put even more strain on the Conservatives. These tactics compounded the problems 
that the Party was already suffering and helped significantly to precipitate the Conservatives' 
downfall and increase the importance of the media itself4. Thus, use of the media by the 
political parties to promote their own agendas may have influenced the tone of reports, rather 
than just the forces of the Reinforcement Thesis being at work. Whilst always retaining some 
credibility, the Reinforcement Thesis has other critics, such as Martin Harrop. He argues that, 
from the 1980s, the Conservatives and Labour sought to use the media as a more active method 
of 'selling' and defending new policies to the electorate~ key aspects of the 'pas.' One of the 
main reasons that caused the major parties to do this was because it was felt that modem mass 
media (television especially) provided an efficient and effective way to influence undecided 
The main question to be addressed through the rest of this section, therefore, is who 
managed to use the media better to relay their messages to the Scottish electorate? The Glasgow 
University Media Group has given extensive consideration to this question. Their work on the 
UK as a whole suggests that use of the media by the political parties (rather than the just the 
64 Ibid. 
6S In: Seaton & Pimlott (eds.), 1987, p53. 
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media itself) was different in England and Scotland. This may indeed, therefore, have influenced 
the political culture against the Conservatives north of the border. 
John Eldridge asserts that a 'hierarchy of access' to the media exists66. Therefore, the 
Conservatives should have enjoyed optimum coverage from 1979-1997 when they were in 
office. We have seen how the Conservative elite felt that the Scottish media was biased against 
it. In England, this did not seem to be such a problem. On further inspection, however, it seems 
that the actual problem may have lain in Labour's more astute use of the media north of the 
border. As Greg Philo notes, the Conservatives held (in Bulpitt's terms) such ideological 
hegemony in prosperous England in the 1980s that Labour were hesitant to put forward their 
ideas in the media for fear of an adverse reaction67. Similarly, Labour did not seem to use the 
media in England to take any opportunities to criticise Government economic policy. 
Consequently, their chances of making advances in the 'POS' south of the border were severely 
diminished. The Conservatives in England, on the other hand, were confident enough to put 
forward bold statements in the media, knowing that they would be well received in a compliant 
press that seemed to reflect the mood of the prosperous English nation. Whilst admitting that at 
least some aspects of the Reinforcement Thesis may still have carried on into the 1980s and 
1990s, this analysis places more emphasis on the political parties' attitudes towar~ and use of, 
the media. As we shall see throughout this thesis, a compromise between the Reinforcement 
Thesis and acknowledgement of more active use of the media is appropriate for an assessment of 
Local Government and Opposition campaign coverage north of the border. 
66 Eldridge, John: "News Content Language &: Visuals", London, Routledge, 1995, p289. 
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In Scotland, it seems that Labour were more confident in putting forward their case to the 
electorate through the media as they could expect a more sympathetic reception. As we shall see 
in the case study on Stirling in Chapter 6 of this thesis, Scottish Labour local politicians were 
very pro-active in their use of the media to criticise central Government policies such as the Poll 
Tax and promote their own agendas. Even the Conservative Councillors surveyed for the study 
conceded that Labour was far more astute in their use of the media in Scotland in the 1980s and 
1990s. 
Labour had a very professional and effective press office in Scotland. The Conservatives 
needed to emulate this and have a more pro-active attitude towards the use of the media68. This 
is a very important point. On initial examination, it may seem that Scottish newspapers were 
somewhat inclined towards Labour to safeguard circulation in a political culture that favoured 
the Left. However, rather than editors, journalists and proprietors necessarily being actively 
biased, it was often the case that the Opposition were just significantly better at manipulating the 
media into conveying their messages69• Even if a newspaper set out to be impartial, it could still 
often end up devoting many column inches to the Labour or Nationalist causes due to high 
profile campaigning by those parties. Especially in the local press, editorial comment and party 
political news content was minimal compared to the reporting of social and sporting events and 
advertisements. Thus, a pro-Opposition image might inadvertently become apparent as the Local 
Government representatives and activists of those parties seemed far keener to take up as much 
67 Philo, Greg: "Politics. Media & Public Belief', Glasgow, Glasgow University Media Group, 
1993, pp6-7. 
68 Interview with Keith Harding, 12.9.01. 
69 Stirling Councillor Survey (Con & Lab), Winter 2001-2002. 
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of the available space as possible than their Conservative counterparts. The effects on the local 
'pas' in Scotland could not have been good for the Conservatives, as they were finding it very 
difficult to get their message across in an already hostile environment7o. 
On initial inspection, these assessments of Scottish media coverage of party politics 
towards the end of the Twentieth Century suggest that the Reinforcement Thesis was still a fairly 
credible assessment ofthe relationship between the media and the contemporary political culture. 
The impression that Labour were more confident and forceful in their media presence in 
Scotland mirrored their continuing electoral success north of the border. However, it also seems 
that Labour in Scotland better understood and used the dynamics of modernising Scottish society 
and media to their best advantage. Indeed there may have been some residual reinforcing aspects 
in the Scottish media. However, Labour augmented their consequent position of strength with 
more modem pro-active use of the media. Therefore, it was the astute use of the media by a 
major party, rather than just the media itself, that had a significant effect on the Scottish political 
culture and 'pas' towards the end of the Twentieth Century. Another important cultural aspect 
to Scottish party politics in the Twentieth Century was religion. In this instance, the 
Conservatives were to suffer from the ever-decreasing strength of the hold of Protestantism in 
the East of Scotland; something from which they had derived many votes in the past For the 
purposes of this chapter, it is nonetheless important to note how other denominations retained 
their importance within communities, thus preserving the importance of community issues. 
70 Ibid (Con). 119 
Religion in Scottish Community Life 
The Church used to have a strong organisational role in Scottish communities. 
Nevertheless, there was still a split between the (Anglican) Episcopalian landowners (Tories) and 
the rest of the nation in the Church of Scotland. Furthermore, the 1980s saw erosion of the 
Church of Scotland, which damaged working class support for the Conservatives in the urban 
west and rural areas. Seawright asserts that religious de-alignment was not actually a significant 
factor in the Conservatives' demise in Scotland7! . He writes that: "The decline in Conservative 
support has occurred in those of all religions and of none,,72. Therefore, one would have 
expected the Government not to pay too much attention to the phenomenon above any others. 
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As we can in Charts 3.1 and 3.2 however, religion was more ofa determinant of voting in 
Scotland than in England. In a special effort not to antagonise the Northern Ireland situation, a 
decision was taken early on by the Conservative Government not to openly engage in sectarian 
politics in Scotiand73 . With hindsight, this seems to have been a mistake. As Lord MacKay of 
Ardbrecknish was especially keen to point out (and as Charts 3.1 and 3.2 demonstrate), Labour 
were successfully playing the 'Green Card' in the West of Scotland74. Hereby, Labour were 
attracting the descendants of Irish Catholic immigrants by promoting their opposition to the 
Conservatives and their Protestant image. Lord Lang noted that Catholics should be natural 
supporters of the Conservatives, given the Party's emphasis on traditional values75 . It is also 
interesting to note that Labour could attract Catholic voters in Scotland in spite of their abortion 
policies. This demonstrates how the Conservatives could never be popular with Scottish 
Catholics because of their Protestant image. As with the nationalism issue (dealt with in more 
73 Interview with Lord Fraser, 5.3.01. 
74 Interview, 25.1.01 & Interview with Viscount Younger, 14.2.01. 
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detail in Chapter 4), the issue of religion is another where the British Conservatives are atypical 
of their sort of party in Europe, insofar as Catholics usually do vote along these lines. Viscount 
Younger and Lord Lang furthered this point by lamenting the fact that the Conservatives could 
not even capture the votes of well-educated newly-affluent Catholic professionals in the West of 
Scotland 76. 
This failure is due to the fact that there is still too much of a Protestant legacy associated 
with Conservatism in Scotland to facilitate the attraction of these 'natural' supporters. The Party 
faces a conundrum in this respect. They cannot openly support fundamentalist Protestant 
movements in Scotland such as the underground 'Jobs for the Bhoys' campaign77. Nor can the 
Conservatives be seen to complain too vociferously about positive discrimination, as was 
discovered in Monklands District Council during the 1990s. Either of these tactics would leave 
the Party open to accusations of sectarianism and incite problems in Scotland and, more 
importantly, Northern Ireland. However, religious de-alignment amongst more moderate 
Protestants has lost the Conservatives many certain votes78. This was especially the case 
amongst the urban working class; a sector of society that had been impenetrable to the aristocrat-
based Conservatives up until their amalgamation with the Liberal Unionists in 191279. The 
declining importance of religion in the late Twentieth Century was caused by secularisation of 
modem society in general, and mixed marriages and non-discriminatory employment practices in 
7S Interview 27.3.01. 
76 Interviews, 14.2.01 & 27.3.01. 
77 This ultra-Orange campaign was against the institution of a Scottish Parliament as they 
believed that such Devolution was a plot to give more jobs and power to the Irish immigrant 
Catholic community in Scotland - Interview with Lord Fraser, 5.3.01. 
78 Interview with Lord MacKay of Ardbrecknish, 25.1.01. 
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particular. A Gallup Poll in April 1982, just before the Pope's visit to Britain, which attracted a 
crowd of 250 000 to Glasgow, reported that as many as 15% of the British population felt that 
God was not at all important in their lives. Two-thirds of the population acknowledged that 
religion was losing its influenceso. In conclusion, we should note that the Conservative Party 
cannot lay its Protestant image to rest and only loses votes, whilst not gaining any, due to it. 
There is nothing in the 'POMP' that could arrest religious de-alignment8). Nonetheless, it is 
important to re-iterate that anything that increased the importance of local affairs or threatened 
Conservative chances at the Local Government level could have damaged their subsequent 
General Election fortunes by undermining Party Local Government representation and cohesion. 
Religion had a significant effect in this respect, as can be seen by the way in which Labour local 
politicians in Scotland played the 'Green Card' heavily in the 1980s and 1990s82• 
There were no identifiable major religious cleavages in the 1979-1997 period~ yet the 
evidence above suggests that it played some role in the Conservatives' problems. This dynamic 
was part of a longer continuum beyond the years in question, which confirms its part in many 
Scots' natural pre-disposition against the Party, which was acquired through processes of 
socialisation, of both the primacy and recency forms. We have also already mentioned the 
socialising roles of the Scottish education system and media. 
79 Graham Walker in: Devine & Finlay (eds.), 1996, p259. 
so Gallup Political Index, #260 April 1982, p12. By 1989, only 64% replied that they believed in 
God; this figure had dropped from 68% in 1986 - Gallup Political Inde!h #352, December 1989, 
f(interview with Andrew Gamble 16.3.00. 
82 Interview with Lord MacKay of Ardbrecknish, 25.1.01. 
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In order to investigate Scottish political culture and the 'POS' effects of the extra 
importance of local politics north of the border further, we need to establish in greater detail how 
the special relationship between Local Government representatives and their electors was most 
frequently and closely manifested. The issue of Local Authority housing provision fulfils this 
role most accurately~ thus allowing us more insight into the nature of Scottish political culture 
that seemed to affect the Conservatives 'POS' so severely from 1979-1997. 
Local Authority Housing Provision & the 'POS' 
A vital factor to consider with regard to voters' attitudes towards Local Government in 
Scotland was the higher proportion of Scots who relied on the state for housing83. From the end 
of the War, Labour controlled Local Authorities and the SNP were able to take electoral 
advantage of the voters' perceptions that the central Government was failing the economic and 
social needs of Scotland84. Due to apparent economic deprivation and poor living conditions, 
many citizens were eventually moved from areas of urban decay to New Towns in the Central 
Belt. Local Government initially supplied their new housing8s. Hence the higher numbers of 
Local Authority tenants in Scotland than elsewhere in the Union. As the Conservatives came to 
power in 1979, Scotland had the most Local Authority tenants per capita in the 'free world' 86. If 
my hypothesis is correct, this key relationship between citizens and Local Government would be 
of great importance in attempting to explain why a policy such as the 'Right to Buy' (examined 
83 Mitchell, 1990, p129 + interview with James Mitchell, 8.6.00. 
84 Childs, David: "Britain Since 1945 - 3m Ed.", London, Routledge, 1992, p269. Contested by 
Robert Blake with regard to the housing issue. He argues that the Party was particularly 
accommodating towards society's need for new house building - Blake, Robert: "The 
Conservative Party - Form Peel to Major", London, Arrow, 1998, p268. 
85 Bradbury, 1997, p76. 
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in greater depth, below) might have been met with different electoral reactions north of the 
border87. Another important point to consider is whether Mrs Thatcher over-estimated the ability 
of Scots to live without the state intervention that they had become so used t08S? 
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As can be seen from Chart 3.3 to this chapter, when the Conservatives came to power in 
1979, renting housing from Local Authorities was most prevalent in Scotland. The main cpOS' 
implication of this was centred on the idea that Local Councils could engineer electoral support 
86 Regional Trends, Number 20, 1985, p6I & The Daily Telegraph, 10.5.79, p18. 
87 Interview with David McLetchie, 19.1.01. 
88 Charmley, John: "A History of Conservative Politics, 1900-1996", Basingstoke, Macmil1a~ 
1996, p236 + Interview with Lord Sanderson, 30.11.00. 
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for themselves and their party in General Elections by keeping rents low89• Therefore, one of 
the major emphases of Conservative housing policy in the 1980s was to lure voters out of public 
sector housing. The central Government took this decision for the twin reasons that they 
believed property owners to be more likely to vote Conservative and, very importantly for this 
thesis, in order to reduce the influence of Local Authorities90. The key concept in this strategy 
was the 'Right to Buy', as introduced by the Housing Act 1980 and perpetuated in subsequent 
legislation91 . 
Perhaps the most important aspect of the 1980 HOUSing Act was its introduction of the 
concept of the 'Right to Buy.' Hereby, tenants in Local Authority housing were given an 
opportunity to purchase their homes at discount prices92 . The close correlation that the 
metropolitan Government perceived to exist between property-ownership and support for the 
Conservative Party was the reason behind this aspect of the legislation93. The Prime Minister 
was attempting to mould social structures and attitudes to suit her ideas94. She wanted a more 
entrepreneurial spirit in society that would encourage citizens to secure their own welfare 
through their own efforts. This may well have been borne out of a genuine neoliberal desire to 
89 Interviews with Lords Strathclyde, 8.11.00 & Sanderson, 30.11.00 & Keith Harding, 12.9.01 + 
Stirling Councillor Survey (Con), Winter 2001-2002. 
90 Interview with Lord Mackay of Clashfern, 22.1.01 & Stirling Councillor Survey (Con & Lab), 
Winter 2001-2002. 
91 A brief synopsis of subsequent 'Right to Buy' legislation is presented in Appendix A to this 
chapter. The following notational abbreviations will be used throughout descriptions of 
legislation: [part - Chapter - Section - Subsection - Paragraph] (where all are necessary). 
92 Long leases on flats, freeholds on houses [I, I, 1 (1) (a)]. 
93 Interview with Viscount Younger, 14.2.01. The accuracy of this perception is somewhat 
~uestionable with regard to Scotland, as demonstrated by Chart 3.5. 
Anthony Heath & Geoff Garrett in: Denver, David & Hands, Gordon (eds.): "Issues & 
Controversies in British Electoral Behaviour", London, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992, p355. 
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minimise state interference in the lives of citizens. However, the inherent tax cuts would also 
have made the policies of privatisation and property-ownership extension attractive. The hope 
was that citizens who benefited financially from the extension of the property market would 
reward the Conservatives with their votes. Furthermore, the newly propertied class would also 
look to punish Labour at the polls for being so restrictive95. Heath and Garrett assert that 
existing owner-occupiers were always likely to vote Conservative because of their socio-
economic status96. The big challenge for the Conservatives would be to make sure that new 
owners would associate their recent apparent good fortune with the Party, and vote accordingly. 
Given the geographical focus of this thesis, the Tenants' Rights, Etc. (Scotland) Act J 980 
is of much interest. It appeared almost in parallel to the groundbreaking Housing Act. 
Therefore, its contents should disclose whether the Government was prepared to make special 
considerations for the Scottish housing situation. The main point to look out for is whether the 
much higher incidence of Local Authority renting in Scotland was taken into account. I, I, 1 (1) 
of this Act confirmed that the 'Right to Buy' scheme is to be extended to Scotland. Thus, the 
Government's twin desires of extending property ownership and exerting more control over 
Local Government were not stopping at the border. Indeed, special provision was made for 
Scottish circumstances to promote the scheme even further than in England. For example, extra 
discounts on market prices of residences were to be given after only three years tenancy, as 
opposed to four in England [Tenants' Rights, Etc. (Scotland) Act 1980, I, I, 1 (5) (a-b)]. This 
9S This theme was still being continued in the 1987 Party manifesto - in: Dale, lain (ed.): 
"Conservative Party General Election Manifestos 1900-1997", London, Routledge, 2000, p317. 
96 Ibi~ p356 + interviews with David McLetchie, 19.1.01 & Lord MacKay of Ardbrecknish, 
25.1.01. 
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demonstrated that the central Government seemed to be aware of the special housing 
circumstances in Scotland. The special enthusiasm to extend 'Right to Buy' to Scotland shows 
how they wished to court the large number of potential voters in Local Authority housing and 
diminish the influence of the landlord Councils north of the border. 
Part XII of the Act further confirmed the Government's desire to expand the property-
owning classes in Scotland97. Not only was property ownership seen as a way of increasing the 
prosperity of voters, it was also hoped that it would increase their stake in society98. Thus, the 
central Government would have to spend less on renovation. XII, I, 214 (1) permitted Local 
Authorities to advance money to citizens who wish to acquire, build, improve or repair houses. 
Money from this scheme was also to be made available to those who were taking advantage of 
'Right to Buy' [X, I, 216 (1)]. XII, I, 222 (1) extended the Secretary of State's powers to 
advance money to lending institutions, including banks, building societies, the Scottish Special 
Housing Authority and Local Authorities, so that they could give more attractive terms to 
prospective first-time buyers. Finally, the Act re-iterated the Government's commitment to 
improving the quality of housing stock and, therefore, its value by empowering Local Authorities 
and the Secretary of State to make improvement grants for defective properties [XIII, I, 236 (2) 
and XIII, I, 257 (1)]. Thus, right from the beginning of the 'Right to Buy' programme, Scotland 
was to be included as much as anywhere else in the UK. The apparent enhanced role of Local 
Government there suggests that if Scottish Local Authorities, both Conservative and Labour, 
97 "Conservatives aim to extend as widely as possible the opportunity to own property and build 
up capitaL .. and develop economic independence and security", 1987 Party manifesto - in: Dale 
~ed.), 2000, p316. 
Ibid, p317. 
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were to have any 'POS' victories by their handling of a metropolitan policy, then housing 
provision and the 'Right to Buy' was it. 
There are many parts of the Housing Act 1985 that continued to promote the 
Government's programme of selling Council Houses. IV, I, 100 (l) of this Act permitted Local 
Authorities to re-imburse tenants for any improvements that they may have made to their 
dwellings. Thus, tenants were encouraged to keep their homes in good order, thereby raising the 
market value of the property. Furthermore, the central Government could also direct where more 
Local Authority money was to be spent. As we can see from the above and Appendix A to this 
chapter, the Conservatives pressed ahead with the 'Right to Buy' with great conviction. We have 
seen what the Conservative elite hoped to achieve by their housing policies in the 1980s. It now 
remains to be seen what sort of effect the 'Right to Buy' had on the electorate and Local 
Government in Scotland. As we shall see, the policy seemed to have the desired effect at the 
polls in England. However, quite the opposite seemed to occur north of the border. A summary 
and assessment of the possible explanations for this 'POS' discrepancy follows. 
Butler and Kavanagh note four characteristics that were changing in British society 
between 1979 and 1987 that should have steered the electorate firmly towards the 
Conservatives99• Home ownership had risen from 52% to 66%. Share ownership went up from 
7% to 19%. The number of people renting their homes from Local Authorities had fallen from 
45% to 27%. Trade Union membership had fallen from 30% to 22%. All these traits were 
compatible with New Right Conservatism, and should have won the Party many new supporters. 
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Such a swing to the Party did occur in England. However, quite the opposite was the case in 
Scotland. Firstly, with regard to housing, therefore, the question of who was taking advantage of 
'Right to Buy' north and south of the border must be addressed. Any differences between the 
new homeowners in England and Scotland might reveal why those north of the border were less 
likely to re-align themselves with the Conservatives. 
Most instructive in a comparison of first-time property buyers around the various British 
regions is an analysis of their average annual incomes and house prices. Comparative figures for 
all the parts of the United Kingdom are presented in Chart 3.4. The chart shows what kind of 
people (by income) were buying their Council Houses in which areas (demonstrated by the 
average house prices). Whilst house prices may have varied, it is vital to note that the Scottish 
income plots mirror closely those of the EnglandlOO• Therefore, it is fair to say that, using this 
descriptive variable, the same sorts of voters were entering the property market north and south 
of the border as a result of the Conservatives' 'Right to Buy' policies. Thus, there must have 
been extra difficulty for the Conservatives in persuading these potential supporters for the Party 
in Scotland to re-align. 
99 Butler & Kavanagh, 1988, p4. 
100 The correlation would have been even closer had it not been for the inflated house prices and 
wages in the London area. 
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Another key divide in the housing issue in Scotland is that between urban and rural. This 
polarisation was very keenly felt in 1979LOI. The major effect of this on the question in hand 
concerns which sorts of voters were going to take advantage of 'Right to Buy?' From the outset, 
it was unlikely that there would be too many takers for the scheme in rural, more Conservative 
parts of Scotland, given that the majority of Local Authority housing is in urban areas. These 
areas are Labour strongholds traditionally, as many Catholic immigrant communities had 
clustered there l02. In such districts, credible socialist activists, especially including those in 
office in Local Government, could dissuade all but the most insistent purchasersI03. If sales did 
go through in these areas, Labour Councillors were able to take the credit from grateful 
101 Jenkins, Peter: "Mrs Thatcher's Revolution - the Ending of the Socialist Era", London, 
Jonathan Cope, 1987, p95. 
102 Interview with Lord MacKay of Ardbrecknish, 25.1.01. 
103 Interview with Viscount Younger, 14.2.01. 
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purchasers, even though it was ultimately a Conservative policy that facilitated the change 104. 
This was because it was, more often than not, a Labour Council that orchestrated deals over 
individual purchases as the former landlords of the Council Houses in question. 
As we have seen, increased choice of housing tenure was designed to promote 
independence and self-reliance amongst the population. Housing Minister John Stanley hoped 
that such characteristics would tum the population Conservative 105. Labour argued that such 
individualism was dividing the community, especially where estates were split between owner-
occupiers and tenants H.16. Of great importance to this thesis is the point that Butler and Kavanagh 
report about this issue in the 1979 General Election campaignlO7. They note how Conservative 
canvassers were well received on English Council Estates for the first time as they carried their 
message of 'Right to Buy.' On the other hand, Scottish Conservative candidates for Local 
Government and General Elections were still usually met with open hostility on such estates 
throughout the 1980s and 1990S108. 
With regard to the 'POS' effect of housing tenure question, Seawright asserts that, from 
the mid-1970s onwards, tenure was a much more politicised issue in Scotland than in England109. 
Dickson agrees with Seawright's assessment. He asserts that the housing issue became 
increasingly politicised by levels of state intervention in individuals' lives. Furthermore, direct 
104 Interview with David McCletchie, 19.1.01. 
105 Riddell, Peter: "The Thatcher Government", Oxford, Blackwell, 1985, p155. 
106 Ibid, p156. 
107 Butler & Kavanagh, 1980, p190. 
108 Interviews with Ross Harper, 6.8.01 & Keith Harding, 12.9.01 + Stirling Councillor Survey 
(Con), Winter 2001-2002. 
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contact with the state (as in Local Authority housing provision) is either desired by voters on the 
left or derided as being too interventionist by neoliberal Conservatives 11 0. North of the border, 
Labour were using Local Authority housing to keep supporters through low rents whilst the 
Conservatives were unveiling their 'Right to Buy' plans, with all the inherent benefits and costs 
of property ownership 1 11. The Conservative elite had to persuade the Scottish voters that 
property ownership was indeed desirable and that it was the policies of the central Government 
that was making access to the market easierII2. Given the entrenched nature of much of Local 
Government and the persuasiveness of Labour activists in it in Scotland during the 1980s, getting 
these messages across was never going to be easy 1 13 • This point gives support to the hypothesis 
that the Conservatives suffered significantly from poor Local Government representation in 
Scotland. 
As Gerry Stoker notes, the sale of Council Houses was perhaps the biggest success of the 
Conservative Governments of the 1980s and 1990s in the UK as a whole ll4. The major problem, 
therefore, was not in the policy, but its delivery and explanation to the electorate in Scotland. 
We are seeing that the role of Local Authorities in Scotland in this process is substantial. This 
role was played out through Conservative Councillors serving to defend and 'sell' policies at a 
local level and their opponents seeking to disrupt or take the electoral credit through their 
109 Seawright, 1999, p62. 
110 In: McCrone, David; Kendrick, Stephen & Straw, Pat (eds.): "The Making of Scotland: 
Nation. Culture & Social Change", Edinburgh, British Sociological Association, 1989, p79. 
111 Interviews with Lords Strathclyde, 8.11.00 & Sanderson, 30.11.00 + David McLetchie, 
19.1.01. 
112 Interview with Viscount Younger, 14.2.01. 
113 Interview with David McLetchie, 19.1.01. 
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implementation and spending schemes. It is becoming apparent that these Local Councillor roles 
are essential in the 'POMP' and 'POS' in Scotland, but are usually under-assessed1l5. Lord Lang 
admitted how the Conservatives in London had not given enough consideration to this dynamic 
when they were in office1l6. The importance of this issue becomes particularly relevant when 
assessing the conundrum of why the Conservatives could not reap the electoral benefits of 
policies in Scotland that won them many votes south of the border. 
The 'Right to Buy' was perhaps the policy where Local Government was most required 
to 'sell' a central initiative to their constituents, given the intrinsic role of Local Authorities in 
the scheme. It should also be noted that the genesis of the policy came from Francis Griffin, a 
Conservative in Local Government in Birmingham; thus demonstrating how the Conservative 
elite in London was also reliant on subsidiary levels for informing and helping them with local 
issues 117. These two aspects of the relationship between central and Local Government suggest 
that the elite in London should have been keen to strengthen their party's representation at the 
local level by formulating policies for which the electorate would reward Conservative 
candidates at all levels. Furthermore, Local Government under Opposition control might have 
been ameliorated for fear of inducing concerted efforts to undermine the 'POMP', and thereby 
the Conservatives' 'POS.' 
\14 Stoker, Gerry: Intergovernmental RelatiOns, in: Public Administration, 73, 1995, ppl01-122, 
~104. 
IS Interview with Viscount Younger, 14.2.01. 
116 Interview, 27.3.01. 
117 Interview with Martin Perry. 24.8.01. 
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Indeed, Labour were able to capitalise on the 'Right to Buy' scheme. Tenants who were 
purchasing their homes often believed the scheme to actually be a Labour initiative. Most of the 
legal and financial details of a purchase would be handled by the Local Council involved, rather 
than by the central Government. Thus, Labour were able to benefit from increased contact with 
grateful voters I 18. Conservative housing policies impacted more on Labour Local Authorities in 
Scotland than Councils of any party anywhere else, due to the higher proportions of Council 
tenants there. Therefore, there was a different reaction to that south of the border I 19 . Labour 
Councils, seeing their housing subsidies waning, mounted a 'Luddite' campaign against the 
policies 120. An adverse reaction towards their local Labour Councillors may have been expected 
from the electorate, given that citizens may have wished to benefit from the opportunity to own 
property and pay less for local services. However, even though Labour Councils were often 
going as far as cancelling 'Right to Buy' deals, they still had enough political credibility amongst 
the electorate to remain in powerl21. This is a very good example of Local Government in 
Scotland posing a particular 'POS' problem for the Conservative Government. 
South of the border, the Prime Minister was happy that the ever extending 'Right to Buy' 
scheme was becoming so popular with citizens that Labour Local Authorities could no longer 
oppose it122. Even though Council Houses were being bought up at an impressive rate in 
Scotland, however, Labour politicians and activists there were still able to convince voters not to 
118 Interview with Keith Harding, 12.9.01 + Stirling Councillor Survey (Con), Winter 2001-2002. 
119 Bonefeld, Werner, Brown, Alice & Burnham, Peter: "A Major Crisis? The Politics of 
Economic Policy in Britain in the 1990s", Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1995, p144. 
120 Interview with Lord Sanderson, 30.11.00. 
121 Interviews with David McLetchie, 19.1.01 & Viscount Younger, 14.2.01 + Butler & 
Kavanagh, 1984, p63. 
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support the Conservatives as a consequence. Thus, the Conservatives were going to find it very 
difficult to capitalise on the housing initiatives, as they had done south of the border. The two 
main problems were to convince the voters to make the link between any improved living 
conditions that property ownership may have brought and the Conservative Government in 
London; and to circumvent Labour Local Authority opposition 123. This was not the first example 
of this 'low politics' issue of housing and Local Authority rents having a significant impact on 
the Conservatives' UK-wide 'POS.' For example, Butler and King note how the question 
formed an important part of the 1966 General Election campaign124. 
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122 Thatcher, 1993, p279. 
123 Interviews with David McLetchie, 19.1.01, Viscount Younger, 14.2.01 & Keith Harding, 
12.9.01 + Written Statement by Sir Malcolm Rifkind, 22.1.01. 
124 Butler, D. E. & King, Anthony: "The British General Election of 1966", London, Macmillan, 
1966, p20D. 
125 1979,p356; 1983,p3Dl; 1987,p284; 1992,p286; 1997,p256. 
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Voting by Tenure 1979-1987 
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In Chart 3.5, we can see that the 'Right to Buy' policy fulfUled only one of its goals in 
Scotland Many citizens were being lured away from public sector housing. However, even 
when the rate of new purchases was accelerating, the Party was still losing votes. As can be seen 
from the chart, this pattern was not followed in England. The results in Chart 3.6 of most 
interest to the Conservatives with regard to the effectiveness of their housing policies would have 
been in columns B, D and E. B shows the desired effect of luring Council House buyers to the 
Party. Nevertheless, this was not happening in the numbers they hoped for and there was a 
disappointing fall in 1987. D and E decrease nicely through the 1980s. The steady decrease in 
D, E and F show bow mucb the Labour Party had to worry about, as it was losing support in all 
tenure areas. It must be remembered, however, tbat these figures relate to the whole of the 
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United Kingdom. Council House sales were moving apace m Scotland as well. The 
Conservatives were not reaping the electoral benefits in the same way as in England. 
With regard to the 1980s, there seem to be two main reasons why the Conservatives did 
not benefit at the polls in Scotland from the 'Right to Buy.' Most Scottish voters who had 
benefited from 'Right to Buy' were not enjoying significant concurrent increases in their general 
standard ofliving126. Therefore, just acquiring the deeds to their houses127 would not have been 
enough to encourage them to vote Conservative for the first time. Furthermore, as Local 
Councillors in Scotland could wield significant influence on their constituents, Labour groups in 
Local Authorities were able to deflect due praise and electoral reward from a seemingly well-
designed piece of 'POMP.' One of the most astute ways in which they managed this was to 
highlight the poor quality of Local Authority housing stock that was left. Rather than be 
criticised for no longer being able to provide good quality housing, Opposition-controlled Local 
Authorities were able to blame the metropolitan Government and, thus, absolve themselves. It 
will be interesting to note in subsequent chapters whether such manipulation was possible in 
policy areas that did not involve Local Authorities as much as the selling off of Council Houses? 
With regard to housing, John Major had more success with a more traditional 
Conservative 'statecraft' approachl28. However, this is not to say that all Thatcherite policies 
had been jettisoned. An aspect of Thatcherite practice perpetuated by the new Prime Minister 
126 Interview with David McLetchie, 19.1.01. 
127 An act that often burdened voters with the extra expense of house repairs for the first time. 
This was particularly difficult to accept for Scots who had been brought up in a culture of 
expecting maintenance from their Local Authorities - Ibid. 
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was to use Scotland as a testing ground for new schemes. For example, ' gro-grants ', which gave 
private developers access to Government grants to build affordable homes, were implemented 
north of the border before their introduction in England and Wales in 1996129. Just before the 
1997 Ejection, Seldon asserts that the Prime Minister was still looking to widen the 'Right to 
Buy' scheme 130. The Party tried to soften the message by saying that £6bn had been spent so far 
through Housing Association renting projects l3l . However, this message did not get away from 
the fact that Local Authority housing was still being run down in favour of private ownership. 
This was not well advised. 'Right to Buy' was decreasing in popularity from the mid-1980s in 
all regions as purchasers were being trapped by negative equity and older tenants were finding 
that they could never realise their assets132 . 
1997 Conservative Votes % by Tenure 
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3.7 - Source: Brown et aI, 1999133. 
128 Bradbury, 1997, p8I. 
129 Lund, Brian (ed.): "Housing Problems and Housing Policy", London, Longman, 1996, pS8. 
130 Seldon, 1998, p543. 
J3l 1997 manifesto, in: Dale (ed.), 2000, p428. 
132 Christine Whitehead in: Cook, Philip & Crook, Tony: "Low Cost Home Ownership. An 
Evaluation of Housing Policy Under the Conservatives", Aldershot, Gower, 1986, p74. 
133 Brown, Alice; McCrone, David; Paterson, Lindsay & Surridge, Paula: "The Scottish 
Electorate - The 1997 General Election and Beyond", Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1999, p5S. 
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The figures in Chart 3.7 best illustrate the apparent failure of extending home ownership 
in the hope of attracting more voters north of the border. By 1997, we can see that not only did 
Scottish owner-occupiers not vote Conservative in as great a proportion as their English 
counterparts, but also that they did not even make up the largest proportion of the meagre 
Conservative vote there. This was despite the fact that, during the period 1995-1997, the 
economy and house prices were starting to recover 134 . Butler and Kavanagh note how house 
prices were rising by between 15% and 30% and how unemployment was falling135. However, 
the Conservatives still fared badly in the 1997 election. Butler and Kavanagh conclude that this 
was not because voters were so disaffected with Conservative capitalism that they were de-
aligning and seeking a true alternative. Instead, the New Labour Party under Tony Blair had 
come so close to the Conservatives' position on economic matters that owner-occupier members 
of the middle class could vote Labour without the spectres of collectivisation and high taxation 
that they had been taught to fear in the Thatcher years. 
As can be seen in Chart 3.3, Scots eventually bought their Council Houses in fairly 
similar proportions to their English counterparts. Therefore, there must have been an added 
Scottish dimension to the problem of convincing the electorate to reward the Government for 
popular policies with their votes. If, as this chapter seeks to demonstrate, Scottish Local 
Government representatives play an enhanced role in their communities, then this variable 
assumes great explanatory significance. In subsequent chapters, we shall learn of a general 
antipathy towards the Conservatives in Scotland, which was caused by a combination of 
134 Butler & Kav~ 1997, p303. 
13S Ibid. 
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historical and structural factors and ill-advised contemporary policies136. If this long-standing 
electoral handicap is added to the apparent extra effectiveness of astute Labour Councillors in 
Scotland, any particular metropolitan Conservative policy would have had to have been of 
almost miraculous quality to win over significant numbers of voters there137. 
The next section of this chapter seeks to find more examples of local politicians in 
Scotland successfully attacking or defending the 'POMP.' Thus, we will be able to further 
assess whether they could play a significant role in the 'POS' beyond the housing issue, which 
fell directly under their remit. 
Scottish Local Politics & the 'POMP' 
At this point, it is important to differentiate between the two 'strands' of work undertaken 
by Local Councillors 138. Many times, citizens will be very grateful to their Councillor for help 
with a specific small-scale civic issue such as the repair of a street light. However, in this 
instance, no connection is made between the Councillor's action and the national competence of 
their party. The more important 'POS' work undertaken by Local Councillors is when they are 
acting very openly on behalf of their party in a district-wide issue. Examples of such actions in 
Scotland, which were capable of changing voters' attitudes towards a party, were where 
Councillors championed the interests of their wards, School Boards or Tenants' Association. 
Furthermore, Councillors could join national campaigns and, thus, increase their party's profile 
136 Interview with Lord Lang, 27.1.01. 
137 Ibid. 
138 Stirling Councillor Survey (Lab), Winter 2001·2002. 
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amongst the local community. Examples of such high profile national campaigns that Labour 
Councillors joined included the Miners' Strike, Poll Tax, healthcare and anti-privatisation issues. 
The prime example of Scottish Local Authorities seeking to completely undermine a 
metropolitan Government policy was the concerted opposition towards the Poll Taxl39. It is 
most interesting to note that dissent was even heard from Conservative Councillors. Actions 
taken from that quarter are examined later in this chapter. At this point, the way in which 
Opposition parties in Local Government sought to disrupt the Conservatives' 'POS' in Scotland 
over this issue will be examined. Almost as soon as the policy had been implemented, a non-
payment campaign began. Labour and SNP local politicians endorsed this campaign 
especially 140. It should be noted that there was some disagreement within these parties as to how 
far such measures should be taken141. However, even in areas where most of the tax was 
collectedl42, Local Government representatives of all parties complained bitterly about this piece 
of 'POMP.' If my hypothesis is proved, such antagonism caused in Local Government by the 
'POMP' north of the border was severely damaging to the central Government's 'POS.' 
Amongst Labour and SNP local politicians, the most frequent condemnations of the Poll 
Tax were that it was inequitable and forced them to cut local services due to budgeting 
139 Interview with Lord MacKay of Ardbrecknish, 25.1.01 & Stirling Councillor Survey (Con & 
Lab), Winter 2001-2002. This issue is referred to again in Chapters 4,5 and 6. 
140 Times, 7.1.89, p5. Prominent figures such as the Lord Provost of Edinburgh and the leader of 
Lothian District Council faced legal action for their refusal to pay - Times, 16.3.90, pI & 
Glasgow Heralg, 1.9.89, p8. 
141 Glasgow Heralg, 2.3.90, pS & 20.3.90, pI. 
142 Most frequently in rural regions - Times, 21.9.89, p5. 
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restrictions 143. Such arguments were countered by the Conservative elite and their 
representatives in Scotland with an exhortation for more responsible budgeting practices in Local 
Governmentl44 . As we shall see in subsequent chapters, the Thatcher administration was trying 
to win support by cutting voters' tax bills and introducing more accountable Local Authority 
service provision. The Poll Tax and concurrent Local Government finance measures (to be 
detailed in Chapters 4 and 5) caused the most friction in Local Government in Scotlandl45 . 
Beyond their statutory obligation to implement the policies, however, the question remained as 
to what these Local Authorities could do to damage the Conservatives' 'POS?' 
Teachers, nurses and higher education staff and students were all highly vociferous 
opponents of the policy. Many of these citizens enjoyed substantial rebates. Nevertheless, it 
also seemed that their Local Authorities were not chasing them very hard 146. At this time, 
registration for the new tax was taking place in England and Wales 147. The metropolitan 
Government was pleased to report high rates of returns for this exercise. However, it was 
estimated that 30-40% of Glaswegians were not paying their Poll Tax148• Even though they 
were under statutory obligation to collect the tax, many Local Authorities in Scotland were slow 
to do 50149, thus disrupting the levels of revenue generated. Consequently, central Government 
subsidies would have to be re-evaluated. Such re-evaluations would often lead to tax increases 
143 Interviews with Lords Sanderson, 30.11.00 and MacKay of Ardbrecknish, 25.1.01 + Stirling 
News, 7.5.92, pI & 2.3.95, pI + Scotsman, 7.4.95, p4 
144 Ibid (2 interviewees + 3 newspaper articles). 
145 Stirling Councillor Survey (Con & Lab), Winter 2001-2002. 
146 Times Educational Scottish Suwlemen!, 20.1.89, p3, Times Higher Education Suwlemen!, 
17.3.89, p5 + Interview with Lord MacKay of Ardbrecknish, 25.1.01. 
147 Glasgow Herald, l.9.89, p8 & Times, 2l.9.89, p5. 
148 Ibid (2 newspaper articles). 
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and service cuts in Scotland. Thereafter, the central and Local Governments would vie to 
convince the voters of who was to blame~ with the Conservatives in London blaming non-
payment and inefficiency, whilst Opposition parties were attacking an inequitable 
taxation/subsidy system being imposed by an absentee Government that had no mandate north of 
the border150. In later chapters, we shall see in more detail how the Conservatives suffered from 
a traditional bias against them in Scotland 151. It seems that this accumulation of antipathy led to 
Labour arguments regarding the Poll Tax being more readily accepted north of the border than 
the Conservatives' point of view. 
In addition to supporting non-payment campaigns, Labour Local Authorities took 
advantage of the Conservatives' traditional Scottish handicap to further their cause in the 'POS' 
with measures that were legal, but clearly designed to undermine the central Government and 
alienate Scottish potential Conservative supporters from the Thatcherite creed. An example of 
such a measure was when Labour Councils used their multiplier powers to charge providers of 
holiday accommodation (usually Conservatives) Poll Tax on both their residential and 'business' 
properties152. Whilst these Conservative tax-payers would see that this extra burden had been 
imposed by Labour Councillors, it was possible for Opposition parties to trace the root of the 
problem back to the Conservative elite in London for imposing the Poll Tax in the first instance. 
Another example of such defiance by a Scottish Local Authority came in 1992 when 
149 Interview with Lord Sanderson, 30.11.00. 
ISO For example: Glasgow Herald, 1.3.90, p12. Further examples of this debate appear in this 
thesis' study of Local Government in Stirling. 
151 Interview with Lord Lang, 27.3.01. 
152 Glasgow Herald 2.9.89, p8. 
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Clackmannanshire, by virtue of some clever accounting, managed to circumvent subsidy cuts153. 
By approving the Authority's budget early, they were able to exclude £108k, thereby remaining 
eligible for central help. 
To date, this chapter has sought to discover incidents and characteristics of Scottish 
society that rendered Local Government there quite influential. The first of these circumstances 
was the Conservatives' questionable mandate to govern in Scotland. No matter how empathetic 
Scottish Conservative local politicians were with their fellow-Scots, they still had to try to 
defend and promote policies made by the distant/'foreign' Government in London. Next, a well 
co-ordinated network of Labour Local Councillors in Scotland troubled the Conservatives154. 
These Councillors, who controlled many more Local Authorities than their counterparts south of 
the border, were astute enough to manipulate their constituents into believing that even the 
Conservatives most populist policies were not in the Scots' best interests 155. Unlike Labour, 
Conservative Councils in Scotland had no intra-party mutual support network across the 
nation156. Therefore, it was difficult to muster help for the implementation or defence of the 
'POMP', as well as to run effective election campaigns. The Conservatives' 'POS' was 
suffering in Scotland due to traditional antipathy from the electorate and astute planning by 
Opposition parties in Local Government. Importantly for this chapter, it seems that the structure 
of society and political culture in Scotland rendered local issues and Councillors sufficiently 
153 Stirling Observer, 24.1.92, pI. 
154 Interviews with Viscount Younger, 14.2.01 & Keith Harding, 12.9.0l. 
155 Interview with Viscount Younger, 14.2.0l. 
156 Interview with Keith Harding, 12.9.01 - nor did the Conservatives feel comfortable in using 
the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities as an agency for co-ordination, as was the case for 
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important to facilitate these exchanges in the 'POS.' The next section of this chapter examines 
how the Party elite in London liaised with its lieutenants north of the border in an attempt to 
rectify the situation. 
The Influence of (Scottish) Conservative Grass Roots Activists on the 'POS' & 
'POMP' 
"(A) party which allows its grass roots to wither and decline is likely to run into 
serious electoral problems ... particularly if rival parties are building up their local 
organizations [sic] at the same time"JS7. 
This quote suggests that there is scope for assessment in this area of the Conservative 
Party away from London. Andrew Gamble's notion of the 'POS' highlights the importance of 
local organisation~ even if he does not give too much consideration to regional variations. He 
equates the 'POS' with a market place, with the Government playing the role of producers 
through the 'POMP' with the electorate as the consumers who are usually passive, except at 
election time. There are certain rules that the Government must follow insofar as they have to 
supply policies that will satisfy enough ofthe voters to ensure re-election. It should be noted that 
metropolitan Governments, in the language of Gamble's model, must also react, instead of just 
dictating, to the needs and desires of their own Party members. These members play important 
dual roles, especially in territories far from London. They are required not only for successful 
marshalling of support at General Election times, but also for help with selling new policies in 
their constituencies. 
Labour Local Government representatives - Stirling Councillor Survey (Lab), Winter 2001-
2002. 
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Gamble was keen to consider the dynamic that the central Party should ascribe to strict 
rules of engagement with its own members, as well as the electorate at large158. Following this 
code, that is to say, supplying policies and instructions that can be easily accepted and supported 
by local members, is essential if these grass roots members are to keep performing their essential 
'POS' tasks willingly and effectively. Gamble claims that the general electorate is usually fairly 
passive, reserving their power for the ballot boX159. By their very nature and continuous 'POS' 
role, Party workers are more active and, therefore, need more constant satisfaction from the 
'POMP' suppliers in terms of popular and easily defensible policies. Such constant satisfaction 
is not easy to deliver. Thus, this section will seek to explore whether this has serious 
implications for Conservative Governments in London. The most important questions to be 
addressed, therefore, are what are the major functions of Conservatives away from the central 
elite, how can their effectiveness and loyalty be strained by 'POMP' and can such undermining 
and disaffection eventually react back badly on the centre in the form of an increased chance of 
General Election defeat? 
In my assessment of the role of geographically peripheral Conservatives, it should be 
noted that I include District, County and Regional Councillors as part of the non-elite 'grass 
roots' cadre. This, I feel, can be justified due to the hierarchical nature of the Party, as 
demonstrated by the large amount of power vested in the Leader and the small degree of 
influence ascribed to other levelsl60. Therefore, a multiplicity of functions for the grass roots is 
157 Whiteley et aI, 1994, p218. 
158 Interview with Andrew Gamble, 16.3.00. 
159 Gamble, 1974, p6. 
160 As assessed in greater detail in Chapter 2. 
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suggested. They are required for the essential 'POS' functions of: representing Conservative 
interests on Local Councils and committeesl61 , organising local support through canvassing, 
leafleting, fund-raising, the focusing and directing of General Election campaigns and the 
'selling' of central Government policies to the local electorate162. 
We saw in Chapter 2 that the National Union and Conference have little effect as a check 
on the policies of the leadership163. The main areas where the Leader may be challenged in 
theory are in the Conservative Policy Forum and regarding Party funding and candidate 
selection. Especially with regard to Scotland, however, there are also significant 'POMP' 
functions for non-elite Conservatives. As well as being formulated with regional sensitivity, 
policies have to be 'sold' to the electorate once they are implemented. As we have seen in my 
study on the sale of Council Houses, such policies were made at least partly with the intention to 
court votes out of gratitude. If left to their own devices, it is not guaranteed that voters will 
always be able to make the connection between the two variables 164. This observation 
corresponds with Gamble's conclusions on the random nature of the mass electorate165. 
Therefore, it would seem that local representation and direction is indeed important. Thus, it is 
essential that there is a well-motivated and effective local team of Conservatives to raise the 
profile of the benefits of new policies. As David McLetchie and Lord Lang noted, it is 
161 It should be noted that even if control of a Local Council was in opposition hands (as was 
often the case in Scotland), significant numbers of Conservatives sitting on a council could 
temper local policies and help to marshal support in the wards that they represented. 
162 Interviews with Viscount Younger, 14.2.01 & Keith Harding, 12.9.01. 
163 Whiteley et al. 1994. p29. 
164 Interview with Viscount Younger, 14.2.01. 
165 Gamble. 1974, p7. 
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impossible to maintain an election campaign level of enthusiasm around the UK at all timesl66. 
However, as local activists are required to keep working for the Party between General Election 
campaigns, the need to ensure their co-operation through the provision of adequate resources 
and, more importantly, popular and easily defensible policies is apparent. 
Ian Gilmour notes that public disapproval of the Government had grown to record 
proportions in the summer of 1995 (see Chart 2.7). This was due to: "(P)alpable incompetence 
and inadequate leadership, higher taxes, Conservative disunity and the Government's 
extremism" 167. Not only was this a slight on the Conservatives' 'POMP', but also a strong 
indicator that an administration must avoid fragmenting its own party to prevent members from 
stopping working and the general image of untrustworthiness that can be transmitted thereby to 
the electorate at large. 1995 marked the first elections to the new Unitary Councils in Scotland. 
The nature of the Conservative campaigns there demonstrates the nature of the relationship 
between national and local politics. We have already seen that many voters in Local 
Government Elections base their choices on national issues. Whilst this does not always mean 
that they will vote for the same party that they usually support in General Elections, it renders the 
actions of Westminster Parliamentarians very important to representatives in Local Government. 
If this thesis' hypothesis is proved correct, therefore, it would have been very important for the 
Conservative elite in London to protect their own General Election chances by supporting their 
Local Government representatives with popular and easily defensible policies. We shall see 
throughout this thesis how many aspects of the 'POMP' did not achieve this goal. Conservative 
166 Interviews 19.1.01 & 27.3.01. 
167 Gilmour, 1997, p367. 
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candidates highlighted this problem in the 1995 Local Government Election campaigns. Many 
Scottish Local Government candidates openly implored the electorate to base their decision on 
local, rather than national issuesl68. The Conservatives had a reasonable record in local service 
provision in Scotlandl69. However, it was realised by Party Local Government representatives 
north of the border that this would count for nothing if the electorate took the Party's record in 
national Government into consideration. 
In the immediate post-war years, the Conservative Leadership placed great importance on 
their local members. Before nation-wide mass media, the elite in London relied on their 
peripheral members to act as a 'canvasser corps' and 'ambassadors in the community'l7O. 
Importantly, grass roots members were not used as foot soldiers only. Their opinions and local 
knowledge were also taken into account. Whiteley et al acknowledge that the Party Leader in 
London did not have to, and rarely did, take any notice of such advicel7l. However, the 
increased levels of self-worth felt by the ordinary members justified the fa~ade. Such myths 
keep Party workers interested and out on the streets. When they felt that such influence in 
London had disappeared, Scottish Party workers quit their tasks in droves 172. 
168 Stirling Councillor Survey (Con), Winter 2001-2002. Scotland on Sunday, 2.4.95, plO & 
Scotsm~ 5.4.95, pS, which contains an interview with Sir Michael Hirst, the then Chairman of 
the Scottish Conservatives. 
169 Interview with Keith Harding, 12.9.01. 
170 Whiteley et ai, 1994, pp4 & 188 & CCO 2/1/17. 
171 Whiteley et ai, 1994, pp5-9. 
172 Interviews with David Seawright, 13.4.00, Viscount Younger, 14.2.01, Lord Lang, 27.3.01, 
Ross Harper, 6.S.01 & Keith Harding, 12.9.01. 
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With regard to the modem era of mass media, Whiteley et at cite Butler and Kavanagh's 
study of the 1987 Election173. In this analysis, local campaigning in the modem era is seen as 
irrelevant. It is claimed that General Elections are won on national issues. It is not certain that 
such sentiments can be applied to Scotland. As this thesis seeks to emphasise, 'local' matters are 
very important there l74 . All parties ignore these special circumstances at their peril. If parties 
are prepared to conclude that only UK-wide issues matter, then great temptation to ignore their 
geographically peripheral grass roots members and Councillors will arise. 
At interview, a senior Conservative Party official explained the formal arrangements 
between the Conservatives in London and Scotland 175. He was very keen to stress that separate 
parties existed north and south of the border. The Scottish Party enjoys representation at formal 
institutions like the Conference and has its own chairman and campaign team. He was adamant 
that the relationship with London is one of co-operation, with no question of dictation from the 
metropolis. In formal institutional terms, this may well be the case. Lord Sanderson defended 
this position by upholding the genuineness of the autonomy of the Scottish Associations176. 
However, the frequency of Scottish Conservatives joining other quasi-nationalist complaints 
against London 177 either suggests that their autonomy allowed them too much freedom or that 
they were indeed feeling alienated by their own Party's actions. 
173 Whiteley et ai, 1994, p189. 
174 Interviews with James Mitchell, 8.6.00 and David McLetchie, 19.1.01. 
175 Anonymous Interview, 21.6.00. 
176 Interview with Lord Sanderson, 30.11.00. 
177 Interview with Lord Lang, 27.3.01 & Lang, 1994, p9. 
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Lord Strathclyde was prepared to admit that the Conservatives, when in Government, do 
not always pay enough attention to their grass roots members as should be the casel78. It should 
be noted that local activists do tend to agree with the central Party more often than not, and can 
be just as vocal in demonstrating this approval as any kind of disaffection179• However, certain 
issues such as the Poll Tax, VAT on domestic fuel and the 'Options for Change' military cuts 
were examples of concerted Scottish Conservative militancy. Lord Sanderson added the issues 
of Devolution and privatisation to this list, and confirmed that local opposition was only likely to 
be heard if their agent was skilful and in favour with those in powerl80. An example of such an 
effective agent was the work done for the Stirling area when Michael Forsyth was MP. The 
effect of local militancy was often minimal initially, as demonstrated by the fact that the policies 
stayed in place. It should be noted that opposition to metropolitan policies was often voiced not 
because the local activists disagreed with the terms of, or ideas behind, the policies, but because 
they could see what damage was being done to the Party's cause in Scotlandl81 . 
As was the case with Local Government representatives of the Opposition parties, the 
Poll Tax generated much disquiet amongst Conservatives in Scotland. Whilst they may have 
agreed with the neoliberal opinions behind the Tax and the economic reasoning for it, 
Conservatives north of the border quickly saw the need for change if electoral disaster was to be 
avoidedl82. In order to maintain some credibility with the electorate, Conservative Councils in 
178 Interview with Lord Strathclyde, 8.11.00. 
179 An opinion repeated by Lord Mackay of Clashfern - Interview 22.1.01 and Lord MacKay of 
Ardbrecknish - Interview 25.1.01. 
180 Interview with Lord Sanderson, 30.11.00. 
181 Anonymous Interview, 21.6.00. 
182 Glasgow Herald, 4.9.89, p12. 
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Scotland were forced to set higher Poll Taxes than they would have wished in order to maintain 
local services. Rather than heeding their requests for more of the budget surplus to be spent on 
subsidising the Tax in order to prevent such increases, the central Government sought to 
admonish these Councils for being unfaithful to the creed of 'Rolling Back the State'183. Thus, 
for ignoring information coming from the geographical periphery, the Party elite was further 
jeopardising Conservative support in Scotland. 
Lord Sanderson identified another danger for the Party based on local issuesl84. If the 
Parliamentary seat was seen to be safe, the MP and central Party would become 'lazy' and pay 
even less attention to local members. This never seemed to be a problem when central policies 
and local attitudes converged. When this was not the case through the 1980s and 1990s, the 
Party was to regret not having a better-established local organisation in place to help in election 
campaigns and to sell potentially unpopular, but economically necessary, central policies to the 
local electoratel85. 
David McLetchie bemoaned the fact that the membership in Scotland has been too 
submissive at timesl86. He was worried that there was not always enough policy development 
activity that could have shared resources between London and Scotland. He was not happy with 
the age structure of the Party membership either. From the 1980s onwards, there was not enough 
coming from the younger generation of Scots to equal the concurrent vibrancy being enjoyed by 
183 Ibid, 3.3.90, pI. 
184 Interview, 30.11.00. 
185 Interview with Lord Mackay ofClashfem, 22.1.01. 
186 Interview, 19.1.01. 
153 
the Labour Party through its trade union activist membership. Lord Fraser also acknowledged 
that not much policy input was coming to London from Scotland187• However, he also felt that it 
was unlikely that any major ideas from north of the border were completely ignored or 
suppressed. A bigger problem with regard to local members in Scotland, he felt, was the way in 
which London was not always able to recognise the unexpressed fears of their supporters north 
of the border. For example, many Scottish Conservatives were worried about unemployment. 
Even if their jobs were secure, the future was not looking so healthy for their children. Such 
individual fears impacted heavily on voters' perceptions of the Government's ability to manage 
the whole economy. 
The next reason for Conservative 'POS' failure in Scotland to be examined is how 
Scottish Conservatives, including the Party's representatives in Local Government, were 
becoming further alienated from the Party in London. This was due to a perceived increase in 
central control of Party affairs~ a tendency that hurt their national identity and seemed to be a 
paradox within a Party that was espousing so much Devolution to individuals on the 
geographical periphery. 
The Effect of Centralisation on Conservatives in Scotland 
It should be noted here that the government of Scotland was still left very much to those 
north of the border in the years after the Act of Union in 1707. Furthermore, Scottish Tory MPs 
187 Interview, 5.3.01. 
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were always managed by Scots in the pre-Dundas era188• Of course, party discipline was not the 
same as in modem times, but the idea of only Scotsmen taking decisions that would affect 
Scotland alone was present (the 'West Lothian question' had yet not arisen). Even in the days of 
the Oxford administration in the Eighteenth Century, it was realised that peripheral members had 
to be kept satisfied with tokens such as effective systems patronage and some control over their 
own areas
189
• This system carried on into the Twentieth Century, with patronage and the 
utilisation of a local elite to act as agents for the distant metropolitan Government being accepted 
practice in traditional Conservative territorial management strategy. 
Mark Bevir and R. A. W. Rhodes cite Robert Blake's assertion that anti-centralisation is 
one of the most important tenets of conservatisml90. Having the power to go against such 
tradition demonstrates the influence of the Leader, in this case, Mrs Thatcher, on the direction to 
be taken by the Party. However, it should be noted that there is a school of thought that argues 
that centralisation of power was on the metropolitan Conservative elite's agenda at least since the 
Second World War. This argument is best exemplified by Seawright, who claims that, ever since 
the Maxwell-Fyfe reforms of the late 1940s, the metropolitan Party believed that running the 
various geographical regions in the same 'professional' style as Smith Square was the optimum 
way forward 191. This suggests that any autonomy for local Associations is a myth. Such close 
control from London is also evident in the quite insistent manner in which guidelines for 
188 David Hayton in Ellis, Steven & Barber, Sarah (eds.): "Conquest & Union. Fashioning a 
British State 1485-1725", London, Longman, 1995, p298. 
189 Riley, P. W. 1.: "The English Ministers and Scotland 1707-1727', London, Athlone, 1964, 
R169. 
90 In Berrington, Hugh (ed.): "Britain in the Nineties - the Politics of Paradox", London, Frank 
Cass, 1988, plOO + Interview with Lord Lang, 27.3.01. 
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ostensibly local issues such as the appointment of Agents are dictated 192. The appointment 
function demonstrates how powerful the central Leadership can be. and how misguided they can 
be in the exercising of this strength. It must be noted that some Scottish Conservatives, in the 
shape of the MPs based in London. were in favour of such reformsl93. However. those closer to 
events in Scotland, such as the Scottish Unionist Association. always felt that they were better 
placed to run the Party north of the border. 
The elite in London was impervious to such analyses of the situation. Thus, in 1965, the 
Divisional Councils were replaced by larger Regional Councils and closer association with 
English leadership: "(U)nder the guise of rationalisation". was brought in194• The Scottish 
Conservatives expressed gratitude for the help they were receiving from London in their post war 
regeneration programme. However, the feeling that 'London knows better' seems to permeate 
many metropolitan communications with Scotland. The usual excuse given is that there is better 
access to professional resources in Londonl95. However, the amount of control afforded to the 
metropolis is plain to see. One of the main complaints of Central Office in the early 1950s came 
whenever they did not receive copies of memoranda or other pieces of information that were 
circulating north of the borderl96. 'Intelligence reports' from the Party elite in Scotland were 
gratefully receivedl97, but it seems that Central Office wanted to make up its own mind regarding 
191 Seawright, 1999, p8. 
192 CCO 2/1/17. 
193 Seawright, 1999, p12. 
1941bid, p26. 
195 CCO 2/1/17. 
196 Ibid. 
197 (As long as the reports were accurate ... Central Office was not always convinced) CCO 
2/2/18. 
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Scottish affairs by examining unadulterated original evidencel98. This insistence on all Scottish 
correspondence being available in London carried on into the 1960s, again showing the Central 
Office's desire to oversee, rather than being there to servel99. 
Any remaining sensitivity to Scottish needs and desires seemed to end when Mrs 
Thatcher invoked a more unitary attitude to the running of the United Kingdom. The Prime 
Minister was undertaking an exercise in the nationalisation of powe~. Such policies were 
unpopular with Scots~ especially when subsidies were removed from local industries, which were 
expected to fend for themselves in the free market, just as businesses in all other parts of Britain 
were201 . Mrs Thatcher's failure to adapt to the political culture of Scotland, as her predecessors 
had acknowledged the need to, led to electoral demise202. Traditionally, power and officialdom 
had been based in Edinburgh to allow Scots easy access, thus preserving their national 
distinctiveness and pride203. Writing in the midst of the changes, Bulpitt assesses the new 
instrumental populism of Thatcherism thus: 
"(T)he Thatcher government appears to have adopted a very radical territorial 
code, forsaking the traditional reliance on intennediate collaborative elites [sic] 
for a direct link with the citizenry,,204. 
198 Ibid 
199 CCO 2/6/20 & 2/7/13. Access to more recent files in the Party archive is restricted. 
200 Garner & Kelly, 1998, p62. 
201 This dynamic is explored in much greater detail in Chapter 4. 
202 Seawright, 1999, plS8. 
203 Birch, Anthony H.: ''The British System of Government - 9th Ed.", London, Routledge, 1993, 
~70. . 
In: Madgwtck & Rose (eds.), 1982, p168. 
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Central power and autonomy was being increased under the guise of promoting individuals. 
Bulpitt was referring to Local Government reforms in this piece, but it can be inferred that the 
Conservative elite in London was making sure that all forms of criticism to their central direction 
would be by-passed. It is not certain that administrative Devolution gives a local elite an 
increased sense of political power05. However, it would appear that removing a local Party 
elite's authority to decide what was best for its own members might have more serious 
consequences for the central Conservative Leadership. If Scots in general were deserting the 
Conservatives, then even the Party's own members must have been disillusioned as well by this 
piece of domineering leadership from London206. 
Mrs Thatcher ordered an examination of Scottish Conservative organisation after the 
General Election disaster of 1974. Consequently, a committee headed by Russell Fairgrieve 
recommended in 1977 that even closer integration with Smith Square was needed. The Scottish 
Conservative and Unionist Association was to align its constitution with that of the National 
Union and Scottish constituency affiliation fees were to be paid to Central Office. However, 
some awareness of Scottish sentiments remained. It was noted that total integration with London 
would alienate many Scottish Conservatives. Therefore, it was agreed that a Scotsman would 
remain in charge of organisational administration and that Scottish moneys would be kept 
nominally separate from national Party funds207• Fundamentally, however, the Scottish Party 
20S Keating, Michael: "State & Regional Nationalism - Territorial Politics & the European 
State", London, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1988, p125. 
~onsequently, they were much less likely to work effectively for what they perceived to be a 
lost cause - Interviews with David Seawright, 13.4.00, Viscount Younger, 14.2.01, Lord Lang, 
27.3.01, Ross Harper, 6.8.01 & Keith Harding, 12.9.01. 
207 Seawright, 1999, p27. 
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had become heavily integrated with the National Union208. Seawright quotes the Deputy-
Chairman of the Scottish Conservatives, Bill Hughes, bemoaning this fact in 1990. Mr Hughes 
said in the Sunday Times Scotland of 12.8.90 that the Scottish Conservatives were only a branch 
office of the UK Party. The fact that the Scottish Conservatives are not even registered for V AT 
in Scotland shows how their autonomy has been eroded in favour of central control. The 
Scottish MPs who had promoted more central professionalisation in the 1960s had not envisaged 
this degree of London dominance. The Conservative leadership in London was again flexing its 
considerable muscles over the way the Party was to be run209. To highlight the dangers of 
centralising against the wishes of Scottish Conservatives, Seawright writes: 
"A wellspring of discontent at the 'local level' for the Tories hindered the party's 
appeal to its electoral environment. It became a reinforcing alienation, as the 
party increasingly 'centralised' it lost the imfOrtant local activists ... who could 
assuage feelings of alienation at locallevel,,21 . 
Removing Scottish Conservatives' advisory powers in London was not only a political 
mistake~ it was also an affront. The Scottish Conservatives were best placed to advise London 
on local sentiments towards the Government. Eminent Scotsmen such as George Younger and 
Malcolm Rifkind were aware of the damage being done to Conservative chances in Scotland by 
Mrs Thatcher's new form of ' statecraft.' Therefore, they tried to voice these opinions in the 
appropriate forum of the Cabinet. James Mitchell complained that these Scots did not put 
forward their case with sufficient fortitude211 . As Mrs Thatcher was not aware of the particular 
208 Interview with Lord Sanderson, 30.11.00. 
209 Seawright 1999, pp27-28. 
210 Ibid, p31. 
211 Interview, 8.6.00. 
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circumstances in Scotland, she needed to be given accurate infonnation212. This might not have 
always been forthcoming due to career protection reasons; furthennore, the Party Leader was 
able to exercise ultimate power and either take no notice of the advice, or remove the sources213 . 
Gamble cited William Whitelaw as an example of a Scot being able to get close to the 
Prime MinisterlParty Leader. David Seawright did not agree with this particular choice, but 
confinned the theory using George Younger and Malcolm Ritkind as examples within the 
Thatcher Administration214. Alik Buchanan-Smith detected and tried to reverse this trend as 
early as the early 1960s. It should be noted that, whilst he did manage to get his representations 
to the highest levels, they were often marked with the annotation: "No reply needed,,215. 
Similarly, detailed election strategies were shown tacit interest, but no practical support was 
forthcomini 16. It should also be noted that some Scottish Conservatives were co-opted into 
Thatcherite ideas on territorial management. For example, Michael Forsyth was prepared to 
rebuff and defeat the Scottish Conservative dissident lain Lawson who had wished to highlight 
and challenge the metropolitan Government's regionally insensitive policy regarding the closure 
of the Gartcosh steel planrl7. With regard to the hypothesis under consideration, it is important 
to note that many Scots, when they perceived that the Conservative Governments in London 
were somehow acting in a regionally insensitive or 'anti-Scottish' manner, often looked to 
212 As the Glasgow Herald pointed out, all that Scottish Conservatives had to do to demonstrate 
the contemporary problems to the Prime Minister was to show her opinion poll data - 5.9.85, pI 
(on the occasion of a Prime Ministerial visit to Scotland). However, no one seemed prepared to 
do so. 
213 Interviews with David Seawright, 13.4.00 + two unattributable, Winter 2000-2001. 
214 Interview, 13.4.00. 
215 E.g. CCO 2/5/20. 
216 CCO 2/6/20. 
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alternative sources of political authority. In many instances, such an alternative was found in 
Local Govemmenr l8. 
James Kellas writes: 
"The balance of power between the British and Scottish... organisations is tilted 
overwhelmingly to the British end. The leaders of the British parties control the 
party organisations and have the decisive voice in drawing up the party 
manifestos,,219. 
Kellas believes that consensus is the ideal way to solve intra-party centre-periphery arguments. 
Otherwise, there always seems to be an element of coercion in the imposition of central 
direction. Coercing Scottish Conservatives to accept policies decided in England can only lead 
to resentment~ especially, as we have seen, if Conservatives in Scotland realise how much 
damage is being done by a particular policy on a local level. Garner and Kelly are prepared to 
conclude that ordinary members can have some influence over the Party's direction220. The 
increase of better educated middle class members has led to the dictates of the elite being put 
under more sophisticated scrutinr21. Thus, Jim Bulpitt's assertion that the leadership must react 
to popular sentiment within the Party to maintain electoral organisation and support, a key 
concept for this thesis, may have some credence222. 
217 Stirling Observer, 22.11.85, pI. 
218 Stirling Councillor Survey (Con & Lab), Winter 2001-2002. 
219 In: Seldon, Anthony (ed.): "UK Political Parties Since 1945", London, Philip Allan, 1990, 
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o Gamer & Kelly, 1993, p127. 
221 Interview with Lord MacKay of Ardbrecknish, 25.1.01. 
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Mrs Thatcher, however, was quite prepared to go ahead with plans to transfer as much 
power as possible to London in spite of the potential effect on peripheral members223. This upset 
Scots in general with regard to Local Government. However, a precedent had been set for 
London to have the ability to dominate in as many aspects of peripheral life as fitted in with the 
idea of central autonomy. Mrs Thatcher was hostile to too many influences diluting her policies. 
Consequently, the Scottish Conservatives were to see their influence diminish rapidly. This era 
marked a real depression in Scottish Conservative spirits. Consequently, they no longer felt 
inspired to work for the good of the Party. It seemed to them that there was no point in doing 
Alice Brown et al give one of the most strident criticisms of Mr Major's Prime 
Ministership based on this topiC225• They note how attempted policies such as school opt outs 
from Local Education Authority control demonstrate how the Prime Minister was willing to act 
without consulting the Scottish Conservative elite. Such a tactic was likely to cause friction 
within the Party and guarantee unpopular policies. No one could give better analysis of local 
public opinion than Party members in Scotland. Mr Major ignored them to his cost. The trend 
towards centralisation was not reversed when Mr Major entered office. Ian Gilmour asserts that 
it was taken even further, as evidenced by the increasing numbers of powerful QUANGO'S226. 
223 Gilmour, 1997, p369. 
224 Interviews with David Seawright, 13.4.00, David Mcletcbie, 19.1.01, Viscount Younger, 
14.2.01, Lord Fraser, 5.3.01, Lord Lang, 27.3.01 & Ross Harper, 6.8.01. 
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As has been mentioned, one of the worst courses of action that a metropolitan 
administration can undertake with regard to Scotland is the centralisation of decision making 
power towards London. It should be remembered that most Scottish opposition to government 
from London is not concerned with the imposition of somehow 'foreign' rules. Rather, the Scots 
are more worried that their distant governors will not be sensitive to the distinct needs and 
desires of the nation227• Such a viewpoint is often put forward by the Conservatives' opponents 
from the left. It can be argued that the Conservatives complied with tradition for most of the 
Twentieth Century and paid attention to the distinctiveness of Scotland. The Central Office was 
prepared to accept that the word "Conservative" should be kept out of Unionist literature228. 
Winston Churchill had even countered Labour's nationalisation programmes in the early 1950s 
with arguments including the potential removal of self-direction from Scotland229• An internal 
Party report on the General Election of 1955 identifies the two most important indicators of 
voting intention230• Anti-nationalisation was confirmed to be a prime motivation for 
Conservative supporters. Party loyalty is seen to be very important for voters of all persuasions. 
Therefore, we have more evidence that the Conservatives acknowledged that they had a support 
base in Scotland but still, by implication, that they had to treat it well to inspire continued 
loyalty. 
227 Mitchell, James: Unionism, Assimilation and the Conservatives, in: Contemporary Political 
Studies, (3), 1995, pp1376-1383, p1377. 
228 CCO 213/18 & CCO 215120 - access to more modem files in the Conservative Party archive is 
restricted. 
229 Campaign Guide, 1950, pS13. 
230 CCO 2/4/15. This period marked the zenith of Conservative electoral support in Scotland. 
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An important cause of the Party's demise north of the border towards the end of the 
Twentieth Century was their failure to realise that this loyalty was not as deep-rooted as in 
England. Voters are more prepared to experiment with minor parties as protest votes towards 
'POMP' in local elections. These votes in England were generally made by Conservative and 
Labour renegade supporters who were easy to 're-attach' at the next General Election, rather 
than by committed partisan supporters of the minor parties231 . Major problems arose for the 
Conservatives when these voters did not return to them at subsequent General Elections in 
Scotland. This was a particular problem when, towards the end of Twentieth Century, core-
periphery divisions re_opened232. 
Pippa Norris cites Vernon Bogdanor's argument that this core-periphery division re-
opened because class was becoming less of a determinant of votini33• The traditional role of 
class may indeed have been waning in England. This role was defined early in the 1980s by 
David Robertson as the only factor that mattered in British electoral politics, 'because nothing 
else does' 234. Interestingly, Robertson saw class as less of a factor in Scotland at the time due to 
other important local issues such as religion and Devolution (dealt with in Chapter 4). However, 
a major cleavage with England occurred in this respect towards the end of the decade. 
Somewhat ironically, class/socio-economic status and well-being was in fact to replace issues of 
Church and constitution for Scottish voters as the Government sought to remove these questions 
from the political agenda. In England, the Conservatives were able to preside successfully over a 
231 Bo Sarlvik in: Sarlvik, Bo & Crewe, Ivor: "Decade of dealignment The Conservative victol)' 
of 1979 and electoral trends in the 1970s", Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983, p341. 
232 Norris, 1997, p131. 
233 Ibid. 
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'classless' society of individuals, as the economy was sufficiently buoyant there. North of the 
border, however, by removing religion and Devolution from politics, all the Government 
managed to do was highlight the Scots' economic misfortunes even more and thus generate 
collective opposition. This is a case of opposition to the Conservatives based on what Robertson 
defines as 'class related economic phenomena,235. 
Given the relatively poor economic performance of Scotland and the more frequent 
occurrence of communities there being closely bound together around centres of industrial 
employment, the high potential for locally-organised opposition to the Conservatives is evident. 
The main hypothesis to be tested empirically in Chapter 7 of this thesis was generated by my 
elite interview programme. If any substantial findings are made, therefore, their importance will 
be magnified by the fact that, whilst some senior Conservatives were aware of the problems, 
nothing was done to alleviate the situation. 
Conclusion: Conservative Local Failure in Scotland & the 'POS' 
Lord Fraser asserted that, up until the 1970s, Scottish Conservative Associations had very 
often been at the heart of their communities. In this chapter, we have seen the importance of 
local communities in Scotland. As Lord Fraser asserted, Conservative local politicians often did 
very well for the Party's 'POS' north of the border by having a high profile at the usually 
commercial heart of these comrnunities236. Local Councillors had done very well by adopting a 
'stand up and be counted' approach to their Conservatism. Rather than trying to distance 
234 Robertson, David: "Class and the British Electorate", Oxford, Blackwell, 1984, pI3. 
235 Ibid, p32. 
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themselves from the Party, they had decided, as Mr Major tried to do in 1992, to court the votes 
of those in Scotland who wanted the Union to remain intact and furthermore enjoy the 
Conservatives' economic responsibility. Once policies from London began to alienate Scots, 
these Local Councillors were doomed to lose office, thus taking local Conservative organisation 
with them. 
At interview, David McLetchie and Lord Fraser were convinced that mid-term protest 
votes against the Conservative 'POMP' damaged the Party's General Election chances very 
badly in Scotland237• Scottish Conservative representatives in Local Government had been put in 
an untenable situation both by their association with the administrations in London and by 
having to try to 'sell' and defend a succession of policies that were deeply unpopular in the 
contemporary economic climate in Scotland. This chapter has shown why Local Government 
Election losses could have been so dangerous for the Party's General Election chances. This has 
been done by identifying the importance of Local Councillors in Scottish communities, astute 
Labour Local Government manoeuvres and use of the media and some inappropriate 
metropolitan policies that all had malevolent effects on Conservatives at the local level in 
Scotland. Importantly, we have also seen how Conservatives at the local level in Scotland 
became disaffected with the Party elite. This soured relationship compromised the enthusiasm 
with which they worked in the 'POS.' That the Thatcher administrations were so keen to 
minimise the role of Local Government north of the border demonstrates its pervasive effect on 
Scottish society very clearly. Furthermore, Conservative Party organisation north of the border 
236 Interview, 5.3.01. 
237 19.1.01 & 5.3.01. 
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was focused quite precisely on these local representatives. Therefore, once these Councillors 
were out of office, often through little fault of their own, the local cells that looked to them for 
direction (the local 'platoons' as Lord Lang referred to them238) crumbled. Thus, the 
amalgamation of the local cells that used to constitute a basis for Conservative 'POS' in Scotland 
was no longer possible. Consequently, Opposition representatives in Scottish Local Government 
were free to establish ideological hegemony and rally the voters against the Conservatives in 
elections at all levels. 
The next chapter of this thesis examines ways in which the Conservatives' 'POMP' of the 
1980s and 1990s caused perennial unpopularity in Scotland both in General and Local 
Government Elections. Given what has been shown to date, one would immediately expect that 
the actions of the Party leadership must take the blame for any unpopularity or credit for any 
successes, as the elite has a very high degree of control over the 'POMP.' However, it should 
also be remembered that Conservative leaders are working at a disadvantage in Scotland. As this 
chapter has explored, natural disposition has grown against the Party in Scotland due to a 
succession of unpopular policies and the nature of the local political culture. Therefore, the 
Party has to work extra hard north of the border to achieve electoral success239. 
238 Interview, 27.3.01 and Lang, 1994, p9. 
239 Interview with Lord Lang, 27.3.01. 
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Appendix A 
'Right to Buy' Legislation in the 1980s 
The Housing and BUilding Control Act 1984 extends the 'Right to Buy' in England and 
Wales [Synopsis]. 
Housing Defects Act 1984. Local Authorities were forced to pay reinstatement grants to, 
or buy back from, any purchaser of a defective property of theirs. Lee notes that, between 1980 
and 1984, Governmental spending on housing dropped 30% in Scotland24O• This was a lower 
figure than in England. However, because the Scots were more dependent, the cut had a more 
devastating political effect than south ofthe border. 
The Housing Act 1985 consolidated what had gone before. N, I, 100 (1) permitted Local 
Authorities to re-imburse tenants for any improvements that they may have made to their 
dwelling and N, I, 101 (1) dictated that Local Authorities are not allowed to raise the rents of 
their properties that have been improved in this way. The system of 100% mortgages being 
made available to all those taking advantage of the 'Right to Buy' scheme was introduced by V, 
I, 133 (5i41. XIV, I, 435 (1) (a-c) granted Local Authorities permission to give loans to 
prospective purchasers or home improvers. XIV, I, 435 (3) confirmed this power, even if the 
property in question was not actually in the Local Authority's area. First-time buyers were to be 
240 Lee, C. R: "Scotland and the United Kingdom. The economy and the Union in the twentieth 
centurv", Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1995, p201. 
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given more help by the new power of the Secretary of State to 'make advances' to lending 
institutions for this purpose [XIV, I, 445 (1)]. Thus, the New Right programme of property-
ownership extension was to be furthered with the help of Building Societies and Local 
Authorities at only minimal expense to the central Governmenr42. XV, 1,460 (1) confirmed the 
power of Local Housing Authorities to give grants for improvements and repairs to dwellings in 
their areas. Consequently, the market values of the properties would rise. This benefit was 
considered more than sufficient payoff for the central Government, which had to foot up to 90% 
of the bills [XV, I, 516 (1-3)]. With respect to this central spending, however, it is essential to 
note the conditions of XVI, I, 528 (1). Here, the Secretary of State retained the ultimate power to 
decide which buildings are worthy of spending central Government money on to remedy defects. 
This clause offset the duty put upon Westminster to help Local Authorities with the costs of 
repairs and reinstatement grants and repurchases of defective dwellings that were sold off [XVI, 
1,569 (1) (a-b)]. 
The Housing Associations Act 1985 continued the Government's programme for 
encouraging the dismantling of the old housing regime. Housing Associations were to be non 
profit-making residence providers and developers [I, I, 1 (1) (a-b)]. A Housing Corporation was 
to be set up to oversee this part of the industry (thus ensuring national co-ordination) [I, I, 17 
(1 )]. It was the remit of this Corporation to promote the development of Housing Associations 
241 This measure was revoked in 1993, after it had become too expensive. 
242 The plan to use of Building Societies in this way had first come to light in the Party manifesto 
of February 1974 (in: Dale (ed.), 2000, p214). 
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[III, I, 75 (1) (a-e)] and to make loans to groups or individuals for housing needs [III, I, 79 (1)]. 
To this end, it would be allowed to borrow directly from Whitehall [III, I, 92 (1)]243. 
Under the terms of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985, it was also insisted that landlords 
(often Local Authorities in Scotland) were obliged to keep their properties fit for human 
habitation [I, 1,8 (1) (a-b)]. Maximum rents were imposed, as was an obligation to make repairs 
if rent was to be payable [I, I, 8 (5) and I, I, 11 (1) (a)]. 
The terms of III, I, 16 (1) of the Building Societies Act 1986 made the Government's 
plans quite clear. This clause widened the scope of who may be eligible for a Building Society 
As they felt that run down Council Estates were a breeding ground for socialism, the 
central Government saw fit to provide funding to regenerate in the Housing and Planning 1986 
[Synopsis]. This Act went on to proclaim that 32% + 1% per year of tenancy (up to a maximum 
of 60% of the market value) was to be the new offer for houses; discounts on the purchase of 
flats were to be calculated at 44% + 2% per year of tenancy (up to 70% of the market value) [I, 
1,2 (2) (a)]. I, 1,3 (2) permitted the Secretary of State to allow even more generous discounts in 
Scotland. 
243 The formation of a Housing Corporation is mentioned as part of proposed Housing Finance 
Acts in the Party manifestos of February and October 1974 (ibid, pp214 & 244). 
244 The compliance of building societies in the provision of mortgages was essential, even when 
central or Local Government were supplying substantial loans or improvement grants. Building 
Societies were heavily involved in the 'self-build' housing project in Stirling that was praised by 
Prince Charles - Times, 7.10.86, pS. 
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4. Conservative 'Politics of Metropolitan Power' and 
the Party's Demise in Scotland 1979-1997 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I wish to summarise and explore policies and further aspects of Scottish 
society that have been identified as causes of the Conservatives' slide towards electoral defeat in 
1997. Hereby, we shall be able to assess the relationship between 'POMP' and 'POS' and see 
whether there seem to be deficiencies in the current canon of explanations for the Party's 
electoral problems in Scotland. One of the key dynamics to bear in mind during this chapter is 
how central policies that were unpopular in Scotland reduced the Conservatives' chances in 
elections for Local Government, as well as in General Elections. This thesis tests whether this 
reduction in Local Government representation was particularly dangerous for the Party in 
Scotland. Therefore, the prime focus of this chapter is not on the pockets of local opposition 
that grew in Scotland, such as the campaign to save Ravenscraig Steel Works mounted by 
Motherwell District Council. Rather, it seeks to investigate the 'POMP' that caused problems 
with the Party's 'POS' in Scotland. The final section of the chapter is an assessment of the 
major existing explanations for the Conservatives' electoral decline in Scotland. This review 
helps to put this chapter's findings in perspective and explains how this thesis hopes to 
complement the existing body of literature. 
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Scottish Anti-Conservatism (or Vice-Versa?) 
One question to keep in mind is whether there was more to the Conservatives' 
unpopularity in Scotland than just a succession of policies that were difficult to accept because 
they caused unemployment or higher taxes and so on? If the Scots did not hold some kind of 
extra pre-disposition against the Conservatives, the Party might have been able to win them over 
with policies that improved household income and standard of living, as they did south of the 
border. If such a natural pre-disposition against the Conservatives did exist amongst the Scottish 
electorate, however, then the Party would have had to work much harder to maintain the 'POS' 
through their policies. Therefore, before examining the effect of specific policies that were 
known to cause the Conservatives problems in Scotland such as the withdrawal of industrial 
subsidies and the Poll Tax, we shall explore more deep-rooted obstacles that they had to 
overcome. 
As the Conservatives came to power in 1979, 50% of opinion poll respondents thought 
that the Party could only be trusted 'rarely' to look after the special interests of Scotland 1. Even 
if they are not extreme separatists, many Scots feel a sense of national pride and are thus keen to 
see their needs and desires respected by London2 - a key tenet in both the 'POMP' and 'POS.' 
Therefore, we begin to see the roots of considerable distrust and unpopularity for the Party. 
Some reasons for the Conservatives' in-built disadvantage north of the border to be examined 
1 Gallup Political Index Report, #226, June 1979, pplO-l4. 
2 Interviews with James Mitchell, 8.6.00, Anonymous, 21.6.00 & William Paterson, 13.9.01. In a 
Gallup poll in May 1996, 49010 of respondents in Scotland said that they felt 'Scottish first, 
British second' (18% said 'Scottish only'~ 13% 'British first, Scottish second') - Gallup Political 
& Economic Index, #429, May 1996, p6. 
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are (quasi-)institutional such as the four party system. Other explanations may be classified as 
more 'cultural' such as the effects of national identity. Another very important personal factor 
was the unpopular character of Mrs Thatcher in Scotland. As we shall see, Opposition groups, 
including those in Local Government, exploited many of these problems and twisted them into 
the view that the English Conservatives were actually anti-Scottish. None of my Conservative 
elite interviewees gave the slightest credence to this view. However, its very existence was 
significant. Two questions to be addressed, then, are how could such a situation have arisen and 
what 'POMP' steps were taken to alleviate the problem? 
The view that the Conservatives were anti-Scottish may have built up due to a stream of 
policies that did not seem to have the Scots' best interests at heart, in favour of the more 
powerful lobby south of the border. Such a progression fits in with the proposition that the 
Conservatives were dangerously neglecting their levels of support in Scotland by concentrating 
on England. Mrs Thatcher's memoirs and the words of Lord Strathclyde are most persuasive 
when denying an anti-Scottish bias in the Party elite. The Prime Minister lauds Scottish 
luminaries such as Adam Smith and David Hume for inspiring many of her attitudes and 
policies3. Furthermore, it seems that she had a 'soft spot' for the Scots, for it was they who 
played a major role in bringing down the Callaghan Government after the Devolution 
referendum of 19794. Lord Sanderson confirmed that Mrs Thatcher appreciated the help that 
Scotland could be. She was also encouraged to keep a high profile in Scotland by Peter 
3 Thatcher, 1993, p622. 
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Thomeycroft and R. A. Butler. Lord Sanderson confirmed that this attitude did not disappear as 
soon as Scotland had played its role in bringing down the Callaghan administration. Even 
though her affinity for Scotland is phrased in her memoirs mainly to illustrate surprise that 
Thatcherism was not more popular north of the border, it is clear that the Prime Minister was not 
anti-Scottish in the way suggested by her opponentss. 
Lord Strathclyde blamed a coalition of the Labour Party and Scottish media for the 
erroneous image that the Conservatives had to endure in Scotland. He asserted that Labour, 
seeing that they had no chance of persuading sufficient numbers of voters to support their own 
policies, turned to a virtually slanderous campaign to discredit the Conservatives6. Lord 
Sanderson added the strong Trade Unions and left-leaning educational establishment in Scotland 
to the list of agents provocateurs of the anti-Scottish reputation that was built up for the 
Conservative party7. Most importantly for this thesis, cells of astute Labour activists in Local 
Government in Scotland were often mentioned as sources of anti-Conservative feeling and 
organisation north of the border8. I agree that the Conservative elite was not anti-Scottish per se. 
However, the evidence used by Labour was only available because of the policies that are 
studied here. By the general tone of much of their 'POMP, it may have seemed that the 
Conservatives were concentrating on the governance of England. Therefore, it would indeed 
4 Bulpitt, Jim: "Territory and Power in the United Kingdom. An Intemretation", Manchester, 
Manchester University Press, 1983, p191. Interviews with Lords Strathclyde, 8.11.00 & 
Sanderson, 30.11.00. 
s Thatcher, 1993, p291. 
6 Bulpitt, 1983, p191 & Interviews with Lords Strathclyde, 8.11.00 & Sanderson, 30.11.00. 
7 Interview, 30.11.00. 
8 Interviews with Viscount Younger, 14.2.01, Lord Fraser, 5.3.01 & Keith Harding, 12.9.01. 
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have appeared on an unsophisticated level that they were anti-Scottish. It should be noted that 
the Conservatives were aware of the view and its unfortunate electoral implications. The current 
Strathclyde Commission on the reorganisation of the Scottish Party is very keen to redress this 
particular problem9. It should be noted at this point that a lot of Conservative elite interview 
material is utilised in this chapter. The recollections of these interviewees are always 
interesting, but are naturally biased towards their Party's view. Nonetheless, they are utilised in 
order to demonstrate what contemporary attitudes prevailed in the Party elite and consequently 
affected the 'POMP.' 
Mrs Thatcher's Personality 
This reason for the Conservatives' unpopularity in Scotland is not easy to quantify 
(opinion poll data notwithstanding), as it is such a subjective matter. However, the frequency 
with which it was mentioned by my interviewees, the literature and media suggests that it must 
be taken into serious consideration. Understandably, no interviewees wished to be quoted on 
this topic. However, it is possible to provide a clear picture of the situation without attributing 
sources directly. It was perceived in Scotland that Mrs Thatcher was an archetypal English 
middle class 'bossy' woman. All these factors made popularity seem very distant for her in 
Scotland 10. The former Prime Minister even noted the seriousness of the problem by writing in 
her memoirs: 
9 Interview with Lord Strathclyde, 8.11.00. 
10 Interviews with Viscount Younger, 14.2.01 & Keith Harding 12.9.01. 
175 
"Some part of this unpopularity must be attributed to the national question on 
which the Tories are seen as an English party and on which I myself was 
apparently seen as a quintessential English figure")). 
Chart 4.1 represents positive responses (%) to the following propositions about Mrs 
Thatcher put by Gallup in UK-wide surveys: 
A: 'She's not in touch with the working class/ordinary people' 
B: 'She thinks a lot of herself 
C: 'She divides the country' [especially pertinent for the Scottish question] 
D: 'She is a snob, talks down to people' 
E: 'She's cattylbitchy' 
Mrs Thatcher's Image 
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As can be seen, a lot of voters did not have a very good image of the Prime Minister. It is also 
evident that the situation deteriorated with time. Given the importance of personality in modem 
party politics, this factor hurt the Conservatives' 'POS.' One could argue, however, that it was 
II Thatcher, 1993, p624. 
12 Gallup Political Index: #295, March 1985, p9 and #344, April 1989, p8. 
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not directly tied to their 'POMP.' The Glasgow Herald offered the opinion at one point that no 
amount of tax cuts could save the Conservatives in Scotland due to the electorate's opinion of 
Mrs Thatcher's personality. On the event of a Prime Ministerial visit, the Secretary of State 
would have been well advised to tell Mrs Thatcher to stay away, for fear of causing more 
resentment by her very presenceJ3 . Nevertheless, the Government could have improved this 
image through the presentation of, or 'spin' put on, their policiesl4. 
Elsewhere in her memOirs, Mrs Thatcher expresses surpnse that her policies and 
neoliberal views were not accepted as readily in Scotland as elsewhere in the Unionl5. If 
neoliberalism had achieved hegemony in the Scottish political culture, the Conservatives' 
preferred 'POMP' could have been pursued more successfully north of the border. As this was 
not the case, more regional sensitivity was required. The Prime Minister's failure to give 
credence to these circumstances seemed to exacerbate the situation. Economic circumstances in 
Scotland were quite different to the contemporary affluence being enjoyed in England. 
Therefore, perhaps a more traditional Conservative Unionist would have adapted his or her 
policies to make their impact less painful north of the border, thus conforming to the 'POMP' 
restraints of Scottish political culture. Mrs Thatcher was not prepared to dilute her message of 
'Rolling Back the State.' As we shall see (especially in Chapter 5), this was to have significant 
impact on the relationship between central and Local Government over issues such as subsidies 
I3 Glasgow Heralg, 6.9.85, plO. 
14 Interview with Viscount Younger, 14.2.0l. 
15 Thatcher, 1993, p618. Also noted in Hogg & Hill, 1995, p247 + Interview with Lord Lang, 
27.3.01. It should be noted that there was at least tacit respect for the Prime Minister's 
assertiveness and directness north of the border - Interview with Keith Harding, 12.9.0l. 
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and housing. As Viscount Younger and Ross Harper noted, one of the persistent roles of Local 
Government is to complain at their treatment by London 16. Both interviewees conceded, 
however, that the discrepancy in power between the two levels of government is too great to 
ascribe significant checking power over central administrations to agents of Local Government. 
This thesis contemplates the idea that a lack of Conservative representation in Scottish 
Local Government was particularly dangerous for the Party. Firstly, this may have been the case 
because there were no local Party leaders in situ to organise effective campaigning. With more 
direct relevance to the 'POMP', this dynamic may have been dangerous because there were few 
Conservatives in Local Government north of the border in any position to defend and 'sell' the 
policies that were emanating from London. Consequently, it would have been very difficult for 
the Party to achieve any sort of ideological hegemony in Scotland. 
Defence of the 'POMP' on the local level in Scotland was essential as the Thatcherite 
free-market approach was not going to be readily compatible with traditional Conservative 
territorial management or the views of most Scots regarding what the state should provide for 
them. This was because the neoliberal system cannot allow for regional preferences and 
subsidies. Lord Fraser confirmed central Conservative beliefs of the timeI7. He questioned why 
Scotland should have so much extra money poured into its Health Service? On the whole, 
Edinburgh and Glasgow suffered no greater health problems than, say. Liverpool or Newcastle. 
It is also important to note the intractable nature of the Prime Minister's personality. She was 
16 Interviews, 14.2.01 & 6.8.01. 
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not prepared to listen to bad news from Scotland and was determined that the best prescription 
for their ills was an increased dose ofThatcherism, which had worked so well in Englandls . 
As Lords Sanderson, Mackay of Clashfern and Younger pointed out, Mrs Thatcher never 
ignored Scotland. They claimed that she always kept abreast of developments there and always 
wanted the best for the nation l9 . They also noted how she was popular north of the border as 
Leader of the Opposition in the late 1970s. These recollections suggest that, in the 1980s, the 
Prime Minister may have been ignorant of the true needs and desires of Scotland, in spite of her 
best efforts. Alternatively, an external force was exaggerating her characteristics, which she 
could do nothing about, and transforming them into an image that the Scottish electorate was 
going to be hostile towards. The most plausible explanation for the Scots' apparent change of 
heart between the 1970s and 1980s came from Lords Strathclyde and Frase~o. The Opposition 
parties in Scotland were looking for a convenient 'hook' upon which to hang their arguments, 
arguments that were appealing to the voters' nationalist sentiments. Thus, the fact that the Prime 
Minister seemed distant and unwilling to create policies that were sensitive to the particular 
needs of the fragile Scottish economy were mixed with her personality to create a view that she 
was actually anti-Scottish. It does not seem that this was the case. but it became a very familiar 
and effective weapon against the Conservatives north of the border. 
17 Interview, 5.3.01. 
18 Unattributable interview comment - Winter 2000-2001. 
19 Interviews 30.11.00. 22.1.01 & 14.2.01. 
20 Interviews, 8.11.00 & 5.3.01. 
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One often-overlooked aspect of this topic is the lack of a viable alternative at the time. 
Unpublished MaRl data from 1979-198321 confirms that Mrs Thatcher was held in very low 
esteem north of the border, and that Labour, as a party, were likely to receive many votes. 
However, Michael Foot did not seem to be a credible alternative at the time. The answer: 'Don't 
know', as to who would make the best Prime Minister, scored only fractionally below the two 
major party leaders. 
It is interesting to note the contrast with Mr Major's personality. During the early 
months of his administration, the new Prime Minister was able to enjoy popularity in Scotland 
simply because he was not Mrs Thatcher, such was the level ofunpopu)arity that she had built up 
through the 1980s22. James Mitchell and Lord Lang noted that the Conservatives had (and 
continue to have) great potential support across Scotland23 . Therefore, a fresh start was required 
in 1990. The removal of Mrs Thatcher was a great step forward in this respect. Thus, successful 
policies put forward by her successor should have found popularity both north and south of the 
border. This chapter assesses whether this was the case? Another issue that has caused the Party 
much trouble and is very much specific to the geographical periphery is that of Devolution. 
Nationalism and Devolution 
This is not an appropriate place to try to explore the whole Scottish nationalist arena and 
see how it has contributed to the Conservative demise since the Second World War. That task 
21 Supplied to me from their records by MORl's Edinburgh office. 
22 Unattributable interview comment, Winter 2000-2001 + Gilmour, 1997, p353. 
23 Interviews, 8.6.00 & 27.3.01. 
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has been undertaken elsewhere24 . However, there are specific aspects of the issue that 
particularly troubled the Conservative Party from 1979-1997. If Devolution was, as Lord 
MacKay of Ardbrecknish asserted, the underlying priority of most Scots, the issue cannot be 
ignored25 . Devolution never topped the polls in order of importance to Scottish voters; topics 
such as unemployment and the Poll Tax were seen as momentarily more important. However, 
the importance of issues such as these tended to wax and wane with (in )appropriate measures in 
the 'POMP.' NationalismlDevolution, on the other hand, is like religion insofar as nothing short 
of a revolutionary move in the 'POMP' such as the institution of a Scottish Parliament can even 
partially remove the issue from the Scottish voters' agenda. Therefore, as Lord MacKay 
confirmed, the Conservatives still need to address their previously unsuccessful attitudes. 
This part of the thesis should be approached with the English Party's concerns about 
Devolution being the start ofa 'slippery slope' towards the break up of the United Kingdom and 
consequent firm Unionist stance always in mind. The most frequent expression of nationalist 
opposition is that Westminster administrations of any party do not have a legitimate mandate to 
govern the Scottish nation. As we have seen in the last chapter, in the eyes of many Scottish 
voters, this relationship with London confers more of a right to govern on Local Authorities in 
Scotland; thus rendering crucial the role of Scottish Local Government in the 'POS.' The lack of 
mandate problem was exacerbated when Conservative Governments were in power as they 
frequently polled less than a quarter of the General Election vote in Scotland and only had MPs 
24 For example Mitchell, 1995 & Mitchell, James: "Strategies for Self-Government. The 
Campaigns for a Scottish Parliament", Edinburgh, Polygon, 1996; Lynch, 1999 & Seawright, 
1999. 
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representing a handful of seats north of the border. The other main argument against Devolution 
brought by the Conservatives in the 1980s was the increased amount of bureaucracy that it would 
engender6. These attitudes were to colour their relationship with Scotland, including Local 
Government and their own Party members there27. The tactics employed by the Conservatives 
during the late 1970s when Labour were seeking to institutionalise Devolution show what 
attitudes were going to be dominant when Mrs Thatcher became Prime Minister. Furthermore, 
little rhetoric on the question appeared from the Party thereafter, as they erroneously believed 
the issue to be 'dead,28. 
The Conservative Campaign Guide of 1977 claimed that the Party was always interested 
in the views of the Scottish people. However, it was felt that sufficient Devolution was present 
in the form of the Scottish Office and the 'holy trinity' of autonomous Church, legal and 
education systems north of the border9. Given the danger to the Union posed by any more 
Devolution plus the opportunity to defeat the Callaghan Government over such a contentious 
issue, it was clear that the Conservatives were going to oppose any legislation30. The actual 
principle of Devolution had not been completely ruled out by the Conservatives. Thus, they had 
remained true to their ethos of pragmatically analysing each circumstance to discern what policy 
within reason would be best for them at the polls (the apparent introduction of less flexibility in 
25 Interview 25.1.01. 
26 Interview with Lord Mackay of Clash fern, 22.1.01 + Thatcher, 1993, p619. 
27 It was noted in Chapter 2 that these Unionist opinions were genuinely felt principles, rather 
than being a pragmatic vote-winning exercise. However, we also noted the benefits that might 
have been obtained if more flexibility had been possible. 
28 Interview with Lord Sanderson, 30.11.00. 
29 This opinion was repeated by Lord Strathclyde - Interview, 8.11.00. 
182 
the Thatcher years is examined in Chapter 2 of this thesis). At that time, the specifics of the Bill 
before Parliament and the state of affairs in Scotland and the United Kingdom as a whole led 
them to believe that opposition was in order. 
Alternatives to Labour's Devolution plans were considered within the ranks of the 
Conservative Party. It is a true measure of its awareness of the 'POS' when an elite is prepared 
to sacrifice some of its own dogma and listen to peripheral members in an effort to keep them 
working. However, as was discussed in Chapter 2, such internal democracy was not a typical 
characteristic of the Conservative Party under Mrs Thatcher. Francis Pym came up with a 
programme that would increase Parliamentary scrutiny of legislation concerning Scotland by 
Scottish MPs31. Thus, voters north of the border would have known that issues specific to their 
interests were being discussed a little closer to home. However, the important decisions would 
still have been taken in London. Just as when the novelty of earlier pieces of Devolution had 
worn off, it would have been realised soon that Scotsmen in London were far more likely to hear 
the instructions of their political masters or mistresses rather than the lamentations of those they 
were supposed to be representing32. A significant example of such administrative Devolution 
was the creation and subsequent moving to Edinburgh of the Scottish Office. 
Due to Conservative amendments, the referenda about assemblies in Scotland and Wales 
in 1979 were never likely to pass. This was the case. Again, the Nationalists removed their 
30 "Campaign Guide", 1977, pSIS. 
31 CRD 4/5/13. 
32 Unattributable interview comment, Winter 2000-2001. 
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support from Labour. A fatal blow was dealt to the Callaghan administration when a vote of 
confidence was proposed and lose3. Mrs Thatcher was keen to take over. As we have seen, an 
explanation for her actions with regard to territorial management as Prime Minister was that she 
believed that Devolution was a dead issue after the failure of the 1979 referenda. 
Being closer to the people of Scotland, some Conservatives north of the border realised 
that this was not the case and expressed the idea that the incremental granting of limited 
Devolution during the 1980s and 1990s would have helped to stem the waxing nationalist 
movemene4. However, such a plan was never seriously considered because of the fear of the 
'slippery slope,35. Furthermore, there has not been any tacit admission with hindsight from 
within the Party that such a compromise might have been usefue6. The Conservatives believed 
themselves to be a devolutionary party of sorts~ with power being delegated to individual citizens 
on the periphery, rather than legislative or bureaucratic bodies37. The Conservatives were trying 
to find an intermediate point between their brand of Devolution and something that would have 
satisfied the nationalists. Such a compromise may have saved the Party some support. However, 
good intentions count for very little without actual policies that could pacify nationalist protests. 
James Mitchell concluded that the Conservatives should never 'dabble' in Devolution in any 
way, as it is alien territory for them and there are too many risks involved in entering their 
33 Sked, Alan & Cook, Chris: "Post-War Britain. A Political History - 4th Ed.", London, 
Penguin, 1993, pp317-323. 
34 Hogg & Hill. 1995. p247 & Anonymous Interview, 21.6.00. 
35 Interview with Lord MacKay of Ardbrecknish, 25.1.01. 
36 Interviews with Lord Sanderson, 30.11.00 & Viscount Younger. 14.2.01. 
37 Interview with Lord Lang. 27.3.01. 
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opponents' stronghold38. As we saw in Chapter 2, this attitude seemed to inform the Party's 
1992 General Election campaign. Rather than appear weak through being the fourth most 
enthusiastic party for Devolution, the Conservatives adopted a strong Unionist stance. That 
Election saw the Party's Scottish fortunes rise momentarily. 
Perhaps the most enduring result of Scottish nationalism is its generation of a four party 
system north of the border. As David McLetchie, amongst others, was very keen to point out, 
the addition of a viable fourth party in the shape of the SNP has further restricted the 
Conservatives' chances of success north of the borde~9. Approximately 60% of Scots vote 
consistently for the Labour Party. Therefore, to have another contender in the race for only 40% 
of the voters is a severe handicap40. 
Lord MacKay of Ardbrecknish expanded on this point41 . Unlike other nationalist 
movements in Europe, the SNP were able to lure voters from the Conservatives. Around the 
continent, parties of the same centre-right persuasion as the British Conservatives are usually the 
natural home for 'patriots.' Therefore, it was somewhat incongruous to see social conservatives 
north of the border voting for someone other than the Conservative Party because of the 
Devolution issue. This seems to have been a result of the Party's anti-Devolution stance plus a 
moderation of SNP economic policies that allowed voters of the centre-right to choose them as a 
38 Interview, 8.6.00. 
39 Interview, 19.1.0l~ re-iterated by Keith Harding -Interview, 12.9.01. 
40 Especially in a 'First Past the Post' electoral system - Interview with David McLetchie, 
19.1.01. 
41 Interview, 25.1.01. 
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viable alternative to the Liberals or Labour42 . Elsewhere in Europe, the Conservatives would not 
have had to worry about losing votes to nationalists. However, because of these special Scottish 
circumstances, the Party would have been well advised to guard against ill-conceived 'POMP', 
as the SNP could indeed have benefited43. Thus, due to a quirk of the Scottish electoral system, 
an extra dimension to the relationship between the 'POMP' and 'POS' was evident. 
A devoutly unitary Government could never countenance Devolution. Therefore, 
personal economic prosperity was promoted as being a more worthwhile goal than 'lofty' 
constitutional issues in the I 980s44. When Devolution finally did become an issue in the 1992 
General Election campaign, the Conservative vote in Scotland actually went up. Thus, their 
Unionist stance might not have been so much of a catastrophic problem. In 1997, when the issue 
was very divisive, the Conservatives' Unionist policy was one of the least of their worries in 
Scotland45. As the electoral data in this thesis' Introduction shows (Chart 1.1), the Party's 
popularity was declining rapidly in all parts of the Union. Therefore, the disaffection shown in 
Scotland was shared in England. English voters would not have complained at Unionism unless 
it was exerting financial strain on them. One proposition in this area is that industrial closures in 
Scotland were easier for the Government to contemplate because of the associated reduction on 
the tax burden in England. The vital point to note at this stage is that, in the Elections where 
Mrs Thatcher and Mr Major were victorious, Devolution never seemed to damage the 
42 It should also be noted that the Liberals and Labour also adopted a more nationalist tone in 
Scotland to attract these voters away from the Conservatives - ibid. 
43 Interview with Lord Sanderson, 30.11.00. 
44 Willetts, David: "Modem Conservatism", London, Penguin, 1992, p95. 
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Conservatives' chances in Scotland more than any other policy issue. Nevertheless, it should 
always be remembered that any consolidation of antipathy towards the Party might have been 
manifested in poor Local Government Election results. The effect of these seemingly minor 
local losses is key to this thesis. Starting with the industrial subsidy issue, we will now examine 
specific policies with their genesis in the neoliberal Thatcherite creed and how they affected 
Local Government and the 'POS' in Scotland. 
Unitary Government & the Withdrawal of Industrial Subsidies 
The heavy industries of coal, steel and shipbuilding had formed a substantial backbone 
for the Scottish economy through the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. Their slow demise 
was to cause 'POS' problems for the Conservatives at both ends of the social spectrum. As 
overseas competition increased after World War Two, Scottish industry had to rationalise to stay 
competitive. The first problem that this caused for the Conservatives was that many of their rich 
company-owning contributors in Scotland lost their fortunes and were no longer able to promise 
money or the votes of their workers. The employers had been able to do this through the 
deferential system that has been mentioned elsewhere in this thesis46. We have already seen how 
Protestant working class support has helped the Conservatives in urban Scotland47. Therefore, 
an even more important implication of industrial demise north of the border has been how much 
damage has been done to this sector. These 'POS' problems were not, however, a direct result 
45 Only 14% of Scottish respondents said that self-government was 'The most important issue' in 
deciding their General Election vote - Gallup Political & Economic Inde~ #429, May 1996, p6. 
46 Interviews with David Seawright, 13.4.00, Lord Fraser, 5.3.01 & William Paterson, 13.9.01. 
47 Interviews with Lords MacKay of Ardbreclmish, 25.1.01 and Fraser, 5.3.01 + William 
Paterson, 13.9.01. 
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of Thatcherite 'POMP.' Well before the 1980s, market forces had dictated the downturn in the 
fortunes of Scottish industry. The Conservatives in London had even been able to derive some 
political capital from the situation in Scotland. In the 1950s, Labour planned to use 
nationalisation as a tool to fix the problems in hand48• With regard to Scotland, the 
Conservatives were able to cite this as another demonstration of centralisation against the 
interests of the Scottish nation49. 
Nevertheless, Thatcherite industrial policies were to have a very significant effect on the 
'POS' in Scotland. In the 1980s, the metropolitan Government believed that a 'dependency 
culture' permeated working class Scotland5o. In times of economic hardship, this culture 
expected help in the form of subsidies51 . Britain as a whole was not being won over to the 
Conservatives' message of self-help. It may have been popular when the economy was healthy. 
However, when times started to get more difficult, positive replies to the question of whether 
people should help themselves, rather than rely on the Government - a key tenet of Thatcherism 
- dropped rapidly below 50%52. The Scottish expectation for subsidies was never going to be 
met by Mrs Thatcher with her emphasis on market forces, individual self-help, a unitary lack of 
48 Seawright, David & Curtice, John: The Decline of the Scottish Conservative and Unionist 
Party 1950-92: Religion, Ideology or Economics?, in: Contemporary Record, 1995, pp319-339, 
E335. 
9 Bogdanor, Vernon: "Devolution in the United Kingdom", Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
1999, p146. 
50 Interview with Lord Lang, 27.3.01. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Gallup Political Index, #289, September 1984, plO. Positive replies to the same question 
totalled 42% in September 1986, 39% in May 1987 (Gallup Political Index, #321, May 1987, 
pll) and only 33% in June 1987 (Gallup Political Index. #322, June 1987, pll). 
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regional preferences and minimal Government intervention and expenditure53 . The Party faced 
an almost impossible dilemma in the 1980s. Economic reason dictated that it would be 
disastrously inefficient to keep heavy 'smokestack' industries open with Government subsidies54. 
Political expediency, on the other hand, suggested that any 'POMP' actions that seemed to be 
against the interests of those employed in these industries would have a malevolent effect on the 
Party's 'POS' in Scotland. Not only would newly unemployed voters be unlikely to vote 
Conservative in General or Local Government Elections, but Party Association members and 
Local Councillors in Scotland would face an overly difficult task of justifying and supporting 
very unpopular central 'POMP.' Consequently, local representation and campaign work on 
behalf of the Party would dwindle. The General Election dangers of this situation form the core 
of this work's hypothesis. 
Nevertheless, the programme to reduce Government subsidy was eventually instituted 
and Scottish industry was left to 'sink or swim' in the maelstrom of the market. Even as early as 
1980, nearly a third of the population was blaming Government policy for commercial 
problems55. By the middle of the decade, this attitude was calmed only by a shift in blame 
towards Japanese imports. The main worry amongst the Party at the time was that the 
53 Interview with Lord Lang, 27.3.01. 
S4 Interview with Lord Sanderson, 30.11.00 - as demonstrated by the minimal effect of a large 
increase in Government spending 1981-1982 - see Chart 4.2. This decision was taken in the 
face of the fact that 85% of Scottish respondents said that it would be a good idea for the 
Government to subsidise industry (even 79% of English respondents agreed to this), Gallup 
Political Inde~ #226, June 1979, p13. An unpublished MORI poll at the time reported that 91% 
of Scottish respondents saw unemployment as the most important contemporary problem. 67% 
of those polled felt that the Government should perform a 'U-turn' with its policies. 
S5 Gallup Political Inde~ #287, July 1984, p13. 
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Government's economic projections were inaccurate56. These projections forecasted economic 
recovery in Scotland. They were eventually borne out, but not until many voters had had to seek 
new employment. 
In 1981, there was little sign of what was to come. The Iron and Steel (Borrowing 
Powers) Act of that year even permitted British Steel Corporation borrowing to increase by up to 
approximately £lOOOm [I, I, 1 (2)]. This tone was continued in the Iron and Steel Act 1981. 
There, I, I, 3 (1-2) absolved the BSC from its liability to payoff long-standing Government 
loans. These actions do not seem to be those of an administration looking to wind down an 
industry. Indeed, I, I, 1 (2) and I, I, 1 (3)(a) of the Act seemed to positively encourage the 
industry by releasing it from the burden of having to supply all domestic demands and allowing 
the Corporation to look abroad for business. However, even though this policy could be 
presented as dynamic encouragement, it was also leaving the industry more prone to the 
pressures of the international market. 
These measures were taken in spite of the requests made by the Secretary of BSe in a 
written representation to the Industry and Trade Committee in the 1979-1980 session. Here, it is 
argued that, even though the Corporation was expecting a £2.5bn improvement by 1983-1984, it 
still required help with fighting reduced domestic demand and global over-capacity57. Whilst the 
Corporation was looking to open new markets, it was also hoping to reduce costs and was 
56 Interview with Ross Harper, 6.8.01. 
57 HC7S8, 1979-1980, pp v & 14. 
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investigating whether capacity should be lowered58. In this document, it is clear that the BSC 
wanted continued Government subsidy to cover its operating losses59. Therefore, it seems that it 
was not just the workforce that was having difficulty in adjusting to the new attitudes that were 
appearing in Government. 
Initial Thatcherite legislation regarding the coal business seemed to be anything but 
against the industry. At this point, it should be remembered that the new Conservative 
administration was still consolidating and faring perilously in the polls. Therefore, it was 
prudent, in spite of the Prime Minister's economic principles, to alleviate any protest from the 
working class that would have been engendered by unsympathetic legislation60. Consequently, 
the Coal Industry Act J 982 saw the borrowing power of the National Coal Board rise by around 
£lOOOm [I, I, 1]. Government grants to the NCB were to rise from £525m to £lOOOm [I, I, 2 (2)]. 
Furthermore, Government subsidies for pit closures and redundancies were also to rise [I, I, 4 (1-
2)]. The central Government's popularity in the industrial areas of England and Scotland did not 
fall any more dramatically than in other regions from 1979 to 198361 . Therefore, it seems that 
there must have been a sea-change in 'POMP' part way through the Thatcher years to cause such 
a failure in support as the Party suffered in Scotland and the North of England. 
Perhaps one of the earliest examples of such a change being manifested in legislation 
came in the British Shipbuilders Act 1983. This Act, one of the last of the first Thatcher 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Interview with Lord Mackay ofClashfern 22.1.01. 
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Government, insisted that British Shipbuilders should take more responsibility and be more 
efficient [I, 1,2 (1)]. Thus, the Government's intention to relinquish control of industry to the 
markets is revealed. Such policies make jobs more insecure. British Shipbuilders had noticed 
the new trend in policy early in the Thatcher years. In their representation to the Industry and 
Trade Committee in 1980, they note how they were remaining competitive and within spending 
targets in spite of reduced subsidy. Not only was this industry looking for Government subsidy, 
they were also hoping for help in exchange rate policy and permission to extend credit to their 
customers62• Such intervention seemed increasingly unlikely, as witnessed by the Government's 
attack on the inefficiencies of nationalised industries in the 1983 manifest063 . 
The Trade Union Act 1984 was another measure that perpetuated the popular sentiment 
that the Government did not have workers' interests at heart and were anti-Trade Union64 . I, I, 1 
(IXa) of this Act insisted on secret and fair ballots for senior union positions and I, I, 10 (1) 
made the same requirement for strike action to be legitimised. Lord Sanderson noted how strong 
the Trade Unions were in Scotland at this time65. Consequently, opposition to the Conservatives 
grew further once these activists were able to use the content of these pieces of legislation as 
evidence that the Government was somehow campaigning against the interests of Scottish 
workers in favour of the more prosperous white-collar community of the Southeast of England. 
At this time, the seemingly anti-Trade Union direction being taken by the Government was 
61 "Dod's Parliamentary Companion - New Parliament Edition", 1984: pp515-548. 
62 HC758, 1979-1980, ppI5-16. 
63 In: Dale (ed.), 2000, pp291-292. 
64 Interview with Lord Mackay ofClashfem, 22.1.01. 
65 Interview, 30.11.00. 
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becoming clearer to the electorate. Disapproval of legislation banning strikes went up 
approximately 15% from the last poll (taken at the end of 1977)66. However, it should also be 
noted that out of all the issues facing the country at the time, the Government's Trade Union 
policies were amongst their most popular with a large section of society67. The Government's 
fortitude on this issue was about to be tested by the National Union of Mineworkers. 
The initial terms of the Coal Industry Act 1985 seemed to show that industrial policy had 
not changed that much. For example, I, I, 1 (1) of that Act still bound the Government to make 
grants to the NCB to help to clear its debts. However, on further inspection, there were subtle 
changes that hurt Conservative support among the working class industrial community. This 
happened once the unions had translated technical policies into their own language. 
Government money was still to be made available to the coal industry even though it was in the 
throes ofa bitter strike at the time. However, I, I, 1 (4) forbade future increases in the amounts 
involved and I, I, 3 (2) saw the levels of redundancy grants rising only by an insignificant 
amount. Thus, in effect, the Government was reducing the burden placed on affluent English 
taxpayers by industrial support and making a firm statement to the militant Trade Unions. This 
process was continued in the British Shipbuilders (Bo"owing Powers) Act 1986, where the 
amount that the industry could have was only allowed to rise by £100m. This was a much 
smaller amount than precedent would have suggested. A similar pattern is apparent in the Coal 
Industry Act 1987. There, I, I, 2 (1) still allowed for the Government to pay grants for deficit 
66 Gallup Political Index, #282, February 1984, p12. 
67 Ibid, #307 March 1986, p8. 
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elimination in the industry. However, important funds were being withdrawn in the form of the 
abolition of pit closure grants, closure costs notwithstanding [I, I, 4 (1)]. 
With particular respect to Scotland, the Government's legislative programme for helping 
industrial development did seem to have a pro-English slant. As David McLetchie pointed out, 
the help being afforded to British Leyland's Longbridge plant was particularly galling to Scots 
who were losing their industrial jobs68. The figures involved were substantial. British Leyland 
was to receive £1440m between 1979-198369. The Industrial Development Act 1985 
concentrated on the expansion of the Industrial Estates Corporation south of the border and 
extended the borrowing powers of the Welsh Development Agency [I, I, 2 (1) & I, I, 5 (1)]. 
Some rectification seemed to be in the offing with the Scottish Development Agency Act 1987. 
I, I, 1 of this Act promised a rise in the SDA allowance from £700m to £1200m. However, as 
Chart 4.2 shows, this seems to have been somewhat of a smoke screen (given the proximity of a 
General Election) as subsidies for Scotland were quickly reduced in other areas. 
By this time, the Conservatives were struggling badly in Scotland. A Gallup poll in 
September 1986 showed that 77% of Scottish respondents disapproved of the Government's 
record to date, whilst 79% said that they were dissatisfied with Mrs Thatcher as Prime 
Minister70• Amongst people who had voted Conservative in 1983, unemployment was cited as 
the most important reason by any who had decided to change their allegiance in the next 
68 Interview, 19.1.01. 
69 HC194, 1980-1981, pI. 
70 Gallup Political Index, #313, September 1986, p18. 
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Election~ and a mere 4% felt that the Conservatives had the best policies to deal with Scotland's 
economic problems7!. There was a clear link between the Conservatives' 'POMP' relating to 
industrial Scotland and their fading chances in Local Government and General Elections. 
However, it seems that the Party elite felt that the correct remedies were already in place. 
As the end of the 1980s approached, a particular aspect of the Conservatives' industrial 
policy ethos was legislated into being. Privatisation had always been mooted, but was somewhat 
controversial to attempt just before a General Election. After the 1987 Election, the 
Conservatives felt secure enough to introduce this measure. As we saw in the Introduction to 
this thesis (Chart 1.1), their support had risen to comfortable levels in General Elections in 
England. This was not the case north of the border, however. Consequently, this apparent 
further attack on the traditional structure of Scottish industry was seen as another great affront. 
The British Steel Act 1988 announced the dissolution of the British Steel Corporation and that it 
was in the gift of the Government to appoint a successor [I, I, 1 (1)]. The Government was to be 
given the option to purchase securities in the successor to BSC [I, I, 4 (1)(a)), but would only be 
liable to loan the new company funds during the transitional period [I, I, 8 (1)]. It should be 
noted here that some Scottish Conservatives were beginning to see the potential damage to the 
Party's support north of the border over this issue. They asked BSC to make their actual plans 
public72• However, lack of insistence from the metropolitan Government, who were keen to see 
the privatisation programme through, meant that this issue was not raised again. The British 
7! Ibid. Even in May 1996, only 15% of respondents felt that the Conservatives had the best 
~licies to deal with unemployment in Scotland- ibid, #429, May 1996, p5. 
2 Glasgow Herald. 2.3.90, p5. 
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Coal and British Rail (Transfer Proposals) Act 1993 furthered the privatisation programme into 
the Major era. This perpetuation of a policy that was unpopular in Scotland can be understood, 
though, given the statistic that nearly 40% (the highest score in the poll) of the (UK) population 
felt that the Government was getting its privatisation programme <about right,73. 
Concurrently, the Government was continuing to reduce the support it traditionally 
offered to heavy industry. Thus the Coal Industry Act 1990 initially seemed to follow more 
traditional lines. I, I, 1 (1) promised that the Government could continue to make grants to the 
industry to help to cover its deficits. However, that the Government was not prepared to 
continue to shore up an economic disaster is shown by their willingness to increase the amounts 
available for redeployment and workforce reduction grants. I, I, 2 (3) of the Coal Industry Act 
1990 said that these amounts should rise from the 1987 levels of £300m to £1250m (with a 
maximum ceiling of £ 1500m). Whilst initially costing the tax payers extra, the nature of these 
one-off payments show that the Government wanted to close the issue once and for all and no 
longer have to spend public money on large subsidies. This attitude was echoed in the Coal 
Industry Act 1992, which increased the same payments in this industry from £1250m to £2500m 
(maximum £3000m) [1, 1, 1 (3)]. 
Whilst these reforms were being instituted, other industrial policies seemed to be 
perpetuating the popular sentiment that the Conservatives were somehow not acting in the 
interests of workers in Scotland. The Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act /993 
73 Gallup Political Inde~ #342, February 1989, p8. 
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abolished minimum wage requirements in the limited sectors where it had already been 
instituted [III, 1,35]. As mentioned earlier, the Welsh also seemed to be doing better than their 
geographically peripheral counterparts in Scotland. The Welsh Development Agency Act 1988 
saw this institution's financial limit rise from the 1975 figure of£450m to £700m [I, I, 1]. With 
regard to the housing issue, Peter Walker was able to stand up for Wales effectively. Successive 
Secretaries of State for Scotland did not seem to wield so much influence with the Prime 
Minister. However, it should be noted that Scotland has tended to do better out of the Barnett 
Formula than Wales74• 
Lord Mackay of Clashfem felt that the subsidy reduction episode caused the most 
problems for the Party in Scotland 75. He gave the following rationale for the pursuit of these 
policies which, even at the time, the Government knew were going to be unpopular. The 
policies were pursued because they were 'right.' In this instance, being right meant following 
economic reason and reducing the tax burden by pulling Government support out of dying 
industries. When a policy is said to be right, one must consider just whom it is right for761 In 
this instance, it was indeed right for aftluent English voters who were going to reward the 
Conservatives for the lower tax bills that they were enjoying. 
74 Interview with Lord MacKay of Ardbrecknish, 25.1.01. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Opinion polls at the time put it to the respondents that policies were not being changed 
because the Government felt that they were right. Even so, the question ran, did the policies 
need changing? In June 1983,63% thought so; by September 1984, this figure had risen to 69% 
(Gallup Political Inde~ #289, September 1984, plO). See Appendix A to this chapter for an 
analysis of the proposition that the Government was too rigid/inflexible. 
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David McLetchie, Lord MacKay of Ardbrecknish, Sir Malcolm Ritkind, Viscount 
Younger and Lord Lang were all most keen to defend the policy insofar as, in the long run, it has 
been justified by the regeneration of the areas of Scotland involved77. Indeed, the Conservatives 
did institute tax conditions favourable to investment, which now sees, for example, (mainly 
American-owned) high-technology industries flourishing in 'Silicon Glen' and the re-trained 
area around Ravenscraig enjoying better employment rates than it did when the steel plant was 
open. However, it is open to debate whether the Governments of the 1980s knew for certain that 
this would be the case78 or whether they were just happy to enjoy the popularity accrued in 
England from the tax cuts at the time of subsidy reduction79? Furthermore, as Chart 4.2 shows, 
any improvements in the Scottish unemployment situation were also accompanied by 
momentary increases in Government spending. The close correlation between rising subsidy and 
falling unemployment levels in Scotland is apparent (for example 1986-1987 and 1993-1995~ as 
is the converse, as demonstrated by 1983-1984 and 1991-1992)80. These trends show that the 
Party was deluding itself if it was thinking that it was their long-term investment promotion 
strategy alone that was re-vitalising the Scottish economy. One of the main aims of the subsidy 
reduction programme was to reduce the burden it was placing on taxpayers. It was not possible 
to solve the unemployment problem in Scotland without going back on this promise. 
77 Interviews 19.1.01,25.1.01, Written Statement dated 22.1.01, Interviews 14.2.01 & 27.3.01. 
78 Interview with Ross Harper, 6.8.01. 
79 Relying on this source of popularity was another risky strategy as the decade wore on. Whilst 
less than half of respondents felt that Government services should be extended, even at the cost 
of higher taxes in 1980, the figure had risen to nearly 70% in 1986 (Gallup Political Index, #234, 
February 1980 & #308, April 1986, pI2). 
80 Correlation calculations for all of the British regions are presented in Appendix B to this 
chapter. 
198 
Subsidies & Unemployment in Scotland 
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-1.2 - Sources: The Scottish Abstract o(Statistics81 . 
The winding down of the steel industry in Scotland demonstrates how Thatcherite 
policies went too far in the pursuance of market values and helped to create an irredeemable 
'POS' situation for the Party in Scotland; a situation that they were forced to acknowledge well 
before the electoral disaster of 1997. There was plenty of warning for the Government as to the 
potential unpopularity of the policies north of the border. The Second Report of the Trade and 
Industry Committee in 1984-1985 urged the Government to re-consider the imminent closures 
and pleaded the steel industry's case citing the recent difficulties of the miners' strike as a 
mitigating circumstance for poor performance82. It was openly acknowledged that the end of 
81 The Scottish Abstract o(Stalistics: Number 14, 1985, p205 - #15, 1986, p20 - #16, 1987, p186 
_ #19,1990, p172 - #20,1991, p16 - #23,1994, p20 - #24,1995, p19 - #25, 1996, p275 - #26, 
1998, pp274 & 285. 
82 HC474, 1984-1985, P vii. 
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state aid for the industry was planned. In order to protect jobs, the Government was reminded of 
its commitment to approach this moment with as much flexibility as possible83 . 
The slightly confusing way in which the Thatcher administration was approaching 
industrial policy is highlighted in the Third Special DTI Report to the House of Commons in the 
same session. With regard to the steel industry, it was noted that, even though the Government 
was withdrawing subsidies, it was still retaining a high degree (higher than would be permitted 
in the private sector) of control of loan repayment conditions and the appointment of successors 
to the British Steel Corporation84. Therefore, not only were the Conservatives going to be 
unpopular for ending state aid, they did not even seem to be giving the industry a fair chance of 
recovering and flourishing naturally in the free market. 
Perhaps the most high profile manifestation of this problem in Scotland was the closure 
of the steel rolling mill at Ravenscraig. An announcement was made in May 1990 by British 
Steel pic, the Government appointed quasi-private successor to the BSe - a privatisation that 
was worth £2425m in 198885 - that the plant was to close with the loss of 770 jobs (out of a total 
of only 3200 in the town)86. Even though this was a commercial decision being made by a 
supposedly independent corporation, links between their misfortune and Government policy by 
the voters of the region were inevitable87. The situation was not helped by the decision six 
83 Ibid. 
84 BC334, 1984-1985, p vii. 
85 Cook & Stevenson, 2000, p188. 
86 BC473, 1990-1991, P v. 
87 Ibid. 
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months later to close the plant at Clydesdale with the loss of a further 1200 jobs. British Steel 
pIc tried to justify the decisions by citing the fact that profits were down 27% during the summer 
of 1990 and that £80m to £ 100m would be saved by the closure of Ravenscraig alone88. The 
Trade Unions, in response, tried to defend the plant by citing its cheap costs and excellent 
delivery record and optimistically predicted increased demand. Another source of defence for 
the plant was the Motherwell District Council. They brought up a typical Scottish argument 
asking why jobs were in danger in their area whilst the industry in England (e.g. Redcar) and 
South Wales (e.g. Port Talbot) was still benefiting from high levels of Government investment89? 
Perhaps the most interesting intervention in the Ravenscraig saga was from the Scottish 
Office. Indeed confirming their portfolio of defending Scotland in London, the Department put 
in a representation to try to convince British Steel of the merits of choosing Dalzell as the site of 
its proposed new steel plate mill. By association, this was a strident defence of the Ravenscraig 
plant as Dalzell would be dependent on it for its steel slabs (the basic 'ingredient' of plated 
steel). The Scottish Office was worried about job losses at Ravenscraig and Dalzell and 
complained at the uncooperative nature of British Steel's replies to their questions and 
requests90. However, this representation seems to be of the kind inspired by a somewhat guilty 
conscience, desperate to appear to be defending Scottish workers, when it was Governmental 
industrial and privatisation policies that had caused the problems in the first place. 
881b'd . 1,pVl. 
89 Ibid, p viii. Thus we see how a central policy has caused Local Government in Scotland to 
organise and express opposition. 
90 Ibid, pp xi-xiii. 
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It is a difficult task to try to prove that the withdrawal of Government subsidies caused 
industrial closures and more unemployment in Scotland than in the rest of the UK. 
Conservatives would argue that inefficient mismanagement was the primary cause91 . Indeed, 
during the course of this discussion, it should be remembered that Scots enjoyed very high per 
capita metropolitan Government spending, even in the 1980s. What can be shown, however, is 
whether there was a higher correlation between lowering levels of subsidy and increased 
unemployment in Scotland compared to other regions? Either way, the electorate in Scotland 
perceived that this was the case and consequently did not support the Government or, 
importantly, its representatives in Local Government. 
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Chart 4.3 shows that, especially during the 1980s, Scotland suffered consistently high 
levels of unemployment. Scottish respondents, like all others in the rest of the UK, consistently 
rated unemployment as being the most important issue before the country through the 1980s92. 
Therefore, it seems that the Government should have done more in the 'POMP' to relieve the 
situation. This becomes especially clear when we see that the only region where there is a 
significant correlation (at the 1 % level) between unemployment and central subsidy levels is 
Scotland93 . In the graphical representation of the relationship shown earlier (Chart 4.2), it was 
possible to see how the employment fortunes of Scotland waxed and waned with the 
corresponding levels of subsidies. While neither this impression nor the correlation calculations 
confer definite causation on the dynamic, we can conclude that nowhere else in Britain were 
levels of unemployment associated so much with the metropolitan Government's systematic 
withdrawal of subsidies than in Scotland. 
In Scotland, the policy was to have two injurious effects on the Conservatives' support. 
Firstly, newly unemployed workers were not likely to vote for the Party that they held 
responsible for their misfortune. Furthermore, as David McLetchie and Lord Fraser pointed out, 
there was also a more subtle implication for the 'POS' in this dynamic, which may eventually 
have had a disastrous effect on the Conservatives' chances of General Election success in 
92 Unemployment was seen as the most important problem (scoring between 75%-85%) in 
Gallup Polls through the 1980s - Gallup Political Indexes, #226, June 1979 onwards (always on 
pp2-4). The issue scored as highly as 91% in a Scottish poll- ibid, #313, September 1986, p18. 
Unpublished MORl data has the issue consistently above 90% as the most important problem 
facing Scotland in the 1980s. 
93 The calculations for this point are presented in Appendix B to this chapter. 
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Scotland94. Whilst voters only change their allegiance in General Elections under extreme 
duress, they are far more easily convinced to register a 'protest vote' at mid-term Local 
Government Elections. Therefore, many Conservative Councillors lost their seats both north and 
south of the border as a result of unpopular policies generated in London (see Chart 1.2). As 
these interviewees pointed out, incumbent local officials are essential for the Party's 'POS' in 
Scotland. The organisation and direction of General Election campaigns were focused on these 
local luminaries north of the border95. Industrial closures struck at the heart of traditional 
communities in Scotland. That the Party Leadership did not appreciate the connection 
demonstrates a lack of sensitivity to peripheral concerns. This thesis measures the General 
Election dangers to the Party of this trait. 
The second unfortunate effect of industrial closures on the 'POS' was the way in which 
local Party activists reacted. As the Conservatives' popularity in Scotland visibly waned, the 
'little platoons' of Party workers were less inclined to work had for an apparently lost cause96. 
The efforts of local Party workers are essential for the running of a successful election campaign. 
Furthermore, they are needed especially on the geographical periphery to help to 'sell' new 
policies to the local electorate97 . As we have seen, the issue of the sale of Council Housing in 
Scotland demonstrates the need to have effective local activists to perform this function. 
Scottish Council tenants were just as prepared to buy their properties as their English 
counterparts. However, the Conservatives were not able to reap the same political reward as in 
94 Interviews, 19.1.01 & 5.3.01. 
95 Interview with Martin Perry, 24.8.01. 
96 Interviews with David Seawright, 13.4.00, Viscount Younger, 14.2.01 & Lord Lang, 27.3.01. 
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England. This was due, in part, to the absence of local activists to counter opposition denials 
that the voters' increased standard of living was due to Conservative housing policy. A stream 
of other metropolitan policies that had been too difficult to defend had driven local Party 
activists in Scotland from the cause. Perhaps the most notorious of the Conservative policies 
that had convinced their own members to cease their efforts in Scotland was the Poll Tax. 
Thatcherite Neoliberalism and Scotland 
Before we examine that policy, it is necessary to assess how the Thatcher administration 
was developing in the 1980s with regard to Scotland. It appears that there was a subtle change in 
the Prime Minister's attitude to territorial management during this time. Even though she 
believed the issue of Devolution to be dead after the referenda of 1979, Mrs Thatcher's first few 
years in office still included some concessions to Scottish separateness. As we have seen, the 
continued presence of non-Thatcherites in the Scottish Office and Parliament contributed to this. 
Once her position and majority were solidified after the 1983 election, however, she had more 
confidence and was not concerned that certain policies would offend Scottish voters, who were 
not likely to vote Conservative anyway98. Chapter 2 acknowledged that Thatcherism was not a 
dramatic departure from stances taken by previous Conservative administrations insofar as it was 
a programme directed at solving contemporary problems. Nonetheless, her attack on 
corporatism and state subsidies seemed radical compared with the 1970s and was never going to 
be popular north of the border. 
97 Interview with Viscount Younger, 14.2.01. 
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Since the 1930s especially, Conservatives had cited Scottish dependence on the 
Government in London as a reason for keeping the Union together. In the 1980s, Mrs Thatcher 
was courting Opposition (including Nationalist) protest by making cuts in British institutions 
such as nationalised industries, the NHS and comprehensive education. The Nationalists did not 
seem to appreciate the irony in their vigorous support for these tools of the British state. The 
Prime Minister was not taking into account the need for administrations in London to be seen to 
be paying special attention to the needs and desires of people north of the border99. It is 
imperative that the Conservative elite in London is at least seen to appreciate the special needs 
and desires of the Scots if a reasonable 'pas' situation is to be maintained. This attention must 
be paid both to the Scottish electorate as a whole, and also to Party workers and Local 
Government representatives north of the border. In periods of more traditional Unionist 
administration, such amelioration had been achieved through the 'dual polity' system (see 
Chapter 2). Hereby, the central Governments were also insulated against issues of 'low politics.' 
During the 1980s, however, the Thatcher Governments wanted to take power away from 
pockets of socialist opposition in Local Government. It was concluded that the best way to do 
this was to ostensibly place as much power as possible in the hands of the individual voters. 
Therefore, the move to centralise power was disguised as a populist measure. If decision and 
funding powers were taken away from Local Authorities in the name of accountability and 
efficiency, the central Government would pick up the residue. However, the central Government 
98 Unattributahle Interview comment, Winter 2000-2001. 
99 Francis, Martin & Zweiniger-Bargielowska, Ina (cds.): "The Conservatives and British 
Society, 1880-1990", Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1996, p123. 
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may have been causing unseen problems in local 'POS' in Scotland by building up resentment 
amongst opposition controlled Local Government in Scotland. This issue is explored more fully 
in Chapter 5. 
An example of successful power centralisation for the Conservatives was the efficient 
instigation of the NHS and welfare state after the Second World War. According to Mitchell, 
Mrs Thatcher saw the 1970s as a similar crisis point in British history due to economic 
stagnation 100. Thus she was prepared to initiate her policies of centralisation once she was well 
established in office. The benefits of such neoliberal policies were very evident in the 
prosperous south. As we saw with regard to housing, the Conservative Governments of the 
1980s and 1990s were seeking to attract new working class support by widening prosperity and 
property ownership. However, these economic benefits were not felt in Scotland. Removal of 
Government subsidy and investment hurt the 'dependent' Scots. Therefore, a 'POMP' move was 
to blight the 'POS'; for not only were Scots, including Conservatives there, upset at seeing 
centralisation and removal of local autonomy, they were also suffering financially. A senior 
source at Conservative Central Office claimed that the change from Union to Unitary had no 
effect amongst Scottish ConservativeslO1. It is probable that the affluent members of the Party 
north of the border did not mind, as their incomes were safe and boosted by tax cuts. However, 
as David Seawright commented, the 1980s saw a significant downturn in grass roots activity for 
the Party in Scotiand102. Mrs Thatcher's personality may well have appealed to the collective 
100 Ibid. 
101 Interview, 21.6.00. 
102 Interview, 13.4.00. 
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Scottish Conservative psyche 103 • However, such appeal is not enough to sustain local activism if 
central policies render their efforts futile or are incompatible with any residual Scottish 
pride/nationalism. The one policy that did most damage to the Conservatives' 'POS' in this case 
was the introduction of the Community Charge. 
The Community Charge 
In Chapter 3, we began to see how this policy inspired Opposition-controlled Local 
Authorities in Scotland to try to disrupt the 'POMP' as much as possible in order to make gains 
in the 'POS.' Presently, an analysis of the reasons why the Conservative elite generated and 
perpetuated the policy further investigate how the Poll Tax caused them electoral problems north 
of the border. As in the case of the withdrawal of industrial subsidies, the formulation of the 
Tax seemed to be grounded in sound economic logic and consistent with contemporary 
Conservative ideology104. There would be savings for property-owning potential Conservative 
voters, the Tax could be promoted as being more equitable than the rating system and Local 
Authorities would become more accountable to their electors. Thereby, the Conservatives hoped 
to eliminate local left wing political projects that were currently being funded by the money 
collected as Domestic Rates. It was the intention of Mrs Thatcher to replace the inequitable 
Rating system since her time at the Department of the Environment in the 1970s 105. The 
resultant Poll Tax, however, turned out to be probably the most unpopular single policy of the 
103 As suggested in Thatcher, 1993, p622 and Central Office interview, 21.6.00. 
104 Interview with Andrew Gamble, 16.3.00. 
105 Interview with Lord MacKay of Ardbrecknish, 25.1.01. Domestic rates were the most 
important single issue in the minds of most voters with regard to Local Government in Scotland 
- Interview with William Paterson., 13.9.01. 
208 
Thatcher-Major era. As with Devolution, this episode has been well documented elsewhere. 
However, there are points that came up in my elite interview programme that demonstrate how 
the Government felt at the time. From these views, it may be possible to better appreciate the 
relationship between this aspect of the 'POMP' and the Party's 'POS' in Scotland. Most 
importantly, we should also remember how the 'POMP' was causing Conservative Local 
Government representatives in Scotland to lose their seats or much credibility in their 
communities. 
6 
5 
4 
3 
2 
-. -----
1 
Scottish Local Government Income 
-------...--
.--
--- .-- .-
- . 
.-..... 
-
.- -----.--. 
- Grants £bn -- Rates/Poll Tax £bn 
4.-1 - Sources: The Scottish Abstract o{Stat istics 1 06. 
Following a pattern that very much comes to light in the centre-periphery relationship 
regarding housing, a hope of the Government was that the Poll Tax would increase central 
autonomy by reducing the need for subsidy of local services. As Chart 4.4 shows, this hope was 
106 The Scottish Abstract o{StaUstics: Number 14, 1985, p201 - #16, 1987, pI83 - #18, 1989, 
p165 - #21, 1992, p189 - #25, 1996, p269 - #26, 1998, p279. 
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not realised. At least during the Rates era, levels of subsidy were fairly consistent. Once the 
Poll Tax was introduced in 1989-1990, these levels began to rise and rose sharply again when its 
successor, the Council Tax, arrived in 1993-1994. The cost of Poll Tax rebates was not high 
enough on its own to account for the increase in the central grant bill for Scotland in the 1990s. 
However, it is obvious that one of the original goals of the Tax, that is to say a reduction in 
central costs, had not been achieved. 
The first aspect of the relationship between the 'POMP' and 'POS' to be considered with 
regard to the policy is that the genesis of the Poll Tax idea came from affluent Conservative 
supporters in Scotland 107. Indeed, the metropolitan Government interpreted initial enthusiasm 
and high collection rates for the Poll Tax there as a further demonstration of the popular desire 
for an alternative to Domestic Rates 108. Affluent potential Conservative voters in Scotland had 
become disillusioned with the system of Rates re-evaluations that was in place north of the 
border 109. Unlike England, there was a statutory requirement for a re-evaluation to take place 
every five years in Scotland. Therefore, prosperous Conservative voters saw their Rates bills go 
up frequently as they moved to better areas or gentrified their current locality. A further problem 
for Conservative supporters in Scotland was that Labour Local Government activists had 
managed to gain influence with the nominally independent rates assessors in areas such as Fife 
107 Interviews with David Seawright, 13.4.00, James Mitchell, 8.6.00, Lord Strathclyde, 8.11.00, 
Lord Sanderson, 30.11.00, Viscount Younger, 14.2.01, Lord Fraser, 5.3.01 & Lord Lang, 27.3.01 
+ Stirling Councillor Survey (Con), Winter 2001-2002. 
lOS Interview with Lord Lang, 5.3.01. 
109 Interviews with Lord Sanderson, 30.11.00, Viscount Younger, 14.2.01, Lord Lang, 27.3.01 & 
Ross Harper, 6.8.01. 
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and StrathclydellO. The Rating system had been very difficult to administer and collect in 
Scotland I II. As judicial review north of the border was not flexible enough to reform the status 
quo sufficiently, a completely new system was envisaged. However, devising a replacement was 
to prove very difficult in practice. Nevertheless, the determination to do so was a good example 
of the Party elite responding to the wishes of the grass roots in Scotland after William Whitelaw 
told Conference how bad the situation had become north of the border I 12 . 
As Secretary of State at the time, it was George Younger's job to sell the resultant new 
policy to all the voters of Scotland. As Lord Sanderson noted, the Secretary of State had to 
administer an 'iron fist in a velvet glove' 113. A tough remedy for the disastrous economic 
position that had been inherited in 1979 was necessary. However, dramatic policies that deeply 
affect voters' incomes near to elections are rarely a good idea. Consequently, the new Tax was 
to 'hole' the administration 'below the water line,1J4. Perhaps the most difficult obstacle was 
due to the fact that the Tax was being implemented a year earlier in Scotland, as dictated by the 
Abolition of Domestic Rates Etc. (Scotland) Act 1987. This made it look like Scotland was 
being used as a 'guinea pig,llS. All my interviewees denied that this was the case. Lord MacKay 
of Ardbrecknish gave the most plausible reasoningl16. If Scotland was an experimental 
laboratory, it was quite obvious that the experiment had failed and it would not have been 
110 Interview with Lord Sanderson, 30.11.00. 
III Interview with Lord Mackay of Clashfem, 22.1. 0 1. 
112 Interview with Ross Harper, 6.8.01. 
113 Ibid 
114 Ibid. 
I1S This view was heavily perpetuated in the Scottish media - Interview with Viscount Younger, 
14.2.01. 
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continued in England. However, not only was the Tax not being imposed at the same time in 
England, but also a concurrent Rates re-evaluation was not even being held. Consequently, 
English Rates were staying 10wl17. Thus, it seems rather difficult to defend the position that 
Scotland was not being treated differently to England. Such a line of questioning would often 
elicit the response that the Poll Tax was a Scottish idea anyway. Viscount Younger lamented the 
fact that he did not insist on a concurrent reform of the rating system in England1l8. He is 
vindicated in this view by the fact that, by 1988, the Government's handling of the Rates 
question was second only to their NHS reforms in terms of unpopular policies1l9. 
The most visible and strongly opposed aspect of the new Tax was that many voters were 
having to pay something for the first time 120. Any re-arrangement of the Rating system was 
going to be a zero-sum situationl21. There were some in Scotland who benefited. However, 
those who lost out were more voluble in their protests than the praise for the policy coming from 
those who had gained. Due to non-payment and, more especially, many exemptions connected 
with the high proportion of Council House renters north of the border, a large proportion of 
116 Interview, 25.1.01. 
117 Interview with Viscount Younger, 14.2.01. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Gallup Political Index, #330, February 1988, p5. 
120 This was the source of most opposition on the national level. A Gallup poll in June 1990 
recorded that 49% of respondents were 'very opposed' to the tax. 42% of these thought that it 
was 'not a fair system.' 26% of these respondents felt that the tax meant that the rich would get 
richer and the poor, poorer. All these scores were the highest to each question Gallup Political 
Inde~ #358, June 1990, p8. Between July 1987 and November 1992, the range of positive 
responses to the proposition that the Poll Tax was unfair was between 580/0-77% (Gallup 
Political Index, #387, November 1992, p8). Only about a quarter of respondents thought that the 
Poll Tax was fairer than the domestic rating system, whilst nearly a half preferred the Council 
Tax to its predecessor in such terms of equity (ibid). 
212 
Scots never had to pay Rates. Under the new system, virtually everybody had to pay some 
amount. This caused much resentment122• Poorer voters did not like having to pay anything and 
also resented that, by virtue of the costs that they were incurring, their more affiuent neighbours 
were paying less than under the Rating system. Consequently, protests came quickly and 
vociferously from such disparate quarters as pensioners and student nurses123. An unattributable 
source commented how this initial bad reaction to one of her 'pet' policies in Scotland steeled 
the Prime Minister into refusing any ameliorating measures. Given the small amounts of 
revenue involved, it would not have been a problem to offer low-income voters 100% rebates on 
their bills. However, on principle, the Prime Minister refused to do this. Consequently, non-
payment and slack collectionl24 campaigns began and the Conservatives seemed unlikely to win 
many votes in Scotland. My source on this point was convinced that the policy could have 
survived successfully if the 'double blow' of its implementation and refusal to grant 100% 
rebates had not been delivered. Therefore, we have more evidence of how Mrs Thatcher's 
personality coupled with an unpopular 'POMP' measure reduced the Party's chances in 
Scotland. The Party would lose many votes in Local Government Elections as a direct 
consequence of the tax. Therefore, as this thesis seeks to demonstrate their 'POS' in Scotland 
would suffer significantly. 
121 Interview with Ross Harper, 6.8.01. 
122 Interview with Lord Lang, 27.3.0l. On l.4.89 (pI), the Times reported that l.2m of those 
eligible for Poll Tax rebated in Scotland had not applied. Thus, many more voters were 
'suffering' under the tax than was necessary. 
123 Interview with Lord MacKay of Ardbrecknish, 25.1.01. 
124 By 1992, it was estimated that £250m of Poll Tax had not been collected by Opposition party-
led Local Authorities in Scotland - Times, 1.5.92, p2. 
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Loyal Scottish Conservative activists would no longer work hard for what they perceived 
to be a lost cause. Furthermore, Labour Local Authorities were able to make great play of how 
they were being forced to reduce services as their incomes dropped due to central policies. II, I 7 
(2) of the Abolition o/Domestic Rates Etc. (Scotland) Act 1987 announced that all local services 
not directly paid for by other sources were now to be financed by the ('personal', 'standard' and 
'collective') Community Charges. As we shall further in Chapter 5, the Thatcher Government 
was very keen to exert control over the activities of pockets of 'town hall socialism' in this way. 
This imposition of extra central restraintl25 was announced in the 1987 manifesto as a measure 
intended to "(S)trengthen democratic processes in local authorities,,126. The democratic 
credibility argument, which claimed that Local Authorities would become more responsible to 
their electors if value for money in terms of taxation and services became an issue, was an 
attempt to mask a more likely inspiration for the policy. By prescribing that Local Government 
should be more financially responsible, the Prime Minister hoped to take away their option of 
continuing to run 'loony left' programmes funded by central subsidy. If Councils wished to be 
well financed, they would have to levy high Poll Tax demands. This would make them 
unelectable. However, as Viscount Younger noted, this plan somewhat backfired on the 
Government as astute Labour local politicians in urban Scotland were able to absolve themselves 
of blame in the eyes of their electors when bills went up and services still suffered127. They had 
sufficient credibility in their communities to successfully argue that there was nothing that could 
125 Such extra central control was somewhat paradoxical in an administration that claimed to be 
trying to 'Roll Back the State.' 
126 In: Dale (ed.), 2000, p344. 
127 Interview, 14.2.01 & Times, 25.l0.88, p12. 
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be done in the face of a harshly imposed dictate from London. Consequently, the Conservatives' 
image north of the border was even more deeply wounded. 
The Poll Tax was initiated as it was felt that any measure that simplified Local 
Government finance was worthwhile 128. The Prime Minister's obstinacy was revealed when 
even the huge electoral and public order problems associated with the issue did not dissuade her. 
The campaign to oust Mrs Thatcher concentrated on her perpetuation of such an unpopular 
policy, thus demonstrating that the Party was more interested in reviving its electoral chances 
than remaining true to neoliberal principles. Very importantly for this thesis, even Conservative 
representatives in Local Government129, that is to say, those charged with implementing the 
policy, complained that the policy was too hard to defendJ3O. However, the Prime Minister was 
'not for turning. ' 
In the sphere of Local Government, the Conservatives suffered heavy losses of 
Councillors at the end of the 1980s because of the Poll Tax fiasco. The study of subsequent 
election results in Chapter 7 of this thesis tests how well this damage could be sustained in 
Scotland? At the time in question, some of the Party elite acknowledged that Councillors were 
128 Interview with Martin Perry, 24.8.0l. 
129 Who will usually be more passive and accepting of central directives tolerate more than their 
(Old) Labour and Liberal counterparts out of deference to the Party Leadership - ibid 
130 This concurs with Rhodes & Marsh' s conclusion that the Conservatives suffered not so much 
from essentially poor policies, but more from ill-aJnsiderediinappropriate implementation -
Rhodes, R. A. W. & Marsh, David: "Policy Networks in British Government", Oxford, OUP, 
1992, p9. 
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essential for organisation of campaign and policy selling effortsJ3i. This opinion was not, 
however, given much priority when the 'POMP' was being formulated132. It is ironic to note that 
the genesis and impetus for a policy that made the Party vulnerable to accusations of being anti-
Scottish and regionally insensitive actually came from north of the border133 . Thus, it almost 
appears that whatever the Conservatives did with the 'POMP', they were doomed to failure in 
Scotland due to the basic pre-dispositions against them amongst society there. Importantly for 
this thesis, it should be noted that as more Scots felt that the metropolitan Government did not 
care about them, they felt inclined to look for alternative sources of satisfaction in the political 
marketplace that is so essential to the concept of the 'POS.' In many instances, this alternative 
was found in the sphere of Local Governmentl34• 
The Poll Tax was unpopular with many voters in Scotland who had to endure higher 
bills. In addition, however, this thesis seeks to promote the importance of a more subtle side 
effect on the Conservatives' 'POS' north of the border. The policy can be seen as a clear reason 
for Conservative losses in Local Government representation and a catalyst for concerted 
campaigns against to the Party from Opposition groups in Scottish Local Authorities13s• These 
dynamics are explored further in subsequent chapters. As we have already seen in Chapter 3, the 
pervasive nature of Local Government in Scottish society rendered the actions of these 
Opposition agents significantly influential. Therefore, the Poll Tax further jeopardised 
131 Interviews with David McLetchie, 19.1.01 & Lord Fraser, 5.3.01. 
132 Interview with Lord Lang, 27.3.01. 
133 Ibid & interview with Ross Harper, 6.8.01. 
134 Stirling Councillor Survey (Con & Lab), Winter 2001-2002. 
135 Ibid. 
216 
Conservative General Election chances in Scotland by allowing Opposition parties to win more 
seats in Local Government and use the policy as 'proof' for their case that their constituents 
should reject the Conservatives. Before concluding this chapter, a literature review follows in 
order to assess further how this thesis' findings complement existing explanations for the 
Conservatives' demise in Scotland. 
The Conservative Electoral Demise in Scotland 
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As can be seen from Chart 4.5, the Party suffered a gradual decline in General Election 
support north of the border from their zenith in 1955. The major debate in the literature 
covering this era is whether this regression was inevitable due to the changing social and 
136 Kendrick, Stephen & McCrone, David: Politics in a Cold Climate: The Conservative Decline 
in Scotland, in: Political Studies, 1989, XXXVII, pp589-603, p590. 
137 Butler & Kavanagh, 1980, p356; 1984, p301; 1988, p284; 1992, p286 & 1997, p256. 
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economic structure north of the border since the War, or whether it was caused primarily by the 
'POMP' ofthe 1980s and 1990s? 
When presented in graph form, the uniformity of the regression is persuasive prima facie 
evidence for the former argument. Importantly, there seem not to be any radical downturns in 
the Thatcher-Major years. Indeed, the Party's vote went up in 1992. However, as we shall see in 
this section, the 'POMP' of the 1980s and 1990s is also often identified as the major cause of the 
Conservatives' electoral problems in Scotland. It is important to remember that even if the 
politics of the New Right in the 1980s and 1990s might not have been completely to blame for 
the Party's problems north of the border, they were nonetheless unable to effect the electoral 
success being enjoyed concurrently in England. Therefore, accounts of the incompatibility of 
Thatcherism and Scotland must not be discounted. This section concludes with an assessment of 
how the dynamics under investigation have developed in the post-1997 era. Fractionally 
extending the time frame of the study facilitates the benefit of hindsight and mention of the 
effects of Devolution in the literature being reviewed. The next stage of this section, therefore, 
is to assess the Conservatives' demise from a long-term perspective, starting with the era of post-
war consensus. 
Long-Term Decline 
In the middle of the Twentieth Century, Conservative support in Scotland consisted of a 
wide 'ideological bloc', which included: Protestantism, 'Orangeism', Unionism, British and 
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Imperial identity and militarism 138. Proponents of the view that the Conservative demise in 
Scotland began well before the Thatcher era contend that it was mainly due to the undermining 
of these traditional establishments by a modernising and secularising world that undid the 
Party's core support north of the border. 
In Scotland, some modifications had to be made to the Conservative Party to appeal to 
anti-leftist voters. Even in the near aftermath of the Act of Union in 1707, the Tories north of 
the border seemed to be merely an extension of the English party. This may have suited the 
hierarchy of the Party in Scotland, who enjoyed the financial, organisational and confidence 
benefits of being associated with their powerful English counterparts. However, the national 
pride of many Scottish citizens turned them against the Party. Even the religious affiliation of 
the Tory Party in Scotland, Episcopalianism, was seen as the 'English Kirk', rather than the 
preferred Presbyterianisml39. Therefore, an alternative had to be sought. Towards the end of the 
Nineteenth Century, 'Unionism' was developed as a solution to this problem. It added some 
aspects of Liberalism to the elements of Toryism that were acceptable to the Scots. Thus, a 
stringent anti Home Rule movement began. At this time, Home Rule was dubbed as 'Rome 
Rule' , due to its connections with Irish Catholic dissidence. This new Unionist party appealed to 
Presbyterians and businessmen in Scotland who feared that Home Rule would threaten their 
1· . d . I Co. d 140 re IgtOUS an commerCIa 11 ee oms . 
138 Kendrick & McCrone, 1989, p595. 
139 Dyer, 2001, p39. 
140 Ibid 
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Proponents of the longer-term view of the Party's Scottish demise ascribe much credit for 
the perpetuation of Conservative success earlier in the Twentieth Century in Scotland to 
continuing Unionist government. David Seawright is such an exponent of the importance of 
Unionism to the Conservative cause in Scotland141 . He notes how Unionism developed into an 
ideology in itself, which prescribed methods of governance for all aspects of the polity and 
economy. Traditional Unionism called for moderate socio-economic management and 
intervention. In addition, as witnessed by the circumstances surrounding Unionism's genesis, 
the distinctive identities of the various regions were to be accommodated as much as possible by 
the granting of limited administrative Devolution. An important observation by Seawright is that 
the final slow decline of traditional Unionism (coupled with economic stagnation) north of the 
border was enough to swing the Scottish electorate away from the Conservative party142. Thus, a 
long-term issue, rather than some of the infamous policies of the 1980s such as the Poll Tax, 
may have played the most important role in the Conservatives' electoral decline in Scotland. 
The question still remains, however, of why and how Unionism died in the British state? 
When considering the longer-term explanations of the Conservative decline in Scotland, 
it should be remembered, as Stein Rokkan and Derek Unwin note, that Unionism had more 
chance of success in the pre-1970 era143. They argue that it was only after that date that the 
inhabitants of the UK's various regions became acutely aware of their distinctiveness within a 
multinational state. Before then, it was easier to appeal to a sense of British identity. 
141 Seawright, 1999, pI58. 
142 Seawright & Curtice, 1995, p332. 
143 Rokkan & Unwin, 1983, p68. 
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Michael Dyer traces the onset of the demise of Scottish Conservatism to the mid-1950s, 
when the existing influential centre-right coalition fragmented into the Conservative, Liberal and 
Scottish Nationalist Parties. As we have seen, this coalition had emerged as a reaction to 
perceived leftist threats in the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuriesl44. It broke up due 
to its failure to renew and modernise in the post-war yearsl45. Labour, on the other hand, were 
astute enough to quickly leave behind the wartime domestic party political truce and re-engage 
in [the 'POS' and] electioneeringl46. It is interesting to note, as Dyer does, that the 
Conservatives in England did modernise to a certain degree in the post war era. Their Unionist 
counterparts in Scotland, on the other hand, were culpable for not doing so simultaneouslyl47. 
Dyer also notes that there only seemed to be minimal Scottish involvement in modem 
Conservatism after the major re-organisation of the Party undertaken in the mid_1960s148. From 
1912-1965, the word 'Conservative' had not been used in the Party name north of the border in 
order to distance the Scottish Party from London and promote Unionism, rather than (English) 
Conservatism, as the main cause of the organisation. This approach sought to win more support 
amongst the Scottish general electorate and Party members alikel49. The scheme worked with 
the voters and gave Scottish Conservatives a sense of quasi-autonomy and associated confidence. 
As examined especially in Chapter 2 of this thesis, once they were fully re-integrated into the 
144 Dyer, 2001, p39. 
145 Ibid, p31. 
146 Ramsden, John: "The Age of Churchill and Eden. 1940-1957", London, Longman, 1995, 
fE55-56. 
Dyer, 2001, p46. 
148 Ibid, p31. 
149 Interview with David Seawright, 16.4.00. 
221 
UK-wide organisation in the I 960s, however, not only was this confidence lost, but the influence 
of Scottish Conservatism was also somewhat diluted. 
Throughout this thesis, we hear from Local Councillors and Party Archive sources that 
the remaining Conservatives in Scotland have felt somewhat ignored by the Party elite in 
London. Consequently, essential local information has not always been communicated or 
assimilated and local Party activists have not been inclined to give their best efforts. 
Consequently, the Conservatives' 'POS' in Scotland has been compromised. John Ramsden 
notes how Scottish Conservatives were beginning to feel isolated and ignored by the central 
Governments in London in the 1950s and 1960S150. The opinion that this problem pre-dated the 
Thatcher era again lends more credence to the long-term account of the Scottish Conservative 
decline. 
Richard Rose presents another example of a relevant issue that began before the 1980s 151. 
He notes the problems inherent to ignoring the multinational nature of the UK and denying the 
Scots a sense of distinctiveness. Ramsden makes more specific points along these lines. He 
identifies an apparent over-concentration on the governance of the South East of England by the 
Conservatives as early as the 1960s 152. This is an accusation often levelled at the Thatcher-
Major administrations, as examined in this chapter. In this instance, however, it is interesting to 
note again that the trend may have started before 1979. 
150 Ramsden, John: "The Winds of Change: Macmillan to Heath, 1957-1975", Longman, 
London, 1996,pI35. 
lSI Rose, Richard: "Politics in England Today", London, Faber & Faber, 1974, p34. 
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Kendrick and McCrone present another argument that suggests that the Conservative 
decline in Scotland may have started before 1979. However, they do not believe that the demise 
was as natural or inevitable as writers such as Rose or Dyer suggest. Kendrick and McCrone 
agree that the end of the post-war consensus precipitated the downfall of the Conservatives north 
of the border. However, rather than blaming changes in modem Scottish culture, they identify 
long-term central economic policy as the main reason for the swing to the centre-left north of the 
border. Kendrick and McCrone argue that Scottish voting habits changed drastically when it was 
perceived that Scotland had diverged from England in terms of priority of economic 
management from the 1960S153. Labour and the Conservatives had, since the end of the War, 
tried to ensure low unemployment and inflation, economic growth, a mixed economy, the 
welfare state and Keynesianism. They had sought these goals through different means, but there 
seemed to be agreement on what constituted optimum economic targets. The voters had to 
choose who they felt were best able to achieve these aims. This consensus extended to the 
Scottish polity. Once Governments and voters began to see Scotland as a separate economic 
entity, however, this sense of unity could not be preserved. As such ties to the Union broke 
down north of the border, the Conservatives were bound to lose votes. 
Another example of the long-term view is that of A. J. Davies. He notes how the 
simultaneous demise of Protestantism and manual labour in Scotland seriously diminished the 
152 Ramsden, 1996, p251. 
153 Kendrick and McCrone, 1989, p597. 
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Conservatives' support there 154. This development started before 1979 and, especially in the 
case ofsecularisation, there was little the Governments of the 1980s or 1990s could have done to 
arrest the situation through the 'POMP.' Orangeism (a formerly important source of votes for 
the Scottish Conservatives, as it had brought in supporters from disparate social backgrounds) 
was bound to diminish in importance once the rate of Irish immigration into the urban West of 
Scotland fell 155 and society in general secularised. 
Whilst assessmg these vanous examples of a longer-term decline of Scottish 
Conservatism, it is interesting to note that a version of this argument is presented in the Thatcher 
memoirs156. It is unsurprising that the former Prime Minister does not blame her policies or 
personality for the Party's electoral problems in Scotland. Furthermore, that she cites the longer-
term reasons does not necessarily lend them more credence. Nonetheless, like the Conservative 
elite's perceptions of the Scottish economy, these opinions on the nature of society north of the 
border could have influenced the contemporary 'POMP.' All the interviewees cited in this 
chapter strenuously denied that the Party ever gave up Scotland as a hostile lost cause in the 
1980s and 1990s. However, if the leadership was permeated with a belief that Scottish society's 
structure was inevitably changing against their favour, it seems likely that they would have put 
more effort into securing territories more suited to their outlook; such as the new working class 
Conservative voters of the South East of England. 
154 Davies, A. J.: "We the Nation. The Conservative Party and the Pursuit of Power", London, 
Little, Brown & Co., 1995, p145. 
ISS Dyer, 2001, p41. 
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As we shall see later in this literature review, many sources trace the decline of Scottish 
Conservatism almost exclusively to the Thatcher era. Given the evidence presented by Dyer and 
others, however, it is worth considering the proposition that the undoing of the Party in Scotland 
started before 1979. That the downward curve presented in Chart 4.5 takes no dramatic shifts in 
the latter years of the Twentieth Century suggests that the Party fared no better or worse than 
expected, in spite of the apparently radical impact of the politics of the New Right in Scotland. 
The long-term explanation of the Party's demise in Scotland raises many important 
points. There are two main deficiencies, however. Firstly, to conclude that most of the 
Conservatives' demise in Scotland was caused merely by the 'passage of time,157 seems to 
oversimplify what seems to have been a complex interaction of social and party political factors. 
Furthermore, to understate the effect of Thatcherism on Scotland may be a serious omission, as 
the rest of this thesis seeks to assess. During the 1980s, the Conservative vote in England rose, 
but the opposite occurred north of the border. With especial reference to this work, therefore, 
why the 'POMP' of the Thatcher-Major era was not able to arrest the demise of the Party in 
Scotland (or, indeed, how it may have compounded it) would seem to need more examination 
than the inevitable dialectic view offered by proponents ofthe long-term explanation. 
Short-Term Decline 
The other main argument in the literature on the Conservatives' electoral demise in 
Scotland places much more blame on the 'POMP' of the 1980s and 199Os. Of the specific 
156 Thatcher, 1993, p619. 
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policy areas that caused the Conservatives the most problems in Scotland in that era, many 
writers cite Devolution as having been most damaging. This is an interesting case, as the issue 
had been contentious well before 1979. Other frequently mentioned aspects of 1979-1997 
'POMP' that are identified as having lost the Conservatives votes in Scotland include the Poll 
Tax and the withdrawal of industrial subsidies. The specific policies and issues have all been 
studied in this chapter. It is the purpose of this section to establish the legitimacy of these 
matters in current explanations for the Conservatives' decline in Scotland. 
Despite Mrs Thatcher's protestations that she was always most keen on the preservation 
of the Unionl58, many Scottish Conservative MPs saw the unitary code being employed in the 
1980s as putting too much strain on the Union and consequently further damaging the 
Conservative vote in Scotlandl59. Therefore, whilst the decline of Unionism might be recognised 
as a long-term problem, it may have been a more immediate issue, the adoption of neoliberal 
unitary strategies, that administered a fatal blow to it. 'Territorial Management' is an 
appropriate collective term for these principles and policies when applied to Scotland. 
Territorial management is included in the 'POMP', when consideration is given as to how a 
policy might be received in the various regions when it is under formulation; and also in the 
'POS', when deciding how best to sell and/or defend a policy away from London. As we have 
seen in this chapter, Mrs Thatcher took heed of these territorial management dynamics when 
making policy. The major question for this section, therefore, is whether her apparently radical 
157 Dyer, 2001, p33. 
158 Thatcher, 1993, p624. 
159 Interview with David Seawright, 16.4.00. 
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territorial management strategy significantly damaged the Party's electoral chances north of the 
border? 
Writers from different ideological backgrounds all identify the Conservative territorial 
management strategy in the 1980s as having been a major contributor to problems in elections in 
Scotland. Anthony Birch presents an example of this view. He notes the differences in culture 
between England and Scotlandl60. This issue would seem to fit into the list of longer-term 
problems. However, many argue that it was the unitary approach adopted in the 1980s that 
finally turned Scottish national identity into an electoral problem for the Conservatives. Birch 
concludes that Governments of all parties in the era of post-war consensus best managed these 
differences in culture and society. As noted earlier, this was achieved by appealing to Scots' 
sense of British identity, yet still acceding to Scottish national pride by allowing some autonomy 
through Local Government and somewhat separate administration by the Scottish Office. 
Thereby, the unitary approach of the 1980s is condemned for its lack of regional sensitivity. 
The consensus of opinion in the literature is that traditional Unionist territorial 
management strategies, which allowed Scotland a fair degree of administrative autonomy and 
preferential economic support, helped significantly to preserve Conservative support north of the 
border. As we have seen in this chapter, when a stricter unitary code and New Right 
commitment to a market economy in the 1980s replaced this strategy, the national pride and 
financial fortunes of many Scottish voters were damaged. These downturns were blamed on the 
160 Birch, 1993, pp5-10, 81 & 269. 
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contemporary 'POMP' rather than a natural long-term decline. Electoral problems for the 
Conservatives at all levels in Scotland were an inevitable result. 
Examples of this analysis appear frequently in the works of writers who examine the 
nationalist perspective. James Kellas asserts that most Scots are very proud of their distinctive 
identityl61. When the economic fortunes of Scotland did not mirror those of England in the 
1980s, the removal of regional preferential economic treatment by the unitary administration in 
London was blamed and simultaneously labelled 'anti-Scottish.' This issue has been examined 
in greater depth in this chapter. James Mitchell also identifies regional insensitivity by the 
Conservatives of the 1980s as having been a recent and significant cause of their electoral 
demise north of the borderl62. 
Michael Lynch notes another apparent affront to Scottish national pride that seemed to 
lose the Conservatives votes in the 1980S163. As examined in Chapter 2 of this thesis, the 
presence of the Secretary of State for Scotland, Scottish Office and special Parliamentary 
arrangements for Scottish matters in London satisfied many voters north of the border that their 
interests were being adequately defended. The sense of quasi-autonomy afforded by these 
institutions and separate legal, educational and ecclesiastical and, importantly, Local 
Government, institutions in Scotland had been sufficient to satisfy residual Scottish national 
pride in the Unionist era. From the 1980s onwards, however, it seemed that St Andrew's House 
161 Kellas, 1989, p124. 
162 Mitchell, 1996, p48. 
163 Lynch, Michael: "Scotland A New History", London, Pimlico, 1991, p448. 
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could have been merely a conduit for Downing Street directivesl64 . Thus, another aspect of 
Thatcherite territorial management may indeed have caused immediate problems for the Party at 
the polls north of the border. Michael Keating also notes how the Scottish Office had an 
important role to play in the preservation of national pride even if its powers were only in fact 
nominal 165 . Its seeming downgrading in the Thatcher era was thus a potential threat to Scotland 
that was not going to be popular with the electorate there. 
Lindsay Paterson reports how, after the departure of Mrs Thatcher, the Conservatives in 
London realised how some of the centralising tendencies of the 1980s had harmed them in 
Scottish electionsl66. As we saw in Chapter 2 of this thesis, the Major administration tried to re-
assert some Scottish confidence through reverting to more traditional Unionist territorial 
management strategies. The promotion of the Scottish Office as the most able protector of 
Scottish interests in Chapter 4 of em 2225 - Scotland in the Union - a Partnership for Good 
(1993) is a good example of the re-vitalised Unionist rhetoric of this era. As we saw in Chart 
4.5, the Conservatives' vote went up in Scotland in 1992, when the Party's General Election 
campaign focused heavily on Unionist principles. 
As Brown et al note, it seemed that the Conservatives of the 1980s had become out of 
touch with what Scottish voters needed and wanted 167. In some ways, this lends credence to the 
164 Ibid. 
165 Keating, 1988, p129. 
166 Paterson, Lindsay: "The Autonomy of Modem Scotland", Edinburgh, Edinburgh University 
Press, 1994, P 171. 
167 Brown et ai, 1996, ppl05-106 & 1999, pS. 
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longer-term hypothesis of the Party demise in Scotland, as perhaps society had modernised north 
of the border to an extent that could not be accommodated by traditional Conservative territorial 
management strategies. However, we have already seen in this thesis how pragmatism and 
sceptical reductionism have dominated Conservative thinking. Therefore, that the Party did not 
adapt to contemporary circumstances in Scotland could be more of an error in judgement when 
formulating policies and territorial management strategies in the 1980s and 1990s than an 
unavoidable result of changes in society beyond their control. 
Some assessments of the 1980s and 1990s from the liberal and conservative traditions 
also see the 'POMP' of that era as having been a more important cause of the Conservatives' 
losses in Scotland than any long-term natural decline. Jonathan Bradbury168 and Jim Bulpitt169 
make reference to the change in Conservative territorial management strategy after 1979 as 
having contributed to the increased divergence in electoral success for the Party in Scotland 
compared to the rest of the United Kingdom. 
Bradbury, like Kellas, notes how it was inappropriate to try to extend the market-based 
policies of the New Right to the struggling economy of Scotland. These policies were unlikely 
to bring a 'feel good factor' to the Scottish electorate, as will be discussed with reference to the 
work of David Sanders below. Furthermore, their imposition was an unpopular reversal of the 
more traditional system of regionally sensitive economic preferences. Bulpitt makes the point 
that the centralisation preferred by the Thatcher administration was an affront to the voters and 
168 Bradbury. 1997. p74. 
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Conservative Party members in Scotland. The more traditional Unionist style of territorial 
management allowed for Party agents on the geographical periphery to be allowed considerable 
autonomy in running local affairs. Once this system was changed in favour of more central 
control, the Party elite in London was susceptible to accusations of governing in the style of an 
'absentee landlord.' That the Conservatives had few MPs north of the border at that time also 
brought their mandate to govern into question, as discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis. Thus, a 
contemporary decision in the 'POMP' of the 1980s brought electoral problems in Scotland for 
the Conservatives by awakening long-term animosities that had previously been ameliorated by 
traditional Unionist territorial management strategies. 
Whilst giving much attention to the longer-term arguments, Seawright and Curtice 
acknowledge that some of the troublesome issues readily associated with the Thatcher era did 
lose the Conservatives votes in Scotland170. One important conclusion of theirs is that if the 
Thatcher or Major Governments had been able to bring economic success to Scotland, then the 
Party would have fared much betterl71. This idea conforms to the opinions of David Sanders. 
He proposes that central Governments are best advised to dispense essential bitter economic 
policies early in the term of a Parliament172• Such unpalatable measures often cause 'mid-term 
blues', an important symptom of which can be the loss of Local Government representation in 
mid-term elections. Central administrations should then be able to recover for the next General 
Election by reflating the nation's economy and the citizens' sense of well being with some 
]69 Bulpitt in: Madgwick & Rose (eds.), 1982, p166. 
170 Seawright, & Curtice, 1995, p324. 
]7] Ibid, pp325-329. 
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astutely timed tax or interest rate cuts. Such a programme of policies, timed to bring the least 
electoral harm/most electoral benefits, would comply with Jim Bulpitt's notion of a successful 
'statecraft cycle' 173. 
As this thesis examines, such tactics seemed to do well for the Conservatives in affluent 
England. However, as they did not enjoy the benefits of the 1980s economic boom, not only did 
Scottish voters remove many Conservatives from Local Government in mid-term, but were also 
harder to persuade to vote for the Party at the next General Election. This thesis argues that the 
removal from office of many Scottish Conservative Councillors made the vital 'POS' functions 
of re-attaching dissident voters and winning new support very difficult north of the border. 
It is important to note at this point that opinions on the effect of Thatcherism on the 
Scottish electorate have changed somewhat with hindsight. As we saw in Chapter 2, when Mrs 
Thatcher came to power, she was generally perceived to be a radical atypical Party leader. With 
time, however, this opinion was widely reconstructed to the point of acknowledging that, in spite 
of some innovative policies, she was quite a typical pragmatic Conservative leader. The same 
sort of dynamic seems to appear in assessments of the effect of Thatcherism on Scotland. As 
events were transpiring, it appeared as though the Conservatives' 'POS' in Scotland was 
suffering significant damage due to the new Prime Minister. The electoral data presented in 
Chart 4.5 has caused some re-appraisal of this view and the re-invigoration of the long-term 
explanations reviewed above. However, the frequency with which the Party elite's economic 
172 Sanders, 1991, pp236 & 236n. 
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policies and apparent overly-English image are still cited as definite vote losers in the 1980s and 
1990s render this short-term view still highly relevant and worthy of examination. A brief 
review of post-Devolution opinions of Central-Local Government relations in Scotland now 
follows in order to assess further the importance of these dynamics in Conservative politics north 
of the border. 
Post Devolution Opinions 
Even though they lost all their MPs in Scotland in 1997, the Conservatives retained 8.8% 
of Councillors and won 19/129 seats in the new devolved Parliament. Therefore, a new aspect 
of Central-Local relations is emerging north of the border that is closely connected with the 
issues dealt with in this thesis. James Mitchell highlights the most important points174. He notes 
that Devolution, as formalised in the Scotland Act J 998, represents constitutional radicalism. 
However, there are two factors that seem to suggest that the actual changes effected might not be 
so momentous as first envisioned. 
We see throughout this thesis that over-centralisation has damaged Conservative 
electoral chances north of the border. As both the long and short-term explanations examined 
above suggest, appearing to be a distant 'absentee landlord' in London that seemed to want to 
draw more and more power to the centre ensured distrust for the Party on the geographical 
periphery. This problem originated almost immediately after the Act of Union in 1707. 
Nationalists have cited it as the prime root of their cause throughout the Twentieth Century. In 
173 Bulpitt, 1986, p21. 
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the short term, the problem seemed to be at its most acute during the Thatcher era, as witnessed 
by the Major administrations' efforts to pacify Scotland through the restoration of limited 
decentralisation. It would seem that Devolution should have fixed this problem. However, it is 
possible that the process may have just transferred power from one metropolitan centre (London) 
to another (Edinburgh). Thus, many Scottish citizens and local politicians may still feel 
somewhat disenfranchised. Somewhat ironically, such complaints are now beginning to 
emanate from Conservative communities who feel that the Labour Executive in Edinburgh is too 
distant and uncaringJ75• 
It is too early in the life of the Scottish Parliament to conclude on how these new 
problems are going to be solved. However, the second point made by Mitchell has definite 
resonance for this thesis. He notes that it is very important to assess whether reform of the 
informal institutions and relationships in Scottish politics will accompany the constitutional 
changes of Devolution176? With regard to this work, it will be very interesting to note how the 
role of Local Councillors in Scotland will be affected by the advent of the new Parliament and 
Executive. We are seeing how Councillors have played an important role north of the border in 
marshalling support for their parties and representing their communities against the 
Governments in London. It remains to be seen whether MSPs will replace Councillors as 
important local luminaries. An interesting dynamic herein is whether voters know whether to 
approach their Councillor or MSP with a particular problem? In this thesis, we see how such 
174 In: Hay, Colin (ed.): "British Politics Today", Polity Press, Cambridge, 2002, p237. 
17S Interview with Ross Harper, 6.8.01. 
176 In: Hay (ed.), 2002, p255. 
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contact has facilitated extended influence for Councillors in the past (especially with regard to 
Local Authority housing). If MSPs begin to poach such gratitude for help in matters that are not 
really in their remit, the balance of political influence in Scotland could change. As Appendices 
C and D to this chapter show, the separation of powers between Local Authorities and the 
Scottish Parliament is not always entirely clear. Therefore, the potential for voters going to the 
wrong representative is high. 
Similarly, it seems that the relationship between Local Authorities and the Executive has 
yet to stabilise177. Edinburgh has almost certainly replaced London as the focus of political 
power in Scotland. The situation is still somewhat in flux. However, it seems that there is 
potential for significant encroachment of Councils' powers by Holyrood. Another interesting 
issue in this respect is the way in which the Scottish Parliament delegates functions and powers 
back to Local Authorities, as is its right. Whilst the MSPs may feel that they are reducing their 
own burden, it is interesting to consider the possibility that they might thereby also be 
surrendering political influence back to the Councillors. The Parliament does place many such 
burdens on Councils, such as responsibility for education. As much of the funding for these 
policies is 'ring fenced' by the Executive, significant control is thus exerted over the Local 
Authorities. This confirms the opinion expressed by Bennett et al that the Executive is 
beginning to be viewed with more suspicion by Local Councillors of all parties than is the 
I· . 1 ... 78 Par lament Itse I . 
177 Bennett, Michael, Fairley, John & McAteer, Mark: Devolution in Scotland: The impact on 
local government, on www.jrf.org.uk/knowledge/findings/govemment 
178 Ibid. 
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While relations between Scottish Local Government and the new Executive in Edinburgh 
are thus sometimes strained, they are still thought to be better than when Local Authorities north 
of the border had to deal with St. Andrew's House. It now seems that Edinburgh, rather than 
central Government in London, is the centre of administration. This improves the Executive's 
mandate and credibility, but does not completely remove all antagonism between the various 
levels of government; as witnessed by some frustration being felt by Scottish Local Authorities 
in their dealings with the newly-expanded Civil Service centred on Edinburgh. 
It cannot be argued that the institution of the new Parliament has made bureaucracy north 
of the border any more straightforward. As Bennett et al note, Scottish Local Authorities still 
have to deal with many different departments in Edinburgh179. Many of these departments seem 
to be of the opinion that Local Authorities are not always able to administer public services 
adequately. The counter argument put forward by the Executive and Civil Service in Scotland is 
that even though central control of service provision might thus have actually increased since 
Devolution, this was necessary if standards were to be maintained. This situation may even be 
more complicated than its predecessor; which saw the Scottish Office play a fairly all-
encompassing role. Nevertheless, Local Authorities in Scotland now have to interact with a new 
political centre. It will be interesting to see whether the Conservatives can use this new situation 
to their advantage. To conclude this literature review and establish where this thesis might fit 
into the canon, a summary of the long and short-term views of the Scottish Conservatives' 
decline follows. 
179 Ibid. 
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Summary 
The body of academic literature on the Conservative decline in Scotland that blames 
Thatcherite measures in the 'POMP' has contributed to the topics and associated interview 
questions that are addressed in this chapter. As we have seen, some of these measures were very 
unpopular in Scotland and lost the Party votes in General and Local Government Elections there. 
As this thesis seeks to demonstrate, the latter was especially harmful for the Conservatives' 
'POS' north of the border. Therefore, even though Scottish incompatibility with these policies 
may have been caused by long-term social structures north of the border, it was the policies, 
rather than the structures that could have been causing the Conservatives most problems at the 
polls in Scotland. Nonetheless, the evidence presented in Chart 4.5 is still most compelling. 
The Conservatives' demise in Scotland has been steady since 1955, with little statistical 
evidence that the Thatcher-Major era was any worse than expected. Therefore, there are two 
points that should be made to conclude this section and show how this thesis hopes to 
complement the existing body of literature. 
Firstly, it does seem clear that the Conservative decline in Scotland began before 1979 
and has been precipitated by society structural factors since the 1950s. This thesis seeks to 
promote the extra 'POS' importance of Conservative Local Councillors in this structure. 
However, even steady declines usually feature noteworthy points. Therefore, it is still worth 
studying the unpopular policies of the 1980s and 1990s. Thereby, it is possible to assess why 
and how the structure and attitudes of Scottish society did not allow the Conservatives' demise 
north of the border to be arrested or reversed by the 'POMP' that was popular elsewhere. There 
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have been many studies of the unpopularity of the Thatcherite 'POMP.' This thesis hopes to 
compliment this canon by highlighting some currently undervalued 'side effects' of these 
policies and the nature of the society into which they were introduced. If the hypothesis can be 
adequately supported, the effects of the 'POMP' in the 1980s and 1990s on Conservative Local 
Government representation in Scotland should acquire more significance. If it was indeed very 
difficult for the Party to recover in General Elections north of the border following Local 
Government Election losses, then more attention should be given to the aspects of the 'POMP' 
that caused mid-term protest votes and inspired Opposition party Councillors to mount concerted 
protests against the central Government. Furthermore, the nature of the Scottish political culture 
that renders Local Government representation so important north of the border should also 
assume more significance. 
Conclusion 
Having explored the 'POMP' based reasons for the Conservative demise in Scotland, we 
are finally left with the task of trying to identify which, if any, had the most disastrous effect on 
the Party's 'POST Furthermore, could any of the problems have been alleviated with more 
regionally sensitive 'POMP?' Constructing an empirical framework for the first question has not 
been straightforward. For example, how does one quantify the impact of Mrs Thatcher's 
personality on the Party's popUlarity? Opinion polls that have asked this question are prone to 
sampling error and can only extract subjective replies. Furthermore, we are still left with the 
question of whether this variable would have been considered to be so important if other, for 
example, economic, policies had been benefiting Scots as much as their English neighbours? 
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Nonetheless, consistent opinion poll data and the frequency with which this issue was raised by 
my interviewees supports the proposition that the Prime Minister's personality and image were 
very important factors in the build-up of antipathy towards the Conservatives in Scotland. 
Lord Lang put forward a plausible case that the Conservative demise in Scotland was 
mainly due to an accumulation of animosity towards the Party, rather than one specific policyl8o. 
The (%) opinion poll data in Table 4.6 seems to substantiate this point to a degree. The question 
before the respondents was 'Which of these do you think has been the most important reason for 
the Conservatives' decline in Scotland?' The top three possible answers in Table 4.6 help to put 
the examples in this chapter into better perspective. 
MOST IMPORTANT 2ad MOST IMPORTANT 
(0/0) (%t) 
The Conservatives are a mainly 31 22 
English party, which governs 
Scotland in England's interests 
The Conservatives are too much 29 24 
in favour of things like 
privatisation, private enterprise 
and market forces 
The Scottish economy has done 16 18 
badly under the Conservatives 
The Conservative are opposed to 8 16 
giving he Scots any form of seIf-
government 
None of these reasons 3 4 
Don't know 12 15 
4.6 - Source: Gallup Political & Economic Index. #429, May 1996, p8. 
ISO Interview, 27.3.01. 
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We can see that the Party's image in Scotland was still severely tarnished by the pro-English 
aura of Mrs Thatcher. What is perhaps more interesting, though, is that the second and third 
most popular replies could have been directly addressed through the 'POMP', and yet, were not. 
Mrs Thatcher did not seem to understand or engage in the territorial aspect of governing the UK. 
Her successor was resented less north of the border because he seemed to realise that Scottish 
esteem had to be protected. Examples of such sensitive 'POMP' included the holding of EU 
conferences in Edinburgh and the return of the Stone of Destiny. It seems that these measures 
came too late to save the Party in Scotlandl81 . 
Perhaps the Poll Tax is the most potent example of a specific Thatcherite policy causing 
problems in the Scottish 'POS.' This is because it added most to the Scots' perception that the 
Conservative elite was more concerned with the governance of England and did not have the 
interests of 'ordinary people' 182 at heart. The Tax also caused many Conservative Councillors to 
lose office and gave their Opposition replacements considerable material with which to attack 
the central Government. Mrs Thatcher's retrospective attempt to shift the blame onto the Scots 
who called for reformation of the domestic rating system and 'their' leaders such as Malcolm 
Rifkind seems merely to be a way of avoiding embarrassment I 83 • According to Gamble, it was 
181 Interview with William Paterson, 13.9.01. 
182 A phrase used frequently in appropriate Gallup polls; confirmed by Keith Harding -
Interview, 12.9.01. The Scottish Conservatives knew that this perception had to be changed, but 
that this would not be easy to do if the Government in London was keen to perpetuate the 
~licies that were causing the problems. 
83 As in: Thatcher. 1993. p652; Cole. John: "As It Seemed to Me. Political Memoirs". London, 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1995. p315 & Lloyd, T. 0.: "Empire. Welfare State. Europe. English 
History 1906-1992. 4th Ed .... Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993. pp512-513. 
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embarrassment that the Scottish Conservatives were feeling during the 1980s184. They were 
proud and determined to maintain their Unionist credentials. This linked them with the 
Conservatives in London. To all other Scots during the 1980s especially, this was a link that was 
far from desirable. 
It should be re-iterated here that many policies that formed the Thatcherite canon were 
pragmatic responses to economic problems, rather than dogmatic adherence to any particular 
philosophy. However, it seems rather clear that it was usually English economic problems that 
were being solved. Gamble asserted that the Thatcher administration never got to grips with the 
way in which the disparate coalition of Conservatives and Unionists in Scotland had to be held 
together; a task that required more 'politicking' than just facing the substantial economic 
problems of Scotland. The old style grandees of the Party were still influential in 1979. 
Therefore, the first step to be taken was to install some Thatcherites to positions of power in the 
Scottish Party. Michael Forsyth was one such placement. However, the potential problems for 
the 'POS' are obvious if the local leadership is looking askance at the central elite, whilst still 
caught in economic turmoiL For example, Mitchell mentioned that the Scottish elite realised 
that there was not much point in trying to take on the Labour Party in Scotland in the same way 
as Thatcherism had won the hearts (through the wallets) of 'Essex man.' 
184 Interview, 16.3.00. 
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Another problem with the Scottish Conservative leadership that was identified by 
Seawright and Mitchell was a sense of complacency that pervaded their thinkingl85 . The fact 
that Conservative strongholds in Scotland still needed defending was ignored. With Labour 
concentrating their efforts in Scotland as the only chance of success, such complacency was very 
dangerous. Most importantly, as Seawright and Lords Fraser and Lang noted, the Party members 
and Local Government representatives in Scotland did not feel inclined to work for a Party with 
a stagnant local leadership and seemingly uncaring distant elite in Londonl86. 
The aim of this chapter was to explore the strained relationship between London and 
Scotland in the 1980s and 1990s. A more specific objective was to assess the link between 
Conservative 'POMP' and 'pas' during this time. By virtue of the elite interview material 
utilised, extended perception of this dynamic may be derived~ as we have seen what the 
administrations perceived to be the problem. As noted, these perceptions were not always 
accurate. The 'POMP' was driven by a mixture of these perceptions and increasing levels of 
dogma. These policies proved to be incompatible with what was traditionally popular with the 
Scottish electorate. Furthermore, the seemingly excessive focus on satisfying English tax-paying 
voters meant that is hardly surprising that Conservative 'pas' was failing north of the border. 
Most importantly for this thesis, we have noted the extra strain put upon Conservative Local 
Councillors and Party members in Scotland. The succession of policies emanating from London 
was putting them in an increasingly untenable situation. The 'pas' consequences of this 
dynamic are key to the hypothesis in this work. 
185 Interviews, 13.4.00 & 8.6.00. 
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Through the course of this current chapter, we have examined some of the Governmental 
policies and attitudes that may have further soured their image in the eyes of many Scottish 
voters. Given this evident natural pre-disposition of the Scots against the Party, the Conservative 
administrations of the 1980s and 1990s would have had to have formulated some extremely 
popular measures in the 'POMP' in order to overcome this deficiency in the 'POS.' As we have 
seen with regard to housing policy, Labour Local Authorities in Scotland could undermine even 
such ostensibly popular measures. 
Previous studies of the policies mentioned above have all linked them with the 
Conservatives' electoral demise in Scotland through a basic function. That is to say, that voters 
were unlikely to support a party that they perceived to be anti-Scottish, culpable for the running 
down of heavy industry and instigators of the widely unpopular Poll Tax. However, I feel that a 
very damaging impact of these policies has been undervalued. This thesis seeks to emphasise 
that significant danger for General Elections was caused by the damage being done to 
Conservative Local Government representation and, consequently, organisation in Scotland. The 
contemporary 'POMP' was undermining an agency that was key to the Party's 'POS' north of 
the border. As we have seen, the Thatcherite 'Rolling Back the State' programme caused much 
friction with Local Government in Scotland. Chapter 5 will focus on this aspect of the 'POMP' 
to demonstrate how disaffected Local Authorities in Scotland could effectively undermine the 
Conservatives' 'POS' in their region. 
186 Interviews, 13.4.00,5.3.01 & 27.3.01. 
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Appendix A 
Conservative Inflexibility 1985-1991 
.  
O~-T--+-~--~--r--r--T--T--+-~--~--r--r--+-~ 
85 86 87 88 89 90 91 
-- A - B 
-- c D 
4.7 - Source: Gallup Political Index187. 
LEGEND: 
A = Agreement with the proposition that 'the Conservatives are too rigid and inflexible' 
B = " " 
c = " " 
D= " " 
" " 
" " 
" " 
'the Conservatives don't care what hardships 
their policies cause' 
'the Tories want to cut back too much on health, 
education and other services' 
'causing unemployment to rise is not an acceptable 
way to deal with inflation' 
187 Gallup Political Index: Number 296, April 1985, p7, #300, August 1985, p7, #302, October 
1985, pIO, #305, January 1986, p8, #308, April 1986, p8, #311, July 1986, p7, #314, October 
1986, p9, #317, January 1987, p7, #320, April 1987, plO, #326, October 1987, p9, #338, October 
1988, p8, #344, April 1989, plO, #310, September 1989, p9, #361, September 1990, p8 & #374, 
October 1991, p33. 
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Two interesting points from this analysis are that, as with the propositions about Mrs 
Thatcher's image, the questions have been generated by estimations of contemporary public 
feelings~ and that the position seemed to be considerably ameliorated when Mr Major took 
office. Rather than the harsh characteristics ascribed to his predecessor, the new Prime Minister 
was initially seen to be more 'caring' and concerned for the country as a whole. The opinion 
that he was more likely to listen to reason was also more noticeablel88. However, Mr Major's 
caution was soon being interpreted as indecisiveness and, as the state of the economy worsened 
in the mid 1990s, his personal qualities were being called into question more and more. Most 
notable in all this data is that the Party seemed to make no effort to change its 'POMP' in spite 
of consistent warnings from the electorate. 
188 Gallup Political & Economic Index, #365, January 1991, p8 onwards. 
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* 
AppendixB 
Correlation Between Levels o/Government Subsidies and Unemployment in 
the British Regions 
Region n. Pearson Sig. (2-tailed) 
Correladon 
Scotland 16 0.712 *** 0.002 
North 15 0.458 0.86 
North West 15 0.614 * 0.15 
East Midlands 15 0.237 0.395 
West Midlands 15 -0.726 * 0.011 
South West 15 -0.38 0.893 
Wales 15 0.366 0.179 
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
4.8 - Datafor Calculations from: Annual Abstract o(Statistics, 1997, p133 and 
Regional Trends, 1990, p182; 1992, p145 & 2000, p177. 
Table 4.8 demonstrates how dependent Scotland was on central Government subsidies 
for its economic well being by supporting the proposition that Scotland was the only region in 
Britain that had such significant dependence on money from the central Government. 
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Appendix C: Local Council Functions 
The following list has been drawn from the current Stirling Council website 
(www.stirling.gov.uk). It demonstrates well what a wide range of issues still come under the 
prerogative of Local Government in Scotland. The list is not exhaustive. However, when it is 
taken in conjunction with the new powers of MSPs, this information is useful in assessing who 
will go on to play the most influential role in the lives of Scottish voters. Perhaps the issues in 
the 'Services' section afford Local Authorities the most contact and consequent influence with 
their constituents. It should also be noted that the Council undertakes partnerships with other 
agencies to formulate 'joined up Government.' Issues such as healthcare and policing are 
included in these schemes. 
Council: Local Elections, Council Tax and jobs for the local community . 
••• Services ••• Waste management (reduction of waste, re-use, recycle, home composting, 
refuse collection), planning (schedule, building control, local plan, structure plan etc.), housing 
(repairs, rents and allocations), care (aftercare, home helps, childcare, creches), libraries and 
schools. 
Business: Advice, co-ordination and licensing. 
Leisure: Sports centres and playing fields. 
Tourism: Local places of interest, monuments etc. 
Community: Various interest groups, community centres and halls. 
Family Life: Adoption, marriage and bereavement. 
Travel: Pavements, road signs, safety and some public transportation (buses, in particular). 
Animals: dog shelter, strays, pest control, fouling etc. 
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Appendix D: Powers of the Scottish Parliament 
The Scottish Parliament's Public Infonnation Service has produced a document called 
You and Your MSPs. In it, the devolved matters that come under the jurisdiction of the 
Parliament are listed thus: 
- health 
- education and training 
- local government 
- social work 
housing 
- planning 
- tourism, economic development and 
financial assistance to industry 
- some aspects of transport, including the 
Scottish road network, bus policy and ports 
and harbours 
law and home affairs, including most 
aspects of criminal and civil law, the 
prosecution system and the courts 
- Police and Fire Services 
- environment 
- natural and built heritage 
- agriculture, forestry and fishing 
- sport and the arts 
- statistics, public registers and records 
As can be seen, the Parliament is claiming several important issues that have usually 
been administered by Local Government. In many instances, Councils still seem to believe that 
they are in charge (for example, housing and education). Close examination of the Scotland Act 
1998 and subsequent Local Government legislation usually reveals which level of government 
has prerogative over certain issues. It is unlikely that many citizens would do this when in need 
of help. Therefore, the chances of voters going to the wrong level are high. It will therefore be 
interesting to see whether party political allegiances could be affected by MSPs 'poaching' work 
and subsequent voters' gratitude from Local Councillors. 
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5. Metropolitan-Peripheral Governmental 
Relations 1979-1997: 'Rolling Back the State' 
Introduction 
In Chapter 3, we saw how the Conservative central Governments in the 1980s sought to 
court the votes of new homeowners. The 'Right to Buy' scheme achieved this goal to a 
significant degree in England, but was not so successful north of the border. Traditionally 
accepted reasons for why this might have been the case were dealt with in Chapter 4. A new 
dimension of the dynamic has also begun to emerge. This thesis seeks to emphasise the role of 
Local Government in Scotland in the demise of the Conservative Party in General Elections 
there. This chapter will, with the housing issue as a primary example, assess how successive 
Conservative central Governments liaised with, and, very importantly, controlled and dictated to, 
Local Authorities north of the border. 
A vital aspect of the Conservatives' 'POMP' was its re-structuring of the, mainly 
financial, relationship between the central Government and Local Authorities. Along with 
inflation and recession, the Conservative elite saw Local Authority spending as a huge problem 
in the early 1980s l . Key motivations for the Conservatives' policies in the 1980s were to 
increase Local Government accountability and to reduce the financial burden on central 
1 Riddell, 1985, p43 & Tony Travers in: Stewart, John & Stoker, Gerry (eds.): "Local 
Government in the 199Os", Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1995, p12. 
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Government2. The potential benefits for the Party's 'POS' were twofold. Firstly, it was hoped 
that the electorate would associate more efficient and, thus, cheaper, local services with central 
Government initiatives~ and vote accordingly in subsequent General Elections3. Secondly, if 
somewhat belatedly, it was hoped that this effect would extend to Local Government elections. 
This is vital for this thesis, as it demonstrates recognition on the part of the metropolitan elite that 
having substantial numbers of Conservatives in office at the Local Authority level would make 
the implementation of 'POMP' measures somewhat smoother4. It seems, however, that the 
Conservative Leadership did not attend to the matter early enough. Furthermore, we must assess 
the possibility that, by virtue of the cuts in Local Government funding and power inherent to the 
'Rolling Back the State' programme, the central Government inspired Opposition-controlled 
Local Authorities to organise concerted campaigns against the Conservatives. 
It is important to note that the Whitehall departments who need to liaise most closely 
with Local Government are the Scottish and Welsh Offices and the Department of the 
Environment. These departments manage the interface between national Government policy 
and, through the policy-implementing agencies of Local Government, the daily lives of citizens5. 
This locus could be considered to be the juncture between high and low politics. This thesis 
seeks to investigate the proposition that it was because they failed to successfully manage this 
dynamic in Scotland that the Conservatives' 'POS' failed north of the border. That is to say, by 
2 Riddell, 1985, p43; Tony Travers in: Stewart & Stoker (eds.) 1995, p12 & Thatcher, 1993, 
~18. 
Interview with Viscount Younger, 14.2.01. 
4 Interview with Keith Harding, 12.9.01. 
5 Interview with Martin Perry, 24.8.01. 
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failing to maintain adequate representation in, and workable relations with, Local Government in 
Scotland, the Conservative elite was putting their General Election chances there in jeopardy. 
In order to establish the nature of the relationship between central and Local Government 
in Scotland, the main theme of this chapter is analysis of measures taken and statutory powers 
used by Conservative central Governments to exert control over Local Authorities. Within this 
theme, the issues of funding and spending control are key. After introductory sections on each of 
these, the chapter assesses how the various metropolitan strategies impacted on Local 
Government in Scotland. Therefore, there are sections on the funding of Council Housing and 
how 'Rolling Back the State' was perpetuated in the 1980s and 1 990s. The following section 
begins the assessment of why Opposition-controlled Local Authorities in Scotland may have 
been inclined to rally concerted support against the Conservatives. 
Metropolitan Government Control of Local Authorities 
The metropolitan Conservative elite was keen to reduce Local Government spending~ 
thus hoping to gain votes in Local Government and General Elections through the 'POMP' and 
to minimise the funds available for self-promoting schemes devised by Labour Local 
Authorities6. The key tenets of the Conservative strategy were to weaken the Trade Unions' 
influence in Local Government and increase accountability of Local Authorities to the 
'consumers', the tax-paying voters. The major tactics included stricter spending and income 
controls for Local Authorities, such as rate capping in the Local Government and Planning 
6 Interview with Viscount Younger, 14.2.01 & Thatcher, 1993, p6Sl. This constituted an attack 
on the 'New Urban Left' - Rhodes, 1988, p191. 
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(Scotland) Act, 1982 and subsidy cuts 7. Cuts in central subsidies and other perceived regionally 
insensitive pieces of 'POMP', such as the withdrawal of financial help for the Gartcosh steel 
plant, caused Scottish Local Authorities to boycott meetings with the central Government in the 
mid-I 980s8. However, it seems that this demonstration of dissidence did nothing to change the 
metropolitan Government's proposed policy course. The imbalance of power between the two 
levels of government ensured that there was often little that Local Authorities could do to 
overturn central policy decisions9. Therefore, peripheral dissidence, if it was to make gains for 
Opposition parties in the' POS' would have to come in less direct fonns. 
Further friction with Local Government was caused in 1985 by the abolition of urban and 
Metropolitan Councils that the Conservative elite felt constituted significant opposition to their 
'POMP. ' Another important aspect of this strategy was the privatisation and sub-contracting of 
services that had been expensive for mtepayers lO• It should be noted that, at least initially, many 
Councils were able to retain the power of service provision, with the attendant funding, by 
keeping the relevant contracts 'in house' 11. This is an example of the methods that Local 
Authorities devised to circumvent the new central controls that were being imposed. 
We have seen in Chapter 2, with regard to the Conservative Leadership, how the power 
of appointment is very important when collaboration is desired. Up until the mid-1970s, central 
Government had the power to appoint senior members of Local Authorities. However, 
7 Rhodes, 1988, p278. 
8 Times, 6.9.85, p2. 
9 Interview with Keith Harding, 12.9.0l. 
10 Pickvance in: Pickvance & Preteceille (eds.), 1991, pp69-72. 
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especially after the Local Government Act 1972, this gift was substantially diminished12• 
Nonetheless, central Government still retains important legislative power over Local Authorities. 
A significant part of Local Government's remit is to administer and implement Westminster 
statutes. Therefore, Local Authorities can be forced to implement policies with which they may 
have substantial disagreement. With regard to Labour Councils in Scotland, having to carry out 
Poll Tax collection was the most potent example of such a disagreeable policyl3. 
Local Authorities may seek some autonomy in the passing of Bye-Laws or Private 
statutes applicable only to their jurisdictions. However, central control over these mechanisms is 
considerable, given that the Secretary of State needs to confirm all Bye-Laws and the increasing 
difficulty of passing any Private Bill through Westminster 1 4. It should be remembered that 
central Government has no statutory power to directly effect the actions of Local Authorities. A 
Government in Westminster can only challenge a Local Authority in the same way as a private 
citizen~ that is to say by appealing through the judicial system that a Council is acting ultra vires 
if it refuses to carry out a statutory obligation or goes beyond its remit. Nonetheless, central 
Governmental control of the offices of the Attorney General in England and Lord Advocate in 
Scotland usually means that such appeals can be expedited quickly and successfullyl5. 
11 Kevin Doogan in: Stoker (ed.), 1999, p76. 
12 Prophet, John: "The Councillor. 11th Ed.", Crayford, Shaw & Sons, 1997, p22. 
13 Interview with Lord MacKay of Ardbrecknish, 25.1.01 + Stirling Councillor Survey (Lab), 
Winter 2001-2002. 
14 Prophet, 1997, p29. 
15 Ibid, p30. 
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It is interesting to note that, whilst the Thatcherite refonns were very unpopular on the 
Local Government level, there were hardly any substantial effective protests. Even in Scotland, 
where the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities might have been expected to provide some 
sort of cohesion, there was never enough unity of spirit or action to cause the metropolitan 
Government any significant trouble16. COSLA was only seen to be a unifying force and 
effective in negotiations with central Government over 'minor local' issues such as Rate Support 
Grants up to 197917. The only protests that had any delaying effect on the 'POMP' were due to 
individual bargaining between specific Scottish Local Authorities and the Scottish Office18• 
Rhodes also makes the important point that the dis-aggregation of Scottish Local Authorities 
may have weakened their bargaining positions, but also concurrently threatened central 
autonomy~ a threat that the Conservatives tried to counter by retaining ideas of a dual polity 
through the Scottish Office. The most powerful force that dissuaded Scottish Local Authorities 
from uniting more often in concerted opposition to the metropolitan administration was the 
imbalance of power between the two levels of government. It was often the case that less well-
off Labour-controlled Councils in Scotland may have opposed the contemporary 'POMP' in 
principle, but could not countenance punitive central subsidy cuts that would be brought down 
on them should they step outside their statutory regulations 19. The next section introduces this 
powerful form of central control before more specific examples are sought from the housing 
issue. 
16 Interview with Keith Harding, 12.9.01 & Gerry Stoker in: Stoker (ed.), 1999, pI. 
17 Rhodes, 1988, p275. 
18 Ibid, p281. 
19 Stirling Councillor Survey (Lab), Winter 2001-2002. 
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Local Authority Funding Controls 
Stephen Lee writes that: 
"Since the mid 1970s the combined effects of escalating public expenditure, 
public sector deficits and shifting political preferences has imposed an ever 
increasing pressure to restrain Local Authority spending,,20. 
An important feature to note here is that this issue was being raised before the Conservatives 
came to power in 197921 . Thus, further credence is given to the argument that Thatcherism was 
more of a typical Conservative reaction to contemporary problems, rather than a radical new 
ideology. One of the most obvious methods of controlling the actions of Local Authorities is 
through the levels of central subsidy. Subsidy cuts would always be a particularly awkward 
subject in Scotland, given their more prosperous position compared to England under the Barnett 
Formula and per capita spendini2. Nevertheless, measures to this effect were being taken from 
the mid-1970s. Such steps included counting Local Authority spending as part of total Scottish 
expenditure by St. Andrew's House and an absolute refusal to allow Local Authorities to go over 
budget; they would have to lose future grant money and cut services if they did23. These cuts, 
implemented by Labour, reduced Local Authority expenditure financed by the centre by 7.5%24. 
As we shall see in this chapter's analysis of central-peripheral Government relations over 
housing provision, one of the main issues being addressed by the Conservative metropolitan elite 
20 Lee, 1995, p162. 
21 Daily Telegrapb. 5.3.79, p8 &, 19.3.79, p8. 
22 Interviews with Lords Sanderson, 30.11.00, Mackay of Clashfern, 22.1.01 &, Fraser, 5.3.01 + 
Cm 2225 "Scotland in the Union", 1993, §2.11, p14. 
23 Lee 1995, p163. 
24 Ibid. 
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was the funding of local socialist programmes with central subsidies25 . The problem was that 
Mrs Thatcher never knew when to 'draw stumps' and withdraw from a situation that was making 
the Party more unpopular with the voters26. Here, the connection between the 'POMP' and 
losses at the polls was somewhat indirect, but nonetheless important. In this case, rather than the 
'POMP' being directly unpopular with the electorate, it was Local Government representatives 
in Scotland who wished to complain. As this thesis demonstrates, such concerted opposition by 
this group had a considerable effect on the 'POS.' Once Local Authorities do have their funding, 
the next important source of central control is to impose restrictions on how it can be spent. 
Again, this topic is briefly examined now to clarify subsequent examples from the housing issue. 
Local Authority Spending Controls 
Since the end of the Nineteenth Century, Local Government has lost the Common Law 
right to conduct its affairs and spending as it sees fir7. Mainly due to the large amounts of 
expenditure and subsidy involved, the Westminster Parliament now has to authorise most of the 
actions of Local Government. Local Authorities have a statutory right to receive funding, but 
increasing central controls are being placed on how this money can be spent, and on which 
particular projects. This increased central interference has been a cause of much antagonism 
amongst local politicians28, and has increased their desire to rally voters against the central 
25 Cole, 1995, p315. 
26 Interviews with Lord Sanderson, 30.11.00, David McLetchie, 19.1.01, Lord Mackay of 
Clashfem, 22.1.01 & Viscount Younger, 14.2.01 + Young, Hugo: "One of Us - Final Edition", 
London, Macmillan, 1991, p622. 
27 Prophet, 1997, p21. 
28 Interview with Martin Perry, 24.8.01 + Stirling Councillor Survey (Lab), Winter 2001-2002. 
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administration29. Therefore, the next task is to introduce how central Government in the 1980s 
and 1990s sought to exert its control over Local Authority spending in Scotland in order to 
understand how this dynamic may have exacerbated the Conservatives' General electoral 
problems north of the border. 
Mitchell identifies the housing policies of the early 1980s as an ideal test ground for 
Conservative anti-Local Authority spending ploys30. These tactics for limiting Local Authority 
spending continued through the 1980s, even after the perceived overspending seemed to have 
finished31 . Lynch goes on to assert that the issue of Local Authority financial regulation was the 
cause of most Anglo-Scottish tension in the 1980s. The central Government was furthering a 
programme to promote uniformity around Local Governmene2• Kellas claims that this re-
assertion of central power effectively combated secessionist nationalism as wen33• A very 
definite message about the supremacy of Westminster was being sent out. Because of this, 
Labour used nationalist arguments in its rhetoric in Scotland34. This split the nationalist vote. 
However, the Conservatives still did not manage to win over disenchanted Labour voters who 
were not nationalists. They could find a more natural home with the Libemls35. The four party 
system in Scotland, during times when the SNP has electoral credibility, affects the 
Conservatives' prospects significantly, as they have to fight with an extra enemy for a share of 
29 Interviews with Lord Sanderson, 30.11.00 & Viscount Younger, 14.2.01. 
30 Mitchell, 1990, p116. 
31 Lynch, 1991, p448. 
32 Grey, 1994, pSI & Stoker, 1995, pl02. 
33 Kellas, James: "The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity - 2nd Ed.", Basingstoke, Macmillan, 
1995,pl0S. . 
34 Interview with Lord Strathclyde, S.II.00. 
35 Interview with David McLetchie, 19.1.01. 
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the 40% of the electorate who are not committed Labour voters36. As we have seen, the agents 
and policies of Local Government in Scotland have the potential to affect the way that their 
constituents make their choices in General Elections. Given that many Local Authorities were in 
Labour hands during the 1980s and 1990s in Scotland, it would therefore have seemed prudent 
for the Conservative administrations in London not to cause too much friction with these 
Councils for fear of inciting well-organised opposition in subsequent General Elections. 
In the same way as the Poll Tax, Scotland can be seen as a 'guinea pig' for new central 
Government policies in the area of Local Government spending control. For example, the 
Secretary of State for Scotland could determine what constituted 'excessive and unreasonable' 
spending by a Local Authority long before this power was given to the Department of the 
Environment in England until 198537. As Secretary of State for Scotland, George Younger took 
the first punitive measures against Local Authorities in 1981 when he withheld £45m from 
Lothian and £1.2m from Stirling38• The then Minister of State for Local Government, Tom 
King, was quoted as saying that if Local Authorities were not prepared to meet the new spending 
targets, Local Government in Britain was finished in its present form39• Local Authorities were 
going to have to re-assess their current practices in two major areas: those of spending of central 
subsidies and staffing levels40• 
36 Ibid + Interview with Lord MacKay of Ardbrecknish, 25.1.01. 
37 Rhodes, 1988, p279. 
38 Times, 22.7.81, p2. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Times Education Scottish Supplement 11.7.80, pI + Times, 5.6.81, p4 & 31.8.82, p3. 
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As service provision forms the core of Local Government's remit, funding has become a 
key issue. Thereby, central Government has found a way to exert increasing amounts of control 
over Local Authorities. As the following examination of funding in the Scottish housing system 
demonstrates, the Conservative Governments of the 1980s and 1990s reformed many of the 
sources of funding and accountability/spending control structures of Local Government. 
Thereby, they attempted to win the votes of individuals who began to enjoy less of a tax burden 
and, simultaneously, put closer controls on the self-promoting activities of Local Authorities. 
The Funding of Local Authority Housing 
Within this thesis' examination of the 1980 Housing Act in Chapter 3, we saw how the 
'Right to Buy' scheme was implemented by the metropolitan Government in order to swell the 
'property-owning democracy' and reduce the influence of Local Government on voters' lives. 
However, there was another purpose for that, and subsequent, legislation in the housing sphere. 
A higher degree of central Government control was being placed upon Local Authorities. Their 
finances, which may have been used to pay for socialist/'loony left' programmes41 , were being 
tightened. This policy is a good example of the way in which the Prime Minister was always 
looking for solutions to perceived problems through any means available. 
Housing subsidies form a considerable proportion of central subsidies to Local 
Government, and were dealt with in VI, I, 97 (1) (a-c) of the Housing Act 1980. The subsidies 
were to be calculated by the formula: 
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Base Amount + Housing Costs Differential - Local Contribution Differential. 
The 'Base Amount' was the previous year's subsidy. HCD was defined as the difference from 
the previous year in 'reasonable' expenditure, mainly for repairs. It is significant that the 
metropolitan Government had the power to decide what constituted 'reasonable' levels of 
spending~ as such estimations could easily have been tailored to suit their budgets. LCD was the 
difference in income to a Local Authority's Housing Revenue Account~ mainly accounted for by 
rent payments, but - very importantly - also to include moneys from the sale of their properties 
under the 'Right to Buy' scheme. If Local Authorities wanted to receive a decent subsidy, 
therefore, they could not put up their rents too much. Thus, the Thatcher Government would 
have appeared to be the friend of the tenant; a very beneficial image in the sphere of' POS' , and 
simultaneously been able to closely manage the finances of socialist Local Authorities42 . 
The impact of this legislation was demonstrated by the way in which the metropolitan 
Government had to defend it before Parliament. Malcolm Rifkind realised that Scottish Local 
Authorities were deeply unhappy with linking capital allocation with rent levels, but insisted that 
the Government was convinced of the need to do so for the national interest43• That these 
changes marked the first substantial amendments to the HRA system since 1919 demonstrates 
41 Tony Travers in: Stewart & Stoker (eds.), 1995. p13. 
42 As far as the Government was concerned, their housing policy was very successful in 
achieving its main aim of containing socialist opposition manifested in Local Authorities -
Interview with Lord Mackay ofClashfern, 22.1.01 + Brown et 01, 1996, pl06. 
43 HC112, 1980-1981, p18. 
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how vigorous, and, thus, susceptible to criticism, the Thatcherite agenda for Local Government 
Similarly, central Government was in a strong position to manage what Local Authorities 
did with the money that they eventually received. If, again, a Council wanted to continue to 
receive decent levels of central subsidy, it would have to spend the money on housing to 
maximise its HCD. Not only would this ensure that Local Authority housing stock would be in 
good condition for re-sale, but also continue to divert funds from socialist programmes. Lee 
asserts that Local Authorities tried to respond to these measures with 'creative accounting' 
practices, increased charges on housing services and increased rents. These measures were 
justified as protection against Domestic Rate rises due to falling central subsidies4s• However, as 
has been discussed, the central Government had accounted for such attempts in the LCD sections 
of the legislation. I, I, 8, (1) of the Tenants' Rights, Etc. (Scotland) Act 1980 reduced the number 
of restrictions on Local Authorities who wished to sell their properties. In an age of increased 
central control, this clause may seem out of character. However, it should be remembered that 
any extra income that Local Authorities generated from the sale of their properties would reduce 
the level of central subsidy that they could claim, as their Housing Revenue Accounts would be 
more self-financing. 
The latter parts of the Housing Act 1980 returned to the twin Thatcherite agendas of 
selling Council Houses and re-structuring the central-local financial relationship. V, I, 90 of the 
44 Kenneth Spencer in: Stewart & Stoker (eds.), 1995, p156. 
45 Lee, 1995, p163. 
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Act asserted that Local Authorities were still obliged to consider the quality of their housing 
stock. The central Government was thus keen maximise profits from the sale of existing stock in 
order to keep subsidy costs down. VI, I, 102 (1) (a) of the Housing Act 1980 confirmed this 
central desire to retain as much power as possible through the subsidy issue. The Secretary of 
State was to retain the right to recoup any subsidy money that he or she felt was not being used 
for the intended purpose. According to this section, Local Authorities would have even less 
scope to use housing moneys for their own purposes than was engendered by the HeD clause in 
VI, 1,97 (1) (a-c). 
VI, I, 117 (1) & (2) of the Housing Act 1980 made provision for Rent Allowances to rise 
from 75% to 90%. Rate Fund Contributions were to fall from 25% to 10%. Rate Capping, 
another instrument of central control, was to appear in the Local Government (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1981, the Local Government and Planning (Scotland) Act 1982 and 
the Rating and Valuation (Amendment) (Scotland) Act 1984. High Local Authority spending 
was a key target for Conservative policy in the early 1980s. Their manifesto of 1983 promises to 
abolish Metropolitan Councils (which was done in 1985) and continue with Rate Capping46• 
Again, this is an example of the central Government managing to appeal to the electorate 
at large, whilst concurrently exerting considerable levels of tight financial control on Local 
Government. Even though Rent Allowances were technically being put up, with consequent 
benefits to the central Government's image with tenant voters, Local Authorities could not really 
take advantage of too much of this extra funding. To do so would involve raising the absolute 
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level of their rents. This would be disastrous with Local Government Elections being imminent. 
Similarly, the parallel cut in Rate Allowance precluded another avenue for Labour Councils to 
maximise central funding for their political projects. They already knew that rent increases were 
out of the question, even if central funding was available. Now, they could not raise rates either, 
as sufficient central funding to alleviate the effect on local electors was reduced. 
A small loophole for Local Authorities appeared to open in IX. I, 143 (2) of the 1980 
Housing Act. Here, permission was given to transfer Housing Revenue Account money into the 
General Rate Fund. This could have been a method for Local Authorities to keep Rates down, 
and thus appear to be more voter-friendly. Given that marginal constituencies or wards would 
necessarily contain more (usually) aftluent Conservative voters who would be likely to be paying 
quite high Rates, being able to keep their bills small would benefit incumbent Labour or Liberal 
Councils. However, the loophole closed quickly due to the LCD clause of VI, I, 97 (1) (a-c) of 
the Housing Act 1980, as detailed above. With regard to this issue, it should be noted that the 
Poll Tax was inspired by Mrs Thatcher's opposition to the inequitable Rating system and its 
effect on aftluent Conservative voters, which was particularly notable in Scotland, from 1974 
onwards47. When examining the 'POS' in Scotland, therefore, the role of middle class 
Conservative voters should not be overlooke~. Firstly, the Poll Tax was initiated on their 
behalf. Secondly, their defection to nationalist inclinations in the 1990s demonstrates how 
Conservative 'POMP' measures from London were unpopular with Scots as a whole. However, 
46 In: Dale (ed.),2000, p304. 
47 Interviews with James Mitchell, 8.6.00, Lord Sanderson, 30.11.00, Lord Mackay of Clashfem, 
22.01.01 & Lord MacKay of Ardbrecknish, 25.01.01. 
48 Paterson, 1994, p171 + interviews with David McLetchie, 19.1.01 & Lord MacKay of 
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it should be remembered that property-owning middle class status was never as prevalent in 
Scotland as in England49. 
The final section of the 1980 Act with relevant impact on this thesis concerned the repair 
of Local Authority housing. IX. I, 134, (2) established a Housing Repairs Account System. IX. 
I, 149 gave Local Authorities the right to require tenants to effect repairs on their homes. 
Especially by 1987, this emphasis on repair rather than build anew was at the forefront of the 
Conservative housing provision programme50. Whilst these may seem to form part of a 
traditional housing policy agenda, the resulting effects are still very much part of the New Right 
programme of property-ownership extension and Local Government control. If tenants are 
forced to make repairs, they will be more likely to want to buy their property, rather than let the 
landlord reap the benefits of their work. Furthermore, the effected repairs would necessarily put 
up the market value of the properties. Thus, if they sold, the Local Authority's LCD would rise, 
consequently necessitating lower central Government subsidy, with consequent popular tax 
savings to the electorate at large51 • The period from 1979 was thus characterised by the central 
Government trying to place as many such financial curbs as possible on Local Authorities52• 
Ardbrecknish, 25.1.01. 
49 Finlay in: Francis & Zweiniger-Bargielowska (eds.), 1996, p122. 
50 Party manifesto 1987, in: Dale (ed.), 2000, p319. 
51 Local Government involvement in housing had started in the 1890s. Thereafter, central 
governments have had to find the difficult balance between service/subsidy provision and 
unpopular tax increases - Lee, 1995, p45. 
52 Marr, Andrew: "Ruling Britannia - The Failure and Future of British Democracy", London, 
Michael Joseph, 1995, p76. 
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The Housing Act 1980 has been identified as an important turning point in the Thatcherite 
programme for widening the Conservatives' support and a demonstration of how the new 
Government was seeking to make amendments to the existing relationship between core and 
periphery parts of the state53. A compelling argument is that Thatcherism was not an ideology, 
but a change in justification for new Conservative policies54. With regard to the issues in this 
chapter, it is important to note that, due to a fresh set of ideas being in place in Downing Street, 
core-periphery relations, as manifested in the Local Government housing issue, would be 
changing. Whilst the Housing Act 1980 is always remembered as a landmark in the course of 
extension of property-ownership, its effect on the finances of Local Government should not be 
overlooked. Given the hypothesis in this work, substantial changes in the central-Local 
Government relationship will always be of interest. If the hypothesis is correct, this IS 
particularly important in the case of Scottish Local Authorities. 
'Rolling Back the State' in Scotland 
Grey identifies a definite agenda in Thatcherite dealings with Local Government5S. A 
successful econom? was of most importance, closely followed by a desire for the state to be as 
free as possible from special interest demands (Trade Unions especially) in the light of the 
economic stagnation of the 1970s. The market was seen as superior to the state with regard to 
resource allocations7• These ideas were to inspire policies identified as 'Rolling Back the State.' 
53 Bulpitt in: Madgwick & Rose (eds.), 1982, p16S. 
S4 Evans & Taylor, 1996, p219. 
55 Grey, 1994, pS7. 
56 On this subject, Bulpitt writes: "Local Government bas taken the brunt of the Government's 
economy offensive", in: Madgwick & Rose (eds.), 1982, pl66. 
57 Stoker, 1999, p3. 
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As we have seen in this and earlier chapters, the metropolitan Governments' policies were 
designed due to the ideological beliefs of the New Right. That is to say, with a mind to reducing 
state interference in citizens' lives and promoting the apparent virtues of accountability and 
economic efficiency in the provision of essential services58. However, we also saw earlier how 
the Conservatives have always formulated their 'POMP' with a pragmatic view to holding office. 
Therefore, it was no coincidence that these ostensibly ideology-based policies effected tax cuts 
and increased freedom of choice for voters. The metropolitan Governments of the time planned 
that these changes in society would bring them votes. They were correct in this assumption with 
regard to affiuent England, where the citizens could take advantage of the new opportunities. 
The economic climate in Scotland was different, however. As they had less stake in the benefits 
of the 'POMP' and due to the extra influence of Local Government north of the border, the 
voters there were more susceptible to the manoeuvres of Labour-led Councils. 
Bulpitt notes how Local Authorities had been becoming increasingly powerful since the 
1960s59. Therefore, it is possible to appreciate the thinking behind Conservative housing policy. 
They were hoping to exert more control over Local Authorities through central subsidy cuts and 
increased accountability to local voters who, as property owners, would look for better and 
cheaper services60. Bulpitt asserts that events of the 1970s generated new levels of core-
periphery contact in the 1980861 . Failing economic efficiency led to central calls for closer Local 
Authority accounting, as demonstrated by the Housing Act 1980. One result of the perceived 
58 Bulpitt in: Madgwick & Rose (eds.), 1982, p167 & Cosgrove, Patrick: "Thatcher. The First 
Term", London, The Bodley Head, 1985, pS9. 
59 Bulpitt in: Madgwick & Rose (eds.), 1982, pl66. 
60 Interview with Lord Sanderson, 30.11.00. 
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increase in central interference was that ratepayers were becoming more politicised62• This 
effect was manifested in two ways at the opposite ends of the political spectrum in Scotland. 
Existing Conservatives there were very keen on the New Right ideals espoused by the 
Thatcherite administration63. Indeed, it was these voters that were to call for the re-evaluation of 
the Domestic Rating system that led to the introduction of the Community Charge64. On the left 
in Scotland, it was becoming apparent that the perceived 'bossy' authoritarian interventionist 
style of the new very English Prime Minister was adding more weight to arguments against 
Conservative rule from London65. The key dynamics to assess in this issue are the effects of the 
'POMP' on Scottish Local Authorities, and how these units of Local Government were able to 
marshal and cajole General Election opposition to the Conservatives as a result. 
As we saw in Chapter 3, Local Government has an enhanced role in Scottish society. 
Therefore, any metropolitan measures to disrupt this process are of interest. The Local Authority 
housing issue again provides a suitable example of such dynamics north of the border. A 
substantial amount of power was transferred from Local Government to Whitehall by I, I, 4, of 
the Tenants' Rights, Etc. (Scotland) Act 1980, whereby the Secretary of State could oversee and 
even amend housing sale conditions. I, I, 15 of the Act saw Local Authorities losing more 
powers; this time to Housing Associations, who were under the control of the Housing 
61 Bulpitt, 1983, p173. 
62 Ibid, p181. 
63 Interviews with Lord MacKay of Ardbrecknish, 25.1.01 & Viscount Younger, 14.2.01. 
64 Interviews with Andrew Gamble, 16.3.00, David Seawright, 13.4.00, Lord Sanderson, 
30.11.00, Lord MacKay of Ardbrecknish, 25.1.01 & Viscount Younger, 14.2.01 + Stirling 
Councillor Survey (Con), Winter 2001-2002. 
65 Interviews with Lord Sanderson, 30.11.00, David McLetchie, 19.1.01, Lord Mackay of 
Clashfern, 22.1.01 & Viscount Younger, 14.2.01 + Young, 1991, p622. 
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Corporation - thus granting the central Government a higher degree of control. This clause 
extended the range of projects that may qualify for Housing Association grants. II, I, 24 (1) of 
the Act required Local Authorities to pay departing tenants for any improvement work that they 
may have carried out on the property. Therefore, not only was there an incentive for tenants to 
take more pride in their dwellings, which was an essential component of making them want to 
join the property-owning classes, but the re-sale values of the dwellings would also rise, thus 
ultimately reducing the levels of central Government subsidy. Furthermore, the Government was 
once again narrowing the scope of how Local Authorities could spend their money. 
Seemingly, the central Government was still looking to perpetuate Local Authority 
renting towards the end of the Tenants' Rights, Etc. (Scotland) Act 1980. However, IV, I, 37 (2) 
(a-b) of this Act revealed their true agenda. This clause tightened London's control over Local 
Authority rents. Thus, the metropolitan Government could promote itself as the protector of 
tenants. However, just as important to the Conservatives was the increased ability to control 
how much funding Labour Councils could raise for their socialist schemes66. A final clause in 
the same vain was V, 1,66 (1) (a), which reduced the number of acceptable circumstances in 
which improvement grants could be made. Whilst this may have stifled a few attempts at 
upgrading (as promoted in n, I, 24 (1) of the same Act), it ensured that the Government could 
keep a check on the spending that they had to subsidise and that they only had to pay for work in 
constituencies where it would benefit them. So far, there seems to be little that Scottish voters 
could have objected to. Indeed, the tenants were being given more opportunities to take 
advantage of the 'Right to Buy' scheme than their English counterparts. Thus, Local 
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Government in Scotland may indeed have played an important role in preventing the 
Conservatives from benefiting in elections from this regionally sensitive piece of 'POMP. ' Such 
energetic campaigning on the part of Local Government in Scotland was invigorated by the 
contemporary 'POMP' pertaining to their powers and finances. 
The Conservatives added to their housing subsidy controls that were in the Housing Act 
1980 by decreeing that the Scottish Office could reduce central grants and even order Rate cuts 
where the metropolitan Government felt that Local Authority expenditure was 'unreasonable,67. 
Throughout the era in question, the Conservative Governments in London persistently strove for 
lower Local Government spending due to their ideology and quest for the votes of grateful 
taxpayers. Local Authorities were frequently warned against over-spending and over-staffing 
during the early Thatcher years68. The same message was still being issued towards the end of 
the Major era69. Towards the very end, £96m was going to be paid to the new Unitary Councils 
in Scotland to help with re-organisation70; and even £10m cash bonuses were being offered to 
Local Authorities with the lowest spending levels71 . Even though the punitive aspect of the 
central Government's strategy had disappeared, it seems that they were still trying to court votes 
by keeping taxes down. However, such amelioration was too late as the Party's reputation had 
been too severely damaged amongst Scottish Local Authorities and, consequently, with the 
voters there as well. Despite its failure to achieve the desired results in Scotland, however, 
66 Interview with Lord Sanderson, 30.11.00. 
67 Interview with Ross Harper, 6.8.01. 
68 Daily Telegraph. 19.3.79, p5, Times Educational Scottish Supplement 11.7.80, pI & Times, 
5.6.81, p4. 
69 Times Educational Scottish Supplement, 23.2.96, p3. 
70 A figure rejected as being inadequate - Times, 5.3.96, p2. 
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'Rolling Back the State' was not tempered after its implementation. We will examine how the 
programme was perpetuated now. This will demonstrate how insensitive 'POMP' allowed 
opposition Local Authorities in Scotland to benefit in the 'POS.' 
Perpetuation of 'Rolling Back the State' 
The Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980 was the next significant piece of 
legislation in the housingILocal Authority spending control question after the Housing Act 1980. 
Part V of this Act seemed to give more help to citizens at the lower end of the economic scale. 
V, I, 33 (1) ensured a system of Domestic Rate relief. Such a clause would usually induce 
Labour Councils to put up their Rates. They could take this revenue enhancing measure with 
little fear of a backlash from local voters, as the subsidies would take care of the extra burden. 
However, the Local Contribution Differential clause in the calculation for central subsidies was 
again to keep a check on Rate levels72. The metropolitan Government achieved a further double 
success with V, I, 33 (1) of the Act. This clause stipulated that owners of unoccupied properties 
were still liable to pay rates. Not only did this keep the values of Local Authorities' LCD high 
enough to reduce the need for central subsidies, with inherent tax burden~ it also looked like the 
Government was challenging Rackmanite landlords on behalf of the people. In Scotland, these 
landlords were very often the Local Council. The former benefit would have been more 
important to the metropolitan Government. The latter, however, would also have helped their 
levels of support. 
71 Times Educational Scottish Supplement, 21.2.97, pI. 
72 Central subsidies = Base Amount + Housing Costs Differential - Local Contribution 
Differential (Housing Act 1980 - VI, I, 97 (1) (a-c». As rates are included in the LCD, it was not 
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Part VI of the Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980 was concerned with 
central support for Local Government in the area of rates. VI, I, 48 (1) stated that the Secretary 
of State may reduce Rate Support Grants to Local Authorities if the uniform rate for the area in 
question was greater than the national uniform rate73. This was a further example of central 
Government reducing the ability of Local Authorities to charge high Rates to fund their own 
projects. Scottish Local Authorities sought to oppose this piece of 'POMP', as they had done 
over similar issues such as the re-organisation of Housing Benefie4• The Convention of Scottish 
Local Authorities endorsed such a plan. However, as we have already seen, it was very difficult 
for the various Local Authorities north of the border to engineer sufficient unity of purpose and 
endeavour to seriously challenge the metropolitan Government directly. Nonetheless, any 
resentment held by Local Authorities in Scotland against the metropolitan Government is 
important to note, as it seems to be the case that they could muster significant opposition in their 
communities at General Elections. 
The system for central support for rates was formalised in VI, I, 53 (1) (a-b) and VI, 1,54 
(1) (a) of the Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980. There, the following formula 
was setout: 
in the interests of Local Authorities to charge too much - Lee, 1995, p203 + Interview with Lord 
Sanderson, 30.11.00. 
73 The 'national uniform rate' being what the Secretary of State calculates that Local Authorities 
need to charge to cover their costs; thus giving a lot of power to the centre. 
74 Times, 6.7.82, p3 - reporting how George Younger had cut Stirling's RSG by £1.2m because 
he felt that the Council was overspending. 
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Domestic Rate Relief Grant + Block Grant = Rate Support Granl5• 
The question of central subsidy was continued in the Social Security and Housing 
Benefits Act 1982. There, Local Authorities and Housing Associations were obliged to 
institutionalise statutory Rate and rent rebate schemes for their tenants [II, I, 28 (1) (a)]. Whilst 
citizens were not to be allowed to use these moneys to fund mortgage payments, the policy was 
still consistent with one of the Government's other main goals. The Secretary of State was 
claiming a lot of power in deciding how much funding Local Authorities could receive. Indeed, 
deciding what an 'appropriate' level of funding actually was again to be left in the gift of the 
Secretary of State [Social Security and Housing Benefits Act 1982, II, I, 29 (2)]. Even though 
subsidies could be paid out for up to 90% of Local Government expenditure [II, I, 32 (3) (a)], 
central control and reduced costs were evident. Local Authorities could still not payout too 
much if they know that 10% of their bills would have to be self-financed. To exert further 
control on how Local Authorities were to use their finances, II, I, 34 (1) of the Act gave a 
formula for calculating how much of a Local Authority's Rate Fund Contribution (RFC) must be 
paid into their Housing Revenue Account (HRA). It was: 
RFC to be paid into HRA = (Iotal HRA Rebate + Costs) - Rent Rebate SubSidy paid into HRA 
Therefore, it would not be in the interests of Local Authorities to put up their rents too much, as 
such a measure would have increased the value of their 'Rent Rebate Subsidy.' Local 
75 In this equation, the 'Block Grant' equals 'Rate Support Grants' minus 'Domestic Rate Relief 
and 'Rate Support Grants' were not to include housing subsidies. 
272 
Authorities may have been inclined towards such a tactic, as it would not have cost them votes 
due to rent rebates being available to tenants. By 1985, COSLA saw fit to complain to 
Parliament about this system76• They did not complain too much about Housing Expenditure 
Limits imposed by the Secretary of State through HRA calculations, even though Local 
Authority control over rent levels was seriously diminished. However, once it became apparent 
that central subsidies were to be dropped to a very low statutory limit, COSLA expressed the 
view that more central money was needed if they were to avoid having to put up rents at twice 
the rate of inflation. By 1984-1985, COSLA was budgeting for a Rate Fund Contribution 
expenditure of £120.4m, whilst the metropolitan Government was offering a RFC of only 
£89.5m 77. Steve Leach identifies COSLA' s non-co-operation as having been severely 
detrimental to the Government's efforts to re-organise Local Government. As we have seen, 
however, others feel that the various Local Authorities in Scotland lacked the cohesion and unity 
necessary to mount substantial campaigns against the central Government78. The main point of 
contention in the housing issue was that, whilst some autonomy was being granted to the 
periphery, the powers of the Secretary of State were broadening to an even greater degree79• 
XIII, I, 417 (1) (a-d) and XIII, I, 419 (1) of the Housing Act 1985 show how the 
Government was still keen to keep close watch over the finances of Local Authorities. The 
former required the keeping of detailed Housing Revenue Accounts (income and expenditure) 
regarding all housing within a Local Authority'S jurisdiction. The latter stipulated that a 
76 Bell8, 1984-1985, p9. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Including Keith Harding -Interview, 12.11.01 + respondents to Stirling Councillor Survey 
(Con), Winter 2001-2002. 
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Housing Repairs Account was also to be kept. These were not new measures, but the re-iteration 
of their importance makes it clear that Westminster was no longer prepared to allow Local 
Government to continue as a bottomless pit of unaccounted subsidy money. 
The issue of central subsidy was one that the Conservatives were very keen to address. 
Not only could they save tax paying voters' money by tightening the scheme, but could also keep 
a check on Labour schemes undertaken by Local Councils. XIIL 1,422 (1) (a-c) of the 1985 
Housing Act confirmed the same formula as the 1980 Housing Act (Subsidy = Base Amount + 
HCD - LCD). Therefore, the same restraints were being put on Local Authorities as to the levels 
of rents and rates that they could charge. Similarly, the central Government was still looking 
good in the eyes of the voters who appreciated their protection against high living costs. 
Part IV of the Housing (Scotland) Act 1987 puts the onus for maintaining standards onto 
Local Government. IV, I, 85 (1) of this Act stated that Local Authorities must ensure tolemble 
standards of living in their area. IV, I, 88 (I) permitted Local Authorities to order buildings to be 
repaired, as long as the dwellings were not in Housing Action Areas. IV, I, 89 (1-2) gave Local 
Authorities more powers to condemn or order the immediate improvement of buildings in 
HAA's. These sorts of powers were continued into Part V of the Act. V, I, 108 (1) gave Local 
Authorities the power to serve notice for repairs to be carried out. All these schemes may seem 
to have had the interest of inhabitants at heart. However, they also formed part of the centml 
Government's strategy to make Local Government shoulder more responsibility and cost for 
housing and get more properties into a reasonable state for selling off. Hence, Opposition Local 
79 Leach in: Stewart & Stoker (eds.), 1995, p54. 
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Authorities in Scotland were becoming increasingly interested m organlsmg concerted 
opposition to the Governmentso. 
Several grants were left in the gift of the Secretary of State to ensure that Local 
Government did not have too much of a financial burden imposed by London. This could have 
been a particularly powerful weapon in the hands of the increasingly nationalist Opposition 
parties in Scottish Local Government. IX, I, 191 (2) of the Housing (Scotland) Act 1987 made 
provision for a Housing Support Grant, which was to take into account Local Authorities' 
income and expenditure on housing. The Scottish Special Housing Authority was still to receive 
grants from London [Housing (Scotland) Act 1987, IX, I, 194 (1)]. It should be noted that Local 
Government in Scotland had always marginalised the SSHA as an instrument of central 
control8l . 
As we have seen in earlier Acts, however, the Government in London was very keen to 
tightly control how exactly their money was to be spent. X, I, 203 (1) of the Housing (Scotland) 
Act 1987 confirmed that Local Authorities were still to keep Housing Revenue Accounts and the 
Secretary of State was to retain the power to limit estimated rate fund contributions to this 
account [x, I, 204 (1)]. Thus, in addition to Local Contributions Differential restraints, Local 
Authorities could not raise their Rates in order to receive more subsidy. This is a measure that 
80 Stirling Councillor Survey (Lab), Winter 200 1-2002. 
81 Lee, 1995, p165. 
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would have hurt potential Conservative-voting ratepayers and would be blamed on the central 
Government82• 
In the Housing (Scotland) Act 1987, Local Authorities were also ordered to maintain their 
Rent Rebate Accounts ~ I, 205 (1)]. Money to be credited to these accounts could be taken 
from rent rebate subsidies under the Social Security and Housing Benefits Act 1982 [X, I, 205 (2) 
(a) Housing (Scotland) Act 1987]. Debits were to be rent rebates and costs [X, I, 205 (2) (b)]. X, 
I, 206 (1+2) ordered Local Authorities to keep a Rent Allowance Account as well, with similar 
credit and debit sources as above ~ I, 206 (1-2)]. Part III of the Housing (Scotland) Act 1988 
took yet more power from Local Government. III, I, 57 (1) gave Scottish Homes the right to 
approve 'Right to Buy' applicants. Local Authorities never had this right. Thus, the 
metropolitan Government was ensuring that Opposition Councils never had the chance to court 
votes through the application procedure. 
It can be argued that this central system of 'clawing back' money and power from Local 
Authorities was started by Labour's limits on capital spending in 1975. However, Mrs 
Thatcher's campaign against municipal socialism had more effect83• With regard to the 'POS', 
the ultimate result was malevolent to the Conservatives as increased levels of Local Authority 
non-compliance in Scotland and the Poll Tax riots demonstraJ. This centralisation of power 
82 Stirling Councillor Survey (Con), Winter 2001-2002. 
83 By 1986, 75% of Local Authorities in England and Wales were receiving no central subsidies 
for housing - Malpass, Peter & Murie, Alan: "Housing Policy and Practice - 3rd Ed.", 
Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1990, plOO. 
84 Peden, G. C.: "British Economic and Social Policy - Lloyd George to Margaret Thatcher. 2nd 
Ed", Hemel Hempstead, Philip Allan, 1991, p233 (the Poll Tax being part of the central 
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was the key difference with concurrent devotion to the New Right in the United States, thus 
confirming a more authoritarian attitude in this COuntry85. 
The Local Government and Housing Act 1989 confirms that Local Authorities were still 
required to keep Housing Revenue Accounts [VI, I, 74 (1)]. The Local Authorities were duty 
bound to keep these accounts in credit by all reasonable measures, thus reducing the need for 
central subsidies, as provided for in VI, I, 80 (1) of the Act. As receipts from the sale of Council 
Houses could be credited to a Local Authority's BRA, they were thus encouraged to sell as many 
of their properties as possible. It was not until this piece of legislation was enacted that HRA' s 
were 'ring-fenced'; that is to say that, before this Act, Local Authorities could still use Rates to 
fund their accounts86. Metropolitan Government control of Local Government finances was 
increasing rapidly at this time. The introduction of the Poll Tax was perhaps the highest profile 
manifestation of this new relationship. The Local Government and Housing Act 1989 also 
insisted that a Housing Repairs Account must be kept [VI, I, 77 (1)]. As in all of the previous 
pieces of legislation dealing with the provision of subsidies by the central Government, the 
Secretary of State retained the ultimate power to decide upon an appropriate level of debt relief 
for Local Authorities [VI, I, 83 (1) (a-b)]. Malpass and Murie note that this legislation changed 
Local Authority spending patterns considerably87. 
Government's strategy to control Labour rates bills - Interview with Viscount Younger, 14.2.01) 
+ Interview with Lord MacKay of Ardbrecknish, 2S.1.0 1. 
85 John Robertson in: Waltman & Studlar (eds.), 1987, p38. 
86 Lund, 1996, p76. 
87 Malpass & Murie, 1990, pl07. 
277 
Regarding the Government's desire to upgrade housing to reduce the financial burden on 
themselves and create new Conservative voters, this Act made provision for the declaration of 
'Renewal Areas' by local Housing Authorities [Local Government and Housing Act 1989, VII, I, 
89 (1)]. The Secretary of State could provide fmancial assistance for these areas [VII, I, 96 (1)]. 
Thus, especially given the increased central financial control involved, it is possible to see the 
possibilities for more social engineering. 
VIII, I, 101 (1) of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989 asserted that Local 
Authorities should be paying more towards housing repairs than the current levels. This 
demonstrated the central Government's continuing twin desires to direct Local Government 
funds towards 'appropriate' projects and win over newly affluent and better-housed voters. 
18.6% of Local Authority housing stock was sold off in the 1980s88. The challenge facing the 
Conservatives was how to reap the political benefits of this phase89• In 1988-1989, Local 
Government spent £ 13 25m (out of a national total of £6198m) on housing90• Housing was still 
costing the Conservatives in London a lot of taxpayers' money. This is despite the fact that, in 
real terms, expenditure on housing across Britain had halved from 1976-1977 to 1989-199091 • 
Again, speaking in real terms, housing subsidy in 1989-1990 was only 15% of its value in 1979-
1980 in Scotland92• However, the metropolitan Government could argue that it was still helping 
in the housing issue. For example, mortgage tax relief had improved considerably - not of much 
88 Lee, 1995, p20t. 
89 Written Statement by Sir Malcolm Rifkind, 21.1.01. 
90 Lee, 1995, p162. 47.5% of this money was supplied through central subsidy. 
91 Ibid, p203. 
92 Ibid, p204. 
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use to Council tenants in urban Scotland - as had encouragement for the private sector. Again, 
this would be of little use to the many Scots who were still public sector tenants93 . 
As Mitchell notes, Local Government had been steadily amassing responsibilities through 
the Twentieth Century by the process known as 'administrative Devolution,94. Not only would 
such a pattern have ameliorated nationalists in Scotland, but also would have reduced the 
financial and bureaucratic burden on the metropolitan Government. The Conservatives are, as 
we have seen, in favour of such central autonomy from peripheral 'low politics.' Housing was 
one such issue that had been left in the hands of Local Authorities. Therefore, when the 
Thatcher administration began to legislate many new restrictions on the actions and funding of 
Local Government in this sphere, the core-periphery relationship was going to be significantly 
altered. The central administration's intervention in the housing issue was a departure from 
traditional dealings with Local Government, and marked one of the first major breeches in Local 
Authority autonomy95. A key question is how would voters and Local Authorities north of the 
border receive the changes? Before concluding on that question, the next section assesses 
whether the same motivations drove Conservative housinglLocal Government funding policies 
when John Major took over. 
'RoUing Back the State' in the 19901 
After the 'Taking Stock' exercise following the General Election victory of 1992, a major 
point to be emphasised to the people of Scotland was how their interests were being protected 
93 Ibid. 
94 Mitchell, 1995, p1380. 
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and promoted by the Scottish Office in London. This role, which included investigations into 
how housing could be improved, was mentioned explicitly in the White Paper Scotland In the 
Union - A Partnership for GOOt!6. The argument ran that the Scottish Office would take all 
decisions on Scottish domestic issues. Thereby, control by London would be reduced97. This 
opinion asserted that the Scottish Office defended the interests of Scotland in London, rather 
than merely being a conduit for the Government's decisions north of the border. 
However, the familiar theme of extra central control on Local Government finances re-
appeared in the Leasehold Reform, Housing and Urban Development Act 1993. II, I, 136 (3) of 
this Act commanded Local Authorities to pay a levy to the Government in London on each of the 
property disposals that they might make under 'Right to Buy' legislation. Nevertheless, Local 
Authorities were still duty-bound to provide housing for all welfare recipients in their areas 
[Leasehold Reform, Housing and Urban Development Act 1993, II, I, 149]. III, I, 158 (1) of this 
Act instituted the Urban Regeneration Agency (not an agency of the Crown - III, I, 158 (3)). 
The remit of this Agency was to include the acquisition and management of land for housing in 
addition to building and (re)development projects [III, I, 160 (1) (a-I)]. Thus, more power over 
housing was taken from Local Government and given to the centre. This was confirmed by the 
Secretary of State being given the ultimate power to approve this Agency's spending, including 
the provision of grants and loans [III, I, 164, (1-3)]. The Agency was to have the power to 
appoint Urban Development Corporations lUI, I, 177 (1)]. This left the power of appointment 
9S Malpass & Murie, 1990, p88. 
96 em 2225, 1993, §4.8, p19 + Interviews with Lord Strathclyde, 8.11.00, David McLetchie, 
19.1.01 & Viscount Younger, 14.2.01. 
97 "Campaign Guide", 1992, p251. 
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with the metropolitan Government, whilst releasing a lot of the responsibility and expense of 
housing provision into the private sector. 
Another important development in this era was of the system of Citizen's Charters. One 
of these included a 'Householders Guide to Planning,98. The most important point here is the 
way in which the Major administration was perpetuating the Thatcherite programme of drawing 
power away from pockets of town hall socialism. In another continuation of typical 
Conservative practice, the Prime Minister was also keen to emphasise how this extension of 
choice for citizens also meant that important decisions regarding Scotland would actually be 
taken north of the border. This issue, which may be classified as 'low politics', had been 
addressed from the 1960s, when the Party was beginning to realise that there was more to the 
Scottish question than the constitution~ and that secession might be averted by smaller 
incremental steps towards Devolution99. 
Even though the metropolitan Government introduced tighter controls on Local 
Authorities in an attempt to court popularity for saving ratepayers' money, they still suffered at 
the polls in Scotland due to astute manoeuvres by Labour and SNP activistslOO• Scots were 
buying their Council Houses, but were also being warded off transferring their allegiance to the 
Conservatives. This dynamic is most interesting when examining the link between the 'POMP' 
98 Cm 2225, 1993, §9.4, p35 & "Campaign Guide", 1994, p485. The 'Right to Repair' had to be 
watered down from the Prime Minister's original design, as this would have put too much of a 
burden on already stretched housing finances - Hogg & Hill, 1995, p102. 
99 For example, "Campaign Guide", 1997, p572 + CRD 3/28/1, 1968 & CRD 3/28/6, 1968 + 
Interview with Viscount Younger, 14.2.01. 
lOO Interview with Viscount Younger, 14.2.01. 
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and 'POS.' Initially, it would seem reasonable to assume that popular policies should lead to an 
improvement at the polls. As we saw in Chapter 3, the Government's 'Right to Buy' scheme 
was as popular with Scots who could afford to participate as their English counterparts. 
However, the Conservatives did not enjoy a concurrent upturn in General Election fortunes north 
of the border. Therefore, another agency must have been at work to disrupt the desired 
connection between the benefits of the central housing policy and a willingness to re-align to the 
Conservative Party in Scotland. 
I wish to contend that this extra dimension north of the border was the influence of Local 
Government. We have seen in this chapter how the Thatcher Administration revolutionised the 
way in which this branch of government had to operate. As Chart 5.1 demonstrates, the mid-
1980s saw Local Government contributions to housing actually exceed those of the metropolitan 
Government at times. 
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This particular piece of 'POMP' may have seemed to be ideal for winning new voters, 
which indeed it was in England due to a relatively affluent population being able to benefit more 
from Income Tax cuts. However, the friction that 'Rolling Back the State' caused in Local 
Government in Scotland was to lead to more concentrated opposition north of the border than 
could be justified by the minimal numbers of new Conservative voters that it created there. Two 
links between the Conservatives' 'POMP' and problems caused by Local Government in 
Scotland should always be kept in mind. The Party's 'pas' suffered because Opposition 
representatives in Local Government were antagonised into orchestrating campaigns against the 
Conservatives. Furthermore, many of the Party's own Local Government Election candidates 
were losing. This was because anyone from the Conservative Party was associated with the 
'loathsome' administration in London lOl . The credibility of Opposition Councillors in Scotland 
allowed them to construct this perception of the Government in London in spite of some of the 
'POMP', such as the 'Right to Buy', being readily accepted by Scottish voters. 
It should be remembered that Conservative majority control of a Scottish Local Council 
was not always necessary to stave off damage to the Party's 'pas' in that area. What was 
required, however, was a significant Conservative presence to organise and direct effective 
campaigns. Many Conservative representatives in Scottish Local Government were losing their 
seats due to the 'POMP' being employed at the time~ that is to say, through little fault of their 
own. This thesis investigates the proposition that it was the continually dwindling numbers of 
Conservative Councillors that significantly exacerbated the problems with Party's General 
Election chances north of the border. 
101 Stirling Councillor Survey (Con), Winter 2001-2002. 
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'Rolling Back the State' and the 'POS' 
A way from the Local Government funding issue, Thatcherite economic policy could be 
characterised as a return to more traditional Conservative non-interventionist statecraft102. 
However, Local Authorities were concurrently having many of the freedoms that they had 
enjoyed from central control eroded103 . By this time, authoritarian populism was achieving 
ideological hegemony in Eng/and104. Bradbury concludes that Thatcherism failed in Scotland 
mainly because its message was applied to the wrong policy areas105. Given the different kind of 
relationship between citizens and Local Authorities in ScotlandlO6, it seems that these 'POMP' 
measures were very likely to cause an adverse 'POS' reaction north of the border. 
Through the 1980s, Labour Local Authorities in Scotland were still putting up resistance. 
The way in which the metropolitan Government seemed to be targeting these Councils for cuts 
encouraged them to resist in the most effective way that they could; that is to say, by militating 
their constituents against the Conservatives. Due to the different structure of civil society and 
the political culture north of the border (as examined in Chapter 3), Opposition Councillors had 
sufficient credibility and influence to allow them to convince their constituents that the 
102 Christopher Harris in: Brown, Philip & Sparks, Richard (eds.): "Beyond Thatcherism - Social 
Policy. politics and society", Milton Keynes, Open University Press, 1989, p3. 
103 Wilson & Game, 1994, pl02. 
104 Marsh, 1995, p597 and Andrew Gamble in: Mohan (ed.), 1989, p8. 
lOS Bradbury, 1997, p80. 
106 With the voters there being more dependent on Local Government for the provision of 
housing and, thus, more receptive to socialist propaganda that accompanied Labour Councils in 
the 1980s - Interviews with Lord Sanderson, 30.11.00 & Keith Harding, 12.9.01 - this dynamic 
was explored more fully in Chapter 3. 
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Conservatives were a distant anti-Scottish absentee landlord, not worthy of their votes in Local 
or General ElectionsJ07. 
Mrs Thatcher's Government wished to reduce public spending on housing by replacing 
public with private moneyJ08. Initially, the beneficial effect on the Public Sector Borrowing 
Requirement of such savings was the key motivationJ09. However, it should be noted that the 
Government introduced· accounting procedures that made it look as though their programmes 
were saving more taxpayers' money than was actually the case. For example, as mortgage tax 
relief and Local Authority purchase discounts were not to be included in housing expenses of the 
central Government, they could claim to be saving money when, between 1986-1990, the exact 
opposite was the case and expenditure was rising1JO. 
As Whitehead goes on to note, it was deemed easier to cut funding for housing than for 
any longer-term projects. Thus, housing subsidy cuts accounted for 80% of the projected cuts 
for 1980-1981. Housing was one of the few areas in which cuts could be made. Others included 
overseas aid and payments to Europelll. Riddell goes on to make the point that whenever such 
cuts appear, there is always party political, rather than economic, motivation behind themIl2. 
These cuts led to reductions in Local Authority building, which reached their lowest levels since 
1921, and housing availability for the first time since 1919. Benefit cuts were never going to be 
107 Interview with Lord MacKay of Ardbrecknish, 25.1.01. 
108 Bradbury, 1997, p80. 
109 Malpass & Murie, 1990, p105. 
110 Christine Whitehead in: Cook & Crook (eds.), 1986, p87. 
III Riddell, 1985, p112. 
112 Ibid, p114. 
285 
popular, especially in Scotland, where a higher proportion of the population depended on Local 
Government for housing provision and subsidy I 13. One argument put forward was that the cuts 
would actually cost the Government more in the long run. This was due to the expectation that 
poorer housing conditions would lead to deterioration in the nation's health 114. 
Despite the disquiet that this aspect of the 'POMP' was causing in Local Government in 
Scotland, the metropolitan Government saw the greater good of lowering the PSBR as sufficient 
justificationl15 . Subsidy cuts are just as hard to justify to scrutinising committees at Westminster 
as with the electorate, Whitehead asserts116• However, Michael Heseltine was able to do so by 
pointing to the numbers of unoccupied buildings at the time and saying that they should be 
renovated, rather than pouring more taxpayers' money into new projects117. The metropolitan 
Government was also looking to make welfare savings and increase citizens' pride in their 
communities by promoting private ownership. Privatisation was popular amongst New Right 
Conservatives because it increased efficiency and choice. Malpass and Murie note that these 
measures marked an increase in housing benefit being seen as a welfare issue, with all the 
attached stigma in 1980s Britainl18. The Social Security & Benefits Act 1982 saw rent and Rate 
113 It is interesting to note that as late as 1964, the Conservatives were stilI very keen for Local 
Authorities to playa major role in the rental sector- in: Dale (ed.), 2000, p156. 
114 Tony Dickson in: McCrone et al (eds.), 1989, p61. 
lIS Interview with Lord Mackay of Clashfem, 22.1.01. The Conservatives knew that they had to 
be careful with cutting housing subsidies. The Housing Finance Act 1972 had effectively 
removed rent subsidies from many households. This lost the Party many votes - Dennis 
Kavanagh in: Seldon, Anthony (ed.): "How Tory Governments Fall - The Tory Party in Power 
Since 1783", London, Fontana, 1996, p370. 
116 In: Cook & Crook (eds.), 1986, p60. 
117 HC383, Session 1980-1981, p180. 
118 Malpass & Murie, 1990, p87. 
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rebates being amalgamated with benefit moneys for the first time1l9. The Thatcher Government 
was couching housing policy in terms of what the state could afford, rather than the more 
traditional housing issues of shortages and conditions. The importance of community spirit in 
the field of renovation as an alternative to expensive new building work is mentioned in the Party 
manifesto of October 197412°. This preferred 'POMP' might have been acceptable in the 
prosperous South East of England. In Scotland, however, it was not conforming to the 
constraints imposed by the dependence of many citizens on their Local Authority. As these 
Labour-controlled Local Authorities had the credibility to steer their constituents towards voting 
against the Conservatives in Local Government and General Elections, a damaging blow was 
being dealt to the Conservatives' 'POS' north of the border. 
Conclusion 
As we saw in Chapter 3, the Conservatives were looking to fare well from housing policy 
by being seen to give opportunities for social and financial improvement to the working class. 
Simultaneously, however, the metropolitan Government was pursuing its own agenda of 
removing as much power as possible from the hands of socialist Local Governments 121 • As 
Labour activists on the ground in Scotland were still well-received and respected, they were able 
to cause anti-Conservative resentment amongst the electorate by identifying policies that the 
metropolitan Government deemed anti-wastefulness to be anti-ScottishI22. 
119 Ibid, p101. 
120 In: Dale (ed.), 2000, p244. 
121 Interview with Lord Sanderson, 30.11.00. 
122 Interview with Viscount Younger, 14.2.01. 
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The metropolitan Government was seeking to spread the notion of an "Enterprise Culture' 
to Scotland123 . However, rather than being a philanthropic venture to improve the lives of Scots, 
voter-friendly tax-cuts involved in "Rolling Back the State' were more attractive to the 
Conservative Leadershipl24. Mitchell notes another potentially happy result for the 
Conservatives of cutting back on support for Local Authorities in the housing sector. The 
metropolitan Government hoped that the (mostly Labour) Councils would be forced to put up 
their Council House rents 125. This would have helped the Conservatives to challenge their 
opponents' practice of "buying' tenants' votes with low rentsl26. However, as Chart 5.2 shows, 
Local Authorities in Scotland managed to avoid putting up their rents by more than the rate of 
inflation. If any services had to be cut in order to keep rents down, the Labour Councils had 
enough credibility in their communities to be able to deflect criticism by asserting that the 
problems were being caused by the Conservatives' 'POMP,127. 
123 Mitchell, 1990, pll5. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Interview with Lord Sanderson, 30.11.00. 
127 Interview with Viscount Younger, 14.2.01. 
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We have also seen how metropolitan Government housing policy was designed to 
prevent Scottish Local Authorities from raising funds for their party political programmes 
through dramatic increases in Domestic Rates in the 1980s. However, as Chart 5.3 of average 
Scottish monthly charges demonstrates, the metropolitan Government was not able to exert as 
much control as they desired; above-inflation rises being evident in the mid-1980s and 1990s. If 
the period from 1989 to 1993 is momentarily ignored, we see that the plot from Rates to Council 
Tax is quite smooth and rises more steeply than the chart of Local Authority rents (Chart 5.2). 
128 Regional Trends: Number 17, 1982, p46, #18, 1983, p37, #19, 1984, p35, #20, 1985, p35, 
#21, 1986, p37, #22, 1987, p37, #23, 1988,p35,#24, 1989,p35,#25, 1990, p64,#26, 1991,p62, 
#27, 1992, p183, #28, 1993, p180, #29, 1994, p200, #30, 1995, p218, #31, 1996, p224, #32, 
1997, p208 & #33, 1998, p208. 
129 Scottish Abstract orS/ali ·tics: Number 9, 1980, pp31-32, #10, 1981, p30 & #14, 1985, p49. 
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Another aspect of 'Rolling Back the State' that the metropolitan Governments of the 
1980s tried to implement and use in a similar way was an instruction to reduce the number of 
Local Authority employees132. Hereby, it was hoped to further reduce costs to the taxpayers and 
militancy amongst public sector employees. However, as Chart 5.4 shows, Scottish Local 
Authorities were also able to resist this measure. 
130 Regional Trend: #16, 1981, p94, #22, 1987, pllO, #26, 1991, p160, #30, 1995, p87, #31, 
1996, p201, #33, 1998,p79. 
131 1979-1989 = Rates per hereditament, 1990-1992 = Poll Tax per person & 1993-1997 = 
Council Tax per household. 
132 Times, 5.6.81, p4 & 31.8.82, p3 . 
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As with the housing issue, it seems that Labour Local Authorities north of the border were astute 
enough to circumvent the financial and operational barriers in their way. More importantly, they 
were also able to retain sufficient credibility in their communities to dissuade many voters who 
might have been tempted to re-align to the Conservatives at subsequent elections135 . 
Taken in conjunction with the 'Right to Buy' legislation examined earlier, this chapter 
shows how deeply opposed the Thatcher Administrations were to the apparent inefficiencies of 
Local Government from the very outsetl36 . Furthermore, this chapter has demonstrated how the 
metropolitan Governments of the 1980s and 1990s tried to gain support through removing 
powers from Local Authorities. Rather than the actual actions of Opposition groups, much of 
133 Regional Trends: Number 16, 1981, pI03 & #17, 1982, p119. 
134 Scottish Abstract of Stat is I ics: Number 11, 1982, p63, #14, 1985, p99, #20, 1991, plIO, #23, 
1994, pI21, #26, 1998, Internet. 
135 Stirling Councillor Survey (Con & Lab), Winter 2001-2002. 
136 Thatcher, 1993, p32. 
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this chapter has been devoted to how the Conservative elite attempted to control Labour Local 
Government in Scotland through the 'Rolling back the State' aspects of the contemporary 
'POMP.' In the first instance, this may seem to have little to do with this work's hypothesis, 
which considers whether Local Government Election losses were significantly damaging for the 
Conservatives' General Election chances in Scotland. However, especially in the light of 
Chapter 3 and its conclusion that Local Government is particularly pervasive in the 'POS' in 
Scotland, the effect of the 'POMP' on Opposition-controlled Local Government north of the 
border assumes significant importance. 
The Opposition parties could have used Local Government in Scotland to marshal voters 
against the Conservatives. Therefore, an assessment had to be made of how and why they were 
encouraged to do so. This chapter has shown that a primary source of antagonism was 
contemporary Conservative 'POMP.' Therefore, another dimension of how the Conservative 
elite in London were harming their Party's 'POS' on the geographical periphery is suggested. As 
we have seen, this harm was being caused by central strategies designed to minimise the 
spending and political socialisation role of Local Authorities. Consequent Conservative Local 
Government losses would have left Labour Councillors free to establish ideological hegemony in 
the various regions north of the border. Furthermore, these Councillors would have been keen to 
exact as much damage on the central Government as possible due to the central cuts in their 
funding and power. Even if national issues played an important role in determining a voter's 
choice in a General Election, the structure of civil society, political culture and the 'POS' in 
Scotland suggested that the actions of Labour Local Government representatives there also 
assumed considerable significance. 
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As the data above and subsequent General Election results show, however, much of the 
Conservative programme was not successful in achieving its economic or political goals in 
Scotland. There are few examples of Local Government action being able to directly change the 
'POMP.' This is due to the imbalance of power between the two levels of government. In 
Scotland, however, it seems that the more the metropolitan administration tried to impose 
financial controls from London, the more that Labour Local Government representatives strove 
to convince their constituents of the need to vote against the Conservatives in Local Government 
and General Elections. As this thesis seeks to demonstrate, it seems that especially as the 
numbers of Conservative Local Government representatives in Scotland began to drop as a result 
of this reaction to the 'POMP', the Party's 'POS' began to fail to a critical degree north of the 
border. 
The next chapter of this thesis examines the effects of the dynamics that we have 
explored to date on a specific area of Scotland. Through this study of the interaction between 
local governance and the 'POMP' in Stirling, we will be able to see more clearly just how the 
'POS' seemed to be run in Scotland. 
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6. The 'POMP', Local Government and the 'Politics of 
Support' in Stirling 1979-1997 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to assess how the relationship between the 'POMP' and 
Local Government impacted on a particular area of Scotland. Thereby, it will be possible to 
better appreciate how the loss of representation in Local Government could have affected the 
Conservatives north of the border. Stirling has been chosen as the subject of this case study due 
to its demographic nature and party political history. Both the Westminster seat and the Local 
Council were very closely contested throughout the era in question. Such rivalry on a local level 
helps to highlight the particular dynamics under investigation in this thesis. That is to say, how 
highly active members of Local Government from the major parties in Scotland can serve to help 
or hinder the chances of Westminster candidates in their area through organising support, 
electoral campaigns or opposition to the 'POMP.' 
Therefore, the first task is to profile the population of the area in order to understand why 
and how the major parties may have appealed to the electorate. This is followed by an account 
of the 'POMP' and local issues that influenced the course of national and Local Government 
Elections and Local Authority actions during the era in question. From previous chapters in this 
thesis, we have learned that the issues of subsidy cuts, central control of Local Government and 
the Poll Tax should be of key interest here. The roles and influence of both levels of government 
in Stirling are brought to light in this chapter, thus facilitating a conclusion regarding the defeat 
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of the Conservative General Election candidate there in 1997. This loss could have happened in 
1987 or 1992, given the unpopularity of the Party in Scotland, vigorous campaigning by Labour 
Councillors and marginal nature of the seat. However, Conservative representation in Local 
Government in the area was strong at these times. It was only after a 30% drop in Conservative 
members of Stirling Council that their MP was ousted. It is the purpose of this piece to assess 
whether there was any causal link between these two events. 
Demographic Profile of Stirling 
The District of Stirling is in central Scotland, to the north of Edinburgh and Glasgow. It 
covers an area of nearly 2200 square kilometres and had a population of 83580 in 19971. 
Population is sparse at 381km2, denoting the rural nature of much of the land. It should be noted, 
however, that few of the population are employed in agriculture. The service sector and tourism 
are more important, as can be seen in the charts of industries of employment (6.2 and 6.3). The 
Central Region of Scotland used to be industrialised, with coal and steel formerly being 
important to the economy. Stirling is also an important transport node, being the highest 
tidaVlowest bridgeable point on the Forth. If not engaged in the service sector, agriculture, 
tourism or the light industry of the region, many inhabitants commute to Glasgow or Edinburgh. 
Traditionally, the Conservatives would expect to fare well in the rural parts of such an 
area2• Potential for Conservative success is further suggested by the above-average proportion of 
older people in the district (17.8%). The district's total population grew by 4.1% between 1981-
1 Regional Trends, Number 34, 1999, p205. 
2 Interviews with Lord MacKay of Ardbrecknish, 25.l.01 & Keith Harding, 12.9.0l. 
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1997. This figure was only significantly bettered by Aberdeen, the Lothians and East 
Renfrewshire; and was high compared to the Scottish average of -1 .1 %3. Stirling is the 
administrative centre, with other significant towns being Falkirk, Dunblane and Callander. 
Central Region Populations 1961-1998 
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6.1 - Sources: Census Data4 & Regional Trends. Number 34, 1999, p205. 
3 Regional Trends, Number 34, 1999, p205 . 
4 1981: Report for Central Region - Vol. 1, P xxiv + Scottish Summary, pI. 
1991: Central Region Report, Part 1, p16 + Report for Scotland - Part 1, Vol. 1, p47. 
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As can be seen by the employment patterns in Charts 6.2 and 6.3, manufacturing has been 
steadily replaced by more service-based industries in Central Scotland. This progression is 
similar to those found elsewhere in Britain. As we have seen in previous chapters, this change in 
the nature of the working population was encouraged by the Thatcher administrations through 
subsidy and investment re-direction. The Government undertook this in the hope that newly 
more-affluent young voters would support the Conservatives out of gratitude for what the Party 
elite considered to be their improved standards of living7. Therefore, at least some of the 
continued Conservative strength in Stirling must be attributed to this dynamic. As the data on 
social class in Charts 6.4 and 6.5 confirms, the region was moving away from the predominance 
of III (Manual). 
Social Class (by employment) 1981 (%) 
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6.4 - Source: Census Data8. 
7 Interviews with David McLetchie, 19.1.01, Lord MacKay of Clashfem, 22.1.01 & Viscount 
Younger, 14.2.0l. 
8 1981: Key Statistics for local authorities. Great Britam, p42. 
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Social Class (by employment) 1991 (%) 
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The changing divisions in housing tenure (see Chart 6.6) also show that the area was 
conforming to the central Government's desire to see an increase in the number of potentially 
Conservative voting homeowners. We have already seen in Chapter 3 that this particular change 
in the nature of society did not have such a significant impact on the Scottish electorate as in 
England~ often due to the astute manoeuvres of Labour local politicians. Nevertheless, the move 
towards owner occupancy highlights the possibility of some potential new support for the 
Conservatives in Stirling. Thus, in this case, we should recognise the efforts of Labour 
Councillors in keeping the party political contest so close in circumstances that suggested that 
the area could have become a Scottish stronghold for the Conservatives. Labour local politicians 
tried to keep the voters that they had previously 'bought off with cheap rents lO. To do this, they 
endeavoured to convince the electorate that any perceived improved standards of living were 
9 1991: Key Statistics for Localities in Scotland, pp98-99. 
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nothing to do with the 'Right to Buy' 11; or, if they were, that it was Labour efforts over previous 
years and in the transition period that made it S012. In the first instance, the gentrification of 
Stirling from the early 1980s would seem to bode well directly for a Conservative General 
Election campaign in the area. For the purposes of this thesis, it is also most important to bear in 
mind that such a population was also likely to maintain a significant, if not always Council-
controlling13, level of Conservative representation in Local Government as well. 
Housing Tenure 1981 & 1991 (%) 
Seo 81 SeQ 91 Cntrl 81 Cntrl 91 Stirling 81 Stirling 91 
• Own Oee. • Rent from LA • Private Rent 
6.6 - Sources: Census Data l4. 
10 Interview with Lord Sanderson, 30.11.00. 
II Interview with David McLetchie, 19.1.01 . 
12 Interview with Keith Harding, 12.9.0l. 
13 This work's hypothesis does not rely on Conservatives being in control of Local Councils -
but only that they have at least a sufficient level of representation to challenge the other parties 
and organise and give direction to voters. 
14 1981: Report for Central Region - Vol.1, p xxvii . 
1991: Report for Central Region - Vol. 1, p22 + Housing & Availability of Cars, p268. 
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Unemployment Rates 1979-'97 (%) 
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6.7 - Sources: Scottish Abstract o(Statistic/5 and Regional Trends16. 
We saw in earlier chapters how Scotland's economic fortunes caused many voters to 
reject the Conservative Governments in Westminster. As Chart 6.7 shows, Stirling suffered a 
surge of unemployment in the mid-1980s, as heavy industry in the area deteriorated. It is 
interesting to note, however, that the Conservatives managed to hold the Parliamentary seat 
through this difficult period. This thesis seeks to establish that the presence of substantial 
Conservative representation in Local Government in areas such as this helped significantly in 
defending such difficult causes. 
It should be noted that, as Chart 6.8 shows, average incomes amongst those who 
remained in employment in the Stirling area were rising and often above the Scottish average 
during the 1980s. Therefore, metropolitan economic policies were having the desired effect of 
creating more potential Conservative voters; who might be prepared to reward the Government 
for their newly-found affluence. As we saw with regard to the 'Right to Buy', however, the 
15 Scottish Abstract o(Statistics: Number 12, 1983, p7l, #14, 1985, p117, #20, 1991, p123, #23, 
1994, p13l. 
16 Regional Trends: Number 32, 1997, p209, #33, 1998, p209. 
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association between such new affluence and voting Conservative was weakest in Scotland; 
mainly due to deeper-rooted traditional antipathy for the Party north of the borderl7. Therefore, 
whilst it was important, it is not possible to ascribe the presence of affluence as the sole cause of 
the Conservative General Election victories in Stirling in 1983, 1987 and 1992. Average wages 
did drop significantly there in the mid-1990s18. Nevertheless, it seems that this could not have 
been the entire cause of the Conservative candidate 's loss in 1997, as there was a recovery before 
the election. What is significant, however, is that the presence of a relatively large proportion of 
affluent voters kept the Conservative representation in Local Government in the area at a 
relatively high level for Scotland until 1995. It is only after this representation at the local level 
dropped that the Parliamentary seat was lost. 
Average Weekly Incomes 1979-1997 (£) 
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6.8 - Source: Regional Trends l9. 
17 Interview with Lord Lang, 27.3.01. 
18 See Chart 6.8. 
19 Regional Trends: Number 15, ]980, pp31-32, #16, 1981, pp30-31, #17,1982, p46, #18,1983, 
p37,#19, 1984,p35,#20, 1985, p35, #21, 1986,p37,#22, 1987,p37,#23, 1988,p35,#24, 1989, 
p35,#25, 1990, p35, #26, 1991,p33,#27, 1992, p183, #28, 1993, p183, #29, 1994,p200,#30, 
1995,p218,#31, 1996,p224,#32, 1997,p208,#33, 1998,p208. 
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Now, an analysis of the party political history of Stirling during the era in question will 
further demonstrate how the various dynamics explored in this thesis impacted on a precise, 
closely contested local polity in Scotland. We are particularly interested in Local Government 
related factors that could have led to the defeat of the Conservative MP or helped Labour to keep 
the party political contest close in such an ostensibly affiuent and Conservative area. 
Party Politics in Stirling 1979-1997 
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General Elections in Stirling 1974-1997 
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---~-- - -- .. -
-
O~--------+---------;----------r---------T--------~ 
74 79 83 87 92 97 
--- Labour % SNP% - Conservati-..e % 
6.9 Sources: Butler & Kavanagh20 and Railings & Thrasher2l . 
20 Butler & Kavannagh, 1975, p323; 1980; p382 & 1997, p285. NB boundary changes before the 
1983 General Election removed many urban Labour voters from the constituency - Waller, 
Robert: "The Almanac of British Politics - 4th Ed.", London, Routledge, 1983, p546. Therefore, 
the 1974 and 1979 results shown in Chart 6.9 would have been closer had the seat been contested 
within the post 1983 boundaries. 
21 RaIlings, Colin & Thrasher, Michael (eds.): "British Parliamentary Election Results 1983-
1992", Aldershot, Ashgate, 1999, p303. 
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Seats on Stirling Council 1974-1997 
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6.10 - Sources: Municipal Yearbook & Public Services Directory22 
As can be seen from Chart 6.10, Conservative interests were well represented in Local 
Government in Stirling through the 1980s and 1990s. During this period in other parts of 
Scotland, the Party rarely controlled Councils, and often had no representation at all. Therefore, 
that the Conservatives managed to stay within one or two seats of Labour even during the worst 
economic times and actually take control of Stirling Council in the 1990s, coupled with good 
concurrent General Election performances in the area, increases the significance of the 
proposition in my hypothesis. That is to say, that Conservative General Election chances in 
Scotland were somewhat dependent on levels of Party Local Government representation. 
Significant personalities and events in Stirling will be examined in the rest of this chapter to 
assess how the dynamics in question impacted upon the Local Government and General Election 
results of the area. Whilst these following sections are mainly chronological in nature, emphasis 
is put on aspects of the 'POMP' that earlier chapters have identified as especially contentious in 
Scotland during the era in question. Hence, the topics of subsidy cuts, central control of Local 
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Government and the Poll Tax have sections of their own. The first question to be addressed is 
how, in their own opinion, did Councillors in Stirling affect the 'POS?' 
Stirling District Council & the 'POS' 
Amongst the respondents to my survey of Conservative and Labour Stirling Councillors, 
there were differences in opinion as to how much the actions of local politicians could affect the 
General Election vote of a constituent. None of the Conservative Stirling Councillors surveyed 
believed that their actions on a local level could completely overturn the voting habit of a 
committed constituent in General Elections23 . Nonetheless, the Conservatives did agree that 
their effectiveness and approachability as Local Councillors did have a slight role to play in 
confirming or undermining a voter's initial inclinations about an upcoming General Election. 
All respondents to the survey conceded that national issues played an important role in 
determining Local Government and General Election voting intention. Importantly, however, 
Labour Councillors were considerably more prepared to assert that the conduct, behaviour and 
efficacy of Local Councillors were significant with regard to how constituents would vote in a 
General Election. This demonstrates a seemingly better understanding of how the Scottish 
'POS' works than held by their Conservative counterparts. 
The Conservatives did agree that it is especially important for Councillors to remain as 
accessible and helpful as possible in order to preserve the loyalty of current Conservative voters 
and stimulate an atmosphere of trust, gratitude and respect for the Party amongst the electorate as 
22 Municipal Yearbook & Public Services Directory: 1975, p1386; 1978, p1275; 1982, p1428; 
1984,p1496; 1986,p1451; 1988,p1559; 1991,p790; 1993,p785; 1998,p701 & 2001, p1461. 
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a whole. In other words, if a voter is undecided just before a General Election, the local 
Conservative Councillors hope that their proficiency may persuade the constituent that the 
Conservative Party might be able to deliver such benefits on a national scale as weU24. 
We have seen earlier in this thesis how increased emphasis on community in Scotland has 
indeed rendered the work of Local Councillors important and likely to attract support for their 
party. The less pro-active attitude adopted by Conservative Councillors seems to have hurt the 
Party's 'POS' in Scotland. However, such reluctance on the local level during the 1980s and 
1990s seems understandable in the hostile Scottish environment caused by the Conservative 
'POMP' and long-standing antipathy for the Party. Before examining the effect of actual 
policies, it is useful to build up a profile of the prominent actors and prevailing attitudes in 
Stirling from the early 1980s. Such factors are critical for all parties when trying to establish 
ideological hegemony and successful 'POS.' 
Key Actors & Attitudes in Stirling 
Dennis Canavan was the Labour MP for the Stirling area at the start of the 1980s. He 
relied on support in industrial towns such as Kilsyth, Denny and Dunipace. When boundary 
changes transferred these towns to other constituencies, the Stirling seat became more rural in 
nature. Rural areas such as Kimoss and West Perthshire had always been good for the 
Conservatives (Alec Douglas-Home had been MP there). Sensing that his support base had 
23 Stirling Councillor Survey (Con & Lab), Winter 2001-2002. 
24 Ibid (Con). 
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gone, Canavan moved to stand in Falkirk West in 1983, thus allowing the Thatcherite Michael 
Forsyth to win the first General Election for the new Stirling seat in 198325• 
Forsyth was a young (29) Thatcherite26 at the time and made his feelings about Local 
Government known very quickly. He ran for the Westminster seat against the then Leader of the 
Council, Michael Connerty. Connerty was described as being akin to Ken Livingstone, with 
high public spending and pro trade union views27. This was completely opposite to Forsyth's 
character. He had served on Westminster Council and wanted to see similar cost-saving 
practices copied in Scotland. Indeed, the Conservative group on Stirling Council went on to 
assume the mantle of a Wandsworth or Westminster of the north~ where public spending 
thriftiness was a watchword28. It is interesting to note that this stand as the 'standard bearers' of 
right wing policies in Scotland may have cost the Conservatives in the 1995 Local Government 
Election29. This thesis investigates whether such Local Government election losses were 
dangerous for the Party's General Election prospects north of the border. 
Throughout the 1980s, the two sides on Stirling Council were openly hostile3o. This 
situation was exemplified by Forsyth's decision to take Connerty to court for an injunction 
against the Labour group's policy of putting Trade Union officials on the Council's Policy 
25 Waller, 1983, p546. 
26 A characteristic that led to notable polarisation within the community - Stirling Councillor 
Survey (Con & Lab), Winter 2001-2002. 
27 Times, 20.5.83, p4. 
28 Interview with Keith Harding, 12.9.01. 
29 Stirling Councillor Survey (Lab), Winter 2001-2002. 
30 Ibid (Con). 
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Committee3). Forsyth continued to try to discredit and block central funding for civic and social 
policy projects instituted by the Labour-controlled Councie2• Thus, we have a clear example of 
open antagonism between central and Local Government in Stirling. The key question is how 
did this affect the 'POST 
As the 1980s progressed, apart from the Viewforth area, the town of Stirling was still 
inclined towards Labour. Otherwise, the Westminster constituency, including the rural regions 
of the Trossachs, Callander and Loch Tay, in addition to the small affiuent towns in the north-
east, such as Dunblane, was mainly in favour of the Conservatives. However, some of these 
Conservative areas, such as the Bridge of Allan, in the Airthrey ward, which was moved into the 
Ochit constituency, were being transferred out of Stirling by boundary changes. Therefore, 
Local Government and General Elections in the Stirling constituency were still destined to be 
very close33. As can be seen from the General Election results in Chart 6.9, the Conservatives 
did well in Stirling during the 1980s; a feat rarely achieved elsewhere in Scotland. Even from 
1983-1987 and 1987-1992, when the Party was doing particularly badly north of the border only, 
the Stirling MP seemed to be somewhat immune, in spite of an unemployment rate higher than 
the Scottish average. The question must be asked whether this success was due in any part to the 
dynamics of Local Government in the area? 
31 Stirling Observer, 15.10.82, pI & Times, 20.5.83, p4. 
32 Stirling Councillor Survey (Lab), Winter 2001-2002. 
33 Waller, Robert & Criddle, Bryan: "The Almanac of British Politics - 5th Ed.", London, 
Routledge, 1996, pp772-773. 
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The original Parliamentary constituency included the towns of Stirling, Falkirk, 
Grangemouth Burgh and the rural districts of West Stirlingshire, Kinross and West Perthshire. 
The urban areas, as in the rest of Scotland, were traditionally inclined towards Labour. Labour 
had usually been able to dominate Local Government Elections in these areas. As we have 
already introduced, and very importantly for this thesis, this situation led to antagonism with the 
Conservative metropolitan Government on several occasions. For example, the Council showed 
open defiance for the Government by allowing its vehicles to display CND stickers34. This 
matter may seem petty. However, it is a good demonstration of how Local Authorities can 
highlight and/or criticise the • POMP' , thus potentially affecting voting patterns at subsequent 
General Elections. The nuclear issue is important in Stirling due to use of the Forth by naval 
vessels. Therefore, the Conservative countermeasure of sponsoring a Trident submarine in the 
Council's name when they were in control some ten years later made a very symbolic gesture 
and supportive comment for the contemporary ·POMP,35. Now we shall examine the impact on 
Stirling of programmes from the ·POMP' that were particularly contentious in Scotland. 
Hereby, we will be able to assess how the Conservatives fared in the 'POS' in one of the few 
regions of Scotland where they enjoyed substantial Local Government representation. 
Stirling District CouncU and the 'POMP' 
- Subsidy Cuts in Stirling 
Any actions undertaken by the Labour group in Stirling during the 1980s would seem to 
have been futile, as the Conservative MP was not ousted. However, the demograpbic and 
34 Times, 19.4.82, p2. 
309 
economic circumstances of the area suggest that the Conservatives could have been in a much 
stronger position than they were. It can be argued that Stirling could have been a stronghold in 
Scotland for the Conservatives. However, the Westminster seat was always highly marginal. 
This thesis contends that it was the following actions of the Labour urban Councillors that 
facilitated such a close contest. Furthermore, the continued efforts of the Conservative group 
helped to marshal the votes of the various more aftluent communities of the area. Indeed, 
without such strong local Conservative organisation in Stirling, the Westminster seat could still 
have been lost, as were other aftluent areas in Scotland where Party Local Government 
representation was not strong enough to withstand Labour campaigning. 
As the Stirling Observer noted in the early Thatcher years, the area was going to be 
seriously affected by subsidy cuts. In keeping with its main target readership in the town of 
Stirling. this newspaper seemed to lean to the left when reporting the difficulty that Local 
Authorities faced in lobbying the Westminster Government against funding cuts through the 
Convention of Scottish Local Authorities36. Examples of this were when the newspaper 
proclaimed that a happy New Year was unlikely in 1980 in the face of the proposed cuts37 and 
how it foresaw £ 105m worth of education funding cuts, which were likely to lead to the closure 
of local schools38. 
35 Interview with Keith Harding, 12.9.01. 
36 15.6.79, pI. 
37 4.1.80, pI. 
38 25.1.80, pI. 
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The Stirling Observer argued that the Government in Westminster was not acting with 
maximum sensitivity towards the Stirling region as the administration bedded in. This was 
highlighted in a report on how the area was no longer receiving Department of Industry or 
Scottish Tourist Board subsidies since 'special area' status had been removed (somewhat 
arbitrarily, it is suggested39). Lending more credence to the argument that the Thatcher 
administration was ignorant of, and insensitive to, the special circumstances of the area, the 
newspaper also makes great play of the way in which the metropolitan Government had 
erroneously classified Stirling as being in the same region as Perth40. Such insensitivity on the 
part of the Government was severely criticised by the Labour group on Stirling Council. The 
Labour Councillors claimed more of a democratic mandate as they had been elected by the 
citizens of the area and listened to these voters' opinions more closely through institutions such 
as the Stirling Assembly, the Area Forum and samples of Council House tenants41 • Even though 
the new Parliamentary seat was to be taken by the Conservatives in 1983, an anti-Conservative 
tone in the media was consistent with the ideas of Labour representatives in Local Government. 
Consequently, building any sort of stable 'POS' would have been harder for the Conservatives 
than might have been expected in a region that was as pre-disposed towards them as any in 
Scotlanot2. 
39 2.7.82, pI - 5500 residents had lost their jobs in Stirling as a result of this re-classification of 
the area. See also Stirling Observer, 16.7.82, pi, where Secretary of State Younger comes under 
attack for having removed 'special area' status from the region - a policy consistent with the 
Conservatives' commitment to unitary governance. 
40 Stirling Observer, 16.7.82, pI. 
41 Stirling Councillor Survey (Lab), Winter 2001-2002. 
42 Interview with William Paterson, 13.9.01. 
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By virtue of their ongoing subsidy policy, the metropolitan Government in London did 
nothing to cultivate a usual source of support in the Stirling area. Rural areas were struggling in 
the economic climate of the mid-1980s. However, rather than subsidising farmers after poor 
weather, the metropolitan Government decided to try to introduce small and medium sized 
businesses into the countryside. This may have made financial sense, but did not win them 
support amongst traditionally Conservative farming communities and allowed opposition voices 
in Local Government to point to more regional insensitivity in the 'POMP,43. 
Although it is important to note that there was no apparent immediate General Election 
benefits for the Labour group in Stirling from these incidents, such friction caused by the 
'POMP' could often be stored up and used when evidence against an uncaring distant 
Conservative administration was needed44. Thereby, the 'POMP' could be hanning the chances 
of Conservative Local Government Election candidates. This thesis seeks to demonstrate that 
any such consequent Local Government Election losses jeopardised the chances of Scottish 
Conservative Westminster candidates. As we saw in Chapter 5 of this thesis, the Conservative 
Governments in Westminster were keen to 'Roll Back the State' and keep very firm control of 
Local Government finances. The next section of this chapter examines how this dynamic 
affected Local Government and the 'POS' in Stirling. 
43 Ibid, 30.8.85, pI & 6.12.85, pI. 
44 Stirling Councillor Survey (Con & Lab), Winter 2001-2002. 
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- Central Control of Local Government in Stirling 
This ongoing centre-periphery issue in the 1980s demonstrated how the metropolitan 
Government did not seem to be giving sufficient consideration to the possibility that their 
policies might be damaging Conservative Local Government candidates and representatives in 
Scotland. As we saw in Chapter 5, George Younger targeted Stirling for a £ 1. 2m penalty in their 
subsidies due to alleged over-spending. The Labour group on Stirling Council did not have the 
statutory power to completely disobey the metropolitan Government. However, it did have 
enough credibility in the local community to be able to make great political capital from their 
opinion that the Secretary of State was just looking to court votes by forcing a reduction in 
Domestic Rates. Labour claimed that the central Government was doing this with no apparent 
concern for the consequent reductions in local services45 . It is also interesting to note that a 
similar situation in Edinburgh had not been met with the same punitive response from London, 
as the Edinburgh Council had QC's opinion that such central policies were unjustified. 
However, as Stirling Council did not seem to be preparing any such legal challenges, the 
metropolitan Government felt safe in carrying on46. 
Labour were able to voice their dissenting opinions effectively through the seemingly 
willing Stirling Observer. As we saw in Chapter 3, use of the local media in this way was of key 
importance to controlling the 'POS' in Scotland. Labour seemed to be more aware of this 
powerful tool and used it more effectively during the era in question47• The report on the £1.2m 
penalty goes on not only to question how the Secretary of State can justify the number of public 
45 Stirling Observer, 30.7.82. p2. 
46 Stirling Councillor Survey (Lab), Winter 200 1-2002. 
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sector redundancies that would result from his dictate, but also whether indeed the Conservative 
Government in London has a legitimate mandate to impose such decisions on Scotland? Thus, it 
is possible to see how Labour voices in Stirling would be clearly heard in the local community. 
Despite such opposition at the local level, however, the Government in London were able to 
effectively coerce the Council into cutting its rates by 4% in order to avoid further penalties48. 
The continuing antagonism between the Labour-controlled Council and the Conservative 
central Government was demonstrated when the Council was involved in a legal case concerning 
its Trade Union policies. The Council wished to blacklist any firms who failed to give 
assurances about not crossing picket lines in the miners' strike. The Court of Session issued an 
interim interdict against this policy, which contravened the metropolitan Government's apparent 
anti-union stance49. This is another example of Local Government in Scotland being unable to 
damage the Government directly, but being able to claim some success insofar as they were able 
to rally some anti-Conservative feeling amongst the electorate for future Local Government and 
General Elections, thanks to a particular local issue. 
Nonetheless, the metropolitan Government still had the power to impose its will on any 
dissenting Local Authority. This was further demonstrated to Stirling Council when the Court of 
Session ordered them to cut their Rates again in 1985 as a result of a default order taken out by 
George Younger. As was noted in Chapter 5, Labour Local Authorities preferred to take as 
much money as possible from their Rate Funds to maintain their Housing Revenue Accounts, as 
47 Ibid (Con). 
48 Stirling Observer, 6.8.82, pI. 
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this would facilitate the minimisation of Council House rents, thus encouraging the electoral 
support of grateful tenants. In 1985, Stirling wanted £3.197m of such money, whilst the 
metropolitan Government wanted, and got, an upper limit of £2.026m50. Consequently, the 
District Council had to put up its rents by £2/week in order, it argued, to subsidise potential 
Conservative-voting property-owning ratepayers51 . Even though the Conservative metropolitan 
Government could argue that it was taking the measure in order to protect jobs, Labour Local 
Government in Stirling was still able to gain a 'POS' victory by 'selling' the rent rises as a 
central imposition that they would rather not have undertaken. 
As the local MP, Michael Forsyth complained frequently at the Local Authority's record 
over housing provision. The Labour-controlled Council's reply was dismissive insofar as it 
argued that he had no right to interfere in Local Government business anyway52. Such defiance 
was usually ineffective in preventing central Government intervention. For example, the 
metropolitan Government went ahead with plans to increase the use the private sector to 
administrate the sale of Council Houses in Stirling, despite stringent opposition from the Council 
Labour groupS3. This was a metropolitan Conservative attempt to cut costs and minimise the 
electors' association between better housing and Labour Councils. Nonetheless, even though 
they had little statutory power against the metropolitan administration, the issue did build up the 
49 Times, 24.12.84, p2. 
so Stirling Observer, 5.7.85, pI. 
sllbid, 19.7.85, pI & Stirling Councillor Survey (Con), Winter 2001-2002. 
52 Stirling Observer, 20.9.85, pI. 
S3 Stirling Councillor Survey (Lab), Winter 2001-2002. 
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Labour Local Authority's reputation as the defender of local interest~ thus rendering the 
Conservatives' 'POS' somewhat weake~4. 
It is interesting to note that some parts of the Scottish media at the time were making the 
connection between strong Local Government representation and General Election chances. For 
example, the Glasgow Herald notes that it would be much harder for Michael Forsyth to hold 
such a marginal seat as Stirling if Labour were to do well in imminent Local Government 
Elections55. This understanding corresponds with the characterisation of Scottish political 
culture made earlier in this thesis. However, there seems to have been no major direct response 
by the Conservative elite~ even if Michael Forsyth did make the effort to travel from London to 
vote in the 1988 Local Government Election56. As we have already seen, the Poll Tax was to 
dominate central-Local Government relations at the end of the 1980s. Its divisive effects were 
felt in Stirling and must be examined now in order to assess the policy's effect on the 
Conservatives' 'POS' in this region of Scotland. 
- The Poll Tax in Stirling 
As we have seen in earlier chapters, the Poll Tax was a cause of great tension between 
Conservative central Governments and Local Authorities in Scotland. Upon its introduction, 
Labour Councillors in Stirling joined with their colleagues from other regions in criticising the 
Tax and, in particular, its potential effects on their area57. Many of these protests were co-
54 Interview with Lord Strathclyde, 8.11.00. 
55 5.5.88, p12. 
56 Ibid, 7.5.88, pI. 
57 Stirling Councillor Survey (Lab), Winter 2001-2002. 
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ordinated through Convention of Scottish Local Authorities policy groupS58. It is interesting to 
note that such Scotland-wide co-ordination was much harder for Conservative Local 
Government representatives to muster when they wanted to defend the 'POMP,59. However, 
despite being better organised than their Conservative counterparts, Labour Councils in Scotland 
were not always able to make completely unified stands against the metropolitan Government. 
Even though they may have agreed in principle to the stands being taken against subsidy cuts or 
the Poll Tax, some of the less well-funded Labour Councils were not prepared to risk being 
punished with even more subsidy cuts for disobeying directives from Westminster60. At the 
beginning of 1989, it appeared that Stirling would have the highest Poll Tax in Scotland. 
However, rather than lose support due to their culpability in setting such a high rate, the Labour 
Local Authority sought to shift blame onto the metropolitan Government61 . In order to do so, the 
Labour group drew attention to the fact that Stirling was to receive the third lowest level of 
central Government subsidy for the Tax (£22 per capita, as opposed to the Scottish average of 
£55 per capita). Labour Councillor Jack McConnell said: "Now people on low incomes in 
Stirling are not only subsidising the better off... but also the rest of Scotland,,62. 
Nevertheless, the Labour group on Stirling Council had to manoeuvre most adroitly to 
make political capital from the introduction of the Poll Tax in their region. This was because, 
once actual bills started to arrive, it became apparent that the Tax was not going to hurt as many 
58 Ibid (Lab). 
S9 Ibid (Con & Lab). The view of the Labour Group in the survey was that the Conservative 
Scottish Local Government representatives were (and are) not comfortable in the forum of 
COSLA. 
60 Ibid (Lab). 
61 Stirling Observer, 13.1.89, pI. 
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voters financially as in the rest of Scotland. As we have seen, Labour Councils were not averse 
to setting high Poll Taxes, as they were happy to collect the revenue whilst deflecting the 
complaints of taxpayers onto the metropolitan Government. On average, however, households in 
Stirling District would be paying only £9 per annum more under the Poll Tax than they did under 
Domestic Rates63 . In some wards, the difference would be as much as £238, but it should also be 
noted that several affluent Conservative wards were to see their bills drop by up to £304. This 
phenomenon is revealed in Chart 6.11, which shows the actual monthly domestic charges. This 
demonstrates that very high charges were never a feature in Stirling. Importantly, therefore, 
Conservative Councillors in the area were not voted out of office in protest to the Tax, as was the 
case in many other areas. 
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62 Ibid. 
63 Labour Party figures in Stirling Observer, 27.1.89, pI. 
64 Regional Trends: Number 16, 1981, p94, #22, 1987, plIO, #26, 1991, p160, #30, 1995, p87, 
#31, 1996,p201,#33, 1998,p79. 
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Amongst the Conservative Councillors surveyed for this thesis, it was the consensus that 
the metropolitan Government policy that the Labour group on Stirling Council was most 
effective in discrediting amongst the electorate was the Poll Tax. Especially when they were in 
control of the Council, Labour members were able to use media coverage of Council affairs, 
meeting agenda setting and the power to put motions to the Council very proficiently in their 
campaign against the 'POMP,65. Perhaps the most astute tactic employed to discredit the Tax, 
and the Conservatives in London who generated it, was a campaign to instruct voters to pay one 
day after the financial year in which their money was due had finishe<f6. Thereby, Labour 
Councillors could not be accused of inciting voters to break the law, but were successful in 
discrediting the Tax and bringing chaos to metropolitan Government departments who were 
trying to set annual subsidy budgets. As we saw with the example of the Clackmannanshire 
budget in an earlier chapter, Local Authorities in Scotland often had to resort to such loopholes 
in order to 'outwit' the metropolitan Government due to the imbalance in statutory power 
between the tw067. Successive Conservative metropolitan administrations became wise to these 
tactics over the years. Consequently, the possibility to use loopholes became increasingly 
infrequent68. In this instance, however, Labour had some success in taking support from the 
Conservatives. It was ironic that the Labour Party was able to take support from the 
Conservatives in Stirling over the issue of the Poll Tax, as affluent Conservative supporters in 
65 Stirling Councillor Survey (Con), Winter 2001-2002. 
66 Ibid (Lab). 
67 Ibid (Lab). 
68 Ibid (Lab). 
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this region had campaigned most vociferously and successfully for a change to the Domestic 
Rates system 69. 
The perceived inequity of the system was a clear target for the Labour group on the 
Councifo. However, they were still not able to make enough ground in the 'POS' to oust the 
Conservative MP because the presence of significant numbers of Conservatives on the Council 
precluded complete ideological hegemony for Labour. Furthermore, the Labour group could not 
set extremely high levels of Poll Tax in a Council with considerable Conservative representation. 
Their counterparts in less contested areas could do so; thereby generating much revenue, but at 
little 'POS' cost to themselves, as they could blame the metropolitan Government for imposing 
the Tax. 
Even though the actual charges did not seem to warrant it as much as elsewhere in 
Scotland, the Conservative group still felt justified in attacking what they perceived to be the 
high-spending Labour members for setting high figures 71. It is interesting to note that Stirling 
was one of the only areas in Scotland where the Conservatives had sufficient numbers and 
credibility in Local Government to be able to engage in a concerted attack on Labour's handling 
of the Poll Tax without discrediting themselves in the eyes of the electorate72• 
69 Ibid (Con). 
70 Ibid (Con & Lab). 
71 Stirling Observer, 27.1.89, pI. 
72 Interview with Keith Harding, 12.9.01. 
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As in the rest of Britain, the Labour group in Stirling was able to make some political 
capital from the Poll Tax/Local Authority funding issue73 . Importantly, however, due to the 
relatively low financial impact of the issue on the voters of the area compared to other Scottish 
regions, the Conservatives in Stirling managed to hold most of their seats on the Council on this 
occasion. Thus, the potential 'pas' problems caused by losing significant Local Government 
representation were avoided. This loyalty towards their Conservative Councillors amongst the 
electorate was due to personal affinities and the financial gains made by long-standing and newly 
aftluent Conservative voters who were prospering financially under the new Tax74. The latter 
reason suggests that the Tax had some isolated support in Scotland. More importantly, however, 
the former reminds us that, although accessible 'friendly' Councillors could not always sway a 
voter from long-standing loyalties in a General Election, they held sufficient potential to do so in 
small communities to deserve more easily defensible policies from the metropolitan 
Conservative elite. As on the national scale, it is now important to see whether there were any 
significant changes noticed after Mr Major took office in 1990? 
Stirling in the 1990s 
We have seen that the Labour group on Stirling Council in the 1980s sought to contend 
much of the contemporary 'POMP.' However, the remaining Conservative Councillors managed 
to preserve the Party's 'pas' adequately for their MP to stay in office. In this most Conservative 
area of Scotland, it seems that the Labour group in the Local Authority actually managed to keep 
the party competition closer than the economic circumstances of the area would have suggested 
73 Stirling Councillor Survey (Con & Lab), Winter 2001-2002. 
74 Ibid ( Con). 
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was possible in the 1980s. It now remains to be seen how this situation changed in the 1990s to 
such a degree that the Conservative MP lost his seat in 1997. 
In early 1992, it was announced that Stirling was to receive £ 100m in metropolitan 
Government investment. Most of this money was to be spent on the region's castle and other 
tourist attractions75. This is an example of the metropolitan Government becoming engaged in 
local affairs in order to improve its General Election chances. However, this gesture was not 
able to mask other concurrent problems, which Labour Local Councillors were able to blame he 
metropolitan Conservatives for, and thus gain support in Stirling. 
For example, teachers' wages in the region went up. This could only be paid for by an 
increase in Poll Tax76. Rather than losing support for raising taxes, as was the metropolitan 
Government's hope, Labour Local Government representatives were able to turn the argument in 
their favour by blaming the Conservatives in London for not giving sufficient subsidy and 
imposing such an inequitable tax. Similarly, when Council services did have to be cut, Labour 
were able to deflect criticism from their apparent overspending by blaming the threat of 
metropolitan Government capping77. £4.7m worth of cuts had to be effected in the Central 
region of Scotland at this time in order to avoid Charge Capping78. Thus, it seems that there was 
little that Local Authorities north of the border could do to circumvent metropolitan Government 
directives on 'Rolling Back the State.' However, through deft use of the situation, Labour were 
75 Times, 4.2.92, pIS. 
76 Stirling News, 27.2.92, p9. 
771bid, 7.5.92, pI. 
78 Stirling Observer, 10.1.92, pi & 31.1.92, ppl-2. 
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again able to change the circumstances to their favour by being seen to be the defenders of local 
rights and services. It appears that in the 1990s, the ideological hegemony and credibility of the 
Conservatives was waning, even amongst their own supporters. This can be explained by the 
economic downturn, a more credible Opposition and lack of strong central Party leadership at the 
time. Thus, where they were able to defend controversial measures in the 'POMP' in the 1980s, 
they could no longer do S079. 
We saw earlier in this thesis how some Conservatives in Scotland sought to disassociate 
themselves from the metropolitan Government when it became apparent that the central 
administration's image was hurting the Party's chances in Local Government Elections north of 
the border. In the 1995 Local Government Election in Stirling, this point was made again by the 
Conservative candidatesso. As we have seen in earlier chapters, Conservatives in Scotland were 
occasionally frustrated by what they perceived to be a lack of regional sensitivity in the 
formulation of the 'POMP.' Whilst they agreed with the principles behind the policies 
emanating from London, Scottish Conservative Councillors in the 1980s and 1990s would have 
liked to have had the opportunity to make slight amendments to suit local conditions81 . When 
this flexibility was not forthcoming, many Councillors felt let down by the Party elite in London. 
As this thesis has sought to promote, this underestimation of the importance of Party Local 
Government representatives in Scotland on the part of the Leadership in London was having a 
malevolent effect on the Conservatives' 'POS.' 
79 Stirling Councillor Survey (Con & Lab), Winter 2001-2001. 
80 Stirling News, 16.2.95, p2. 
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As local MP, Michael Forsyth sought to counter this central problem ahead of the 1995 
Local Government Elections in Scotland by helping the Stirling Conservatives' campaign 
through attacking the Labour Councillors for school closures. However, as we saw earlier, such 
tactics could be effectively countered by arguments that metropolitan Government spending 
limits were enforcing cuts82. After the 1995 Local Government Election, where Labour regained 
control of the Council that they had lost by a cut of the cards after the previous tied election in 
1992, the Conservatives in Stirling blamed the Party elite in London for their loss83. It is also 
interesting to note that Forsyth identified the 1995 Local Government Election results in Stirling 
as a stem warning for the metropolitan Government ahead of the 1997 General Election84. 
However, this warning came too late and was not promoted with enough vigour to be effective85. 
In 1995, Forsyth felt that his position as MP was in jeopardy. This was because he 
believed that, despite a good record of service provision and tax cuts in the area, the 
Conservatives had suffered unsustainable losses in the Local Government Elections due to the 
'POMP.' Stirling had been a 'flagship' Conservative Council in Scotland, in the manner of 
Wandsworth and Westminster in EnglanJl6. In addition to its record on service provision and 
tax cuts, Forsyth noted how Stirling Council had been such a good example of the virtues of 
strong Local Government, rather than remote metropolitan administration. This comment was 
not a call for Devolution in the nationalist sense, but did seem to hark back to the more 
81 Stirling Councillor Survey (Con), Winter 2001-2002. 
82 Stirling News, 2.3.95, pI. 
83 Stirling Observer, 14.4.95, p4. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Stirling Councillor Survey (Con), Winter 2001-2002. 
86 Interview with Keith Harding, 12.9.01 & Stirling Observer, 30.3.95, p3. 
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decentralised Unionist principles employed in the pre-Thatcher era. It also marked a slight 
deviation from Thatcherite notions of bypassing Local Government in favour of devolving 
'power' direct to the voters87. Nonetheless, there were some references to 1980s policy in the 
form of considerable Thatcherite rhetoric about efficient Local Government and the 
minimisation of bureaucracy. In summation, however, it was clear notice that, by the mid-1990s, 
the 'POMP' was finally putting too much strain on Party representatives in Local Government in 
even the most Conservative areas of Scotland. The Conservatives in Stirling, by their association 
with the metropolitan Government, no longer held sufficient credibility to allow them to 
maintain the levels of organisation and support that were required for successful General 
Election campaigns. 
Just before the 1997 General Election campaign, the Labour-controlled Stirling Council 
criticised the Scottish Office's consultative document on nursery vouchers88. The metropolitan 
Government wanted to launch a pilot scheme in four of the new Unitary Councils~ Local 
Authorities in Scotland believed that this scheme would take £40m from central subsidies for 
Local Government. Stirling Council was able to highlight problems with the scheme. 
Nonetheless, its statutory obligation to defer to Acts of the Westminster Parliament meant that 
the scheme, like the Poll Tax, had to be implemented. Even though this is another example of a 
Scottish Local Authority having insufficient statutory power to actually disrupt the 'POMP' 
directly, they were again able to demonstrate faults with central Government policy to the 
electorate. At this point, however, there were fewer Conservative Councillors to counter 
87 Interview with Lord Lang, 27.3.01 & Bulpitt in: Madgwick and Rose (eds.), 1982, p163. This 
Thatcherite tactic is examined in more detail earlier in this thesis (Chapter 5, especially). 
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Labour's points. If the hypothesis is correct, this dynamic had a significant effect on the 
Conservatives' 'pas' in Scotland. 
This chapter has given examples from a localised area that suggest that this work's 
hypothesis (that Local Government losses in Scotland made subsequent General Election 
campaigns difficult for the Conservatives north of the border) may be credible. We have noted 
how the Stirling Parliamentary seat was not lost by the Conservatives until they had suffered 
significant Local Government losses in the area~ despite other possible causes of the defeat 
having been in evidence for some time before 1997. Due to economic downturns and aspects of 
the 'POMP' such as subsidy cuts, the Labour group in Stirling had similar opportunities as their 
colleagues around Scotland to discredit the Conservatives in the 1980s and 1990s. However, 
they were not able to do so sufficiently to oust the Conservative MP until there was a significant 
drop in Conservative Local Government representation. 
1980s policies such as the Poll Tax had not significantly affected the numbers of 
Conservative Local Councillors in Stirling as much as in other parts of Scotland. This was due 
to the demographic and economic profile of the area. Once Conservatives on the Local Council 
finally were replaced, however, the Party's General Election chances did seem to be significantly 
diminished. The relative economic prosperity of the area just before the 1997 General Election 
precludes the most usual reason for ousting an incumbent MP representing the metropolitan 
Government. Similarly, there is no evidence of a substantial demographic shift in the area 
between 1992 and 1997. Many loyal and potential Conservative voters were still living 
88 Times Educational Scottish Supplement 8.11.96, p3. 
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prosperously in the area. That they had fewer Party Local Government representatives to 
marshal their support seems to have been a significant factor in Michael Forsyth's defeat. 
Throughout this thesis, we have seen qualitative reasons for why the loss of Local 
Government representation might have been significantly damaging to the Conservatives' 
General Election chances in Scotland. What is still required, however, is quantitative evidence 
that these dynamics were actually played out in the General Elections in question. If such 
evidence comes to light, more significance will be leant to the argument in the hypothesis. Thus, 
the chances of Conservative General and Local Government Election losses in Scotland having 
no causal relationship, but just being associated symptoms of a more general decline, will be 
diminished. Therefore, it is the final task of the work to design and implement a suitable scheme 
for measuring the precise effect of Local Government representation losses on Conservative 
General Election chances throughout all regions of the UK between 1979-1997. 
327 
7. General & Local Government Election Results 
1979-1997 
Introduction & Hypothesis 
Throughout this thesis, I have highlighted one phenomenon in Scottish political culture 
that may have had a direct and, as yet, unacknowledged effect on the relationship between the 
Conservatives' 'POMP' and 'pas' north of the border. As we have seen, Scots' relationship 
with their Local Councillors seems to be quite close. This is mainly due to higher levels of state 
involvement in Scottish life, a lack of faith in, and legitimate mandate for, government from 
London, and closer community spirit engendered by structural and civil society factors. 
On both sides of the border, economic hardship and unpopular central Government 
policies caused the Conservatives to lose many Local Government Council seats due to mid-term 
protest votes in the 1980s and 1990s. Examples of such unpopular measures in the 'POMP' 
included the Poll Tax and industrial closures. What has not been addressed is how this dynamic 
reacted back on the Party's hold on office in Westminster via local party politics. Therefore, the 
hypothesis being tested is whether these policies emanating from London caused, due to their 
effect on Local Government Elections and local party politics. particularly significant damage to 
the Conservatives' 'pas' in Scotland. Thusfar, this thesis has introduced and developed 
arguments about why the hypothesis appears to be true. We have seen how Conservative 
ideology. organisation and policies were not appropriate or well received in Scotland. It has also 
been demonstrated how Scottish Local Government representatives should have been able to 
328 
influence General Election voting quite effectively. Furthermore, the Stirling case study 
identifies the reduction of Conservative Local Government representation as a significant cause 
of the loss of the Westminster seat. It is therefore the task of this final study to measure whether 
indeed the proposition in the hypothesis can be supported to an acceptable degree by actual 
election results from all of Scotland during the era in question. 
The methodology, including an explanation and justification of the points system that has 
been devised follows 1• Thereafter, I shall present the major findings in order to substantiate the 
arguments put forward during my elite interview programme. Essentially, the traditional canon 
of literature on the Conservatives' downfall north of the border blames direct voter association 
between the Party elite in London and Scottish economic and fiscal problems. I wish to contend 
that there was another important, less direct, connection between the 'POMP' and General 
Election losses. Unpopular policies emanating from Westminster were causing many 
Conservative Local Government representatives to lose office on both sides of the border. If the 
hypothesis is correct, it was in Scotland that this dynamic had particularly damaging General 
Election consequences for the Party, as they found it harder to organise the 'pas' in General 
Elections without a significant core of Local Government representatives in situ. If this was 
actually the case, then I believe that a new and significant perspective on the relationship 
between the 'POMP' and the 'pas' in Scotland will have been revealed. 
1 Technical details and data sets are presented in appendices to this chapter, as detailed in the 
text. 
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Psephological Study 
Before the methodology, data and results of this study are presented, an explanation of 
the origins and sources for this work must be given. I wish to quantify how successful 
Conservative General Election campaigns have been in specified regions of the United Kingdom. 
The existing canon of literature on British General Election statistics concentrates on percentage 
swings or seats won and losr. As will be explained in greater detail later, such methodologies 
do not serve to test my hypothesis. Therefore, I have had to combine familiar statistical 
techniques in an original methodology that serves the purposes of this thesis better. There are 
few footnotes, as this method has not been copied from previous studies. Nonetheless, it 
conforms to the basic principles of quantitative work, with especial reference to the work of 
Ottar Hellevik on causal analysis through bivariate cross-tabulation3 and the methods of 
Michigan Scaling of interval level data. 
The first stage of this empirical study was to identify which English, Scottish and Welsh 
Local Councils (County, District and Unitary Authority) had seen significant (5%+) reductions 
in Conservative representation in the interim periods between the General Elections of 1979, 
1983, 1987, 1992 and 1997. This exercise was undertaken to establish a limited dependant 
variable, which could be used for comparing the various geographical regions across the period 
2 For example: "Dod's Parliamentaty Companion"; the Butler & Kavanagh "British General 
Election of. .. " series; Evans, Geoffrey & Norris, Pippa (eds.): "Critical Elections. British Parties 
and Voters in Long-Tenn Perspective", London, Sage, 1999; Heath, Anthony; Jowell, Roger & 
Curtice, John: "How Britain Votes", Oxford, Pergamon Press, 1985; King, Anthony (ed.): 
"Britain at the Polls", Chatham, Chatham House, 1992 and Norris, 1997. 
3 Hellevik, Ottar: "Introduction to Causal Analysis - Exploring Survey Data by Crosstabulation", 
London, Allen & Unwin, 1984, Chapter 1, especially. I am also very grateful to Dr Edvard 
Johansson, Swedish School of Economics, for his help with this study. 
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in question. Being able to compare Scotland with other regions that suffered similar losses in 
Conservative Local Government representation will lend more precision to the case in favour of 
the hypothesis. 
The values in Chart 7.1 record the average proportion (%) of Councils per region where 
the Conservatives lost 5% or more of their representatives between 1979-1997 (all sources of 
data are listed at the end of this chapter): 
Conservative Local Gov't Losses '79-'97 
SCQ London SE SW EA EM WM Yorks NW North Wales 
• Affected Councils % 
Chart 7.1 
Now that we can see that Conservative Local Government losses in Scotland were no 
worse than anywhere else in Britain, it seems legitimate to proceed with an assessment of 
subsequent General Election results. If these General Election results are indeed worse in 
Scotland than in other regions previously affected by Local Government losses, the hypothesis 
(that significant Local Government losses in Scotland were capable of jeopardising subsequent 
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General Election chances there) will be supported. Many of these Councils had at least parts of 
more than one General Election constituency within their boundaries. Therefore, the next task 
was to identify how many Westminster seats were affected by these Conservative Local 
Government representation losses. The data set in Appendix A to this chapter was thus 
generated. 
Analysis of Voting Swings 
The next stage was to examine the Conservatives' General Election results in these 
constituencies in order to evaluate whether there was a significant correlation between losing 
representation in Local Government and poor subsequent General Election campaigns in the 
affected areas. In the first instance, this evaluation involved plotting the (by deviation from the 
average) proportions of Conservative Councillors who lost office against (by deviation from the 
average) the subsequent change in the Party's General Election (GE) vote (%) in each area. The 
results in Chart 7.2 were thus generated4: 
4 The data for Charts 7.2 & 7.3 may be found in Appendix B to this chapter. 
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As can be seen from this nominal data, the almost equal distribution of points between 
quadrants one, two and four suggests that, using this methodology, there seems to have been only 
a weak correlation (r = 0.23) between losing Conservative Local Government representation and 
subsequent poor General Election results. Therefore, it would not be legitimate just to identify 
the Scottish results in Chart 7.25 and conclude that Local Government representation losses there 
were the cause of worse General Election results than in other regions. This data refers to the 
UK as a whole over the four General Elections in question. By virtue of Chart 1.2, that the 
inclusion of the English results in Chart 7.2 would render the correlation weak was predictable. 
5 At points : (0.881,2.6) (4.29, -0.389) (4.201 , 4.308) & (-1.47, -4.623) in Chart 7.2 - marked 
with a '+.' 
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In another attempt to support the hypothesis usmg purely the numbers of Local 
Government representatives lost and subsequent General Election voting percentage changes, 
Chart 7.3 records the ratios of the two variables in each of the regions, averaged over the four 
General Elections in question. Here, higher ratios could equate with better proficiency at 
recovering from local representation losses at the next General Election, as severe local losses 
(numerator) were not followed by large General Election losses (denominator). As can be seen, 
Chart 7.3 does little to support the hypothesis, as Scotland falls close to the mean value. 
Ratios of Local:General Election Losses 
1 
seQ Lon SE SW EA EM WM Yorks NW North Wales 
• Ratios 
Chart 7.3 
Weighted Average Scoring System 
Whilst the nominal information above proved interesting with regard to disputing the 
hypothesis, closer inspection of the General Election results, where Scotland was a consistently 
weak area for the Conservatives, suggests that the processes used above provide an insufficient 
analysis of the situation in hand. The key question is how best to evaluate the effectiveness of a 
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Conservative General Election campaign in an area that has recently suffered losses in Party 
Local Government representation? Due to the plurality voting system employed in General 
Elections, merely measuring the Party's change in vote in a constituency from one election to the 
next can often be misleading. The essence of a successful General Election campaign in a 
plurality system is whether or not the seat was won. 
Because of the multi-party system, it is possible to increase one's share of the vote and 
still lose incumbency~ or still win a seat despite polling a lower proportion of the vote than in the 
previous General Election. Furthermore, very small swings in the proportions of votes cast for a 
party, which do not assume much significance in a study based only on voting swings, can cause 
a seat to be won or lost. Examples of these phenomena generated by the plurality system include 
the fact that, in 1983, the Conservatives won eleven seats in my data set despite polling a lower 
percentage of the votes in those constituencies than in 1979. In 1992, the Party lost four seats 
where their vote only dropped by less than 1% since 1987. Such minor swings would not be 
given the prominence that they deserve in a method that only considered proportions of votes. 
Conversely, in 1997, the Conservatives managed to hold 248 seats in my data set where their 
vote had dropped by more than 10% since 1992. Again, a proportion-based methodology would 
not be appropriate here, as it would assume that these results were disastrous for the Party. That 
they held on to the seats in question suggests that, as my preferred methodology does, some 
reward is appropriate. Therefore, for the purposes of testing my hypothesis, it was necessary to 
devise a method of assessing Conservative General Election performance that placed more 
importance on the success of winning a seat, or failure of losing one, than could be derived from 
simply looking at changes in percentages of votes received. 
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My preferred method for achieving this was to devise a points or scoring system that 
rewarded or penalised the Party in any given region for winning or losing a seat, with less 
importance being placed on merely whether its proportion of the vote had risen or fallen6. The 
methodology and data sets for this exercise are set out in Appendix C to this chapter. The points 
scheme in use assesses how far each of the British regions deviated (better or worse) from 
weighted average regional profiles. Thus, the results in Charts 7.4 to 7.7 were generated. These 
figures represent how comparatively well the Conservatives performed in each of the various 
regions in constituencies that had experienced a 5%+ loss in Party representation in Local 
Government since the last General Election. The' in vacuo' in the titles of this first set of charts 
refers to the way in which these indices were generated, as described in the methodology. That 
is to say, that each of the Charts 7.4 to 7.7 only takes into account the results of the particular 
General Election to which it refers. This method accounts for any short-term or local issues that 
might have affected the results. Based on this data, no comparisons can be made from year to 
year. That exercise is undertaken next. 
6 Some regard is paid to campaigns where the seat was neither won nor lost but the 
Conservatives' share of the vote rose or fell by a significant (5%+) margin. This aspect of the 
methodology has been included to take into account the fact that there are some regions where a 
Conservative candidate may have no chance of winning a seat; therefore, only a significant 
change in the votes that they were able to poll demonstrates the effectiveness of their campaign. 
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1 
1983 'in vacuo' Indices 
seQ Lon SE SW EA EM WM Yorks NW North Wales 
• Indices 
--. 1983 A "9. Profile 
Chart 7.4 
1987 'in vacuo' Indices 
seQ Lon SE SW 
• Indices 
.. -
WM Yorks NW 
-- 1987 A"9. Profile 
Chart 7.5 
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1992 'in vacuo' Indices 
seQ Lon SE SW EA EM WM Yo!1<s NW North Wales 
• Indices 
-- 1992 Avg. Profile 
Chart 7.6 
1997 'in vacuo' Indices 
15 
1 
-1 
-20 
• Indices -- 1997 Avg. Profile 
Chart 7. 7 
The results in Charts 7.4 to 7.7 support the hypothesis that the Conservatives did find it 
harder to recover in General Elections in Scotland after significant losses in Local Government 
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representation than in other regions. If these results are averaged over the four elections, an even 
clearer demonstration of this phenomenon becomes apparent (Chart 7.8). 
Average 'in vacuo' Indices '83-'97 
seQ Lon SE SW EA EM WM Yorks NW North Wales 
_ Indices 83-97 A\9. Profile 
Chart 7.8 
The indices produced thusfar compare the various regions only within each specific 
General Election campaign. Whilst it does appear from these results that Conservatives in 
Scotland fared poorly in General Elections subsequent to substantial losses in Local Government 
representation, it could be argued that the relationship was still co-incidental. Therefore, the next 
exercise to be undertaken was to create a single weighted average regional profile for all of the 
four General Elections under consideration. Cross-tabulation of this profile with the regional 
results provides indices that demonstrate the comparative merits of the campaigns in each region 
with regard to the norm for the whole era in question (hence 'v all years '). This more rigorous 
test negates the effect of local issues that might have swung General Election results away from 
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the regional nonn for one election only. Based on this method, the results in Charts 7.9 to 7.12 
were generated. 
1983 'vall years' Indices 
seQ Lon SE SW EA EM WM Yorks NW North Wales 
• Indices 
-- 83-97 A \9. Profile 
Chart 7.9 
1987 'vall years' Indices 
seQ Lon 
• Indices -- 83-97 A\9. Profile 
Chart 7.10 
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1992 'vall years' Indices 
seQ Lon SE EA EM WM Yorks NW North Wales 
_ Indices 
- - 83-97 A\g. Profile 
Chart 7.11 
1997 'vall years' Indices 
_ Indices 83-97 A\g. Profile 
Chart 7.12 
These results lend further credence to the hypothesis by demonstrating that Scotland was 
still consistently a very weak region for the Conservatives after Local Government representation 
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losses. This effect is again more clearly demonstrated by averaging these results over the four 
elections, as displayed in Chart 7.13. 
Average of 'vall years' Indices 
seQ Lon SE SW EA EM WM Yorks NW North Wales 
_ Indices ... 83-97 AIAJ. Profile 
Chart 7.13 
Robustness Test & Intra-Scottish Comparison 
Before any legitimate conclusions can be taken from these results, however, two further 
tests must be made on the data. Firstly, as with any weighted scoring system, a robustness test 
must be carried out in order to ensure that the results that have been collected are not mere co-
incidences or sensitive to the methodology. Such a test appears in Appendix D to this chapter. It 
confirms the robustness of the scoring system in use. 
Secondly, we must investigate the possibility that the Conservatives in Scotland fared just 
as badly in General Elections in constituencies not affected by previous significant losses in 
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Local Government representation. If this was the case, then the variable in question could not be 
accepted as significantly causal. To do this, another data set must be created; one that records 
how these unaffected Scottish constituencies voted in General Elections. If the Conservatives 
fared better outside the areas affected by Local Government representation losses, more credence 
will be leant to my hypothesis. With regard to that data set7, it is important to remember that 
analysis of voting percentage swings only is subject to the same limitations as in the wider data 
set. Therefore, it is necessary to construct another weighted points system for a more useful 
comparison. It is not possible to use the same weighted average regional profiles as in the 
previous UK-wide analyses, as it would not be legitimate to use a system to evaluate a region 
whose results had not been considered in the original weighted averages; that is to say, the 'Rest 
of Scotland. ' 
Therefore, it was necessary to construct new weighted averages for Scotland alone8. 
Thereafter, the same index-generating calculations ('in vacuo' and 'vall years') were undertaken 
as for the UK-wide data set. Taking the four General Elections into consideration, the average 
indices of the two Scottish sets are presented in Chart 7.14 and clearly show that the 
Conservatives fared worse in General Elections in Scottish constituencies that had been affected 
by previous significant losses in Local Government representation. 
7 As presented in Appendix E to this chapter. 
8 The data for this process is also presented in Appendix E to this chapter. 
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Intra-5cottish Avg. Indices Comparison 
'In Vacuo' v All Years 
• Affected Areas • Rest of SeQ 
Chart 7.14 
Proxy Variable 
Finally, with regard to the party political dynamics under examination, it is useful to set 
up a proxy for the independent variable in the hypothesis in order to confirm the legitimacy of 
the results. The hypothesis under consideration proposes that the Conservative Party in Scotland 
fared poorly in General Elections subsequent to significant losses in Local Government 
representation. In the more qualitative sections of this thesis, one of the main reasons given for 
the likely existence of such a causal relationship in Scotland was the higher level of contact 
between voters and their Local Government representatives there. We have also seen how one of 
the clearest ways in which this relationship was manifested was through Local Authority housing 
provision. Therefore, if the indices produced in this study are accurate, there should be an 
inverse correlation between levels of Local Authority renting and index score in each of the 
regions. This is because Conservative General Election performance should have suffered more 
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from the loss of Party Local Government representation in communities featuring high levels of 
Local Authority renting (such as Scotland). 
Proxy Variable Assessment 
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Chart 7./5 
As can be seen in Chart 7.159, which plots the regions' 'vall years' indices against their 
rates of Local Authority renting, the more an area deviated above the national average for 
Council House renting, the lower their index was likely to be lO. This was always the case in 
Scotlandll . Similarly, regions such as the South East of England, which featured well below 
average levels of Local Authority renting, perennially scored well in the weighted average points 
system. This inverse correlation does not imply defInite causation, as factors in addition to low 
levels of dependency on Local Councils for housing may have helped the Conservative electoral 
cause in their English heartland areas. However, that the regions that scored poorly in the 
9 The data for which is presented in Appendix F to this chapter. 
10 The slope of the linear regression line through the given data points is - 13.608. 
II At points : (29.581 , 5.097) (24.581 , 2.643) (11.581 , 10.122) & (6.581 , -4.515) in Chart 7.15 -
marked with a '+.' 
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weighted average scoring system were frequently where renting from the Local Council was at 
above average levels clearly suggests that there was an important link between loss of 
Conservative influence in Local Government and subsequent poor General Election results. 
Conclusion - Assessment and Use of the Results 
As can clearly be seen in the indices charts above, there are clear discrepancies between 
the General Election success rates in areas affected by Local Government losses north and south 
of the border and between affected and non-affected areas in Scotland. Thus, it is fair to say that 
there has been a strong correlation between losing Local Government representation and running 
a poor subsequent General Election campaign for the Conservatives in Scotland. General 
Election success for the Conservatives waned steadily in the 1980s and 1990s in all parts of 
Scotland. This study proves that the effect was much worse in areas affected by significant 
losses in Party Local Government representation. As was mentioned earlier, some senior 
Conservatives were aware of this dynamic~ but were nonetheless unwilling or unable to change 
the course of territorial management strategy being dictated by the Party Leader at the time. 
Earlier in this thesis, reasons for the increased importance of local politics in Scotland 
were put forward. What remains to be done in order to conclude this work, therefore, is to re-
assess Gamble's notion of the 'POS', determine what modifications are needed to account for 
contemporary Scottish conditions and, consequently, conclude whether the results of the 
psephological study can be legitimately added to the causes of the Conservatives' downfall north 
of the border. 
346 
Data for Calculations From: 
Hemming Information Services: Municipal Yearbook & Public Services Directory -
Authorities & Councillors 
1975: pp1051-1054 &1384-1386 
1978: pp605, 696, 758-763, 1260 & 1275 
1982: pp666, 774,842-847, 1408 & 1428 
1984: pp725, 834, 910-915, 1477& 1496 
1986: pp671 , 764, 828, 898-902, 1361, 1379, 1433 &1451 
1988: pp781, 865,930,1002-1006,1468,1487,1541 & 1559 
1991: pp6, 88,149,224-228,697,715,771 &790 
1993:pp6,89, 149,224-228,694,713,767&785 
1998: pp6, 72, 124, 188-191,464,658, & 701 
"Dod's Parliamentary Companion - New Parliament Edition" 
1984: pp515-548 
1988: pp568-602 
1993: pp684-719 
1998: pp786-829. 
HMSO: Regional Trends 
Number 20, 1985, p61, #24, 1989, p71, #29, 1994, p87 & #34, 1999, p86. 
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Appendix A 
Westminster Constituencies Affected by Significant Conservative Losses in Local 
Government Representation 
Nllmberof Nllmberof Nllmberof Nllmberof 
Affected Affected Affected Affected 
Westminster Westminster Westminster Westminster 
Constitllencies Constitllencies Constitllencies Constitllencies 
REGION 1979 1983 1987 1992 
to to to to 
1983 1987 1992 1997 
SCOTLAND 27 33 27 17 
London 15 4 15 49 
SE England 136 113 37 243 
SWEngland 52 41 14 74 
East Anglia 15 8 9 29 
E. Midlands 59 4 7 100 
W. Midlands 68 24 17 49 
YorkIHumber 98 18 15 10 
NWEngland 109 24 19 54 
North (Eng.) 24 3 6 26 
Wales 32 5 16 11 
Table 7.16 
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AppendixB 
Conservative Losses in Local Government & Subsequent Changes in General 
Election Support 1979-1997 
Tables 7.17 to 7.20 record, by regional average, firstly how much Local Government 
representation was lost by the Conservatives from one General Election to the next~ and then, 
how their General Election vote was affected. The Councils under consideration are only where 
Conservative losses were 5% or more of the Council size (n = 1757). 
Region Losses of Conservative Change in General Election 
Councillors from Support in 1983 from 1979 
1979-1983 (%) 
(% of Council Sizes) 
SCOTLAND -15.019 -l.23 
London -13.808 -l.847 
SE England -23.65 -0.359 
SWEngland -2l.795 -0.508 
East Anglia -2l.619 0.08 
E. Midlands -34.215 0.289 
W. Midlands -37.821 -2.847 
YorkIHumber -24.357 -0.665 
NWEngland -34.081 -3.1 
North (England) -21.854 -0.946 
Wales -13.723 -2.2 
Table 7.17 
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Region Losses of Conservative Change in General Election 
Councillors from Support in 1987 from 1983 
1983-1987 (%) 
(% of Council Size) 
SCOTLAND -11.61 -4.219 
London -5.221 3.0 
SE England -10.605 -0.973 
SWEngland -18.699 -1.455 
East Anglia -8.333 1.1 
E. Midlands -7.792 2.425 
W. Midlands -7.102 0.758 
YorkIHumber -7.225 -2.894 
NWEngland -6.752 -4.829 
North (England) -6.061 -5.4 
Wales -25.806 -2.06 
Table 7.18 
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Region Losses of Conservative Change in General Election 
Councillors from Support in 1991from 1987 
1987-1991 (%) 
(% of Council Size) 
SCOTLAND -11.699 0.478 
London -10.602 -1.813 
SE England -10.397 -1.553 
SWEngland -10.29 -3.354 
East Anglia -6.713 -2.622 
E. Midlands -17.19 -0.2 
W. Midlands -8.583 -1.188 
YorkIHumber -7.952 -0.98 
NWEngland -11.986 -0.926 
Nortb (England) -8.798 0.383 
Wales -7.743 -1.163 
Table 7.19 
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Region Losses of Conservative Change in General Election 
Councillors from Support in 1997 from 1992 
1992-1997 (%) 
(% of Council Size) 
SCOTLAND -17.37 -8.453 
London -17.516 -15.127 
SE England -20.889 -13.145 
SWEngland -28.547 -10.886 
East Anglia -20.371 -12.593 
E. Midlands -22.633 -12.121 
W. Midlands -20.119 -10.229 
YorkIHumber -16.365 -12.93 
NW England -14.041 -11.233 
North (England) -13.375 -12.196 
Wales -19.271 -10.727 
Table 7.20 
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Appendix C 
Methodology & Data Sets for Points System in Psephological Study 
Whether or not the Conservative candidate won, lost or held the incumbency or whether 
it was unchanged in the constituencies in question is recorded hereunder. The following charts 
show the frequency of each incident for each General Election in each of the regions. 
U = incumbency unchanged and the Conservative vote changed up or down by less than 5% 
U+ = incumbency unchanged, but the Conservative vote rose by 5% or more since the last 
General Election 
u- = incumbency unchanged, but the Conservative vote fell by 5% or more since the last General 
Election 
'N' refers to the numbers of Westminster constituencies affected by substantial (5%+) losses in 
Conservative Local Government representation in the interim period since the last General 
Election 
1983 N Wins Holds U U+ Losses u-
SCOTLAND 27 0 4 15 0 1 7 
London 15 0 12 2 0 0 1 
SE England 136 6 127 3 0 0 0 
SW England 52 3 44 2 0 3 0 
East Anglia 15 2 11 2 0 0 0 
E. Midlands 62 12 37 12 0 0 1 
W. Midlands 68 2 34 24 0 0 8 
YorkIHumber 98 10 32 53 0 0 3 
NW England 109 3 61 27 0 2 16 
North (England) 24 1 7 II 2 0 3 
Wales 32 1 13 13 0 0 5 
Table 7.21 
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1987 N 
SCOTLAND 33 
London 4 
SE England 113 
SW England 41 
East Anglia 8 
E. Midlands 4 
W. Midlands 24 
YorkIHumber 18 
NW England 24 
North (England) 3 
Wales 5 
1992 N 
SCOTLAND 27 
London 15 
SE England 36 
SW England 13 
East Anglia 9 
E. Midlands 7 
W.Midlands 17 
YorkIHumber 15 
NW England 19 
North (England) 6 
Wales 16 
Wins Holds 
0 5 
0 3 
1 110 
0 38 
0 7 
1 3 
1 15 
1 13 
0 6 
0 I 
0 2 
Table 7.22 
Wins Holds 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
7 
11 
35 
9 
7 
4 
8 
10 
8 
1 
3 
Table 7.23 
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U U+ Losses U-
11 0 6 11 
0 1 0 0 
0 0 2 0 
3 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 
8 0 0 0 
3 0 0 1 
9 0 2 7 
2 0 0 0 
2 0 1 0 
U U+ Losses u-
20 0 0 0 
3 0 1 0 
0 0 1 0 
0 0 3 1 
0 0 2 0 
2 0 1 0 
5 0 3 1 
4 1 0 0 
7 0 3 1 
4 1 0 0 
12 0 1 0 
1997 N Wins Holds U U+ Losses u-
SCOTLAND 17 0 0 1 0 5 11 
London 49 0 8 0 0 26 15 
SE England 243 0 150 0 0 84 9 
SW England 74 0 39 0 0 21 14 
East Anglia 29 0 19 0 0 7 3 
E. Midlands 100 0 34 0 0 36 30 
W. Midlands 49 0 15 0 0 21 13 
YorkIHumber 10 0 4 0 0 5 1 
NW England 54 0 13 0 0 20 21 
North (England) 26 0 5 0 0 0 21 
Wales 11 0 0 0 0 3 8 
Table 7.2-1 
Once the General Election results had been tabulated in this way, the next task was to 
devise a scoring system to generate comparable evaluations of each region. It was decided that a 
legitimate method for this exercise was first to calculate the profile of a weighted average region 
in each of the General Elections under examination. Thereafter, the actual results from each of 
the regions in each of the elections would be multiplied by the factors generated in the averaging 
process, and then divided by the size of the appropriate regional sample to show how they 
deviated from the norm and, most importantly, how they compared with each other. 
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Hereby, weighted average regional profiles were generated for each of the General 
Elections under examination. Starting with 1983: 
1983 n Wins Holds U U+ Losses U-
Average 58 3.636 34.727 14.909 0.182 0.545 4.000 
Table 7.25 
The actual results in each region are then cross-tabulated with this average profile in the 
following manner in order to generate comparable indices: 
(Number a/Wins in 1983 Average x Number of Wins in Regional Profile) 
+ 
(Number of Hold in J 983 Average x Number of Holds in Regional Profile) 
+ 
(Number of 'U' in 1983 Average x Number of 'U' in Regional Profile) 
+ 
(Number of 'U ...... ' in 1983 Average x Number of 'U+' in Regional Profile) 
(Number of Losses in J 983 Average x Number of Losses in Regional Profile) 
(Number of 'u- ' in 1983 Average x Number of 'U- ' in Regional Profile) 
The result is then divided by the number of seats in the regional profile to generate an index 
score for that area. 
Thus, with regard to constituencies in the 1983 General Election that had seen 5%+ reductions in 
Conservative Local Government representation since 1979, the following indices are generated 
for each region (these are the ' in vacuo' indices in the text/charts above). 
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1983 REGION INDEX 
SCORE 
SCOTLAND 12.37 
London 29.503 
SE England 32.918 
SWEngland 30.136 
East Anglia 27.939 
E. Midlands 24.249 
W. Midlands 22.262 
YorkIHumber 19.651 
NWEngland 22.631 
North (England) 16.629 
Wales 19.653 
Table 7.26 
The process was then repeated for the other three General Elections under considerationl2 . 
12 It should be noted that, at this stage, these indices should only be compared with other scores 
in the same election as they are generated by averages specific to the year in question. This 
methodology thus accommodates short-term contemporary issues that affected the poll of the 
year in question. Longer-term trends are dealt with elsewhere in this chapter. 
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1987 n Wins Holds U U+ Losses U-
Average 25.182 0.364 18.455 3.455 0.091 1.091 1.727 
Table 7.27 
1987 REGION INDEX 
SCORE 
SCOTLAND 3.174 
London 13.864 
SE England 17.949 
SWEngland 17.357 
East Anglia 16.011 
E. Midlands 13.932 
W. Midlands 12.70] 
YorkIHumber 13.828 
NWEngland 5.314 
North (England) 8.455 
Wales 8.545 
Table 7.28 
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1992 n Wins Holds U U+ Losses u-
Average 16.364 0 9.364 5.182 0.182 1.364 0.273 
Table 7.29 
1992 REGION INDEX 
SCORE 
SCOTLAND 6.266 
London 7.812 
SE England 9.073 
SWEngland 6.147 
East Anglia 6.98 
E. Midlands 6.636 
w. Midlands 5.674 
YorkIHumber 7.636 
NWEnglaod 5.622 
North (England) 5.045 
Wales 5.557 
Table 7.30 
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1997 n Wins Holds U U+ Losses u-
Average 60.182 0 26.091 0.091 0 20.727 13.273 
Table 7.31 
1997 REGION INDEX 
SCORE 
SCOTLAND -3.995 
London -10.801 
SE England 8.449 
SW England 5.357 
East Anglia 10.718 
E. Midlands -2.573 
W. Midlands -4.417 
YorkIHumber -1.255 
NWEngland -1.255 
North (England) -4.906 
Wales -15.306 
Table 7.32 
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'vall years' Comparisons 
In order to facilitate comparisons across all of the General Elections under consideration, 
the weighted average regional profile from 1983-1997 is: 
1983-1997 n Wins Holds U U+ Losses u-
Average 39.932 1 22.159 5.909 0.114 5.932 4.818 
Table 7.33 
When cross-tabulated with the actual results in the eleven regions according to the formula 
specified above, the following indices are produced: 
1983 REGION INDEX 1987 REGION INDEX 
SCORE SCORE 
SCOTLAND 5.097 SCOTLAND 2.643 
London 18.194 London 16.648 
SE England 20.867 SE England 21.475 
SW England 18.693 SWEngland 20.97 
East Anglia 17.171 East Anglia 18.648 
E. Midlands 14.484 E. Midlands 16.869 
W. Midlands 12.628 W. Midlands 15.861 
YorkIHumber 10.386 YorkIHumber 16.777 
NWEngland 13.076 NWEngland 5.856 
North (England) 8.62 North (England) 11.326 
Wales 10.681 Wales 10.041 
Table 7.3./ Table 7. 35 
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1992 REGION INDEX 1997 REGION INDEX 
SCORE SCORE 
SCOTLAND 10.122 SCOTLAND -4.515 
London 17.036 London -1.005 
SE England 21.379 SE England 11.449 
SWEngland 13.601 SWEngland 9.084 
East Anglia 15.917 East Anglia 12.588 
E. Midlands 13.503 E. Midlands 3.953 
W. Midlands 10.836 W. Midlands 2.963 
YorkIHumber 16.356 YorkIHumber 5.898 
NWEngland 10.317 NWEngland 1.264 
North (England) 7.652 North (England) 0.37 
Wales 8.216 Wales -5.122 
Table 7.36 Table 7.37 
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AppendixD 
Robustness Test of Points System Methodology 
Rather than the accurate weighted average regional profiles employed above, an 
arbitrary points system is used in this robustness test. If the results thus generated differ 
markedly from those in the main text, than the results in the thesis will be invalidated for being 
overly sensitive to the methodology. The random/arbitrary regional profile to be used to 
generate the robustness test points system is: 
Arbitrary n Wins Holds U U+ Losses u-
Values N/A 5 1 0 1 5 1 
Table 7.38 
Average Arbitrary Indices 
o. 
o. 
-0. 
-1 .0 
• A "9. Indices 
Chart 7.39 
When these values are applied to the results of the four General Elections in question13 and 
the results averaged to produce Chart 7.39, the following figures confinn that the methodology 
employed is robust14 and that the results thereby generated are legitimate. 
13 In the same manner as for the 'vall years' section of the main thesis. 
14 As witnessed by Scotland again being the lowest scoring region and the others appearing in 
virtually the same ranking as the 'genuine' results. 
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AppendixE 
Data for Intra-Scottish Comparisons 
Region & Number oj % Change in Wins Held U U+ Losses u-
General Westminster Conservative Consti luencies Vote since 
Election InvolvedJ5 Last General 
Year Election 
Affected 27 -1.23 0 4 15 0 1 7 
Areas 
1983 
Rest of 39 -1.689 2 13 19 1 0 4 
Scotland 
1983 
Affected 33 -4.219 0 5 11 0 6 11 
Areas 
1987 
Rest of 40 -4.688 0 6 18 0 4 12 
Scotland 
1987 
Affected 27 0.478 0 7 20 0 0 0 
Areas 
1992 
Rest of 41 1.334 0 4 35 1 0 1 
Scotland 
1992 
Affected 17 -8.453 0 0 1 0 5 11 
Areas 
1997 
Rest of 55 -8.085 0 0 13 0 6 36 
Scotland 
1997 
Table 7. -10 
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AppendixF 
Data for Proxy Variable Assessment 
Region 1983 1983 1987 1987 1992 1992 1997 1997 
LA 'vall LA 'vall LA 'vall LA 'vall 
Rent years' Rent years' Rent years' Rent years' 
% Index % Index % Index % Index 
Scotland 53 5.097 48 2.643 35 10.122 30 -4.515 
London - 18.194 28 16.648 22 17.036 20 -1.005 
SE 25 20.867 22 21.475 17 21.379 8 11.449 
England 
SW 19 18.693 17 20.97 13 13.601 10 9.084 
Enldand 
East 23 17.171 20 18.648 14 15.917 13 12.588 
Anllia 
East 25 14.484 22 16.869 18 13.503 17 3.953 
Midland 
West 29 12.628 27 15.861 22 10.836 18 2.963 
Midland 
York! 29 10.386 28 16.777 22 16.356 20 5.898 
Humber 
NW 27 13.076 25 5.856 21 10.317 17 1.264 
England 
North 36 8.62 33 11.326 27 7.652 26 0.37 
EnRiand 
Wales 25 10.681 22 10.041 18 8.216 16 -5.122 
Table 7.41 
Average Regional Local Authority Renting % 1983-1997 = 23.419% 
Sources of Housing Statistics: Regional Trends 
Number 20, 1985, p61, #24, 1989, p71, #29, 1994, p87 & #34, 1999, p86. 
15 The numbers of seats in Affected Areas and the Rest of Scotland do not always add up to the 
number of Scottish constituencies represented at Westminster as it is possible for one seat to lie 
within the boundaries of more than one Local or Unitary Council. 
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8. CONCLUSION 
Introduction 
This Conclusion summarises my findings, relates them to the hypothesis and defends the 
case put forward in the thesis. A major potential criticism of the hypothesis is that the reductions 
in Scottish Conservative Local Government and Westminster representation from 1979-1997 
were merely symptoms of the demise of the Party in general north of the border and had no 
causal relationship. Following a summary of the qualitative chapters, that problem is addressed 
in a re-presentation of the quantitative evidence of Chapter 7. This Conclusion then finishes with 
a wider assessment of the work and its contribution to the field. 
The thesis investigated the connection and inter-relationship between Local Government 
and General Election success. The proposition addressed in the hypothesis concerns the electoral 
fortunes of the Conservative Party in Scotland from 1979-1997 and asks whether: 
Conservative losses in Local Government Elections in Scotland (losses primarily caused by the 
contemporary 'POMP,) were severely dallUlging to the Party's subsequent General Election 
chances there'! 
The quantitative and qualitative evidence in this thesis suggests that the hypothesis can be 
supported. The following presents an assessment of my findings. 
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Thesis Findings 
Chapter 2, which considered the ideology and structure of the Conservative Party, 
appraised concepts and structures that form part of the traditional canon of explanations for the 
Party's demise in Scotland. We saw how the hierarchy of the Party sought to maintain its 
distance from the non-elite and Local Government. This attitude was accepted in affluent 
regions of England where voters saw their wealth as a result of the expertise of the Conservative 
leadership. Such a structure was not so effective, however, when the fortunes of local 
communities were not so prosperous. In such instances (including Scotland), accessibility to the 
Party Leadership for Conservative Local Councillors would seem to have been an ideal source of 
information that could have effected more suitable responses in the ·POMP.' As such 
communication was not possible, we saw how the Party elite in London perpetuated policies that 
may have been winning them votes in the affluent South East of England, but were causing 
considerable damage to their 'POS' on the geographical periphery. Not only were such policies 
as industrial closures and the Poll Tax causing Conservative General Election candidates to lose 
in Scotland, they were also condemning Party Local Government representatives, by association. 
To further the case in favour of the hypothesis, it was necessary to identify which 
characteristics of Scottish society could have rendered the actions of Local Government so 
important in the 'POS' there. Therefore, Chapter 3 of this thesis examined the social 
circumstances and political culture of Scotland~ thereby furthering the assessment of why it 
might have been such a significant problem for the Conservatives to be losing Local Government 
representation in Scotland? As we saw in the quantitative study later in the thesis, such losses 
seemed quite easy to recover from in England. In Chapter 3, we discovered that Scottish voters 
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experienced frequent contact with their Local Councillors as society there seemed to be 
structured heavily around the state and local communities. There were also more practical 
reasons such as the very high incidence of Council House renting and attitudes presented in 
Scottish education and the media. Thus, Scotland's resultant political culture granted significant 
authority and credibility to Local Government representatives. Therefore, the Conservative 
Governments in Westminster would have been well advised to take heed of these differences and 
amend their 'POMP' accordingly. As we have seen, the unitary state ideology of the Thatcher 
era rendered such flexibility impossible, thus jeopardising the Party's 'POS' north ofthe border. 
Thus, we began to see a potential reason for why the proposition in the hypothesis may 
be proven. The continued presence of Conservative Councillors in office in Scotland would 
have allowed the Party closer contact with the communities and the consequent opportunity to 
effectively organise the 'pas.' However, as these Conservative Councillors lost office, their 
replacements from Opposition parties had the potential to take advantage of the influential role 
of Local Government representatives in Scotland to win over the support of their constituents for 
subsequent General Elections. 
Chapter 4 went on to analyse the 'POMP' of the 1980s and 1990s that was causing the 
Conservatives so much trouble in Scotland. The list of central policies that were to blame was 
familiar and there was no effort to discredit existing views that they caused the Party problems 
directly with voters in General Elections in Scotland. However, what should also be 
remembered throughout the course of these discussions is that they were also causing difficulties 
for Conservatives at the local level north of the border. Such non-elite Party members, whether 
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they were Councillors or activists, were essential for the successful organisation of the 'POS' 
and defence of the 'POMP.' However, due to the succession of unpopular policies emanating 
from London, these Scottish Conservatives no longer held Local Government office or any 
credibility within their communities. 
In order to further assess how the findings of this thesis could complement the existing 
canon, Chapter 4 concluded with a review of existing explanations for the Conservative decline 
in Scotland. The fundamental question that was addressed concerned the nature and chronology 
of the demise. Some viewed the decline of the Party from its electoral zenith in 1955 as having 
been long-term and almost inevitable due to the modernisation and secularisation of Scottish 
society, in addition to economic divergence from England. Alternatively, the New Right policies 
employed by the Thatcher and Major administrations were blamed for significantly precipitating 
the Conservatives' downfall north of the border. 
The electoral data presented in Chart 4.5 indeed showed a steady decline that did not 
seem to be altered significantly in the 1980s and 1990s, thus giving credence to the former 
argument. Nonetheless, it is important to note that, even though they did not seem to lose more 
votes than expected in Scotland, the Conservatives also failed to increase their share as in other 
regions of the UK during the Thatcher-Major era. The unpopularity of the policies emanating 
from London after 1979 must therefore not be discounted. The policies of the New Right were 
not well received north of the border, as they were incompatible and unpopular with Scottish 
voters. Many of these voters were dependent on the state for housing, welfare and employment. 
These benefits were reduced through the 1980s and 1990s through programmes such as 'Rolling 
369 
Back the State' and the 'Right to Buy.' With regard to the hypothesis under investigation, the 
unpopularity of the 'POMP' of the 1980s and 1990s in Scotland becomes especially important 
once the connection between unpopular central policies and resultant Local Government Election 
losses is established. 
As we saw in Chapters 2, 3 and 4, the removal from office of Conservative Councillors 
and some aspects of the contemporary 'POMP' allowed Opposition party representatives to gain 
more influence in their communities in Scotland. Therefore, one set of policies of particular 
interest here was the 'Rolling Back the State' project. In Chapter 5, we saw how these measures, 
whilst being popular with affluent taxpayers, somewhat increased the resolve of Opposition party 
Councillors to discredit the Government in Westminster. Given their extra influence in the local 
communities of Scotland, these efforts had significant impact on the 'POS' and consequent 
General Election results. 
Chapter 6 offered a more detailed assessment of the effects of the dynamics in question 
through a case study of the Stirling area. This area was primarily chosen as the Conservatives 
did not lose the Parliamentary seat until they had lost significant representation on the Local 
Council. All of the problems that caused the Party to lose seats in Scotland in the General 
Elections of 1983, 1987 and 1992 were present in Stirling. Therefore, it seemed that the new 
variable that this thesis proffers~ that is to say, that the loss of Local Government representation 
in Scotland made subsequent General Election campaigns especially difficult for the 
Conservatives, may have had a significant effect on the General Election in 1997 in Stirling. 
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Spurious Associations & False Particularisation 
The patterns of Conservative Local Government and Westminster representation In 
England and Scotland, which were presented in Chart 1.2, suggested that there might have been a 
causal relationship between the two variables north of the border. Up to the end of Chapter 6, 
qualitative explanations were presented of why and how the proposition in the hypothesis may be 
supported. To facilitate a more comprehensive conclusion, Chapter 7 examined UK-wide Local 
Government and General Election results from 1979-1997 in order to see whether adequate 
quantitative evidence for the hypothesis was given by the polls in question. 
The study was designed to test for empirical evidence for or against the hypothesis and to 
address the major potential criticism that the findings may be guilty of false particularisation. 
That is to say, statistical support needed to be sought for a significant degree of causality 
between Local Government and General Election losses and, furthermore, that this situation was 
unique to Scotland. If the Conservatives had suffered equal General Election problems 
subsequent to Local Election losses in all regions of Britain, then it would have been impossible 
to defend the hypothesis. It would have been too easy to point out that it should follow that a 
party should do badly in General Elections following Local Government losses in any particular 
region. Electoral defeats at both levels would seem to be unconnected symptoms of the same 
problem~ that is to say, general unpopularity for the Party that had little to do with whether there 
were significant numbers of Local Government representatives in office or not. 
As Chart 7.1 demonstrated, the Conservatives were not losing greater proportions of 
Local Government representatives in Scotland compared to the other regions of Britain between 
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1979-1997. Vitally, however, as the results in Chapter 7 go on to show, the Party found it 
hardest to recover from these losses in subsequent General Elections north of the border. These 
results are essential for defending the proposition in hand. The same variable was in place in all 
regions of the UK; that is to say, significant losses in Conservative Local Government 
representation preceding General Elections. The psephological study presents substantial 
evidence that those circumstances consistently led to poor General Election results in Scotland 
only. Thus, significant statistical support can be given to ascribing causality between Local and 
General Election losses in Scotland, compared with the rest of the UK. 
To defend against the criticism of false particularisation further, it was also necessary to 
test Conservative General Election performances in areas of Scotland not preceded by Local 
Government Election losses. If these General Election results were as poor as in the areas north 
of the border affected by antecedent Local Government Election losses, the hypothesis could still 
not be adequately supported, as, ultimately, no causal link could be suggested between the two 
variables of Local Government and General Election losses. The 'intra-Scottish' comparison 
presented in Chart 7.14 presented further evidence that a substantial causal link did exist between 
Conservative Local Government and General Election results north of the border. Here, it is 
shown how Conservative General Election results in the rest of Scotland were significantly better 
than those in areas affected by Local Government representation losses. In many ways, this 
stands to reason, as a part of Scotland that was prepared to retain significant numbers of 
Conservative Councillors only two or three years before was still likely to be somewhat pre-
disposed to the Party at the next General Election. Nevertheless, if the General Election results 
in these apparently stronger localities had been just as poor as the affected ones, it would seem 
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that Conservative General Election candidates could have lost in Scotland whether or not their 
area had strong Local Government representation. This would have rendered any causal links 
identified in the study as spurious. However, as Chart 7.14 showed, Conservative General 
Election losses in Scotland were indeed worse where they had recently lost Local Government 
representatives. I wish to contend that these losses were significant because these Conservative 
Councillors were very important in Scotland for organising and directing the Party's 'POS' in 
their areas. 
Thus, Chapter 7 showed that the Conservatives did indeed find it harder to organise the 
'POS' in parts of Scotland where their Local Government representation was dwindling. 
Furthermore, this dynamic was more of an acute problem in subsequent General Elections north 
of the border than anywhere else in the UK. 
Conclusion - The 'Politics of Support' and Modern Scotland 
During the 1980s and 1990s, due to the scarcity of Party MPs in Scotland, the primary 
Conservative interface with the electorate north of the borer was, by default, Local Govemmene. 
We have seen how the actions and reputations of Local Government representatives of all parties 
assumed great 'POS' importance in Scotland as voters there looked for sources of authority other 
than the central Government in Westminster. We must now conclude about what sort of effect 
that the failure oflocally organised 'POS' had on the Conservatives' General Election demise. 
1 Stirling Councillor Survey (Con), Winter 2001-2002. 
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When questioned about this dynamic, Lord Lang noted that the Conservatives had never 
really seriously engaged in local politics2. This may have been acceptable practice in England 
where the Party's 'POS' did not seem to be so reliant on Local Government representatives for 
organisation and direction. In Scotland, however, the consequences were more dangerous. It 
would be overstatement to claim that Local Government plays a decisive role in General 
Elections anywhere in Britain. Indeed, as Local Government does not stop for General 
Elections, Councillors are usually too busy to campaign vigorously3. However, this thesis has 
shown that local politicians in Scotland have considerable influence on their constituents' 
General Election voting intentions. Therefore, the Conservative elite in London were 
compounding their General Election problems north of the border by not providing their 
representatives in Local Government there with adequate support, resources or easily defensible 
policies. 
Once the Party elite in London did decide to pour more resources into local politics, it did 
so in a half-hearted manner, and somewhat too late. By this time (the late-1980s), local politics 
was 'out of phase' with the national scene4. Hence, Local Government Elections were being 
used as a protest vote against the national Government in Westminster. In England, it was 
possible for the Conservatives to recover from losses of Council seats and do well at the next 
2 Interview with Lord Lang, 27.3.01 - repeated in Stirling Councillor Survey (Con), Winter 
2001-2002. There are, however, isolated exceptions to this generalisation. For example, several 
successive officials at the Department of the Environment were 'steeped' in Local Government 
issues, as they were charged with liaising with the regions - Interview with Martin Perry, 
24.8.01. Michael Heseltine, Lord Belwin (who had begun his career in Local Government in 
Leeds), John Townend and, especially, John Gummer all made efforts to raise the Party's profile 
on the local level. It seems, however, that the Conservative Leadership was not so interested. 
3 Interview with Martin Perry, 24.8.01. 
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General Election because it seems that voters there made their General Election decisions based 
on long-standing party preferences, personal economic fortune and national issues. In Scotland, 
on the other hand, loyalties were less deep, prosperity was not so high and, crucially for this 
work, the Party depended much more on local politicians to organise their 'POS.' Unfortunately 
for the Conservatives, their position in Scotland was heavily damaged by 'POMP' issues that 
forced Local Councillors out of office. The ensuing lack of organisation at General Elections, it 
is argued here, eventually reacted back on the central Party's General Election chances. The 
results in Chapter 7 show a strong causal link between losing local representation in Scotland 
and poor subsequent General Election campaigns there. 
Post-war General Election results suggest that the Scottish Conservatives were declining 
steadily since the 1950s due to economic divergence with England and the modernisation and 
secularisation of society north of the border. Therefore, it may seem inappropriate to try to 
identify the dynamics of Scottish Local Government in the 1980s and 1990s as having had a 
particularly significant impact on the Party's electoral fortunes there. However, I wish to 
contend that even smooth regressions of this sort are punctuated and perpetuated by readily 
definable turning points and events. As Lord Lang said, it was the succession of such events and 
changes in Scottish society that eventually made it impossible for the Conservatives to be 
successful there5. Therefore, the Local Government dynamics of the 1980s and 1990s6 explored 
4 Interview with Lord Lang, 27.3.01 + Stirling Councillor Survey (Con), Winter 2001-2002. 
5 Interview, 27.3.01 - as examples, he cited the gradual turning of the Scottish media against the 
Conservatives, the growing incompatibility of Mrs Thatcher's personality and ethos with the 
apparent 'dependency culture' north ofthe border and the introduction of the Poll Tax. 
6 As discussed in Chapter 3, the nature of Scottish Local Government was very different in the 
Thatcher-Major era to the 1950s, when it seemed to have little party political influence. 
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in this thesis could be placed alongside long-term changes in modem Scottish society and 
unpopular contemporary policies as another important factor in the Party's decline/failure to 
recover north of the border. 
Of course, the correlation identified in Chapter 7 does not unequivocally prove total 
causation. As Viscount Younger and Lord Lang were most keen to point out, it is impossible to 
ascribe just one particular variable as being the only cause of the Conservatives' electoral failure 
in Scotland7. I am not prepared to go as far as the former and completely dismiss the concept of 
cause and effect. I do, though, agree with both insofar as the Party's demise in Scotland was 
caused by an accumulation of reasons; some of which originated before 1979. There is a set of 
long and short-term reasons for the Conservative demise, which has been examined in Chapter 4. 
This thesis acknowledges the importance of these undeniable causes. My main purpose, 
however, is to introduce and highlight the loss of Conservative Local Government representation 
caused by inappropriate 'POMP' as a new and worthwhile feature of the canon. 
This thesis has shown that many Scottish voters seemed inclined to base their General 
Election choices on the presence of effective and approachable Local Councillors who 
represented the national parties there. It seems that the Conservative central elite failed to 
recognise this. Consequently, not enough was done in London to arrest the tide of Party Local 
Government election losses in Scotland that were being caused by unpopular measures in the 
'POMP.' In conclusion, therefore, I submit that, due to the different social, cultural and party 
loyalty characteristics of Scotland that were examined in earlier chapters, the Conservative Party 
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in Scotland did indeed find it very difficult to recover from losses in Local Government 
representation at subsequent General Elections. 
Main Contributions of this Thesis 
In assessing the main contributions of this work, there are four major themes that should 
be addressed. Firstly, we should consider how the findings of this study add to the understanding 
of Scottish party politics in the 1980s and 1990s. Most important here are new views regarding 
the pervasive nature and influential power of Local Councillors over the electorate north of the 
border. This thesis is not a comparative study and the dynamics of Local Government in 
England and Wales have not been addressed to any substantial degree. However, that the 
Conservatives did not suffer the same General Election problems south of the border subsequent 
to similar Local Government representation losses in Scotland suggests that Local Authorities 
north of the border played a significantly more influential role in the political culture and 'POS' 
there. 
Secondly, this thesis also introduces a new aspect into the well-covered field of why the 
Conservatives capitulated in Scotland. As recounted in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, there are many well 
known and legitimate reasons for the Party's demise, some of which originated before 1979. As 
I have sought to demonstrate, these changes in Scottish society and unpopular measures in the 
'POMP' also had subtle 'side-effects' in Scottish Local Government and, thus, the 'POS.' Many 
Conservative Local Councillors lost their seats merely through their association with the Party 
elite in London. Furthermore, Labour and Nationalist groups in Scottish Local Authorities were 
7 Interviews 14.2.01 & 27.3.01. 377 
encouraged to mount concerted campaigns to discredit the metropolitan Government. Because 
of these circumstances, it became much more difficult for Scottish Conservatives to defend 
central policies amongst local communities and organise the effective General Election 
campaigns. Thus, the Party's' POS' north of the border was severely compromised. Two further 
points to reflect on in this Conclusion concern the implications of this work for similar studies of 
the questions and dynamics in hand. 
This thesis emphasises a dynamic in Scottish political culture that seems to have a 
significant effect on the 'POS.' Therefore, the various political parties might wish to reflect on 
the proposition that protecting the tenure of their Local Government representatives north of the 
border should be more of a priority. When a party is in Government in Westminster (or 
Edinburgh), this can be achieved through regionally sensitive and, thus, easily-defensible 
'POMP.' Whether in office or not, parties could also look to provide more resources for Local 
Government election campaigns and make a commitment to heed the information passed up to 
the party leadership from non-elite members. Better co-ordinated use of their Local Government 
representatives in Scotland should also benefit a party in the 'POS.' To these ends, it is 
interesting to note that Conservatives in Scotland have been campaigning for such 
acknowledgement from the elite in London for some time8• That it was not forthcoming added 
greatly, I submit, to the Party's General Election problems north of the border. As a post-script, 
it should also be recognised that the Conservatives' post-I9971200 1 re-organisation has begun to 
re-assert the efficacy ofa 'bottom-up' approach to the running of the party9. 
8 Stirling Councillor Survey (Con), Winter 2001-2002. 
9 Interview with Keith Harding, 12.9.01. 
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Finally, this thesis tries to salvage somewhat the processes and characteristics inherent to 
the 'POS' for political science in Britain. Given the elite focus of the media and studies of 
'statecraft' in recent times, it is unsurprising that the issues of Local Government, political 
culture, community and popular opinion have been overlooked to some degree. In the 1980s and 
1990s, issues of globalisation and macroeconomics seemed to dominate. As this thesis and the 
movement for peripheral Devolution in more recent times show, however, it was somewhat of an 
error for Governments to pursue the 'POMP' with little respect for their domestic electorate. 
Such mishandling of the 'POMP' ultimately led to the Conservatives losing the right to govern 
as their 'POS' had broken down. 
The Conservatives' demise from their Scottish electoral zenith in 1955 was a slow steady 
decline. As the deviant General Election results of 1979 and 1992 show (both of which 
temporarily reversed the decline), this regression was neither inevitable nor uneventful. In the 
period from 1979-1997, this decline was marked by occasional changes in the nature of Scottish 
society and political culture, events, or policies. Such points of interest included the further 
deterioration of Orangeism/Unionism, economic divergence from England, industrial closures 
and the Poll Tax. These stood out as particularly damaging to the Party's 'POS' north of the 
border. I cannot discredit these reasons, but believe that the new dynamics explored in this thesis 
are worthy of consideration as part of this canon. In conclusion, therefore, I submit that the 
original contribution of this thesis is to demonstrate that the loss of Local Government 
representation north of the border in the late Twentieth Century should be added to the existing 
list of significant causes of the Conservatives' electoral demise in Scotland. 
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9. The Research Process 
After a precise testable hypothesis has been generated, data collection is always one of 
the major tests in producing a thesis. The era in question in this work precluded extensive use 
of one of the two most familiar options for political scientists interested in British affairs~ that is 
to say, archival records. The Public Record Office can only provide certain documents from 
thirty years ago and beyond. The Conservative Party Archive at the Bodleian Library is subject 
to similar chronological and confidentiality access restrictions. Nonetheless, essential 
background information regarding Anglo-Scottish relations and Conservative intra-Party affairs 
is contained in these latter archives. Thus, they had to be consulted. Going through the proper 
channels to request permission for access to these documents tests the tenacity and diplomacy of 
the researcher. 
Apart from archival and secondary source analysis, the major remammg research 
technique, that is to say, interviews, was essential for the completion of this thesis. Gail 
Stedward asks why interviews fonn a very frequent part of political science researchl? She 
questions whether this is the best method to gather the relevant data? However, she also admits 
that there is a fairly limited repertoire of alternative techniques available. As documents in the 
various archives were not going to provide me with sufficient information relevant to the 
modem era, interviews would be the most reliable option. 
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The examination of primary sources is always seen as being the more professional way 
to approach research. This seems to be a reasonable argument, given that the researcher is 
forced to come up with his, or her, own conclusions without relying on the help of others. 
However, there are some pitfalls in eschewing secondary accounts, as Rodney Lowe points our. 
When approaching my interview questions about Conservative metropolitan-peripheral or intra-
party affairs, I had to be wary of possible/probable bias in the wording of documents or 
interview replies. Nonetheless, even if an interviewee's recollections did not seem to be 
'correct' , such information was useful as a demonstration of what misconceptions the 
Governments of the day may have been working under~ thus generating inappropriate and 
unpopular 'POMP.' Whyte comes up with some interesting points to look out for when 
conducting an interview. These are especially relevant if all responses are considered to be 
subjective views, which have been clouded by the interviewee's own feelings about the matter 
in hand. The researcher should evaluate the respondent's state of mind and values underlying 
their opinions. Similarly, ulterior motives behind responses such as career enhancement or the 
desire to please the researcher should be filtered out. When an interviewee is recounting factual 
events, distortions must also be dealt with. Such 'mistakes' may occur if the respondent did not 
actually witness an event, or if memories or perceptions become modified to suit their own 
needs. Therefore, all such accounts should be corroborated whenever possible3. 
I In: B~ Peter (ed.): "Surviving the Research Process in Politics", London, Pinter, 1997, 
r151. 
Lowe, Rodney: Plumbing New Depths: Contemporary Historians & the PRO, 
in: Twentieth Century British History, 8, 2, 1997, pp239-265, pp239-42. 
3 In: Burgess, Robert (ed.): "Field Research: A Sourcebook & Field Manual", London, Allen & 
Unwin, 1982, ppI14-6. 
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Obtaining access to interviewees is a considerable challenge. Gary Spencer examines 
the problem that all political science researchers face: that members of the party political elite 
are often reluctant to grant interviews or survey replies4. This hesitancy, he claims, is borne out 
of a fear of the threats to their careers or reputations that indiscreet comments might pose. This 
assertion was borne out in my research, as mentioned in several of the chapters. Spencer 
recommends more informal approaches to lower ranking officials, in-house researchers or third 
parties if access to the top seems to be impossible. To this, I might add that the advent of 
Parliamentary, Party and Local Council websites has been useful, as e. mails direct to potential 
interviewees seemed more successful in by-passing' gatekeeper' personal assistants than written 
letters or telephone calls. 
Aside from the standard application methods mentioned by Spencer and StedwardS, I 
have found that 'networking' is also very important. Perhaps one of the most important 
questions in an otherwise slightly unproductive interview can be 'can you suggest anyone else I 
should speak to about this issue?,6. Interviewing academics renowned in the field at the outset 
of the fieldwork process can be especially useful in this respect. 
Preparation is vital before embarking on an interview. Not only will the respondent have 
no grounds to dismiss the researcher as an amateur, but also authoritative precise questions 
facilitate an agenda that will both satisfy the needs of the thesis and the ego of the interviewee. 
4 In: ibid, pp23-30. 
5 In: Burnham (ed.), 1997, p1S3, regarding identifying possible targets through media reports 
and departmental yearbooks and the writing of an introductory letter etc. 
6 Stedward, in: ibid, pISS. 
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As Robert Burgess points out, there is often a need to be silent during an interview to let the 
respondent expound on a point, thus revealing its true significance'. This point was borne out 
many times in my experience. From primary and secondary accounts that have been consulted 
beforehand, the researcher should have a definite idea about the course of events under 
investigation. In my case, these were issues pertaining to the central-Local Government 
relationship in the 1980s and 1990s. Therefore, any deviation from the widely accepted canon 
of explanations can either reveal how the interviewee or their party was/is out of touch from the 
social, political and economic realities of the situation under examination or, and with vital 
importance for this thesis, can generate a new hypothesis. 
My hypothesis concerning the connection between loss of Conservative representation in 
Local Government in Scotland and General Election chances was formulated in exactly this 
manner. This JXlint, which was not in reply to a direct question, was mentioned first in an 
informal section at the end of an interview where I always asked whether there are any other 
matters that should be considered. Thus, we can see that a set of fifty questions that could be 
answered 'yes' or 'no', whilst having its uses, is a limited methodology that, if I had employed 
it, would not have facilitated the vital hypothesis-generating comment. Furthermore, as has 
been mentioned in the thesis' text, the interviewee in question acknowledged that members of 
the Conservative metropolitan elite were aware of the dynamic in question at the time. 
However, he admitted that nothing was done in the 'POMP' to arrest the demise of the Party in 
Scottish Local Government. Therefore, not only did an actual elite interview comment, which 
7 Burgess (ed.), 1982, P 109. 
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could have been defined as little more than a casual aside at the time, generate an original 
hypothesis that could be tested, but also gave valuable commentary thereon as well. 
Fiona Devine also puts the case for 'open-ended' questions as, as we have seen, they 
facilitate broader discussions, which may reveal information that the researcher was not aware 
of. However, the interviewer must be firm occasionally. Time is limited. Thus, whilst 
diversions may be interesting, their value to the thesis must be evaluated on the spot and put to 
an end if deemed to be not worthwhile. Prioritising is essential. There are points that have to be 
covered; some that the researcher would like to be touched on and then some issues that could 
be discussed if there is time left over at the end. As William Foote Whyte points out, the 
interviewer must be in control of the direction being taken by the meeting9. Therefore, it is up 
to the interviewer to encourage the respondent to continue, reflect on or repeat a point or to 
introduce new questions about topics that mayor may not have already been touched upon. In 
Kidder and Judd (eds.), the need for the researcher to control the interview tightly is emphasised 
in order that the data collected might be of the highest possible qualitylO. Therefore, it is also up 
to the interviewer to build a strong rapport quickly and thus create an atmosphere in which the 
respondent will not mind having inadequate or vague responses probed. Furthermore, a pleasant 
atmosphere will probably allow the interviewer to steer the respondent away from biases caused 
by the desire to conform to, for example, the wishes of their employer. If a good relationship 
has been formed, the researcher should also be able to motivate the interviewee more easily, as 
8 In: Marsh & Stoker (eds.), 1995, p138. 
9 In Burgess (ed.), 1982, p112. 
10 Kidder, Louise & Judd, Charles (eds.): "Research Methods in Social Relations - 5th Ed,", 
New York, CBS Publishing, 1986, pp225-6 & 265-6. 
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Whyte told us to aim at. Such a relaxed atmosphere can often be built up quickly by asking 
easy questions at the start of the interview. This assures the respondent that they are not going 
to be subjected to any kind of inquisition which may make them appear in some way 
incompetent. 
Indeed, I did find that being able to relax the atmosphere of an interview was most 
productive. All interviewees seemed to be somewhat wary at the outset. As has been 
mentioned, many were concerned about protecting their careers and reputations. The Stirling 
case study emphasised this point and introduced some new technique challenges. With one 
exception in that survey, distance and expense precluded face-to-face interviews. Therefore, the 
remaining options were written questionnaires or telephone interviews. I have already 
explained the problems with questionnaires in cases like this. Thus, telephone interviews were 
mainly employed. 
The Stirling Council website provided the Councillors' home telephone numbers. 
Thereafter, my interview technique was challenged, I submit, more than during the elite (face-
to-face) programme. When a long-standing appointment at the House of Lords or Scottish 
Parliament was used for an interview, the respondents had prior warning and probably took a 
moment beforehand to collect their thoughts. Indeed, one or two had very definite agendas that 
they were keen to fulfil in spite, it sometimes appeared, of the questions that I was asking. 
Before the series of telephone calls to Stirling, each potential respondent was sent a letter 
explaining the project and my intention to get in touch. Nonetheless, the timing of getting 
through on the telephone cannot be foretold as accurately as a precise diary date. Furthermore, 
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it is somewhat of an intrusion to be called at home during the evening. I had to adopt this 
approach, as the chances of catching a respondent in the Council offices at a moment when they 
had time to give an interview were slim. The first few moments of the conversations were vital. 
I had to impart to the interviewees, almost in one breath, that this was a serious project, that 
their anonymity was secure, that their responses were very important to me and that the 
interview would not take too long. 
Thereafter, the interview schedule had to be precise. I still wanted to avoid a scenario 
where questions could be answered 'yes' or 'no.' Nevertheless, with a less 'captive' 
respondent, who could terminate the interview quite sharply, it was necessary to extract as much 
information as possible in a limited time. Therefore, a little more than during the face-to-face 
interviews, I had to lead some answers to suit the needs of the case study. For example, I was 
especially interested to learn about the effects of subsidy cuts, central control of Local 
Government and the Poll Tax in Stirling. Therefore, if the conversation was dealing with 
contentious 'POMP', I felt justified in suggesting these policies as examples in order to assess 
the respondents' reactions. I found this technique useful as it not only suited my agenda, but 
also negated the possibility of embarrassing silences as respondents tried to think of good 
examples for the points that they were making. I am very grateful to these respondents who, 
once they were put at ease, were usually kind enough to grant me a lot longer than I had 
originally suggested. Once again, these more informal afterthoughts that expanded on my 
precise schedule were often most productive. The use of face-to-face and telephone interviews 
presents one of the only major ethical considerations connected with this thesis. The accurate 
representation of what is said at these meetings is essential. 
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The methodology employed in the psephological study is described in the text of, and 
appendices to, that chapter. Of most interest in the research process there was having to design 
and implement a legitimate points scoring system once I had realised that the immediately 
obvious statistical methods were inconclusive with regard to the hypothesis. Such an exercise 
may be open to accusations of 'fiddling the figures' until they suited my purposes. This was not 
the case, however, as demonstrated by my assessment in the chapter itself of the vagaries of the 
plurality/multi-party voting system in use in General Elections. 
Finally, in addition to these methodological issues, finding appropriate conceptual 
underpinning for a work such as this is an important exercise. Gamble's 'POMP' and 'POS' 
have been very useful in providing a model against which my findings can be measured. This 
has led to a level of consistency that might not have been present had no particular exemplar or 
theory of the state been employed. Nevertheless, it should be acknowledged that concepts such 
as Gamble's are of an essentially contested nature. W. B. Gallie presents five criteria that a 
concept should meet to be considered 'contested' and a further two to achieve the status of 
'essentially contested'll. 
Firstly, a concept should be appraisive in character. That 'POMP' and 'POS' and their 
use in this thesis address the nature of the state and party political struggle satisfies this. The 
concept is internally complex; again given the subject that it concerns and the plethora of 
theories about it. The subject matter of the concept satisfies Gallie's requirement to be 
11 Gallie, W. B.: "Philosophy and the Historical Understanding", London, Chatto & Windus, 
1964, pp157-191. 
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'variously describable' without introducing absurdities and admits to occasional (not necessarily 
predictable) modification. The wide canon of theories of the state into which Gamble's concept 
is introduced does not constitute radical confusion, but does necessitate in-built defensiveness 
and aggressive assertion. In other words, whilst asserting the validity of the concept, it would 
be absurd to identity 'POMP' and 'POS' as incontestable or to proceed without appreciation of 
other theories' criteria for assessing the nature of modem democratic states. To be essentially 
contested, a concept must derive from an acknowledged exemplar. Therefore, the underpinning 
of this thesis conforms to that. Furthermore, the use of the original exemplar should enhance it 
and preclude its rejection because it has been proved 'wrong.' Again, the conceptual work in 
this thesis meets these criteria as Gamble's work has been proved useful but neither indisputably 
'right' or 'wrong.' The use of 'POMP' and 'POS' has brought substantial conceptual 
underpinning to this thesis~ thus facilitating consistency of analysis and escape from reliance on 
purely positivistic methodologies. 
In planning and completing my thesis in political science, the nature and time frame of 
the subject in hand answered most of the methodological problems for me. Useful state papers 
would not be available due to the Thirty-Year Rule. Therefore, once a clear hypothesis and 
conceptual underpinning had been established, interviews would have to play a major role in 
gathering data to assess the events of an important era. 
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